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ABSTRACT
"The primacy of Paris inhibits the regional sphere of activity of 
second-ranking French cities. Lyon is particularly disadvantaged in 
that to the west lies the low population density Massif Central, to the 
south is the city-port of Marseille with direct international maritime 
connections, to the east, Grenoble is a dynamic and, to some extent, 
rival pole while to the north-east Geneva has a well-established 
international role. To combat the primacy of Paris, and the 
competition of neighbouring cities, Lyon is justifiably attempting to 
develop an international and trans-national role to enhance its 
economic, political and demographic base".
The objective of this thesis is to test the above hypothesis 
through reference to objective empirical data and subjective 
qualitative methods. An examination of Lyon’s status in the context 
of a theoretical model of an "International City", an empirical ranking 
of 165 European cities and Lyon’s own long-range planning policy 
provide the framework for this study. Lyon’s demographic strength, 
political situation, physical facilitators, (transportation, tourism and 
other infrastructure) and Lyon’s international economic position will 
help place Lyon within the domestic and European urban hierarchy. 
Finally, an examination of Lyon’s relations within the Rhone-Alpes 
Region will provide a clearer picture of Lyon's status and potential 
trans-national role.
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1INTRODUCTION
The author of this thesis is by training a historian and political 
scientist, who has had the opportunity to live, study and travel 
extensively in Europe. As compared with the repetitiveness of 
American city functions and landscapes, the author was aware of the 
specificity of "place" in Western Europe - that is, the immense 
variability of urban characteristics, atmospheres and functions, a 
result at least in part of locational and spatial features frequently 
absent in the United States. In part this reflects the longer and more 
complex history of Europe; but also the fact that to a larger degree 
than in the United States, the evolution of European cities has taken 
place within an international spatial setting. As compared with the 
continental scale of the United States, few major Western European 
cities are located more than 500 kilometres from an international 
boundary. Moreover, since the formation of the European Community 
(EC), these boundaries are becoming increasingly permeable and thus 
new politico-economic spatial systems are evolving. Although not a 
geographer by training, it seemed appropriate to the author that a 
deeper understanding of the spatial implications of European city 
development could best be achieved by researching in the context of a 
geography department and by adopting the integrative approach 
specific to the field of Geography while retaining the virtues of past 
training in the operation of political systems.
Having established the field of inquiry as being the international 
dimension of city development at a time of increasing trans-national 
integration in Western Europe, the question arose of how to define a 
specific project based on the academic resources available at Glasgow 
University. For reasons of prior experience and linguistic competence 
it was clear that it would be rational to select a French perspective. 
Secondly, given the growing links between the Glasgow Geography 
Department and institutes of Higher Education in Lyon and the Rhone- 
Alpes Region, it was logical to select Lyon as a focus of research. 
Moreover, given that these links are still in a developing stage, it was 
hoped that the author could contribute to the partnership rather than 
simply rely on elaborate and long-standing collaboration.
2The choice of Lyon was not, however, simply a matter of 
convenience; but was also conditioned by certain specific features of 
the French national urban hierarchy. Whereas in most Western 
European nations there is a degree of decentralization of political and 
economic power commensurate with city size, in France, history has 
determined that Paris should enjoy a quasi-monopoly in the urban 
hierarchy. Lyon, with all the qualifications of location and hinterland 
to be a major city in the national urban system, finds itself relegated 
to the status of a secondary regional capital, at the head of a regional 
urban hierarchy which it does not entirely dominate. Conversely, no 
provincial city in France has seen its national and international 
transport connections so radically transformed in the last decade. 
Given a location close to three national frontiers (Italy, Switzerland 
and Germany), it is not unrealistic for Lyon to entertain international 
European aspirations as a counter-balance to the overwhelming 
weight of Paris. This, in fact, is the stated aim of the city authorities 
in their strategic planning. This leads the author to state as a 
hypothesis:
"The primacy of Paris inhibits the regional sphere of activity of 
second-ranking French cities. Lyon is particularly 
disadvantaged in that to the west lies the low population 
density Massif Central, to the south is the city-port of Marseille 
with direct international maritime connections, to the east, 
Grenoble is a dynamic and, to some extent, rival pole while to 
the north-east Geneva has a well-established international role. 
To combat the primacy of Paris, and the competition of 
neighbouring cities, Lyon is justifiably attempting to develop an 
international and trans-national role to enhance its economic, 
political and demographic base”.
It is the objective of this thesis to test the above hypothesis by 
reference to objective empirical data and more subjective qualitative 
information. This evidence is evaluated against a conceptual and 
empirical framework which forms the basis of the next chapter. It is 
important to stress what the thesis does not attempt to achieve. The 
thesis does not attempt to model the case of Lyon in any quantitative 
or economic sense. It does, however, aspire to be analytical in the
3sense of establishing the present status, objectives, achievements and 
ambiguities of Lyon’s current situation. The precise methodology is 
indicated in Chapter Two and is pragmatic and eclectic rather than 
concerned with theoretical issues. This approach attempts to blend 
the systematic skills of the political scientist with the spatially 
integrative approach of the geographer. However, this task does 
require a statement of the theoretical and empirical framework upon 
which this thesis is constructed. This framework is presented in 
Chapter One.
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL BASIS
The notion of an "International City" is surrounded by vagueness, 
lack of definition, and a limited amount of empirical research leading to 
definitive results (Bonnafous, 1991). In a world economy which is 
becoming increasingly global, virtually every large city has an 
international dimension. This is far from conferment of the status of 
"International City"; especially in terms of controlling or directing an 
international space.
This chapter aims to clarify the meaning of the term "International 
City" and to introduce the case study which is to be examined in detail, 
the City of Lyon. Accordingly, this chapter reviews, in turn, a largely 
theoretical and exploratory study presented by Panayotis Soldatos 
(Soldatos, 1989) which attempts to define a model of "International" 
status, and an empirical study carried out by DATAR1 and Maison 
RECLUS under the direction of Roger Brunet, applied specifically to 165 
European cities with the aim of producing an international hierarchy 
(Brunet, 1988). Finally, the case of Lyon is introduced as a city which 
aspires to European status. The "Projet de Schema Directeur de 
l'Agglomeration Lyonnaise" report presented by the Syndicat d'Etudes et 
de Programmation de l'Agglomeration Lyonnaise (S.E.P.A.L.) entitled 
LYON 2010: Un Proiet dfAgglomeration pour une Metropole Europeenne. 
illustrates the ambitions of Lyon for the future and assesses Lyon's 
current position in the regional, national, and European context 
(S.E.P.A.L., 1991).
This chapter will provide both a conceptual and empirical context 
as an introduction to an evaluation of Lyon. In addition, the statement of
iDATAR; Delegation a l'Amenagement du Territoire. A state strategic planning 
body established in 1963 to guide policy on regional development matters.
5intent from Lyon establishes a firm foundation upon which to examine in 
detail the feasibility of "Lyon: Metropole Europeenne".
1.1 THE SOLDATOS THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL CITIES
Panayotis Soldatos, Director General of Plnstitut d'Etude des Villes 
Internationales (IEVI-Canada), presents one example of the current 
thoughts, theories, and definitions surrounding the concept of 
"International Cities" in his paper La Nouvelle Generation des Villes 
Internationales dans un Monde Transnationalise (Soldatos, 1989). 
Soldatos asserts that there is no proper definition of what constitutes an 
"International City". Scholars must, he argues, proceed to define the 
concept of an "International City" for two reasons. First, a clear 
conceptual base is needed for theoretical work on "International Cities". 
Second, methodology and policy orientation need to be grounded in a 
solid conceptual framework. Currently, the term "International City" is 
being used politically by urban leaders to create an image and 
atmosphere to support short-range policy making. The political usage of 
this concept does little to help Soldatos and others create the linkages 
and conceptualizations needed by scholars and others to pursue future 
studies in this field.
1.11 CRITERIA FOR INTERNATIONAL STATUS
Despite the evident problems associated with defining exactly what 
constitutes an "International City", Soldatos argues that currently there 
exists a new generation of "International Cities". Throughout history 
there have always been "International Cities", however, in the last 25 
years, a distinctive new style has emerged. Soldatos presents six tables 
of different criteria that are essential to his definition of the new order 
of "International Cities". The first table, entitled "Le Profil International 
Modem des Villes" has 13 criteria. These criteria include such factors as 
geographic location, international services and support, important 
institutions in both the public and private sector, and an active local 
government geared towards facilitating international linkages. This 
provides an overview of the minimum requirements and actors needed
6for International status, but does not give any specifics or details on the 
scope of these factors.
The second table, consisting of 19 criteria, is entitled "Services 
Strategiques de Support dans une Ville Internationale". This is an 
extension of one of the criteria in Table One that states that a high level 
of support services are required for international status. The 
infrastructure of professional services in this table include banking, 
finance, insurance, leisure facilities and a trained workforce. This is a 
section that can be approached in an empirical fashion. A city does, or 
does not, possess these specific support services needed for attracting 
and operating international businesses and institutions. One can 
empirically deduce, to a certain degree, which of these services are 
effective and available at an appropriate scale. For example, the number 
of multi-nationals or corporate headquarters in a city, or the relative 
strength of its banking or insurance sectors, are factors that can be made 
quite clear. One can also effectively compare the rankings of different 
agglomerations in these categories. This service support infrastructure is 
the simplest of the six sectors of the theoretical model to quantify.
The third table concerns "Les Tendances Dominantes de l'Evolution 
de la Nouvelle Generation des Villes Internationales". The common 
factor of all twelve criteria in this table is that they are all conscious 
efforts by city planners to enhance the internationalization of their city. 
Urban marketing, creating an urban network between cities, increasing 
linkages between all public and private sectors including higher 
education and research and development facilities, and increasing the 
level of participation by the local government in actively promoting the 
city in an international context are some of the key criteria of this table. 
The common thread of these factors maintains that all cities are 
attempting to coordinate, on all levels, their approach to improving their 
current status. However, the problem is that the nature of local politics, 
intra-urban relations and public sector-private sector relations is very 
fluid and ever changing. It is a Herculean task to coordinate any of these 
factors for a specific project at a specific point in time. To attempt to 
quantify this over an extended period to draw specific conclusions is
7imaginative indeed. These factors require instead, frequent qualitative 
asssesment within the context of specific projects
The fourth table, "L'Intemationalite des Villes aux Etats-Unis et en 
Europe", is a brief comparison between American and European 
approaches to the criteria set out in Table Three. The broad differences 
in flow control, horizontal versus vertical linkages, and the levels of 
political and private activity in the city's development are discussed.
The approach in the United States is centred towards private institutions 
and investors promoting their city. This system is based strongly upon 
horizontal linkages with the private sector being firmly implanted upon 
the top of the structure. The United States is also perceived as holding 
the advantage in service infrastructure over its European peers. The 
European experience has been more evenly balanced according to 
Soldatos. A vertical linkage has developed between the public and 
private sectors. This has led to a somewhat more advanced role for the 
European urban governments as they have more responsibility in 
promoting all phases of their internationalization than do their 
counterparts in the United States. The consequence of this division in 
Europe is that it requires a higher level of coordination at the local 
political level between numerous political administrations with different 
agendas, thus complicating the task.
The fifth table is concerned with the fourteen criteria that form 
what Soldatos refers to as "Les Principales Fonctions Strategiques 
Recherchees par l'lntemationalisation des Villes". Such criteria as power, 
research and development, production, and international cooperation are 
needed to pursue a genuine international role. The foundation of this 
section of Soldatos' theory is the distinction made between international 
characteristics and international functions. More simply put, between 
power and image. The crux of this section revolves around who controls 
the flow of resources. A powerful city controls the direction of the 
important flows of capital, resources, services and information while a 
less powerful city accepts various flows with few inputs or modifications.
8The sixth and final table that completes the foundation of Soldatos' 
theory on the "New International Cities" is concerned with the "Elements 
Constitutifs d'une Polarisation Spatiale du Deploiement Internationale 
des Villes". These criteria are designed to link the regional, national, and 
international characteristics of an international city into a spatial context. 
Familiar themes of wealth retention, critical mass and an active presence 
in both the regional and national urban networks are reiterated as the 
essential criteria in this section and are expanded into a spatial 
argument.
All of these criteria are broad and many overlap; the crucial point 
being that all cities that strive for an expanded international role must 
provide superior and increasing levels of higher services and resources. 
This phenomenon has been referred to as the rise of the "Generic City" 
(Cheshire, 1990). Also, the local powers that be, either in the public or 
private sector, must strive to actively pursue and coordinate a cohesive 
and aggressive strategy for their city to compete on the international 
stage.
1.12 CRITICAL MASS
An introduction of the currently popular concept of critical mass in 
the context of "International Cities" and the difference between active 
and passive cities will complete the theoretical basis of the Soldatos 
"International City" model. Soldatos and others have attached the 
concept of critical mass to explaining the growth and possible future 
fortunes of cities with international ambitions. Critical mass is the point 
where one has sufficient components and linkages to provide a driving 
force. In the context of a city, once a sufficient number of the criteria 
defined by Soldatos have been achieved to an adequate degree, then the 
growth and expansion of a city becomes a power unto itself. With critical 
mass thus achieved, basic economic, market, and social forces will drive 
the growth of the city regardless of other indicators.
Critical mass must, like everything else, be kept in context. There 
is a different level required and desired at a regional level as opposed to
9an international level. Critical mass for a regional capital is much smaller 
then the critical mass needed to drive a world city. Also, a city need not 
be taken as an individual entity at all times. An alliance between cities 
can prove profitable. The criteria needed for improving a city's status 
could potentially be better met by two or more cities in many cases than 
by a single city. Therefore, an alliance between Lyon and Grenoble, for 
example, could prove highly advantageous for both by achieving critical 
mass through a joint effort rather than wasting time and resources in 
competition.
What critical mass is not is equally important to understand. 
Critical mass is not a set figure or amount that when achieved is 
instantly recognizable and is the key to a prosperous future for a city.
To attempt to quantify all of the elements, intangibles, and criteria that 
make up the elusive critical mass is not possible. The task of empirically 
defining the needed linkages is even more difficult. To further 
complicate matters, it is not unusual to have local politicians telling the 
world that their city has indeed achieved, or is on the verge of achieving, 
critical mass. It is important to realize that because a city's urban 
marketing campaign pronounces that internationalization is eminent 
does not make that fact true. Critical mass is an important yet imprecise 
concept. The theory is sound but much less visible and more difficult to 
judge in this context than in physics.
Tied into the concept of critical mass is the differentiation between 
an active city and a passive city. An active city, according to Soldatos, is 
one that has achieved that elusive critical mass and boasts linkages, both 
horizontal and vertical, between all criteria and institutions. An active 
city is one that is powerful enough to influence and control important 
flows be they economic, political, information based or social. A passive 
city has some of the essential elements and criteria needed to begin 
thinking about international status. However, a passive city will have 
little to no control over vital flows, tending to accept what comes its way 
rather then exporting and influencing their direction. A passive city is 
also characterized by having more regional than international functions.
10
What then can be stated as a theoretical framework for the 
archetypal "International City"? The framework that Soldatos presents 
stresses an advanced degree of infrastructure coupled with strong 
horizontal and vertical linkages between institutions, businesses and 
politicians to coordinate the internationalization and expansion of the 
city. Such a broad yet complex and integrated framework makes 
quantification of specific criteria and concepts difficult and imprecise.
1.2 A EUROPEAN EMPIRICAL STUDY - DATAR-RECLUS
To expand and help illustrate the Soldatos theoretical base, a 
quantitative study designed to rank 165 European cities in hierarchical 
order is examined. The DATAR/RECLUS sponsored project, Les Villes 
Europeennes. was an empirical study that included all cities with a 
population over 200,000 in the twelve European Community countries 
along with those in Switzerland and Austria. The purpose of this study 
was to rank these 165 major European cities into a hierarchical ranking 
based on empirical data (Brunet, 1988).
The methodology used was relatively straight-forward thus 
making the study a solid foundation for ranking and comparing the 
included cities. The project used three criteria for comparing these cities:
1. International Functions
2. Place in New Technologies
3. Demography
These three basic criteria were further divided into sixteen indicators. 
These sixteen indicators divided all 165 cities into either five or six 
categories per indicator, (Table 1.1). All sixteen indicators were then 
judged empirically, factually and qualitatively on both a domestic and 
international scale. Through this methodology, the study was able to 
rank 165 European cities from number 1 (London), to number 165 
(Monchen-Gladbach). One must note that each category has a different 
quantitative value thus the application of the DATAR-RECLUS project is 
of value for comparative purposes.
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TABLE 1.1 
RESULTS OF THE DATAR-RECLUS STUDY
CRITIERIA # LYON PARIS GRENOBLE GENEVA
1 POPULATION 6
_
3 .
1 5 5
2 POPULATION GROWTH 5 3 4 3
3 MULTINATIONALS 6 1 5 4
4 INFRASTRUCTURE
TECHNOPOUTAINES
5
I
1 1 1 4
5 ENGINEERS, MANAGERS 
TECHNICIANS
5
:
„ I,;.,-
1 3 4
6 RESEARCH FUNCTIONS 5
:
2"; 1 2 3
1 UNIVERSITY
FUNCTIONS
6 MNMIMM* 1 3 4
8 FINANCIAL FUNCTIONS 6 lllfflli!
* ;.v  
- - -
' 4-..
2 6 2
9 AIRPORT TRAFFIC 6 1 6 3
10 PORT FUNCTIONS 6 rr. :■ 6 6
11 CULTURAL SPHERE 5 3 1 3 2
12 MARKETS AND SALONS 6 4 1 5 4
13 CONFERENCE CENTRES 6 1 5 2
14 MEDIA 5 1 4 2
15 TELECOMMUNICATIONS 5 1 4 2
16 SPECIALIZATIONS 5 2 1 2 1
Source: Brunet, 1988.
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An examination of Lyon's ranking in the sixteen criteria provides a 
broad idea of the city's strengths and weaknesses.(Table 1.1). Lyon is 
one of eleven cities that ranked in the premier category in respect to its 
"Technopolitaines" infrastructure and activity. In France, Lyon is joined 
in this category by Paris and its Rhone-Alpes neighbour, Grenoble. This 
is, however, the only category in which either Lyon or Grenoble are able 
to break into the premier rank. Lyon complements its strong 
technological base with a solid second rank showing in both its 
professional/white collar workforce and its research capabilities and 
functions. These three criteria are Lyon's strongest scores relative to the 
rest of Europe in the DATAR-RECLUS study. This is a positive indicator 
for Lyon. These are some of the key criteria that help attract and 
maintain new and innovative businesses.
These rankings also illustrate the poor performance of Lyon with 
regard to both Airport Traffic and Conference Centres. Not only is Lyon- 
Satolas International Airport substantially less utilized than the two 
major airports of Paris, as are all French airports, but it also lags 
considerably behind the airports of Geneva, Nice and Marseille. Lyon's 
airport traffic is at a similar level to the airport traffic at Toulouse, 
Aberdeen and Naples.
The state of Lyon's luxury hotel and conference industry reflects a 
lack of the most basic infrastructure. Comparatively, Geneva is a world 
class conference city ranking just behind Paris and London while Lyon is 
of equal status with Angers, Metz and Newcastle. These are obvious 
weaknesses that have a tangible effect on Lyon's ability to increase its 
international role and image.
Lyon is ranked well behind the urban powers of Milan, Frankfurt 
and Barcelona in the DATAR/RECLUS study. However, Lyon is in the 
middle of the next tier of "Eurocities" which includes Glasgow, Geneva 
and Turin. Figure 1.1 illustrates Lyon's relative position within the 
European urban hierarchy and provides a valuable bench-mark for 
placing Lyon within a European context in subsequent chapters.
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FIGURE 1.1 
POINTS RANKING OF NON-CAPrTAL 
"EUROCmES" BY DATAR/RECLUS
GLASGOW
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LYON
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STUTTGART
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FRANKFURT
SOURCE: 
BRUNET, 198a
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For the m ajority of the rem aining criteria Lyon ranks well behind 
Paris ye t a t an  equal or superior level to the o ther French cities. Table
1.1 illustrates w here Lyon ranks criteria by criteria  against Paris, 
Geneva, and  Grenoble. This is to provide some indication of the 
stranglehold  tha t Paris holds on France and  the in terp lay  betw een Lyon 
and  its m ost significant neighbours. The basic flaw of the French urban  
fram ew ork is shown in Table 1.2 by the large gap in  rankings betw een 
Paris and  any o ther French city in  the DATAR/RECLUS study. The 
dom inance of Paris within the French u rban  h ierarchy  is a m ajor 
p roblem  for France and  one that shall be discussed in greater detail in 
subsequen t chapters with particu lar em phasis on its effect on  Lyon's 
in ternational ambitions.
Turning to the final rankings of the 165 cities, it is clear tha t 
London and  Paris are the dom inant cities in  W estern Europe. Lyon 
places in the fourth  level of cities, ranking tw entieth  overall: a  single 
point and  position ahead of Geneva. Lyon is the second ranking French
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city after Paris yet falls well behind its major competitors in the 
"Eurocity" rankings. The major European non-capital cities of Milan, 
Frankfurt, Barcelona, and others all rank clearly ahead of Lyon in this 
study. However, Lyon is close enough to these "Eurocities" to set an 
agenda for the future that will help it to close the gap between itself and 
the other non-capital "Eurocities".
TABLE 1.2
DATAR/RECLUS classification  o f the 32 French agglom erations
stu d ie d
1. Paris
2. None
3. None
4. Lyon
5. Marseille, Strasbourg, Toulouse
6. Lille, Nice, Grenoble, Bordeaux,
Montpellier, Nantes, Rennes
7. Nancy, Rouen, Clermont-Ferrand,
Metz, Orleans, Angers, Reims, Tours
8. St-Etienne, Le Havre, Dijon, Caen,
Amiens, Cannes, Brest, Toulon, 
Valenciennes, Mulhouse, Le Mans, Lens
Source: Brunet, 1988.
Obviously, such a project as the DATAR/RECLUS ranking of 165 
Western European cities has its limitations. There is no international 
accord on definitions and demarcations of cities. To differentiate 
between agglomerations, conurbations, urban regions and city 
boundaries in 14 countries to determine what constitutes a city is not an 
exact science. Another dilemma is the use of certain criteria/indicators 
such as "Technopolitaines". This is a predominandy French concept that
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does not exist or translate well outside of France. Therefore, French 
cities rank quite highly in this category as compared with other 
European cities. Also, the Northern European countries have many of 
their largest and most prestigious Universities in small towns not 
counted in this study. Oxford in England and Heidelberg in Germany are 
but two examples. A third such dilemma is the fact that these indicators 
were judged qualitatively. This is mandatory in any study that attempts 
to rank human habitation. It does, however, always leave the issue of 
ranking cities open-ended.
TABLE 1.3 
L.E.T. "EUROCITY1' RANKINGS
INTERNATIONAL
CITIES
SCORE IN THE PROCESS OF 
INTERNATIONALIZATION
SCORE
LONDON 98 LYON 80
PARIS 98 VIENNA 78
BRUSSELS 96 BERLIN 74
AMSTERDAM 96 ROTTERDAM 68
FRANKFURT 94 STRASBOURG 68
GENEVA 92 ATHENS 62
MILAN 92 HAMBURG 60
BARCELONA 90 COPENHAGEN 56
ROME 86 STOCKHOLM 56
ZURICH 86 DUSSELDORF 54
MADRID 84 TURIN 52
MUNICH 82
Source: Bonnafous and Buisson, 1991.
A study completed by Alain Bonnafous and M A. Buisson at the 
"Laboratoire d'Economie des Transports" (L.E.T.) in Lyon, published in 
April 1991, was entitled A quoi reconnait-on une Ville Internationale? 
Tentative de reponse par consultation d'experts (Methode Delphi). This
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study compares the DATAR/RECLUS results with those of a panel of 
experts using a set questionnaire in ranking the internationalization of 
the leading "Eurocities". The rankings were similar but contained a 
number of interesting differences, (Table 1.3). The Swiss cities of Geneva 
and Zurich were ranked higher by the "expert" panel than by the 
DATAR/RECLUS project, with Geneva ranking as the sixth most 
international city in Western Europe. The Northern Italian cities of Milan 
and Turin were ranked lower by the "expert" panel. While the 
DATAR/RECLUS study ranked Milan third in Europe, the "experts" only 
ranked Milan seventh (Bonnafous and Buisson, 1991).
In this ranking, Lyon is on the verge of international status. Lyon 
is ranked as the thirteenth city in Europe as compared to its twentieth 
place ranking in the DATAR/RECLUS study. Comparing these two studies 
is valuable in determining that the rankings do indeed change depending 
on the specific study undertaken. This comparison also illustrates that, 
according to both studies, Lyon is not yet an "International City" but is 
well positioned to potentially achieve international status in the future. 
This comparison is also useful in that it illustrates that no single study is 
definitive on such a qualitative issue.
For the purposes of this thesis these are valuable empirical studies 
that illustrate the relative rankings of European cities. These are not the 
only studies undertaken to attempt to position the European cities in 
some form of order, but are the most current and topic-specific to this 
thesis. Therefore, these two studies will form the general background 
for our rankings and determinations of status of various European cities. 
These provide a good reference point to illustrate Lyon’s position in the 
European urban hierarchy and to indicate its strong and weak points.
The two rankings show that Lyon is a city that can and should have high 
ambitions for its future. These rankings also illustrate that Lyon is not 
yet a true urban power in Europe and must make a concentrated effort 
to improve its ranking and image or it will be left behind.
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1.3 LYON 2010. THE CITY'S LONG RANGE PLAN
After an examination, by reference to Soldatos, of what in theory 
an "International City" should possess and a recent empirical study that 
actually ranks 165 European cities in a hierarchical order, an 
examination of Lyon's statement of intent for the next 20 years is 
required. LYON 2010: Un Proiet d'Agglomeration pour une Metropole 
Europeenne is a detailed voicing of Lyon's grand ambitions for the next 
two decades. Chapter Four of this report is entitled, "Une Strategie 
Internationale pour Lyon". This chapter clearly spells out Lyon's 
assessment of its current position in the European hierarchy and details 
an ambitious scheme for improving its position as a "Eurocity". This 
study also illustrates that Lyon is well aware of the theoretical study by 
Soldatos and the DATAR/RECLUS project and its results. Many of the 
same concepts and language espoused by the LYON 2010 project is 
similar to the concepts put forward by Soldatos. The need for critical 
mass, increased service infrastructure and control over various 
directional flows is explicitly expressed. The maps used to illustrate the 
DATAR/RECLUS project are used by the LYON 2010 project to illustrate 
its position in Europe and to highlight its strengths and address its 
weaknesses.
This chapter of the LYON 2010 plan begins with an overview of 
Lyon's geographic position, size and ranking within the French urban 
hierarchy along with its stated ambition to be a "Eurocity" by consciously 
improving its level of internationalization. Lyon's geographic position is 
a huge natural asset. Lyon is a traditional gateway between Northern 
and Mediterranean Europe. Lyon visualizes itself as the natural link 
between the industrial north of Italy and the Iberian Peninsula with the 
industrial megacore area of industrial Northern Europe. This crossroads 
position between different yet complementary economic and social areas 
of Europe is vital to Lyon's future growth. Lyon is also situated on the 
main north-south transport axis of the Saone and Rhone river valleys. 
Lyon is planning to utilize its prime geographic location to its best 
advantage in developing a European function in the next two decades.
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Further, Lyon regards itself as the second ranking city in France 
and the only French city with the requirements needed to be a true 
"Eurocity" outside of Paris. Lyon views its demographic size and 
industrial and technological strength, along with its prime geographic 
location and new found proximity to Paris via the TGV (Train a Grande 
Vitesse), as the cornerstones of its claim to be of "European Stature".
Lyon also argues that it does indeed have the superior functions and 
infrastructure needed to be a viable alternative to Paris. This claim will 
be examined in detail in subsequent chapters.
The second of the four foundations that Lyon spells out in its 
proposal is the desire to develop itself as the centre of a European 
transportation/communication network. Lyon views this as a crucial 
step in utilizing its prime geographic location to maximum benefit. Lyon 
envisions itself as having a central crossroads location in the European 
motorway system which would require most north-south overland 
traffic to pass through the Lyon area. Lyon’s port facilities on the Rhone 
and Saone rivers are now able to accommodate 4,500 ton barges. Lyon 
also envisions itself as a centre of any future European wide TGV 
network. A new TGV station at Lyon-Satolas International Airport will 
make this the first airport directly served by the TGV. This, it is thought, 
will increase the image and usage of the airport and reinforce Lyon's 
image as a multi-modal transportation hub for Europe. To complete its 
communication base, Lyon is striving to improve its telecommunication 
network and to establish itself as an important "Teleport".
The third foundation of Lyon's proposition is to achieve 
international status and capability for its urban infrastructure. Lyon 
recognizes that it must improve its high level support infrastructure such 
as banking, insurance, accountancy and other financial services. One 
focus is upon greater decentralization from Paris in both the public and 
private sector. These services must transfer more power and decision­
making responsibilities to the regional level and all must expand their 
international functions. Lyon must also concentrate heavily on the non­
business side of international service functions. As the DATAR/RECLUS 
project illustrated, Lyon is visibly lacking in conference capability and
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lacks the needed business class hotels. The DATAR/RECLUS project also 
showed Lyon’s lack of significant tourist attractions and recognizable 
cultural institutions. There is a recognized need to improve its cultural, 
recreational, educational and other such functions. The vast and rapid 
improvement of these professional and social functions is seen as 
imperative if Lyon is to achieve its stated ambitions.
The final foundation of the internationalization of Lyon in this plan 
is perhaps the vaguest, yet most important to grasp and to apply in a 
tangible fashion. Essentially, it advocates the construction of a tighter 
and more cooperative urban network within the Rhone-Alpes Region 
with Lyon functioning as the regional capital and metropole. Not only 
does this encourage much closer contacts between Lyon - Grenoble - St. 
Etienne, but includes Geneva as well. Lyon considers it vital to be 
acknowledged as the effective rather than nominal capital of the Rhone- 
Alpes Region. Lyon also perceives the promotion of itself as regional 
capital and metropole as being in the best interests of the region through 
increased political and economic coordination and cohesion within 
Rhone-Alpes. A region that is centred around one strong and recognized 
metropole that can speak with one coherent voice will improve the 
overall standing and power of that region. Lastly, Lyon argues that it 
would benefit France as a whole if there was a second grand metropole 
with southern connections to promote the international interests of the 
nation as a whole. Lyon claims that it would be ideally suited to assume 
that position. If Lyon can indeed secure a position as the true capital 
and metropole of the thriving Rhone-Alpes Region, then it will have gone 
a long way towards achieving its international ambitions.
1.4 SUMMARY
This chapter has summarized a theoretical proposal for the 
definition of an "International City", an empirically based study to rank 
165 European cities in hierarchical order pointing out their relative 
strengths and weaknesses, and Lyon’s statement of intent for the next 
twenty years that combines both the theories of Soldatos and the data of 
the DATAR/RECLUS project to mould an operational policy proposal for
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municipal planning. The actual situation of Lyon will now be examined 
and discussed to determine if the reality of Lyon's situation matches its 
current ranking and ambitions for the future.
The notion of the "International City" has a world-wide currency, 
both as a concept and as a basis for action. This is particularly the case 
within Europe, where the process of regional devolution, in turn 
structured around powerful city regions, is beginning to solidify. To 
function efficiently and effectively, such regions seek to gain direct 
international roles, rather than to be dependent on transmission through 
the national capital. Arguably, such a system is evolving spontaneously, 
reflecting the relative strength of the various cities and urbanized 
regions of Europe along with the emergence of the European Community 
as a growing political and administrative force. Equally, it is a field 
where deliberate intervention, be it stated politically, economically, or in 
terms of infrastructure creation, has a vital role to play. The emergence 
of "European" scale city regions is thus a process involving political and 
economic dimensions which need to be coordinated if a coherent strategy 
is to be financed, managed and made operational. It is also an area in 
which myth and reality are commonly blurred, given the determination 
of every major town and city to be considered "European" in function.
The case of France is especially interesting given the long history of 
centralisation and the overwhelming power of Paris at the apex of the 
urban hierarchy. By virtue of their frontier location and historical 
linkages, certain French cities such as Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing and 
Strasbourg may claim a European role . The remaining French cities 
have essentially exercised a purely regional function, relaying the 
commands of Paris to their respective hinterlands. To this may be added 
the major port cities of Marseille, Le Havre-Rouen and to a lesser extent 
Bordeaux, with obvious international trade links (but overseas rather 
than with continental Europe).
The dominance of Paris, which has manifestly attained the "critical 
mass" stage in Soldatos' criteria of "International" scale, has led certain 
French cities to seek a direct European dimension in their functions
L
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rather than to attempt the impossible task of challenging and eroding the 
power of Paris. This involves consolidating direct linkages into European 
spatial systems, acquiring certain higher functions on a European scale 
and striving to attain a "critical mass" at a European if not world level.
This thesis attempts to explore the endeavour on the part of 
France’s second largest city, Lyon. At first sight, Lyon’s excellent location 
and industrial power base would appear to make it a credible candidate. 
Similarly, Lyon’s location within a network of towns which has exhibited 
some of the greatest economic and demographic growth in France , 
suggests that there is sufficient dynamism in the Rhone-Alpes urban 
system to justify an aspiration for "EuroCity" status. The thrust of this 
thesis is that although Lyon may superficially resemble a European scale 
city, the reality exists that it is still far from having reached the first 
rank of non-capital European cities. This view if proved, does however 
provide a bench-mark against which to evaluate Lyon’s metropolitan 
planning strategy. It is conceivable that although Lyon has not yet 
achieved notable European rank, it has embarked on a development path 
which may, in measurable time, result in an enhanced European role.
The terms "International City" and "Eurocity" have been used 
almost interchangeably in this thesis. As stated above (p. 4) virtually 
every large city has an "international" dimension within an increasingly 
global economy. Lyon's efforts to achieve "Eurocity" status thus also 
imply an enhanced role at a scale extending beyond Europe. Conversely, 
the wider Lyon's international prominence, the more credible its role as 
a Eurocity. The distinction between the two terms is therefore semantic 
and a functional separation is not possible. The two terms have been 
employed interchangeably depending on the context concerned and the 
sources utilized. The prime objective is to consider Lyon’s international 
role at a European scale without excluding the wider global context.
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CHAPTER TWO 
METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH
2.1 GENERAL APPROACH
Before turning to the specifics of methodology it is important to 
establish the approach which characterizes this thesis. At the outset, 
two approaches offered themselves. Firstly, a strictly quantitative 
approach, as adopted by the DATAR-RECLUS study ranking 165 
European cities, could have been utilized, involving the acquisition of 
survey data. Secondly, a qualitative approach based on a review of 
policies, opinions and attitudes would have been possible adopting a 
purely "behavioural" philosophical approach. In practice, it was 
considered that the most effective explanatory value would be 
achieved through the combination of both approaches. Thus the 
approach was established as qualitative in nature yet supported in all 
instances by reference to quantitative data and objective facts.
2.2 THE SURVEY APPROACH
Although theoretically possible, given greater time and 
abundant resources, a thesis based exclusively on the accumulation of 
survey data was considered inappropriate. A number of reasons may 
be advanced for a rejection of this method of primary data collection:
1) The scope of the hypothesis was broad by definition. In this 
sense, a single, even multiple surveys, would have been quite 
inadequate to resolve such an open-ended topic.
2) The type of information required covers such a vast spectrum 
that a single or limited constituency of respondents would have 
been ineffective. Similarly, a structured sample, ranging from 
the "man in the street" to the business executive, would have 
been incapable of scientific analysis.
3) The size, structure and complexity of the Lyon agglomeration 
(over 1.2 million inhabitants), implies that it would have been 
impossible to have obtained a valid sample size and structure.
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4) Specific elements, including the planning basis, political 
priorities and regional aspirations are manifestly 
unquantifiable and represent ideas rather than observable facts.
5) The concepts of "Eurocity" and "International City" are in 
themselves ill-defined. It would be extremely difficult to 
conduct sample surveys of a "standard" nature based on a 
common understanding of the proposition.
6) Conducting a survey of the industrial and business sectors of the 
local economy would have raised questions of commercial 
confidentially if they were answered with any degree of 
reliability. This would have inhibited meaningful analysis.
7) The topic implies a regional as well as a local scale centred 
around Lyon. It was practically and logistically impossible to 
conduct, by conventional methods, any form of reliable survey 
based on a significant sample size or of qualified respondents at 
the scale of a region of 5.4 million inhabitants.
8) It was felt that sufficient data existed in the public domain, 
albeit very dispersed and difficult to combine, to arrive at valid 
conclusions that provide a convincing test of the stated 
hypothesis.
2.3 A QUALITATIVE APPROACH
A strictly qualitative approach, based on a subjective analysis of 
published works, planning documents, opinion polls, press opinions, 
political statements or media coverage was considered equally 
unreliable. The scope of the subject and the size of the base 
population implies that an analysis based on surrogate sources 
without objective data as a foundation was also methodologically 
unsound. The task of eliminating political bias or poor information 
would have been virtually impossible. The qualitative approach is 
perhaps better exploited at a lower scale of base population and on 
less abstract issues than the present hypothesis.
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2.4 A COMBINED APPROACH
After considering the above alternatives, a combined approach 
that blended elements of both approaches was indicated. 
Consequently, this thesis adopts as its approach basic qualitative 
methods underpinned in all cases by quantitative objective evidence 
to support the qualitative arguments and conclusions advanced. In 
practice this is "behavioural" in that it examines policies advanced by 
the political and planning elite while concurrently evaluating the 
response of public will as expressed, for example, in key elections. 
Certain facts are readily established, such as transport data, 
demographic characteristics or industrial structure. Other elements, 
planning objectives or regional aspirations, are more difficult to 
measure in a substantive manner. The originality of this thesis is to 
integrate and merge disparate sources of information and surrogate 
data into a convincing statement as to where Lyon actually stands in 
relationship to its stated ambitions of "International" status. The main 
sources of statistical data, together with insights gained by personal 
interview are now summarized.
2.5 STATISTICAL AND PLANNING SOURCES
Access to published statistical data is the least of the problems 
confronting the social science researcher in France. The collection of 
national, regional and local data is entrusted to the Institut National 
de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (INSEE). Based in Paris, 
this government organization also has regional offices, including a 
major bureau in Lyon serving the Rhone-Alpes. Thus, in addition to 
national scale data, notably the National Census, the regional bureaux 
produce regional tabulations and monographs dealing in detail with 
statistical and thematic matters (for example employment and 
housing) which are available for public consultation and purchase.
The author was fortunate in that the summary results of the 1990 
National Census of Population were published early in the period of 
research, although a detailed breakdown at the local level was not 
available immediately.
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The National Census is more than a population enumeration; it 
includes a wide range of socio-economic data down to the local 
(commune) scale, while at the same time aggregating data at a variety 
of larger scales (canton, arrondissement, agglomeration, labour 
catchments, departement and region). The 1990 Census, and, for the 
recording of trends, previous census results, were a primary source of 
demographic data. In addition to the Census volumes, the researchers 
of the regional INSEE conduct "enquetes" (desk studies) and 
"sondages" (sample studies) covering a wide range of socio-economic 
matters, which are referred to in this study.
A valuable and substantial source of statistical data was the 
Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie de Lyon, (C.C.I.L.). The C.C.I.L. is 
a much larger, better financed and more important organization than 
its counterparts in the United Kingdom. The C.C.I.L. is directly 
responsible for financing and managing projects such as the expansion 
of Lyon-Satolas International Airport, operating ports along the Rhone 
river, operating the Ecole Superieur de Commerce and providing data 
and infrastructural help to companies relocating in the area. In sum, 
the C.C.I.L. as an organization is well established as a principal source 
of statistical information as well as infrastructural planning and 
financing, economic performance and other areas of significance in 
Lyon and the surrounding area. The C.C.I.L. maintains a 
documentation service and library in Lyon which was an important 
source of both quantitative data and business reports.
In terms of economic data, the C.C.I.L. and its subsidiary 
l'Agence de Development de la Region Lyonnaise (ADERLY) provided 
copious data on the economic infrastruture of Lyon, the international 
corporations that operate in the area and a singular vision for Lyon’s 
future in their opinion. Since the C.C.I.L. operates the ESC Lyon 
(Graduate Business School) it was possible to access a wide number of 
past and present economic documentation in the ESC Lyon library. All 
documents published by the C.C.I.L. and most other primary data and 
articles/information pertaining to the economic situation in the Lyon 
agglomeration were available in this library.
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The Lyon agglomeration contains a large number of 
organizations that provide information on transportation. The SNCF 
Direction Regionale was a source of information concerning rail 
transportation both within the Lyon area and Lyon’s position within 
the future European TGV system. The Compagnie Nationale du Rhone 
(CNR) and La Direction Departementale de l'Equipment du Rhone 
provided substantial information on the ports of Lyon including the 
amounts and destinations of maritime foreign trade and potential 
future expansions. Lyon-Satolas International Airport provided 
information on its capacity, international passengers and destinations 
along with detailed studies on the impact of the new runway, TGV 
station, cargo areas and terminal redevelopment.
Political and urban planning documents comprised a major 
source of direct information concerning Lyon's current ambitions. The 
Syndicat d'Etudes et de Programmation de 1'Agglomeration Lyonnaise 
(SEPAL) and the Agence d'Urbanisme de la Communaute Urbaine de 
Lyon provided a substantial collection of current data on 
infrastructural projects. The Cite Internationale convention and hotel 
centre, expansion of the metro system with linkages to Eurexpo and 
Lyon-Satolas International Airport, and other such infrastruture 
projects were documented and explained in detail in specific 
publications by these two organizations. Both SEPAL and the Agence 
d'Urbanisme de la Communaute de Lyon had their own documentation 
centre where it was possible to consult and purchase the specific 
plans and ambitions for these and other important infrastrutural 
projects. Additionally, SEPAL produced the LYON 2010 planning 
document (Chapter 1) on the future projects under consideration in 
Lyon and their impact on Lyon's international future. This was a 
primary source of information concerning Lyon's current view of its 
position, international ambitions and specific proposals to achieve its 
international ambitions. Articles related to the LYON 2010 plan were 
another valuable source of information that was obtained through 
SEPAL.
On a more political level, the Prefecture de la Region Rhone- 
Alpes, the Conseil Regional Rhone-Alpes and various departments of 
the Ville de Lyon and the Rhone Departement provided
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documentation on the political agenda of the various political bodies 
that interact within the Lyon agglomeration with regard to specific 
projects and concepts, be it the construction of the Eastern Autoroute 
by-pass or importance of establishing greater regional linkages and 
international functions. The ability to access planning documents and 
policy statements to compare with projects in current or planned 
phases was valuable in discerning fact from wishful thinking along 
with providing a better understanding of the complex interworkings 
of a multi-layered local political system.
The Communaute Urbaine de Lyon (COURLY) consists of the 55 
communes of Lyon and its immediate surrounding area. The offices of 
COURLY provided a wide range of basic data on the day-to-day 
operations of Lyon and these neighbours. Information from bus 
routes to rubbish collection were available through COURLY. More 
significantly, a breakdown of local tax structures, voting patterns and 
other socio-economic indicators concerning the immediate urban area 
of Lyon were available. COURLY is a cornerstone of Lyon’s 
international ambitions (Chapter 4) because it provides a basic 
political linkage of the majority of the Lyon urban area. For example, 
the COURLY, as a political body, had to approve the LYON 2010 plan. 
This was achieved despite numerous political difference, (party 
affiliation, priorities, tax structures, economic needs etc.) between the 
leaders of the 55 communes. Direct access to COURLY data and plans 
provided a better understanding of the degree and level of local co­
operation that exists in Lyon and the amount of co-operation that will 
be needed in the future if Lyon is to achieve its stated ambitions.
With reference to urban redevelopment, the Maison 
d’Amenagement de Gerland provided data and the official policy on 
the ambitious Gerland redevelopment project. This made it possible 
to analyse the official plans for this area and help provide an 
understanding of which sections of this redevelopment plan have 
been delayed or cancelled in the light of recent negative economic 
conditions. The Association Rhone-Alpes pour l'lnnovation Urbaine et 
de Developpement Local (INUDEL) provided information on urban 
planning in other cities within the Rhone-Alpes Region. Data on the 
economic and infrastrutural expansion of Annecy, Chambery, Valence
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and Grenoble were available. Additionally, INUDEL explored the 
connections between Lyon and the other major urban areas within the 
Rhone-Alpes Region including the often neglected southern areas of 
the region.
The publications of the Delegation a l'Amenagement du 
Territoire (DATAR), the State strategic planning agency, provided a 
contextual reference to long range policies on the organization of the 
French national space. For example, information on New-Town 
developments such as l'lsle d'Abeau, and the planning strategies of les 
Metropoles d'Equilibre were obtained through DATAR. DATAR 
documentation was distributed in Lyon through the office of La 
Documentation Frangaise in La Part Dieu. A visit was also paid to the 
main DATAR office and documentation centre in Paris.
2.6 ACADEMIC LITERATURE
In addition to private sector and government sources, this thesis 
draws on a large volume of published work in academic books, 
journals and monographs. A vital access for such sources was the 
Laboratoire de Geographie Rhodanienne, a documentary library and 
database located in the Institut de Geographie at the Universite de 
Lyon in. The regional geographical journal, the Revue de Geographie 
de Lvon. as well as its sister review, the Revue de Geographie Alpine 
at Grenoble, offered fundamental sources covering a wide range of 
academic issues concerning Lyon, Grenoble and the entire Rhone- 
Alpes Region. Another advantage to these publications was that they 
provided the ability to trace the evolution of certain concepts and 
projects over an extended period of time. Such issues as Lyon's 
locational advantage, Lyon's position within the national and European 
urban hierarchy, the domination of Lyon by Paris and the role of local 
government are all given a broader historical perspective.
The Laboratoire d'Economie des Transports (L.E.T.), located in 
Lyon, was the prime source of information relating to transport and 
complemented the raw data provided by the C.C.I.L. L.E.T. provided 
detailed academic papers, programmes and analysis of the 
transportation infrastructure of Lyon. This included the importance
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of Lyon’s location and a number of commissioned studies on the 
future impact of Lyon's advantageous position and the methods of 
optimal utilization of location. Details on autoroute, aviation, fluvial 
and rail transportation along with a variety of academic and 
professional opinions (often in disagreement) added to an 
appreciation of the key role that transport will continue to play in 
Lyon’s future. Additionally, L.E.T. offered economic data and 
academic interpretation concerning Lyon and a wide variety of in- 
house publications unavailable elsewhere.
Other academic sources consulted were provided by: the Centre 
de Documentation et de Recherche Europeenne (CDRE) at the 
Universite de Lyon III, the Centre de Recherche sur la Politique,
1'Administration et Territoire (CERAT) at the Universite de Grenoble 
II, the Centre Universitaire de Recherche Europeenne et 
Internationale (CUREI) at the Universite de Grenoble n. These 
institutions provided valuable data and information specifically in the 
form of a series of five reports entitled Rhone Alpes dans l’Espace 
Europeen. Additionally, the numerous and very useful documents 
written by Pierre Kukawka on the relationship of the Rhone-Alpes 
Region with the rest of Europe and Lyon's relationship with its 
regional neighbours were published through CERAT. These were 
documents that were impossible to obtain except on location. A visit 
to the library of the Department of Geography at the University of 
Grenoble also provided useful information on the current situation of 
Grenoble, its future plans, and its relationship with Lyon.
Finally, the European Documentation Centre at the University of 
Glasgow, an official repository of European Community documents, 
was helpful in providing basic data on the Rhone-Alpes Region.
2.7 PERSONAL INQUIRY AND INTERVIEW
Direct interview has proved valuable in this study as an aid to 
the interpretation and analysis of the data cited above. This method 
is valuable provided that certain controls are adopted as follows:
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1. The interlocutor should be expert, experienced and willing to 
devote time to serious questioning.
2. The range of interlocutors should be varied in terms of 
position of responsibility, political allegiance and 
organizational connection in order to gain a cross-check on 
views.
3. An "informal" interview is preferable to a questionnaire 
approach in terms of eliciting in depth responses.
In relation to the above criteria, (a modified Delphi Method), a 
number of individuals were contacted. In academic fields, a number 
of persons were contacted because of their experience in either a 
specific area or city. Jacques Bonnet and Paul Mingret at the 
Universite de Lyon III, and J. Bethemont at the Universite de St. 
Etienne, offered critical views concerning the position and strategy of 
Lyon in both a local and international context. Their long professional 
interest and research into Lyon?s status along with their own views of 
Lyon’s international future were instructive. Emmanuelle Sabot, with 
connections at universities in both Lyon and St. Etienne, provided 
additional first hand judgements on the current situation of both 
cities.
Pierre Kukakwa at the Centre de Recherche sur la Politique, 
lfAdministration et Territoire (CERAT) at the Universite de Grenoble 
shared valuable insight into the issues of regional co-operation 
between various regional agglomerations and Lyon, the status of 
Geneva and the potential for the Rhone-Alpes Region to play a larger 
role within a Europe of regions. The chance to discuss specific areas 
and the overall concept of my project with local experts provided a 
valuable sounding-board. This helped maintain perspective and 
clarify the process and direction of research.
In was also necessary to conduct personal inquiries with non- 
academic persons. Discussions and interviews with persons concerned 
with the operational end of matters was helpful in obtaining a better 
understanding of the workings of Lyon. Discussions with the Head of
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Documentation at the C.C.I.L. provided details on the operational 
mandate of the C.C.I.L., its role within the agglomeration, how it is 
financed and information on the types of material available through 
the C.C.I.L. documentation service.
Discussions with public relations officials at Lyon-Satolas 
International Airport, SNCF-TGV office in La Part Dieu, and the SEPAL 
office provided insight into the transport issues facing Lyon. Two 
discussions with a functionary at the mayor’s office in Lyon served to 
reinforce the official political position on the importance of Lyon 
becoming an International City.
I attended a number of political rallies in the week immediately 
preceding the Regional Elections of 1992. By attending these rallies, 
the largest of which was an anti-F.N. rally, I was able to draw certain 
basic conclusions concerning these elections (Chapter 4) that were 
subsequently enhanced by the voting results and the various exit 
polls in local newspapers and national magazines. In brief, these 
elections revolved around national issues, primarily the rise of the 
F.N. as a political organization. Regional issues and the concept of 
"Europe" were absent from the campaign.
Finally, I had numerous discussions with the "man on the 
street". French and international students at ESC Lyon, fellow bus 
commuters, cafe patrons, political campaigners and a variety of other 
persons. Unscientific as this may appear, the views of a cross-section 
of persons in Lyon on the issues of Lyon's future position and status, 
economy, and political leaders is an important reality check in that it 
confirms certain issues and refutes others. For example, the image of 
Mayor Michel Noir as the dynamic leader of Lyon is currently mocked 
by the citizens of Lyon because of his legal problems. This bit of 
reality will not be found in the official documents published by the 
city of Lyon. Informal discussions with a wide range of locals also 
imparts a flavour of the people, the city and the area that is 
impossible to obtain if one is not on location and has been a useful 
factor in my study of Lyon.
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2.8 THE MEDIA
By definition, the media seek to express matters of interest to 
the public and in the case of regional newspapers, radio and 
television, to raise matters of local significance. During the periods of 
residence in Lyon, a systematic appraisal was made of the media to 
evaluate regional interest in European matters and to monitor 
editorial comments and reports of speeches by public figures 
concerning Lyon and Europe. The author was present in Lyon during 
the Regional Elections of March 1992 specifically to monitor the 
interest, or lack of, in European matters during the campaign and 
subsequent voting.
The three main types of media that were utilized during the 
course of this project were, daily newspapers, specialized magazines 
and publications, and the radio and T.V. broadcasts. The local papers 
of Lyon were consulted daily during periods of research in Lyon. 
These publications included: Le Progres, Lyon Liberation, Le 
Dauphine Libere, Le Monde (Rhone Alpes edition), Le Figaro (Rhone- 
Alpes edition - especially the Economic supplement every Monday). 
Additionally, the national issues of Le Monde and Le Figaro were 
consistently consulted while in Glasgow. These sources were 
indispensable for extracting the results of the Regional Elections and 
the Maastricht referendum. The above newspapers were a valuable 
medium in terms of monitoring social, economic and political events in 
the city and region as well as public reaction.
France produces a large quantity of quality weekly and monthly 
magazines dealing with industry, business and French politics. These, 
including back editions, were consulted in the libraries of both L.E.T. 
and ESC Lyon. The most useful of these specialized magazines were: 
LTExpansion. La Vie Industrielle. Valeurs Actuelles. L'Activite 
Economique. Science et Vie. Le Point, and LTEvenement These 
publications were useful in providing large scale surveys, opinion 
polls on both economic and political issues, and questionnaires of 
business and government executives on issues such as 
internationalization, regional perceptions and urban rankings.
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Radio and television is the manner in which the majority of 
France obtains its news. These forms of media do not present a 
detailed or academic examination of an issue yet they provide a 
valuable insight into the opinions and attitudes of the city and 
country as a whole. Local radio was especially valuable in 
determining political motivation during the Regional elections of 1992. 
"Call in" radio programmes, official press announcements and 
candidate debates helped clarify issues of the French political process 
and complemented press reports.
2.9 PROCESS OF ANALYSIS
The analytical process adopted in this thesis is inferential. 
However, inference was based wherever possible on quantified data. 
In this sense, as inferential analysis is cumulative; final judgements, 
however subjective, are based on an accumulation of objective and 
measurable fact to support and validate qualitative opinions. In order 
to establish a valid process of analysis, the thesis was divided into 
three sections each with its own internal logic.
Part One is explicitly contextual and attempts nothing more. A 
statement of three contexts was proposed as a basis for examining the 
central hypothesis. The Soldatos model was adopted as a working 
theory. Other literature on the international city was considered, but 
the Soldatos model was adopted as offering certain key notions which 
appeared a priori to be particularly appropriate to the case of Lyon. 
These were "critical mass", "synergy" between sections of the economy 
and the notion of a "threshold" necessary to attain international 
status. Each chapter refers back to these key concepts. Secondly, 
reference is consistently made to the DATAR - RECLUS study. This 
study simply ranks Lyon in relation to other European cities, whereas 
this thesis explores the detailed criteria underlying the status of Lyon. 
Thirdly, the thesis recognises that a key element is the attitude 
adopted by the city in relation to its strategic planning. Consequently 
the plan for LYON 2010 is considered to be a key reference point for 
analysis.
\
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The analysis adopted is reflected in the basic structure of the 
thesis. Part One, in addition to establishing the conceptual basis and 
methodology, examines the demographic context and the political 
framework. The demographic basis is particularly crucial since a city 
lacking demographic dynamism would scarcely be a credible 
candidate for International City status. In spite of a general trend in 
France towards counterurbanization, Lyon, and most of the urban 
centres of the Rhone-Alpes display a positive demographic balance. 
Secondly, Chapter Four identifies the political will as a major factor in 
a European future. After an analysis of the local and regional political 
structures, this chapter exploits the results of the Regional elections 
and the Maastricht referendum as quantitative sources of information 
on European sentiment. These two chapters serve as a benchmark, 
establishing the demographic power of Lyon, with implications for 
market power and labour supply, and its political power to direct 
these human resources towards a European future. The method of 
analysis adopted in Part One is primarily quantitative.
Part Two constitutes the majority of the original analysis in the 
thesis. This section attempts to establish those aspects of 
contemporary Lyon which may be regarded as facilitators towards 
achieving European status. Specifically, the transport infrastructure is 
regarded as being of international class, whereas the financial, 
commercial and hotel sectors are identified as falling short of 
European-scale status. The internationalization of the urban economy 
is examined by sector, including the education, diplomatic and media 
activities. Again, quantitative data is presented to adduce qualitative 
conclusions.
Part Three involves a change of scale from the agglomeration to 
the region. In particular an effort is made to evaluate the attempt of 
Lyon to enhance its international status by creating poly-nuclear 
structures to increase critical mass and synergy. It is clear that this 
objective lies within the realm of aspiration rather than reality. 
Accordingly, the analysis is qualitative rather than quantitative.
In summary, the analysis is not based on a positivist approach 
in the sense that every aspect is subjected to some form of empirical
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data analysis. Nor is the analysis entirely qualitative, since wherever 
possible quantitative data has been used to support the arguments 
adduced. The mode of analysis adopted has thus been essentially 
pragmatic; qualitative and behaviourist analysis have been supported 
by objective and quantitative data. Where analysis has involved 
informed speculation rather than objectively established fact, this has 
been openly admitted.
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE DEMOGRAPHIC BASIS
The 1990 French census enumerated 56,614,493 people in 
metropolitan France. This represents a total increase of 2.3 million 
people from the 1982 census. During the years between 1982 and 
1990, France experienced a 0.5% annual population growth. This is a 
healthy increase from the 0.2% annual increase recorded between 
1975 and 1982 (INSEE. Recensements. 1991). Historically, population 
has always been of concern to the French. During the later years of 
the nineteenth century and the first half of this century, the slow 
population growth in France led to a great deal of political anxiety.
The end of the Second World War in 1945 set off a population 
growth of a proportion unseen in modem French history. The 
"Glorious Thirty" years between 1945 and 1975 saw a rapid 
expansion of French population, economy and living standards.
During these years population remained an important issue (House, 
1978). The rural exodus led to a depopulation of the countryside and 
a vast increase in the population of the major urban centres (Labasse, 
1978). The repatriation of French Algerians in the 1960's (McDonald, 
1969) and the current dilemma over official and illegal foreign 
immigration have kept the issue of population in the forefront of the 
French national consciousness.
Population also plays a significant role in the ranking and 
stature of any city claiming to have international status. Both the 
theoretical model of Soldatos and the DATAR/RECLUS project's 
evaluation of a city's suitability for international status begin with an 
examination of population size. Population is the first true test of a 
city's position, is easily visible, quantifiable and is undeniably critical 
to a city's position and capacities. Population is important in 
developing the critical mass required to present the facilities, services 
and urban environment needed to enable a city to claim international 
standing. This chapter will examine in detail the population of Lyon 
and the administrative areas that are inter-connected with Lyon. 
These administrative areas include the Rhone-Alpes Region, the eight 
departements within the Rhone-Alpes Region, and the local urban
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agglomerations including the distinction between the actual cities and 
the total agglomerations as well as other administrative units specific 
to the Lyon area. This will provide a basis from which to view Lyon's 
position and potential and will be examined first to provide a spatial 
and demographic context to future discussions of Lyon and its 
international ambitions.
3.1 REGIONAL POPULATION GROWTH
The Rhone-Alpes Region had a population of 5,350,701 
according to the 1990 census. This places the Rhone-Alpes Region 
clearly ahead of all other French regions in population size except for 
Ile-de-France (Table 3.1). Ile-de-France has a population of 
10,660,554, almost exactly double that of the Rhone-Alpes. The third 
largest region demographically is Rhone-Alpes1 southern neighbour, 
Provence-Alpes-Cote d'Azur, with a 1990 population total of 
4,257,907, over a million people less than Rhone-Alpes (INSEE 
Premiere, No 82, Juin, 1990).
Rhone-Alpes is not only the second largest region in France in 
terms of sheer numbers but also has one of the highest annual growth 
rates of any French region both today and since 1962. During the last 
inter-censal period, the Rhone-Alpes Region enjoyed an annual 
growth rate of 0.8%, well above the 0.5% national average (Figure 3.1). 
Rhone-Alpes was the third fastest growing region behind the sunbelt 
regions of Languedoc-Roussillon with a 1.14% annual growth rate and 
Provence-Alpes-Cote d'Azur with a 0.9% annual growth rate (Jones, 
1991). Such positive demographic dynamism is one of the criteria 
stressed as mandatory by every study on regional potential. This 
places Rhone-Alpes in a strong position vis-a-vis the most dynamic 
European regions with which Rhone-Alpes hopes to participate as a 
partner in the future post-1993 Europe.
Since 1936 only seven out of the twenty two regions have 
increased their overall percentage of the national population. In that 
time Rhone-Alpes has increased its share of the national population 
from 8.63% to 9.45%. Although this is substantially behind the 
massive 18.83% of the population claimed by Ile-de-France it still
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Table 3.1
Regional Demographic Trends, 1982-1990.
REGIONS Percentage Change Net change Total
______________ Nat Mig Total Nat Mig Total 1990
Languedoc-Rousillon 0.07 1.10 1.17 12 176 188 2.115
P.A.C.A. 0.22 0.67 0.89 71 222 293 4.258
R h o n e -A ln e s 0.52 0 .29 0.81 217 118 335 5.351
Ile-de-France 0.77 -0.06 0.71 636 -49 587 10.661
Aauitaine 0.05 0.59 0.64 10 129 139 2.796
Haute-Normandie 0.63 -0.03 0.60 86 -4 82 1.737
Centre 0.27 0.31 0.58 49 58 107 2.371
M idi-Pvrenees 0.01 0.55 0.56 2 103 105 2.431
Pavs-de-la-Loire (149 0.05 0.54 117 12 129 3.059
Picardie 0.52 -0.02 0.50 73 -3 70 1.811
Corse 0.08 0.41 0.49 2 8 10 .250
Alsace 0.46 0.00 0.46 58 0 58 1.624
Bretagne 0.22 0.18 0.40 48 40 88 2.796
Basse-Normandie 0.45 -0.08 0.37 50 -10 40 1.391
Poitou-Charentes 0.12 0.09 (121 15 12 27 1.595
Franche-Comte (148 -0.33 0.15 42 -29 13 1.097
Bourgogne 0.13 -0.02 0.1 1 17 14 1.610
Nord-Pas-de-Calais 0.64 -0.54 (110 202 -170 32 3.965
ChamDagne-Ardenne 0.48 -0.46 0.02 52 -50 2 1.348
Lorraine 0.50 -0.58 -0.08 93 -107 -14 2.306
A u v e r g n e -0.07 -0.04 a \  | i -4 -11 1.321
Limousin -0.39 0.15 -0.24 -23 9 -14 .723
Source: INSEE, Recensement, 1990.
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TABLE 3.2
REGIONAL ANNUAL POPULATION CHANGE BY PERCENTAGE
REGIONS 1982-90 1968-75
1975-82 1962-68
Languedoc-Rousillon 1.14 1.05 0.69 1.57
P.A.C.A. 0.90 1.08 1.58 2.67
R h o n e -A lp e s 0.79 0 .69 1.12 1.62
Ile-de-France 0.70 0.28 0.95 1.48
Aauitaine 0.63 (158 0.52 1.04
Haute-Normandie 0.60 0.52 0.92 1.16
Centre 0.57 0.72 1.13 1.15
M idi-Pvrenees (154 0.35 0.54 0.98
Pavs-de-la-Loire 0.53 0.82 0.99 0.80
Picardie 0.49 0.51 0.89 1.07
Alsace (144 0.45 1.03 1.16
Bretagne 0.39 0.60 0.72 0.49
Basse-Normandie 0.36 0.48 0.52 0.71
Poitou-Charen tes 0.21 0.37 0.45 0.34
Franche-Comte (115 (132 0.95 1.12
Bourgogne (110 (123 0.64 0.72
Nord-Pas-de-Calais (109 (107 (136 0.70
Champagne-Ardenne (1M (110 0.63 0.99
Lorraine -0.09 -0.07 0.35 0.60
A uvergne -0.14 (102 (120 0.50
Limousin -0.23 -O.03 0.05 0.05
Source: INSEE, Recensement, 1990.
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ranks Rhone-Alpes as the second most populous region in France in 
overall percentage ahead of the 7.52% of the population claimed by 
Provence-Alpes-Cote d'Azur (INSEE Premiere. No 82, Juin, 1990).
Through examining the regional population trends (Tables 3.1 
and 3.2) one finds that the Massif Central regions of Auvergne and 
Limousin are still the weakest regions demographically. Both lost 
population again during the 1982-1990 period and between the two 
constitute only 3.61% of the national population. The north east 
industrial regions of Lorraine, Champagne-Ardenne, and Nord-Pas-de- 
Calais also show poor demographic trends with Lorraine losing 14,000 
people between 1982 and 1990. All three have substantially reduced 
their share of the national population with Nord-Pas-de-Calais 
showing the greatest decline since 1962 dropping from 7.88% to 7.0% 
of the national population (INSEE Premiere. No 82, Juin, 1990). These 
older heavily industrialized regions are experiencing serious problems 
in restructuring their economies away from large scale industries such 
as coal and steel production to the smaller more technologically 
advanced industries (Tuppen, 1983). These regions are losing 
population to the rapidly expanding regions of the south of which 
Rhone-Alpes is a major component (Scargill, 1991).
Overall, the Rhone-Alpes Region accounted for 15% of the total 
population growth in France between 1982 and 1990. This is divided 
into an annual natural growth of 0.5% and an annual positive 
migration rate of 0.3%. Thus, Rhone-Alpes is the second most 
populous region in France and one of the fastest growing. This is an 
important basis for the region's, and Lyon's, ambitious plans for a 
European future. However, Rhone-Alpes still has a significantly 
smaller population than some rival European regions. Lombardy and 
Baden-Wurttemberg both have populations in excess of nine million 
and all of the inherent strengths and critical mass that accompany 
such a significant population. Rhone-Alpes must therefore make full 
use of its other resources and advantages in order to compete in the 
European regional framework.
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3.2  POPULATION TRENDS AT THE DEPARTEMENT LEVEL
Examination of the population trends in the Rhone-Alpes Region 
at the departement level reveals that all eight departements (Ain, 
Ardeche, Drome, Isere, Loire, Rhone, Savoie, and Haute-Savoie) have 
experienced a population increase between 1982 and 1990 (Figure 
3.2). The strongest growth is seen in the Haute-Savoie and the Ain 
departements, especially in the cantons closest to Geneva. The 
weakest departement demographically over the past fifteen years has 
been the Loire which has experienced a net population gain of only 
3,900 since 1975 (INSEE. Points d'appui pour l'economie Rhone-Alpes. 
No 61-62, Mars, 1991).
The Haute-Savoie and the Ain departements have recently 
enjoyed the highest rate of population growth in the Rhone-Alpes 
Region. Between 1975 and 1990 the Haute-Savoie increased its 
population from 446,000 to 568,000, an increase of 122,000 or 27% 
over those fifteen years (INSEE. Points d'appui pour l'economie Rhone- 
Alpes. No 61-62, Mars, 1991). Since 1982, the Haute-Savoie has 
enjoyed an annual growth rate of 1.7% and the Ain a 1.5% increase 
(Figure 3.3). A major impetus for such high annual growth rates has 
been the proximity of the Swiss city/canton of Geneva. Geneva is 
indisputably the economic driving force in this area and exerts a 
much greater economic influence in this section of the Rhone-Alpes 
than does Lyon, as will be discussed later.
The Departement of Rhone, of which Lyon is the capital, had a 
0.5% annual growth rate between 1982 and 1990 corresponding to 
the national average. Examination of Figure 3.4 illustrates basic 
population trends at the departement level in the region. The three 
western departements of Rhone, Ardeche, and Loire have the region’s 
lowest growth totals of under 0.6% annually. The three departements 
to the southeast - Drome, Isere, and Savoie - have a stronger 
population growth rate, between 0.6% and 1.0% annually. The 
northern departements of Ain and Haute-Savoie have, as shown, the 
strongest demographic growth with annual increases of over 1.5%.
The fastest growing cantons in these departements, those closest to
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Geneva, have a growth rate of over 3.5% (INSEE. Points d'appui pour 
l'economie Rhone-Alpes. No 61-62, Mars, 1991).
The eight departements of the Rhone-Alpes have experienced 
vastly different population evolutions due to different levels of 
natural growth and migration. Rhone, Haute-Savoie, and Isere 
exhibited the strongest natural growth trends during the past census 
(Figure 3.5). Ardeche, which lost population between 1975 and 1982 
due to natural causes, (the only departement in the region to have a 
negative natural growth rate during this time), improved during the 
past census period to break even in natural population evolution. The 
rest of the region's departements have experienced modest natural 
growth during the last census period (INSEE. Recensements. 1990).
Looking at the evolution of the departement's population due to 
migration shows a number of interesting trends, (Figure 3.6). Both 
Rhone and Loire exhibited negative migratory trends over the past 
two census periods. The rate of loss was less during the 1982-1990 
period than it was during the 1975-1982 period. This reflects an 
overall improvement in national demographic trends in addition to 
the reduced effects of counter-urbanization. Haute-Savoie and Ain 
showed the greatest population gains through migration during the 
past census with Haute-Savoie registering gains of over 1% annually. 
This confirms that these two departements are the most attractive in 
the region with the bulk of this migration focused, yet again, on those 
cantons closest to Geneva (INSEE. Points d'appui pour reconomie 
Rhone-Alpes. No 61-62, Mars, 1991).
3.3 POPULATION TRENDS IN THE MAJOR AGGLOMERATIONS
The six major agglomerations of the Rhone-Alpes Region that 
encompass over 100,000 inhabitants are, in demographic order, Lyon, 
Grenoble, St. Etienne, Annecy, Valence, and Chambery (Figure 3.7). 
These six agglomerations, consisting of 164 communes, account for 
43% of the region's population. These agglomerations, however, have 
not shared the same demographic experience over the past fifteen 
years (Figure 3.8).
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FIGURE 3.7 
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FIGURE 3.8
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As in the previous census, Annecy (Haute-Savoie) and  
C ham bery (Savoie) were the fastest growing agglom erations in  the 
Rhone-Alpes. Annecy experienced an annual growth ra te  of 1.1% 
during  the years 1982 to 1990. This was far an d  aw ay the strongest 
growth ra te  in the region. Chambery, whose grow th ra te  has slowed, 
still enjoyed a strong 0.7% annual population increase betw een 1982 
an d  1990. These two m edium -sized Savoyard agglom erations rem ain  
am ong the fastest growing agglom erations in France (Figure 3.9).
An exam ination of the difference between n a tu ra l and  
m igrato ry  population evolution over the past fifteen years is 
instructive (Figure 3.10). Every m ajor agglom eration in  the region 
showed, as expected, a natu ra l population gain over the past two 
census periods. Annecy and Chambery are the only regional 
agglom erations to also show a population increase due to m igration. 
This fu rth e r illustrates the high level of attractiv ity  of these two 
Savoyard agglom erations. Very few agglom erations in France actually  
increased their population through m igration over the  past census 
period  thus making the gains of these two agglom erations even m ore 
im pressive (Scargill, 1991).
FIGURE 3 .10
COMPARATIVE ANNUAL POPULATION CHANGE IN 
AGGLOMERATIONS THROUGH MIGRATION AND NATURAL CAUSES
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Grenoble and St. Etienne are the second tier agglomerations in 
the Rhone-Alpes Region with populations of 400,000 and 314,000 
respectively. These cities may be of comparable size but are 
profoundly different and have been heading in opposite directions. 
These two agglomerations form the second tier of the region's urban 
hierarchy behind Lyon and ahead of the fast growing medium-sized 
Savoyard agglomerations of Annecy, Chambery, and Annemasse. 
Valence is the final medium sized agglomeration in the region's 
hierarchy and continues to show modest population gains (INSEE. 
Recensements. 1990).
The agglomeration of Grenoble saw an annual population 
increase of 0.3% during the previous inter-censal period (INSEE 
Premiere. No 111, Novembre, 1990). This added 8,000 people to 
France's tenth largest agglomeration. Grenoble, the historical capital 
of the Dauphine area, has been the single fastest growing 
agglomeration in France since 1806. Grenoble has grown from the 
29th largest agglomeration in France in 1806 to the 10th most 
populated one in 1990. The population has grown from 22,100 to 
400,000. It’s combination of an attractive location, high technology 
industries and a large university sector has made Grenoble a young, 
educated and successful agglomeration which continues to attract 
numerous migrants (Boyer, 1987).
St. Etienne, despite having lost over 3,000 people since 1982 has 
grounds for optimism. Between 1975 and 1982 St. Etienne had an 
annual population loss of -0.8%, a total loss of 17,500 people. Between 
1982 and 1990 the loss of population slowed to a loss of -0.1% per 
year so that in 1990, St Etienne had a population of 314,000 (INSEE 
Premiere. No 111, Novembre 1990). This is a hopeful sign that the 
capital of the Loire has seen the worst of its demographic problems.
St. Etienne is an industrial city that enjoyed its boom years during 
France's industrial revolution. Coal mining, ore and steel production 
were the backbone of its economy. In recent decades, much like 
North Eastern France, St. Etienne has been in the midst of a major 
economic slump and demographic loss owing to the redundancy of its 
major industries.
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In discussing the population of Lyon one must distinguish 
between the city itself and the agglomeration as a whole. The city of 
Lyon grew at a modest annual rate of 0.1% between 1982 and 1990 to 
a total of 415,000 residents. This modest increase is a welcome 
change from the -1.4% annual demographic loss experienced by the 
city between 1975 and 1982 (INSEE Premiere. No 111, Novembre
1990). This is reflective of a national trend of a slower exodus if not 
minor growth in major urban centres. With certain exceptions such as 
Marseille, the massive urban flights of the seventies and early 
eighties has been, at least temporarily, slowed if not stopped (Scargill,
1991).
The agglomeration of Lyon has shown a strong 0.4% annual 
increase during the current census to attain a population of 1,262,000. 
After stagnating with a zero growth rate between 1975 and 1982 the 
addition of almost 40,000 residents to the agglomeration since 1982 is 
an encouraging trend. For the first time in recent memory the Lyon 
agglomeration grew at a faster annual rate than did the agglomeration 
of Grenoble. Examining the population growth of the various spatial 
units that make up the greater Lyon agglomeration; The City of Lyon, 
The Communaute Urbaine de Lyon (COURLY), The Rhone Departement, 
and The Region Urbaine de Lyon (RUL), illustrate the exact nature of 
Lyon’s recent demograpic situation (Figure 3.11).
The 1990 census showed for all of these four spatial units an 
overall population growth. The evolution of the total population 
(Figure 3.12) shows a distinct pattern. The population grew at a 
faster rate with distance from the city centre of Lyon. The City of 
Lyon showed the least favourable demographic trends followed by 
the COURLY, the Departement of Rhone, and the RUL. All four of these 
spatial areas showed an improvement in demographic growth from 
the 1975-1982 census to the recent 1982-1990 census. During the 
1975-1982 census both the City of Lyon and the COURLY had an 
annual population decline (Figure 3.13). Both have recovered to 
record positive demographic gains during the eighties. The 
departement of Rhone and the RUL both substantially increased their 
demographic growth during the years 1982-1990 as compared with
FIGURE 3.11 
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FIGURE 3.12
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the years 1975-1982 (Reperes et Tendances Econom iques. Janvier,
1991).
These dem ographic figures need to be broken dow n into natu ra l 
dem ographic change and m igratory dem ographic change (Figure 3.14). 
All fo u r of these spatial areas showed positive n a tu ra l dem ographic 
gains over the past two census readings and  all im proved the ir 
n a tu ra l gains during the m ost recent census period. However, all 
show ed a negative m igratory  dem ographic change betw een 1982 and  
1990 except for the RUL which registered a 1.3% annua l growth for 
im m igration. The central u rban  zones of the agglom eration are still 
losing population due to migration. The ra te  of decline in the City of 
Lyon has slowed from  -1.73 per year betw een 1975 -1982 to -0.38 
during  the recent census. This is a  positive sign concerning the health  
and  dynam ism  of the centre of the agglom eration. T hat the overall 
RUL gained people in both  natural and  m igratory term s is ano ther 
positive dem ographic factor in Lyon’s bid for in ternational status.
FIGURE 3 .1 4
EVOLUTION OF NATURAL AND MIGRATORY POPULATION 
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After exam ining the six Rhone-Alpes agglom erations of over
100,000 the case of Geneva and  the French section of the Geneva 
conurbation need consideration. The agglom eration of Geneva in
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Switzerland is comprised of 45 communes with a population of
391,000 (Service Cantonal de Statistique. Janvier 1, 1990). The 
French section of what is referred to as the Geneva-Annemasse 
agglomeration has a population of 98,800 and was the fastest growing 
agglomeration in the region with a 4.0% annual growth rate during the 
1982-1990 census (INSEE. Point d'appui pour reconomie Rhone-Alpes. 
No 61-62, Mars, 1991). With a total population of almost 500,000, the 
combined Geneva-Annemasse agglomeration is the second largest 
agglomeration in the region and the fastest growing.
This strong growth around Geneva is significant for Lyon. This 
illustrates the economic dynamism and attractiveness of this 
competing pole. The area around Lyon is not growing as quickly nor 
is it attracting the same calibre of professional residents. This is of 
concern to Lyon especially in its quest to enhance its image as the 
regional capital and strongest urban pole. Also, as will be discussed, 
this reduces Lyon's economic influence over a large and productive 
section of the region
The largest problem that Lyon faces in its attempt to become a 
true regional capital and "Eurocity" is Paris. The rank size indicator 
graph of the population of French agglomerations in 1990 shows the 
extent of Parisian dominance in population (Figure 3.15). Even though 
Lyon occupies the second position on this chart, it is well behind Paris. 
Lyon and the other French agglomerations must use the 
decentralization laws, their regions, urban networks and the 
increasing integration of the European Community as a lever to 
distance themselves from Paris. The historic Jacobin dominance of 
Paris in every sphere of the State's activity needs to be reduced as 
France and Europe face the next century.
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FIGURE 3.15  
RANK SIZE POPULATION GRAPH 
OF FRENCH AGGLOMERATIONS-! 9 9 0
10000
PA R IS
9 0 0 0
8 0 0 0
7 0 0 0
6 0 0 0
5 0 0 0
4 0 0 0
3 0 0 0
2000
1000
POPULATION 
M THOUSANDS
SOURCE; MSEE, 
RECENSEMENT-19 9 0 .
URBAN RANKING
8  1 0  1 2  1 4  1 6  1 8  2 0
3.4 SUMMARY
This chapter has considered the strength and  position of Lyon's 
dem ographic situation in the Rhone-Alpes Region, France an d  the 
European Community. The dem ographic strength  of the Rhone-Alpes 
Region has also been considered being an im portan t com ponent of 
Lyon's am bitions for "International City" status. By analysing 
population  totals and  dem ographic growth, Lyon can be p laced within 
the dem ographic context of the Soldatos model. Total population  is 
one indicator of a city's ability to create the critical m ass n eeded  to 
achieve "International City" status (Soldatos, 1989). W ithout a 
sufficient population base, a city cannot hope to achieve this critical 
mass. These population statistics illustrate th a t Lyon, though  large for 
a  French city, is dem ographically small in com parison w ith o th er 
m ajor European non-capital cities (the Milan agglom eration has, for 
exam ple a population of 4 million), tha t are striving for "International 
City" status.
The size of a city’s population, or m ore strictly th a t of the 
contiguous agglomeration, is a critical factor in the a tta inm en t of 
European status. Population size m easures a po ten tia l in term s of
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labour force, market size, economic strength and external influence.
It could be argued that at present Lyon has not achieved a 
“demographic critical mass” as compared with most other major non­
capital European cities. The agglomeration is, on the evidence of the 
1990 census, still growing and thus the demographic evolution is 
proceeding in the right direction. However, several qualifications 
need to be made. Demographic expansion, though positive, is at a rate 
which will not permit Lyon to close the population gap vis-a-vis other 
major European cities in the immediate future, but merely ensure that 
the gap does not continue to widen. Secondly, the rate of 
demographic expansion of Lyon is lower than some of its regional 
neighbours (Annecy and Chambery) and not significantly higher than 
that of its most powerful rival, Grenoble. In this sense, the recent 
population growth of Lyon has not resulted in an emphatic 
enhancement of its demographic weight within Rhone-Alpes. Finally, 
population size and growth rate, another key indicator, do not of 
themselves measure effective strength. Geneva, with a population in 
its international conurbation only half that of the Lyon agglomeration, 
is clearly ranked in the DATAR/RECLUS study as having higher 
international functions and prestige than Lyon. This leads to the 
conclusion that political, infrastructural and economic considerations 
may carry as much, if not more, weight as population size. This theme 
will be discussed in the following chapters beginning with the political 
framework of Lyon in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE POLITICAL FRAMEWORK
A city, of whatever size, operates within a regional setting. In 
turn this setting consists of two spatial references, which may, but 
commonly do not, coincide. The first of these is a legal and 
administrative framework within which the city exercises defined 
powers. The second is a functional sphere, brought about by the 
polarizing strength of a city within a sphere of influence roughly 
proportionate in extent to the economic strength of the city but within 
which competition with neighbouring cities will define the effective 
limits. The administrative framework may be sub-divided between 
the formal administrative framework which forms part of the 
national, regional and local government system and more ad-hoc 
frameworks employed for planning purposes but which do not 
conform to a consistent national system. This chapter seeks to define 
the various political-administrative systems within which Lyon 
operates and to compare these with the extent of Lyon’s functional 
polarized region.
The analysis of Lyon’s political framework will be studied in a 
number of contexts. Initially, attention is focused on the formal 
administrative framework, especially the regions and their 
relationship to the constituent departements. Secondly, the role of 
semi-official agencies will be considered, as exemplified by the 
Chambre de Commerce et Industrie de Lyon (C.C.I.L.) and the S.E.P.A.L. 
strategic planning agency. Thirdly, a review of the history of post­
war urban and regional planning in France is needed to place Lyon's 
political development plan to achieve international status in 
perspective. Next, an analysis of two recent French elections in which 
the European issue should have been prominent, will be made. These 
were the Regional Elections of March 22,1992, and the Referendum 
on the Treaty of Maastricht held on September 20, 1992.
4.1 THE ADMINISTRATIVE HIERARCHY
In examining the political situation of Lyon one must first touch 
upon the history and political framework of not only Lyon but of
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France. On January 1,1990, Metropolitan France was politically 
comprised of 22 regions, 96 departements, and an incredible 36,763 
communes (Rapport Fabre, 1991). These three forms of local 
administration constitute the major formal administrative units in 
France. The form and function of these three are often ill-defined and 
their responsibilities often overlap in daily operations. One of the 
difficulties facing Lyon is winning the cooperation of numerous local 
political administrative units to devise and implement strategy. An 
examination of each of these three formal administrative units will 
provide a better understanding of the challenges of logistics and 
cooperation facing Lyon as it pursues its international ambitions.
4.11 THE REGIONS
The regions were formally established in 1955 but only gained 
significant authority in 1982 under the package of decentralization 
laws passed by the then new Socialist regime. In 1986, the regions 
were further empowered when the Regional Councils were chosen in 
direct elections rather than being an appointed body, lending greater 
credibility to the Regional Councils (Dawkins, 1991). The regions were 
created to assume some of the overall planning responsibility that had 
previously been the sole preserve of the national government in Paris. 
Regions were viewed as an ideal size to replace the national 
government on certain levels and to compete with the other better- 
established regions in fellow European Community member states.
In the increasingly poly-nuclear European Community where 
many member states have powerful regions, France decided that the 
creation of French regions would serve three important functions.
The first would be to decentralize certain administrative functions 
from the State to the Region. These include territorial planning and 
development, the location and construction of secondary schools, the 
oversight of adult training programs and the development of a 
regional plan to include industrial site location assistance and financial 
assistance to companies contributing to regional development (The 
Economist. 23-11-1991). This would also constitute another step 
forward in the long battle against the dominance of Paris and the 
State in the everyday affairs of the regions (Benko, 1987).
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The second function of the newly-created regions was to 
construct a regional political infrastructure to compete with those 
already successfully in place in other European Community member 
states. This political infrastructure includes planning, coordinating 
social and economic issues with other national and European regions, 
lobbying the European Community, and generally creating the political 
institutions and connections needed to operate in a more independent 
fashion from Paris (Rapport Fabre. 1991). The French regions need to 
establish miniature copies of the National government with economic 
development councils, international awareness, connections and the 
ability to raise and distribute monies in an independent fashion. In 
short, the regions that will be most successful will be those that are 
able to assume greater responsibilities from the State in all sectors of 
government (Barbet, 1992).
Thirdly, decentralization was an economic decision as well as a 
political one (Tuppen, 1988). The Socialist government viewed, in 
quite a non-socialist manner, local authorities as being better 
positioned than the National government to improve and reshape 
their economies during the recession of 1981-1986. Also, 
decentralization eased the financial burden of the state by 
transferring certain costly responsibilities to the lower levels of 
government without necessarily granting these levels of government 
the needed powers to raise the capital required to cover these 
programs. These programs, consisting largely of social welfare and 
retraining/adult education, were viewed as a mixed blessing by the 
regions. Instead of being able to assert more independence through 
financial means, many regions found that the costs of these programs 
prohibited them from instituting any long range planning schemes.
Finances are the major problem of the French regions. The 
regions have limited means of directly raising capital. The regions are 
authorized to collect money through limited taxation on professional 
services and specific property taxes. The regions are also permitted 
to raise indirect revenues through fees charged for drivers' licensing 
and automobile registration. In total, these avenues for raising capital
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are quite limited and the regional budgets are correspondingly small 
(Jouve et. al., 1992).
The regions depend upon the State for the majority of their 
revenue. In 1988, the State budget was set at 1081 billion francs.
The budget allocated to the collective territories of the regions, 
departements and communes was 52% of this total or 565 billion 
francs. Of this 565 billion francs, 348 billion francs was allocated to 
the communes, 138 billion francs was allocated to the departements 
and a mere 30 billion francs was allocated to the regions. In 1991, 
this total had increased to 50 billion francs but was still 
proportionatly much smaller than that allocated to the other official 
administrative units (Jouve et. al., 1992). This lack of financial 
resources restricts the effectiveness of the regions. Without 
significant revenue, the regions have achieved limited success, 
especially in light of the fact that the departements are substantially 
better financed than the regions.
Additionally, the annual contract between the State and the 
Region, negotiated and implemented in five year plans, is another 
source of revenue for the regions. These contracts include an agreed 
upon contribution by both the State and the Region to be spent upon 
specific projects. The five year contract between the State and the 
Rhone-Alpes Region for 1989 - 1994 was divided into four major 
categories: Employment and Development, Non-material Investments, 
Infrastructure and Social Management (Table 4.1). These four 
categories were further divided into 18 subcategories. The 1989 - 
1994 contract between the State and the Rhone-Alpes Region was 
financed by 3,807.1 million francs by the State and 2,590.7 million 
francs by the Rhone-Alpes Region (Contrat entre L'Etat et la Region 
Rhone-Alpes. 1989).
As illustrated in Table 4.1, the major recipients of this contract 
were education and the agricultural industries. Other social and 
infrastructural projects received smaller amounts of money from this 
contract. This is not the total extent of either the region's budget nor 
the contributions by the State. This contract represents areas where 
both administrative bodies agree to pursue specific projects that are
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TABLE 4.1 
STATE/REGION CONTRACT-1989: 
FINANCIAL BREAKDOWN BY TOPIC
THOUSAND FRANCS
STATE REGION
3,807.1 2,590.7
I Emoloi & Develo cement
1 Competitivite des 
entreorises
116.25 116.50
2 A griculture et Agro- 
alim entaire
269.10 326.50
3 Filiere Bois 40.30 34.30
4 Developpement Touristique 63.50 76.10
5 A rtisanat 4.00 5.50
6 Initiatives locales 25.00 25.00
I I In ves tlss em en ts 
immateriels
/ Formation 270.50 303.30
8 Enseignement superieur 160.70 81.20
9 Recherche 101.90 83.40
10 Developpement
technologique
41.65 43.10
I I I Infrastructure
11 Am enagements rou tiers 1,833.00 1,063.80
IV sAmenagement et Solidarite
12 Zones rurales en situation 
critia ue
59.70 60.00
13 Zones de m utation 
industrieile
65.00 65.00
14 Developpement social des 
auartiers
380.00 50.00
15 Massifs de m ontagne 181.50 184.50
16 Humanisation des hospices 145.00 72.50
17 Reseau des villes 0 0
18 Zones frontalieres 0 0
Source: C ontrat enure L'Ecat et ia Region Rhone-Alpes, 21-4-1989.
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best served by mutual coordination and financing. The total budget 
for the Rhone-Alpes Region in 1991 was 4.075 million francs.
A brief comparison with the budgets of the other major 
European regions illustrates the extremely poor financial condition of 
the Rhone-Alpes Region's administration. The 1988 budget for the 
Rhone-Alpes Region was 2 billion francs, the regional budgets for 
selected other European regions, translated into 1988 francs, were; 
Lombardy - 46 billion francs, Catalonia - 33 billion francs and Baden- 
Wiirttemburg - 140 billion francs (Science et Vie Economie. 5-92).
This comparison clearly indicates that the Rhone-Alpes Region, as an 
administrative unit, is not comparable to those other major regions in 
Europe with whom the leaders of Rhone-Alpes wish to compete.
The limited financial resources of the region are primarily 
committed to education. The regions are thus devoting the majority 
of their limited resources to a single area of interest that was 
decentralized from the State to the regions (La Tribune de l'Expansion. 
1990). The State is effectively paying the regions to administer one of 
the State's former responsibilities with State money leaving precious 
little financial resources for the region to mount any other projects. 
None of the other major European regions have such limited financial 
or administrative powers.
To further compound the problems for the Rhone-Alpes Region, 
this region has the lowest per capita budget of any region in France. 
Rhone-Alpes, according to the calculations of the Tenth National Plan 
for the years 1989-1993, will receive 610 francs per capita each year 
during this plan (Jouve et. al., 1992). The national average stands at 
almost 900 francs per capita on an annual basis. This reflects Rhone- 
Alpes position as a populated and prosperous region. However, 
having the lowest regional budget per capita is a severe limitation to 
the effectiveness of the Rhone-Alpes Region's official administrative 
unit at the same time when this body is attempting to implement 
ambitious plans both within the region and throughout Europe.
The regions to date have had a limited success in achieving the 
objectives set forth in both 1982 and again in 1986. The regions have
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not succeeded in obtaining any real power or financial independence 
from Paris. Neither have the French regions set themselves up as true 
competitors with comparable regions in Germany, Italy, Spain or 
others in the European Community. The limited success of the second 
objective is a direct consequence of the results of the first objective, in 
that without adequate financial resources, the French regions cannot 
hope to compete on equal terms with their European partners in 
either economic development or political influence.
Economically, a number of problems have now become evident 
concerning decentralization and devolution from Paris and the 
National government to the regions. During the recession of 1981- 
1986 and subsequently, there were limited numbers of jobs to 
decentralize from Paris to the outlying areas of France (La Tribune de 
l'Expansion. 1990). Unemployment has become a larger priority issue 
then decentralization to the French government, and the French voter. 
Those jobs that were able to be decentralized were mostly low-skilled 
blue collar jobs. Many of these jobs were decentralized within the 
Paris Basin thus doing little to improve employment outside of the 
capital's hinterland. Also, high-level service jobs generally failed to 
follow any industrial decentralization and are, in fact, becoming 
further concentrated in Paris. The net result is that Paris has 
essentially become stronger through the consolidation of its position 
as the unrivalled centre of higher services in France (La Tribune de 1' 
Expansion, 1990).
However, that such ambitious decentralization goals were not 
achieved in a mere ten years is not a complete condemnation of the 
French regions. After a decade, the French regions have evolved into 
an integral and popular political institution in France. The regional 
elections of March, 1992, with 70% voter participation, national 
debate, prominent candidates and intense media publicity illustrate 
both the importance and acceptance of the regions as another tier in 
the French political administration. The results and major campaign 
themes of these regional elections will be examined in detail later in 
this chapter in an effort to determine the importance of the idea of 
"Europe" to Rhone-Alpes voters and the distinction between national 
and regional/local issues.
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The regions are becoming an increasingly important and viable 
political institution in France. Lyon is in the advantageous position of 
being the largest city and administrative capital of the second most 
important region in France; Rhone-Alpes. Lyon is attempting to take 
political advantage of this situation by strengthening its urban 
connections within the region. Increasing formal linkages between 
Lyon and St. Etienne (to be examined in Part Three) are but one 
example of this policy. Also, Lyon is attempting to use the size and 
economic power of the region as a whole to enhance and promote its 
image outside of France. This is critical to Lyon’s plans to achieve 
"International City" status. The Soldatos model states that to be a true 
"International City", a city must sit atop its own regional urban system 
and have strong economic and political linkages with the second tier 
and smaller urban centres within its region.
4.12 THE DEPARTEMENTS
The Rhone-Alpes is comprised of eight departements; Ain, 
Ardeche, Drome, Isere, Loire, Rhone, Savoie, and Haute-Savoie (Figure 
4.1). Lyon, in addition to being the regional capital, is also the capital 
of the Rhone Departement. The departements date back to the 
Napoleonic era of the early nineteenth century. The idea, almost two 
centuries ago, was that the departement capital would be no more 
then one days’ travel by horse from any point in the departement. In 
Napoleon's day this had its advantages for it enabled Paris to firmly 
control the outlying areas of France through the Prefects who were 
appointed by the national government to administer the 
departements. In 1993, some rethinking of this Jacobin institution is 
being debated.
The decentralization laws of 1982 and 1986 expanded the 
authority and role of the departements as well as those of the regions 
(L'Activite Economique. 3-1990). The executive powers of the Conseil 
General of the Departements have been increased to help the 
departements handle their expanded mandate. The departements are 
responsible for the site and construction of "Colleges", schools for 
students between the ages of 11-14 (though the curriculum is still set
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in Paris). The departements are also responsible for certain health 
and social services, public libraries and the operation of fishing and 
trading ports along with the development of a departemental 
transport plan. Other departement responsibilities include rural 
planning, social and public health services, payment of benefits and 
other social welfare issues (Lebuy, 1989).
To enable the departements to finance such responsibilities, the 
ability of the departements to raise capital has been expanded as has 
their overall budget. The budgets of the departements are much 
greater than those of the regions (Tuppen, 1988). Frequently, the 
budget of a major agglomeration is also larger than those of the 
regions. For example, Nice had a budget of 4.7 billion francs in 1989 
while the entire budget of the Provence-Alpes-Cote d’Azur Region was 
3.6 billion francs. This serves to emphasizes the relative weakness of 
the regions in both a national and European wide context. These new 
powers along with the increased budgets have served to increase the 
power of the departements.
Unfortunately, these decentralization laws refused to choose one 
level of local government over the others. Therefore, the 
departements were strengthened through increased executive powers 
at the same time that the regions were created (La Tribune de 
l'Expansion. 1990). Decentralization legislation also failed to provide 
any supervision between the three local levels of government: 
regions, departements and communes. This has led to a situation 
where all three levels of local government are exploring and 
attempting to increase their mandates and powers. This has the 
predictable results of political manoeuvring, infighting, and power 
plays by individuals and groups as well as a great deal of oversight 
and overspending (Keating, 1986).
Certain urban and regional planners are calling for the 
elimination or restructuring of the departements (L'Activite 
Economique. 3-1990). This would be advantageous for the regions in 
that it would truly empower the regions in the political and financial 
areas in which they are currently weak. Also, this would greatly 
boost the image of the regions. Eliminating the departements would
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reduce by one the layers of French government and would constitute 
a major overhaul of the French political system. This will not happen 
soon if indeed it ever happens. However, this question is crucial to 
some of the most heated political debates in and around the Lyon 
area. We shall examine the specific problems and current debate 
later in this chapter.
4.13  THE COMMUNES
France has 36,763 communes; a truly remarkable figure. To 
better visualize the dimensions of this number consider that Italy has 
8,074 communes and Spain has 8,027. The current European 
Community of twelve has 70,000 communes, of which over half are 
French. To approach this from another angle, France has almost 1,500 
people per commune. Denmark has 18,000 and West Germany, before 
unification, had 7,200 people per commune. (Dawkins, 1991). For 
every 1,500 French to have their own layer of government seems, and 
is, excessive and unwieldy.
The commune system causes great problems and confusion in 
the urban agglomerations of France. The administrative concept of a 
city does not exist in France. Instead, a number of communes, and in 
certain cases arrondissements (Paris, Lyon and Marseille), constitute 
the administration of a city. This, as in the case of Lyon, causes 
confusion, delay and conflict. Only the term "Agglomeration", which 
currently has no political jurisdiction, accurately represents a 
functional political boundary. Without such a political boundary, lack 
of direction will continue to plague all cities including Lyon. Planning 
and administration is hindered, responsibility easily evaded and the 
division of financial resources becomes difficult. Having numerous 
communes and local layers of official and semi-official government is 
a serious hindrance when planning a cohesive strategy in a major 
agglomeration (Kesselman, 1985).
4 .1 4  SEMI-OFFICIAL AGENCIES
Examining the various political entities that are not part of the 
national territorial administrative system that directly impact the
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agglomeration of Lyon is critical to understanding the operational 
nature of local politics. The layers of local government begin with the 
nine arrondissements that constitute the City of Lyon proper. These 
nine arrondissements are a part of the official government 
administrative system and are found only in Paris, Lyon and Marseille 
(Benko, 1987). The next official layer of administration in the Lyon 
areas is La Communaute Urbaine de Lyon (COURLY) which consists of 
the 55 communes of Lyon and the immediate surrounding area. The 
COURLY is an important success in local organization being an 
officially constituted body comprised of a number of local political 
administrative units. The COURLY operates a wide variety of needed 
local infrastructure such as trash collection, bus routes and various 
aspects of long-range local planning and cooperation. The COURLY 
enables the Lyon agglomeration to operate in a relatively cohesive 
fashion which, as will be discussed, is the exception rather than the 
rule in the other major agglomerations of the region.
The next layers of local administration consist of various official 
government administrative units cooperating in conjunction with each 
other in semi-official agencies. Therefore, they have no true 
government mandate; but since their members are official the point is 
largely moot. The next semi-official layers is the Schema Directeur de 
lfAgglomeration Lyonnaise (SDAL) which consists of the 55 communes 
of COURLY along with an additional 15 adjacent communes. Finally, 
there exists the larger Region Urbaine de Lyon (RUL) which 
incorporates a total of 442 communes in four departements; Rhone, 
Isere, Ain, and Loire (Gras, 1990).
Coordinating 442 communes, 4 departements, and a large 
handful of minor/major urban planning agencies, semi-official 
administrative bodies and a host of conflicting boundaries and 
mandates is not a recipe for clarity. The logical boundary of the Lyon 
Agglomeration is in direct conflict with a tremendous number of 
official and semi-official governmental administrative layers. The 
Rhone-Alpes Region might claim to be the only local official political 
entity capable of any coordinated activity in this situation; however, 
the local rules and regulations of each commune and departement put 
this idea to rest. Likewise, the supporters of a larger official Lyon
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agglomeration consisting of the present RUL are finding that 
attempting to alter official jurisdictions remains a daunting task 
(L'Activite Economique. 3-1990).
Additional decentralization laws of January 7,1983 passed 
various responsibilities of urbanization from the State to the 
commune. This has politically handcuffed the larger agglomerations 
whose political manoeuvering room has been drastically reduced. The 
major agglomerations are now more dependent upon the 
departements and communes then before 1982. This has reduced the 
effectiveness of the agglomerations1 leaders to pursue a set agenda.
To be effective these major agglomerations need a larger degree of 
political autonomy and a defined, well-integrated administrative 
boundary (Tesse, 1990). Local leaders are beginning to argue that 
decentralization laws have actually increased their dependence upon 
Paris through the fact that local government is increasingly 
fragmented and paralysed. Therefore, local governments in certain 
areas have a habit of abdicating real decisions to the State 
government just to ensure action.
To complicate issues for the major agglomerations, the 
communes, departements, and regions have all increased their powers 
and responsibilities. Therefore, all three local layers of government 
have direct political and financial input into the managing of the 
agglomeration. Agglomerations must now deal effectively with all 
layers of government instead of only with the State. This has proved 
a mixed blessing to the large agglomerations and has complicated 
even the most basic decision-making at the local level. The basic 
problem facing the Lyon and other agglomerations concerning local 
government is that there exist too many layers of government to 
effectively pursue long range objectives of any significance.
4.2 OPERATIONAL AND PLANNING AGENCIES
The Soldatos model argues the need for public and private 
organizations to promote and market the city. Much of the making of 
an "International City" is the crafting of the proper image (Soldatos,
1989). Therefore, the marketing and promotion of a city is critical in
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its quest to achieve international recognition. Private agencies (often 
with semi-official status) must play a substantial role in promoting 
the city’s image. These agencies are also important in tackling such 
issues as long range planning, attracting foreign investment, lobbying 
for the city’s benefit and providing a solid and dependable level of 
urban support and promotion.
A number of agencies in Lyon stand out as leaders in promoting 
the future agenda of Lyon. These agencies are the Chambre de 
Commerce et d'Industrie de Lyon (C.C.I.L)., Le Syndicat d'Etudes et de 
Programmation de l’Agglomeration Lyonnaise (S.E.P.A.L)., l’Agence de 
Developpement de la Region Lyonnais (ADERLY) and l'Agence 
d’Urbanisme de Lyon. These agencies are responsible for the 
promotion of Lyon as an "International City" around the 
agglomeration, the region, throughout Europe and indeed the world. 
These agencies are also working to establish strong links between 
each other and other various secondary promotional groups.
4 .21  THE C.C.I.L.
The C.C.I.L. is not a formal governmental administrative 
organization. Rather, the C.C.I.L. is officially and legally recognized as 
a functioning administrative organization whose responsibilities 
include the operation of the agglomeration's airports, numerous port 
facilities, certain education establishments and other smaller entities 
such as bonded warehouses that serve to promote the financial 
interests of the Lyon agglomeration.
The C.C.I.L. employed 905 people in 1990 and had an annual 
budget of 792.4 million francs in 1991. This represents a relatively 
large and well-financed operation. The C.C.I.L. dispenses the majority 
of its budget to three areas: education, airports and support to 
enterprises. In 1991, 44.51% of the C.C.I.L.’s annual budget went 
towards teaching and education. The majority of this sum went to the 
operation of the Ecole Superieure de Commerce de Lyon, (ESC). This 
prestigious graduate business college, located in Ecully, is one of the 
highest rated in France. The ESC is active in promoting international 
exchanges between graduate business students, especially those in the
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"Four Motors" regions of Europe. These exchanges have also 
broadened to include institutions in North America, specifically York 
University in Toronto, Canada. This is valuable in promoting not only 
the ESC but Lyon as a whole.
A further 30.56% of the C.C.I.L.?s annual budget in 1991 was 
allocated to the airports of the Lyon agglomeration, primarily to Lyon- 
Satolas International Airport. The C.C.I.L. operates Lyon-Satolas and 
played a major role in establishing the separate funding structures 
needed to proceed with the major expansion project currently under 
construction at Lyon-Satolas. As a result of this program of massive 
improvement at Lyon-Satolas, 84.71% of the 1991 annual investment 
of the C.C.I.L. went to the airport development project. The indicates 
the importance that the C.C.I.L. attaches to the development of Lyon- 
Satolas as an international multi-modal transportation hub. The 
C.C.I.L., being a commercially oriented operation, understands the 
importance of first-class physical transportation infrastructure in 
attracting and retaining investment and enterprises.
A total of 20.75% of the C.C.I.L.'s 1991 budget went to 
supporting enterprises. This support ranged from financial incentives 
for locating an enterprise in Lyon to helping construct certain 
infrastructures to promote the cities technopoles. The 123.7 million 
francs allocated to support enterprises in 1991 is not inconsequential 
when helping to attract, establish and coordinate local enterprises.
The C.C.I.L. also encourages local commerce in a number of smaller 
measures such as publishing a monthly magazine, L'Activite 
Economique. which covers the local economic situation.
ADERLY, an affiliate of the C.C.I.L, is a normally independent 
organization in charge of attracting and promoting business 
investment in the Lyon agglomeration. ADERLY is the organization 
that operates international trade missions and offices outside of 
France. ADERLY has an office in the World Trade Centre in New York 
and another mission in Brussels. ADERLY attempts to market and 
promote Lyon as an attractive location to establish a commercial 
enterprise. This is an important role in promoting and developing the 
international image of Lyon. The C.C.I.L., and its affiliate ADERLY,
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clearly typify the semi-official promotional agency that is mentioned 
in the Soldatos model. It is mandatory for Lyon to actively and 
aggressively promote and market its strengths to the international 
community. Organizations such as the C.C.I.L. and ADERLY are fulfiling 
to a significant degree this criteria of the Soldatos model.
4 .22  URBAN PLANNING AGENCIES
In addition to the semi-official commercially oriented 
organizations such as the C.C.I.L. and ADERLY, the Soldatos model 
discusses the importance of semi-official urban planning and 
coordinating agencies. The S.E.PA.L. was created in June, 1985 by 
agreement of the 55 communes of the COURLY and 16 adjacent 
communes. The mandate for S.E.P.A.L. was to revive and update the 
Schema Directeur de l'Amenagement Urbaine (SDAU) planning scheme 
for Lyon. The community leaders wanted to establish an urban 
planning agency similar to the SDAU to create a long term plan for the 
Lyon agglomeration.
The S.E.P.A.L. was given the task of creating a long range urban 
plan which evolved into the document; LYON 2010: Un Proiet 
d'Agglomeration pour une Metropole Europeenne. Aside from 
providing a detailed plan for the future of the agglomeration of Lyon, 
one of the primary tasks of the S.E.P.A.L. was to coordinate with the 
mosaic of organizations, government agencies and academic 
consultants that contributed to the LYON 2010 plan.
Lyon has a wide array of various semi-official planning and 
promotional agencies. In the context of the Soldatos model, Lyon has 
established the linkages required between the public and private 
agencies to provide Lyon with a strong promotional and planning 
infrastructure. Lyon is well served in this criteria of the Soldatos 
model and this will help Lyon to improve its international status both 
politically and economically.
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4.3 POST WAR REGIONAL PLANNING
Urban planning in France has been important, active and 
centralized since the end of the Second World War. Just after the war, 
in 1947, J.F. Gravier published his classic book entitled Paris et le 
Desert Francais. This book had a profound influence on France and 
contributed to the formation of DATAR in 1963. Gravier illustrated 
that France was ill-balanced, especially in economic terms. Paris 
completely dominated France in every aspect possible from 
population to culture, economics to newspapers. Paris was France and 
the rest of the nation was rapidly losing ground (Gravier, 1947).
To address this situation a new policy of "Amenagement du 
Territoire" was begun in France in 1950 under Claudius Petit, the 
Minister of Construction. M. Petit realized that human factors needed 
to be considered along with economic ones in the post war 
reconstruction of France. The Third Development Plan, (Decree of 
June 30,1955), established 21 economic planning regions. Each 
region, and especially the larger agglomerations, were urged to take 
the lead in helping to propose and develop the economies of the 
region (Beaujeu-Gamier, 1974). Although final approval and 
financing was still determined from Paris, this was viewed as the first 
step in easing the monopoly of power in Paris and promoting local 
initiatives.
This same theme is echoed today. A recent government report 
(Avis du Conseil Economique et Social du 20 Tuin 1990 sur rapport de 
M. Raymond) recommended increasing the powers and 
responsibilities of the Regional Prefet to propose and develop the 
economies of the region. This report also stressed that the mayors of 
the larger agglomerations needed to determine the scope, speed and 
objectives of the region both economically and in terms of potential 
" Internationalization11.
In the 35 years between 1955 and 1990 time did not stand still 
as one might suspect. DATAR conceived of the policy of "Les 
Metropoles d'Equilibre" at the beginning of the fifth national plan and 
this was approved in 1964. This policy was designed to encourage
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eight major agglomerations, or combinations of agglomerations, to 
take an active leadership role in their section of France. This would 
also theoretically help balance the country vis-a-vis the dominance of 
Paris (Beaujeu-Gamier, 1974). The eight "Metropoles d'Equilibre", 
decided after great and often heated debate pitting regional rivals 
against one another, were; Lyon-Grenoble-St. Etienne, Marseille-Aix- 
Fos, Toulouse, Bordeaux, Strasbourg, Nancy-Metz-Thionville, Lille- 
Roubaix-Tourcoing, and Nantes-St. Nazaire.
The political concessions that led to such artificial couplings 
made success difficult from the start. Combining two or three regional 
rivals into a single planning unit hindered the effectiveness of this 
idea as did the economic and demographic trends that appeared in the 
seventies. The policy of "Les Metropoles d'Equilibre" was short-lived, 
being quietly forgotten by the early seventies. However, this policy 
was the beginning of an active campaign to combat the total urban 
dominance of Paris.
By 1972 the emphasis had shifted away from the major 
agglomerations to the "Medium-Sized Cities". This corresponded with 
the demographic trends of the seventies and early eighties, including 
counterurbanization and a continued rural exodus. The most rapid 
population growth, and therefore the greatest increase in demand for 
services, shifted to the medium-sized towns and away from the 
largest agglomerations (Scargill, 1983). Again, this trend was 
chronologically limited and the focus of urban/regional planning 
shifted again in the eighties due to an increasingly fluid demographic 
situation and the spatial changes dictated by increasing 
communication technology and the rise of European integration.
Currently the focus has shifted to "Regional Urban Networks" 
and increased decentralization to enhance regional and urban strength 
to compete with other European regions. This is a combination of the 
previous policies and reflects the need to focus on all cities, 
irrespective of their population size and to concentrate on interaction 
between cities within fluid and changing networks of different spatial 
size rather than individual points (Punter, 1989). Lyon's challenge is 
to establish itself as the head of the Rhone-Alpes regional urban
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network as well as to establish its position and linkages within the 
greater European urban network.
Despite forty years of regional planning by DATAR in an effort 
to break, or at least reduce the power monopoly of Paris, success has 
been slim. Paris remains a World City and continues to dominate 
France in all aspects of national life. Examination of a number of 
relevant statistics concerning Paris in 1988 is instructive (Table 4.2). 
The high percentage of the university population, upper managerial 
staff, government funded research workers and percentage of the 
overall national population show Paris to enjoy a veritable monopoly 
of influence in France.
TABLE 4 .2
The M onopoly o f  the Paris A gglom eration, 1988 .
2.2% of the National Land Area
15.6% of the Energy Consumption
18.5% of the Total Population
18.6% of the Nation’s Housing
20.9% of the National Exports
22.0% of the Employed Population
23.5% of the Civil Servants
25.9% of all Household Income
26.9% of all Tax Revenue
27.0% of National Added Value
30.8% of the University Population
36.1% of the Resident Foreign Population
38.2% of all Upper Managerial Staff
41.9% of all Overseas Students
50.3% of Government Funded Research Workers
Source: I.N.S.E.E., 1989.
These are but a few of the statistics available that depict the 
overwhelming dominance of Paris. Paris, like Lyon, has grand plans 
for its future within the European Community and the world. Paris 
plans to compete vigorously for the position of Euro-capital within the
L_
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European Community against London and, in future, against Berlin. 
The State plans to "Massify" Roissy/Charles de Gaulle International 
Airport including the addition of a TGV station in the airport terminal 
similar to the one at Lyon-Satolas International Airport. A new TGV 
station has opened in Massy, a southern suburbs of Paris, and another 
new TGV station has opened at the gigantic new Euro-Disney 
amusement park in the eastern Parisian suburbs (Reynauld, 1991). 
These are but some of the largest and most visible physical projects 
currently under construction in Paris.
Paris is also working hard to retain and improve its position as 
the fifth most attractive city in Europe for investors. Paris is 
currently behind London, Brussels, Frankfurt, and Zurich. One step in 
this direction was the consolidation of all regional bourses, including 
the one in Lyon, into a single national bourse centred in Paris in 
January 1991 (Le Monde. 4-1-91). This has served to further 
monopolize such financial services in Paris. This ambition also 
inhibits the diffusion of top ranking service professionals to smaller 
cities such as Lyon. France considers it vital to maintain Paris as a 
major world city. The French government feels that this can be 
achieved while simultaneously improving the second and third tier 
cities in the provinces. However, doubts exist whether or not cities 
outside of Paris will actually receive the attention and financial 
commitment to significantly improve their position while Paris 
continues to consume the majority of resources and major 
visible/attractive projects. With a continuing focus on Paris, the 
prospects for Lyon and other French cities to fulfil their lofty 
ambitions look less assured.
The increasing degree of European integration and the opening 
of the single market will benefit the expansion of power by both the 
large agglomerations and the regions. These are the two political 
entities that have been historically weak in France due to the overt 
centralization and dominance of Paris both during the Ancien Regime 
and after the Revolution. The government's official report concerning 
the state of the French urban system, (Rapport Guichard. 1986), 
highlighted the urban weakness of France vis-a-vis the rest of the 
European Community. The Rapport Guichard concluded that the
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agglomerations and secondary cities of France lacked the size, 
infrastructure and services of their European Community 
counterparts. Additionally, the internal urban networks remain 
poorly developed. In a Europe dominated by major agglomerations, 
France has determined that it must improve its urban systems and 
networks to remain competitive.
The French government introduced a number of policies 
designed to address and correct this situation. The opening of Europe 
has many French cities looking to establish points in common with 
each other despite historical, political and personal prejudices.
Conflict between the major agglomerations of the Rhone-Alpes is 
becoming increasingly dated, though remaining a very real obstacle to 
progress (Le Monde. 10-6-1991). The recent agreement between 
Lyon and St Etienne to establish closer ties is a good example (that of 
Montpelier and Nimes is another). This networking of cities is 
currently being encouraged by the state in order to establish multi­
polar urban areas that would be in a position to establish the "Critical 
Mass" needed to improve their status. The state, in a volte-face from 
its pre-1945 attitude of divide and rule, now views these urban 
linkages as critical if France is to compete successfully within the 
European Community (Rapport Guichard. 1986).
Urban management is considered crucial to the success of an 
agglomeration. The State is therefore decentralizing certain planning 
powers to the agglomerations and encouraging certain competitive 
policies. The major agglomerations are being encouraged to present a 
stated international ambition and have been granted the authority to 
conduct limited international functions and negotiation. This is a 
small gain for the agglomerations in that they can now conduct certain 
negotiations with other European Community and Swiss 
agglomerations. Lyon can now conduct negotiations with Geneva 
directly though the final decisions still are resolved in Paris. This is a 
small though significant step in the proper direction.
Domestically the focus is on increased action and cooperation 
between the mayors of the major agglomerations and the regional 
prefets. DATAR and Le Conseil Economique et Social suggest that all
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agglomerations should create a detailed fifteen year long range urban 
development plan. The need also exists for better political linkages 
and a precise geographic and economic definition of the metropolitan 
area that corresponds with its immediate zone of influence (Rapport 
Carriere. 1988). Lyon has developed a 20 year plan; the S.E.P.A.L. 
LYON 2010 strategic plan is exactly the form of long range urban 
planning being encouraged by the state. The increase in linkages 
between Lyon and St. Etienne is but one example of the increase in 
local linkages pursued by Lyon. These linkages will be examined in 
detail in Chapter Nine.
The state has planned a number of large far-reaching projects to 
help achieve these goals. "Le Comite Interministeriel d'Amenagement 
du Territoire du 5 Novembre, 1990" decided to pursue seven strategic 
projects on a larger geographic scale than the region to promote 
"European Competitive Zones". DATAR was directed to examine and 
implement these projects, one of which concerns the Saone-Rhone 
area. This project area includes all of the Rhone-Alpes Region, parts 
of Auvergne, Bourgogne, Franche-Comte, and opens onto Provence- 
Alpes-Cote d’Azur. The area in question has an approximate 
population of over seven million persons. The government’s goals in 
this project area are threefold; to give the sector a new identity, to 
build an image of an International Metropole (Lyon), and to establish 
a hinterland for Marseille. This would require the development of 
Lyon as a major financial centre, the completion of all transport and 
telecommunication infrastructure projects and the promotion of urban 
networks and development. The two cornerstones of the national 
agenda to making France more competitive in both the regional and 
the urban level within the modem European Community are the 
growth of certain European Metropoles in a complimentary fashion 
with Paris and the building and strengthening of the domestic urban 
network (Rapport Fabre. 1991). Lyon is a critical component of both 
plans.
Lyon remains a fine illustration of the inherent problems of the 
national agenda in France. Overlapping layers of official government 
authority restrict the ability of the agglomerations and regions to 
pursue their respective programmes. The continuing dominance of
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Paris, their European competitor’s head start and the lack of direction 
are major problems. Lyon wishes to be a "Eurocity" on a scale with 
Milan, Barcelona, Frankfurt and Amsterdam. To achieve this status, 
Lyon must overcome or deflect these problems and focus its political 
will on this task. An examination of how both Lyon and the Rhone- 
Alpes Region are politically preparing to fulfil their ambitions is now 
necessary.
Politically, the European Community is the natural ally of the 
French regions. The member state's national governments are 
surrendering certain powers to the European Community which in 
turn, theoretically, loosens the national government's grip upon the 
regions. In France this is of particular importance in that the French 
regions are constitutionally weaker than their European counterparts. 
The regions in Germany, Italy, Spain, and other European Community 
countries have far greater political and financial decision-making 
capabilities then do the French regions. A useful illustration of this 
point is the lack of participation by regional institutions in France in 
the central structures of the state. Their are no regional 
representatives in the nationally-elected legislative bodies as there 
are in Spain and Italy. Also, unlike other European regions, French 
regions have no normative powers such as security (as in Germany) 
but function strictly as a management authority over a budget the 
fraction of the size of many regions within the European Community 
(Rhone-Alpes dans l'Espace Europeen. No. 5, 1990).
The Rhone-Alpes Region has pursued numerous European 
alliances. Most notable is the accord signed in June 1983 with the 
regions of Baden-Wurttemberg, Lombardy, and Catalonia dubbed the 
"Four Motors of Europe" (Rhone-Alpes dans l'Espace Europeen No. 5, 
1990). This alliance is politically significant in that it links Rhone- 
Alpes with three other prosperous and high profile regions in the 
European Community. This alliance also increases linkages in other 
areas; higher education links between regional graduate business 
schools and joint international lobbying efforts in North America and 
Asia are but two examples. The larger advantages are economic and 
will therefore be discussed in the appropriate section, however, it is
L
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instructive to understand the numerous non-economic advantages 
that such high level associations can provide.
Rhone-Alpes has recently opened an office in Brussels to lobby 
the European Community bureaucracy. The increasing control of the 
European Community in many areas makes it advantageous to 
establish a regional office in Brussels to promote the interests of the 
Rhone-Alpes Region. Notably, the other members of the "Four Motors 
of Europe" also have large regional lobbying offices in Brussels to 
promote their interests. However, not only are these international 
actions almost entirely political to date, but are also of dubious 
legality. Article 65 of the decentralization law of March 2, 1982 
authorizes the regional councils, with State approval, to establish 
trans-frontier contacts. This is a vague and inherently limiting legal 
statement in direct contrast to articles 20 and 52 of the Constitution. 
Article 20 states that the National government determines and 
conducts the politics of the nation. Article 52 states that The 
President of the Republic negotiates all international treaties (Rhone- 
Alpes dans PEspace Europeen. No. 5, 1990). Legally, this leaves the 
regions in an impotent legal position especially since the regions, 
unlike the departements and communes, are not even a legally 
recognized administrative unit in the Constitution.
Despite its precarious legal position, Rhone-Alpes is vigorously 
pursuing a European agenda. Many supporters of Europe, including 
Jacques Delors, (President of the E.C.) argue that the regions are the 
optimum size for effective government within the framework the 
European Community (Interregions. No 101, 4-1988). For Rhone- 
Alpes to achieve any real success as a European actor, the region must 
present a unified and cohesive face towards Europe and be able to 
negotiate as needed with other regions and organizations without the 
approval of Paris or other layers of official government.
4.4 LYON'S POLITICAL BLUEPRINT
I After an examination of the official and non-official agencies
| whose mandates include government, administration, planning and 
| other functions vital to the daily and long-term functioning of Lyon,
1
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along with an overview of the history of urban planning in France 
since the Second World War, a study of the political planning 
currently happening in Lyon is required. This will enable an 
examination of the present and future direction of Lyon’s urban plan 
and help establish whether or not Lyon has the necessary political 
cohesion, strength and vision to qualify for "International City" status 
according to the Soldatos model.
Within the Rhone-Alpes a common front is needed by the 
agglomerations of the urban network to develop and promote the 
"critical mass" needed to place Rhone-Alpes and its agglomerations in 
a competitive position vis-a-vis the larger regions within the 
European Community. Above all else, to successfully construct and 
improve the Rhone-Alpes Region, voluntary political integration and 
cooperation is needed among the major urban centres to create a new 
regional identity (Rapport Carriere. 1988). The formation by the 
region of "Un Conseil des Villes de Rhone-Alpes" is a positive step as is 
the recent Lyon-St Etienne alliance. However, much remains to be 
accomplished at the local political level to ensure any substantial 
degree of urban cooperation in Rhone-Alpes.
4 .41  LOCAL ISSUES AND COHESION
One of the problems effecting the cohesion of the region is the 
historical east-west split within the Rhone-Alpes. Competition 
between the Rhone Axis (Lyon, St Etienne, Vienne) and the Alpine 
Axis (Grenoble, Annecy, Chambery, and Geneva) fuels fears of a 
divided multi-polar region. Lyon, while envisioning itself as the 
capital of the "Grand Sud-Est Frangais", must first establish itself as 
the true regional capital. Subsequently, Lyon must develop as a 
European-sized agglomeration that is prepared to lead Rhone-Alpes 
into Europe with the assistance of, not competition from, the Alpine 
Agglomerations (Rhone-Alpes dans l’Espace Europeen. No. 5,1990).
In the poly-nuclear Europe of post 1993, Lyon and Rhone-Alpes have 
the best chance of any French City/Region outside Paris/Ile-de-France 
of playing a major role. However, this will require a greater degree 
of regional cooperation than currently exists.
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Cooperation is a critical commodity for Lyon as it enters the 
future. On a European scale, the Mayor of Lyon, Michel Noir, stresses 
that the mayors of the major "Eurocities" need to increase the 
exchange of ideas and information on such topics as traffic circulation, 
urban planning, pollution, security and economic development 
(L'Expansion. 12-1990). In a Europe increasingly dominated by the 
major agglomerations, this form of communication and interaction will 
become increasingly important. On a local scale, cooperation between 
the local multi-layered political system is mandatory if Lyon is going 
to have any future success in controlling its own destiny.
The attitude of Maurice Charrier, the Communist Mayor of 
Vaulx-en-Velin, a suburb to the north of Lyon, is illustrative of the 
cooperation needed to advance the agenda of Lyon. M. Charrier is 
politically opposed to Michel Noir and critical of the S.E.P.A.L. LYON 
2010 project, (to be discussed later), yet he voted in favour of 
adopting the project on April 2, 1990. M. Charrier had three good 
reasons to vote for the S.E.P.A.L. LYON 2010 project. The first and 
best reason was that M. Charrier understands that the plan offers the 
opportunity for creating jobs in his area. This is a particularily 
important concern to a communist mayor in a depressed suburb. 
Secondly, the project included concrete proposals with visible 
advantages for Vaulx-en-Velin; specifically a new industrial park that 
is badly needed. Thirdly, M. Charrier and other mayors of smaller or 
weaker communes can understand the advantage of the 
agglomeration speaking in one unified voice in planning and economic 
matters, especially when trying to attract outside or government 
investment (LeProgres, 28-4-90).
The S.E.P.A.L. LYON 2010 plan was passed by a vote of 15 in 
favour and 2 opposed along with abstentions through absence by the 
representatives of the communes of Venissieux and Decines. Only the 
Socialist mayors of Villeurbanne and Francheville voted against the 
plan and this can be viewed as a purely partisan vote since Mayor 
Michel Noir of Lyon was a member of Chirac’s RPR rightist party at 
the time of this vote. This level of local political cooperation is an 
example of what is needed if the Lyon Agglomeration is going to 
successfully plan and execute its ambitious agenda. It is essential that
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there be coordinated and coherent political direction in addressing 
and correcting the shortcomings in Lyon as illustrated in the 
DATAR/RECLUS study and to implement the S.E.P.A.L. LYON 2010 
urban planning scheme. The local political initiatives and their 
attention to the specific problem areas as highlighted in the 
DATAR/RECLUS study will now be examined to determine their vision 
and cohesion.
4 .4 2  POLITICAL AGENDA OF THE C.C.I.L.
The C.C.I.L., as explained earlier, is a semi-official appointed 
body charged with, among other mandates, the promotion of the 
financial and industrial sectors of Lyonfs growth. The C.C.I.L. has 
chosen four specific areas in which Lyon must take political action in 
order to better implement the S.E.PA.L. LYON 2010 plan. These four 
steps are as follows. First, the political leaders must actively lead in 
the development of industry. Second, commercial equipment and 
facilities must be improved. Third, the communication infrastructure 
must be improved. Finally, the Rhone Departement must be expanded 
to include the entire Lyon Agglomeration (L'Activite Economique. 3-
1990).
To help implement the first point Michel Noir created, in late 
1990, the International Council of Lyon. M. Noir appointed Philippe 
Demarescaux, the President of Rhone-Poulenc-Argochimie, and Henri 
Moulard, President de la Lyonnaise de Banque as co-chairmen of this 
council. The members of this council are all local leaders of industry 
and commerce whose goals are to help promote Lyon’s international 
image and industrial development (L'Expansion. 12-1990). This is one 
well-proven strategy to help promote an agglomeration. This increase 
in public-private linkages is a powerful and needed combination as 
Soldatos has argued.
Another strategy is more direct, and it is easier to quantify the 
ensuing results. The local political leaders are investing large sums of 
capital into renovating or constructing new technopoles and industrial 
areas such as Gerland. The COURLY alone invested 70 million francs 
on these large scale projects in 1987. Another consequence of the
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decentralization laws is that individual cities can now set their own 
spending limits and priorities. They are also allowed to raise capital 
through private lenders. In the case of Montpellier and St Etienne 
this has led to an overall deficit of over ffl2,000 per inhabitant. The 
mayors of these cities believe that the increase in tax revenue 
brought about as a direct result of these massive investments will pay 
off these debts (The Economist 23-11-1991). This has produced, 
however, a very troubling possible second scenario.
This has produced the very real possibility of financial disaster 
at the local government level. It is feared that in the later half of this 
decade that numerous local governments could declare bankruptcy, 
forfeit on their interest payments and cause a crisis that the State 
would be forced to correct. Ironically, this would defeat one of the 
major aims of decentralizations, not to mention the dramatic possible 
results of massive bankruptcy among local governments. Currently, 
Lyon has shown admirable restraint and has a reasonable per capita 
indebtedness of around ff7,000 in 1990, though the total amount of 
debt is higher than most cities due to population size. However, the 
pressure to keep pace with other French cities on a spending spree is 
seeing a yearly increase in Lyon's indebtedness. Lyon risks severely 
jeopardizing the future of its S.E.P.A.L. LYON 2010 plan by 
overspending in the short term. Lyon, and all other agglomerations, 
can ill afford poor political financial management at this crucial 
juncture.
The second area which the C.C.I.L. has determined that Lyon 
must take significant political action is the improvement of equipment 
and facilities. This also is split into the physical and political realms. 
The physical improvements are detailed in Chapter Five. However, 
physically building a bank or insurance office has a limited effect on 
the overall commercial abilities and capabilities of Lyon. The crucial 
objective is the transfer of serious decision- making powers and 
financial controls from Parisian or foreign-based headquarters to an 
established regional control centre in Lyon. The C.C.I.L., ADERLY, The 
International Council of Lyon and numerous other public and private 
institutions, in addition to prominent local individuals, are pushing for 
this form of significant decentralization from Paris (L'Activite
ii
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Economiaue. 3-1990). Unfortunately this is a much slower and more 
difficult project than physically constructing banks and technopoles to 
satisfy the physical demands of a modem "Eurocity". Without such 
control of information, power, and other critical flows, Lyon will 
continue to be a passive French provincial outpost to Paris. Achieving 
the ability to exercise true control over directional flows of finances 
and decision-making is the most significant battle that the politicians 
and local business executives will face to establish Lyon as a 
competitive agglomeration within modem Europe.
The third priority addressed by the C.C.I.L. concerns 
improvement of the communication infrastructure. Communication 
infrastructure is, on the one hand, the physical transportation variety 
such as airports, ports, autoroutes and other essentially transport- 
related entities which Lyon is significantly improving (Chapter Five). 
Lyon is still, however, lagging behind such smaller agglomerations as 
Montpellier and Toulouse in such important communication 
infrastructure as fiber-optic and satellite communication capacity 
(L'Activite Economiaue. 3-1990). These forms of high-tech 
communication are vital in the modem work space and are integral in 
attracting business.
Integrating Lyon into the top tier of advanced communication 
technology is a project of large dimensions that will require a 
substantial degree of State and/or regional funding. It is mandatory, 
though, that Lyon be in a position to offer a first class computer- 
driven communication system to compete with other major and minor 
European agglomerations in attracting and maintaining traditional and 
newer high-growth technological industries (Urbanismes & 
Architecture. 11-1990). This advanced communication capacity is one 
area of an agglomeration's infrastructure that is mandatory in the 
current marketplace. The Soldatos model states that such high- 
technology in the computer/information infrastructure is important in 
linking a city to the rest of the modem world and in attracting 
corporations with international functions (Soldatos, 1989).
The fourth point presented by the C.C.I.L. is doubtless the most 
politically delicate and challenging. Changing departement boundaries
87
is as explosive a topic as one could wish to face. The C.C.I.L. and other 
planning agencies in Lyon argue that the departements are obsolete 
and should be eliminated or at least altered, especially around the 
Lyon area. The departements are too small to be an effective national 
or European level of government and too large for effective local 
representation. Also, France already has too many official layers of 
government, which has led to a sense of disenfranchisement among 
the populace and bureaucratic paralysis in operational matters 
(Ballingrand, 1990). The old State-Departement paradigm should be 
replaced by a European Community-Region relationship. This, in 
theory, would eliminate many nationalistic problems, reduce 
bureaucracy and enable greater and fairer popular participation.
This, however, does not impress the departement leaders, 
bureaucrats, traditionalists and many others with a claim to some title 
or financial authority within the structure of the departement.
The C.C.I.L. proposal does not argue for the immediate 
elimination of the local departements but rather for the entire Lyon 
Agglomeration to be included within a single departement: Rhone 
(L’Activite Economique. 3-1990). An example of this need to redraw 
administrative borders at the departement level is evident in the 
north-east of the Lyon Agglomeration. One of the major zones of 
development concerning the Lyon Agglomeration is situated in the 
Ain Departement. Yet, because of the current departement and 
planning borders this area to the east of Lyon, and the new-town of 
l'lsle df Abeau to the south-east, are not officially incorporated in the
S.E.P.A.L. LYON 2010 plan (L’Activite Economiaue. 3-1990). Obviously 
these areas are within Lyon's immediate zone of influence and enjoy 
the benefits of such an association while contributing little financially 
and remaining divorced from the overall planning agenda of Lyon.
These administrative changes are not going to occur in the 
short-term. In this new era of European integration it seems both 
trivial and irrational on a large scale that such parochial political 
battles remain to be fought within the same member state, much less 
the same agglomeration. However, this gulf in theory (idealism) and 
practice (reality) remains vast. It will prove difficult for France to 
operate competitively in a community of regions and agglomerations
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if the departements and the large numbers of communes continue to 
prove such an obstacle.
4 .43  S.E.P.A.L. LYON 2010  PLAN FOR THE FUTURE
For Soldatos, one of the key criteria for an "International” City 
concerns its level of conscious political effort to improve upon the 
other criteria needed to achieve critical mass. Soldatos discusses the 
importance of urban marketing, urban networks, the horizontal and 
vertical linkages between the public and private sector and the 
importance of a long-term urban plan. These forms of local political 
action are critical if a city is to implement and achieve the coherent 
mobilization of its resources to attain a rise in status and long term 
goals (Soldatos, 1989).
In Lyon, a long range urban plan has been recently 
implemented. LYON 2010: Schema Directeur de 1’Agglomeration 
Lvonnaise was developed by S.E.P.A.L. (Syndicat dfEtudes et de 
Programmation de l'Agglomeration Lyonnaise) and ratified by the 
COURLY in its final form in April 1990. This document is the official 
blueprint of Lyonfs urban planning for the next twenty years. If 
implemented in all of its phases, Lyon in the year 2010 will be an 
agglomeration of increased European stature. This 293 page 
document, being the defining article of Lyon’s plans and ambition, 
deserves serious consideration in this study.
Each of the nine chapters will be briefly examined along with 
the conclusion and aspirations voiced at the end of each section. Such 
a review of LYON 2010 is needed at this juncture to give an exact 
representation of Lyon’s ambitions and to study and evaluate the 
potential feasibility and consequences of essential projects.
The first chapter, "L’agglomeration aujourd-hui, ses forces et 
! faiblesses" discusses the actual physical location of the city and its 
overall economic and demographic position, strengths and 
weaknesses, in 1990. This discussion touches upon Lyon’s central 
position as a European crossroads along with a spatial explanation of 
Lyon's poly-nuclear CBD and various ports of entrance. These
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physical attributes are viewed as advantageous. However, the east- 
west economic division of the agglomeration is regretfully noted.
Even with the addition of Lyon-Satolas International Airport and the 
Eurexpo exposition centre, the eastern section of Lyon remains 
economically and socially disadvantaged when compared to the 
Presqu'ile and the western communities of the Lyon agglomeration.
As with most urban plans, a statement of geographic position 
and spatial problems to be solved are the logical starting points. How 
an urban plan acts upon these fundamentals is a basic reason of such 
a plan’s success or failure. Lyon realizes it must take optimum 
advantage of its prime geographic position between Northern and 
Mediterranean Europe. Equally, Lyon must overcome the debilitating 
east-west dichotomy that has haunted previous development in Lyon 
to avoid creating a Lyon of two speeds.
The final sections of the first chapter discuss the economic and 
demographic realities of Lyon. The Lyon agglomeration’s 
demographic growth has increased during the eighties (Chapter 
Three) as has the evolution and diversity of its industrial and service 
sector employment, (Chapter Eight). Lyon claims to be far ahead of 
other French agglomerations on the road to achieving international 
stature, with the overwhelming exception of Paris. This relative 
strength of Lyon within the national urban network is seen as a major 
positive factor for Lyon. France will play an important role in the 
post-1993 Europe and as the second city of France, that enjoys a 
crossroads position, Lyon can look forward with cautious optimism.
The Second Chapter, "Des atouts pour relever les defis de 
l'avenir" moves into discussing specifics of how Lyon is going to meet 
the future challenges. These are the extraordinary challenges ranging 
from social mutations to regional harmony and from economic 
development to local ecology. Every agglomeration of any size is 
dealing with an increasingly vast and complicated range of such 
responsibilities each requiring political oversight and financial 
contributions. The importance of the LYON 2010 plan is that it is 
attempting to provide an all-encompassing plan of action to deal with
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each and every challenge facing Lyon both today and in the decades 
to follow.
An essential element of this chapter is that the planners at 
every level in Lyon must think today of a Lyon, France, and Europe in 
twenty years time while simultaneously and effectively handling the 
complex urban problems of today. What will be the social needs, 
transport necessities, environmental, political, economic and 
communication requirements and concerns of a modem European 
metropolis in the early decades of the next century? These are the 
questions raised and dealt with in this plan.
Aside from outlining the prospective future of Lyon in twenty 
years this chapter also points out some of the current weaknesses in 
Lyon both politically and in terms of infrastructure. The primary 
concern is Lyon's limited control of and influence within the Rhone- 
Alpes Region. With the Massif Central directly to the west, Geneva 
and Grenoble within an hours' drive and Paris two hours north via the 
TGV, Lyon is squeezed. Lyon, though the nominal head of the Rhone- 
Alpes urban structure and second city of France, currently has an 
incomplete role. The city planners realize the tenuous position of 
Lyon and of its inequality with the top tier of European non-capital 
cities. Infrastructurally, Lyon's planners understand that there are 
serious problems that need to be addressed. The weaknesses in the 
hotel and conference industry, financial services, image and other 
criteria of international status are described and addressed. After 
this final descriptive chapter, the LYON 2010 plan proceeds to state 
the specific actions that Lyon plans to take during the next twenty 
years to improve its position and address its major problems.
The third chapter is entitled "L'ambition pour Lyon: Une 
Metropole Europeenne, une ville agreable a vivre." The title sums up 
succinctly the salient points of this third and briefest chapter. Lyon 
wishes to become a leading European Metropole while maintaining the 
pleasant quality of life that the inhabitants of Lyon currently enjoy.
To achieve the first of these ambitions Lyon has decided that it must 
find a specific niche within the European urban hierarchy that it alone 
occupies. A defining identity or image is what is needed for Lyon.
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This point is well taken; however, the suggested niches of Noeud de 
Communication, Pole d'Excellence or Poids Economique are vague and 
ill-defined, not to mention that every potential "Eurocity" is striving to 
fill the same niche. This defeats the entire purpose presented. Lyon 
will be no closer to establishing a personal image or personality if it 
pursues the same niches as every other European agglomeration.
Lyon needs these attributes to compete on a European scale but they 
fail to define the city or provide a motive for others to choose Lyon 
over another European scale city.
Secondly, Lyon realizes that it must become the accepted and 
functional capital of the Rhone-Alpes Region. If Lyon were able to 
bring the other regional agglomerations into a cooperative orbit 
(unlike the competitive/dependant orbit of Paris) a "critical mass" 
could be achieved that Lyon can never hope to duplicate alone.
Aside from the obvious enhancements of the quality of life 
(metro, new parking facilities, parks, etc) Lyon is determined not to 
become a city advancing at two speeds: one sprinting towards the 
goal of being an European Metropole and the other caught in a slow 
dance of poverty. The concept of such a "Metropole Equilibree" is 
admirable. However, considering the current trend world-wide of an 
increasing gulf between peoples resulting from economics, education, 
communication and other socio-economic factors, a twin track growth 
will be difficult to avoid. For example, the metro line to Les 
Minguettes, a deprived peripheral suburb, was postponed (Tuppen, 
1988) until the State included its completion in the current City-State 
| contract (LeProgres, 5-3-1991). It will be equally difficult to prevent 
this split from occurring spatially, specifically along the east-west 
fault line that we have already discussed. Unfortunately, Lyon must 
realize that difficult decisions due to financial constraints will have to 
be faced. This will strain the best laid plans concerning social 
equality.
The second section entitled "Les Orientations du Project de 
lf Agglomeration" is split into two chapters. Chapter Four has already 
been examined in the opening chapter of this thesis, ("Une Strategie 
Internationale pour Lyon"). Chapter Five: "Les Politiques Prioritaires
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de Developement" is by far the largest and most significant chapter in 
the context of the Soldatos model. The priorities of developing Lyon 
in a political context over the next twenty years are set forward. This 
illustrates exactly what Lyon will commit to improve upon over the 
duration of the LYON 2010 plan to meet its objectives. The spatial 
application of these political objectives will be pursued in the 
following two chapters of the LYON 2010 plan. This chapter is divided 
into thirteen subcategories, each a major political objective. These 
thirteen subcategories are as follows:
1. Economic Development
2. University and Research Networks
3. Urban Transport Systems
4. Energy Transport
5. Electronic Communication
6. Housing and Social Life
7. Culture
8. Tourism
9. Commercial Services and Equipment
10. Sport and Leisure
11. Countryside and Natural Spaces
Management
12. Agricultural Land: Economic and
Environmental
13. Active Political Management of Risks,
Problems, and Natural Resources
It is clear, and no surprise, that these thirteen political priorities 
! touch upon almost every major aspect of urban management and are
nearly identical with those points presented by Soldatos. These points 
are examined in detail throughout this thesis and it will therefore 
j only be noted here that Lyon does in fact have a comprehensive
political objective goal for the areas stated. This fulfils one of the 
! main priorities of the Soldatos model of what an "International City"
must possess. It also is an example of the French Government’s desire 
that all major agglomerations have a comprehensive fifteen year 
strategy. The effectiveness and/or competence of these political 
priorities is not as immediately important as the fact that these
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objects exist on paper in an official planning document passed by the 
COURLY.
The third section of LYON 2010, "Le Parti d'Amenagement" is 
subdivided into two chapters. Chapter Six is entitled "Les Principes 
Generaux du Parti d'Amenagement". This chapter discusses the 
strategy of applying the political priorities to spatial action. In brief, 
this chapter discusses every possible way in which Lyon can 
maximize its advantageous position as a European crossroads. Chapter 
Seven, "Application aux Differents Territoires des Principes Generaux 
du Parti d'Amenagement" reveals the six privileged sites in the Lyon 
Agglomeration that will receive the benefit of major specific projects. 
These are:
1. Le Centre Ville
2. Le Plaine de l'Est
3. Les Plateaux et Coteaux Ouest
4. Le Rhone Amont
5. Le Rhone Aval et Plateau Sud-Est
6. Le Val de Saone
These areas are dealt with in detail as the spatial priorities of Lyon. 
The political decisions are to be primarily implemented in these 
locations. Therefore, Lyon has a master political game-plan with the 
exact locations where it will execute these ambitions.
The eighth and final chapter is "Les voies et les moyens de mise 
en oeuvre du Schema Directeur". This chapter discusses the 
implementation of the political priorities upon the chosen spatial 
locales. An example of this would be the major redevelopment 
project being undertaken at Gerland (Chapter Six). This addresses the 
question of what specific actions need to be taken to achieve a goal at 
a particular site? These projects provide concrete results and can be 
monitored and quantified in a manner that is imposible with changing 
perceptions and human/economic flows. When these physical 
projects are completed, they will drastically improve the 
infrastructure of Lyon. The difficult problem remains the ability of 
the political and industrial leaders to devolve any true financial and
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political power from Paris and establish an integrated Rhone-Alpes 
Region within Europe.
This project was not an overnight event. It was begun in 1985 
as a revision by S.E.P.A.L. of an older SDAU urban plan for Lyon. This 
project passed through many forms and titles before its completion 
and debut in the spring of 1990. This five year plus project included 
the participation of numerous official organizations and private 
consultations including a battalion of academics, leaders of industry 
and commerce, and numerous other relevant institutions. This was a 
long debated meticulously-prepared plan that qualifies under 
Soldatos' criteria in every sense of the concept of promoting conscious 
long-term urban planning which links both the public and private 
sectors.
4.44 THE "NICE” REPORT AND CONCLUSIONS
As discussed in Chapter One, Panayotis Soldatos has established 
a research group to study the "New International Cities Era" (NICE). 
One of the cities studied in this project is Lyon. A team of researchers 
from l'Institut d'Urbanisme, l'Universite Lumiere Lyon II, la 
Laboratoire d'Economie des Transports, l'Institut de Recherche 
Economique, Production, Developpement, and l'Universite P. Mendes- 
France Grenoble II was assembled to produce a report for the NICE 
project on the "International City" status of Lyon.
Among other research done by the Lyon NICE research team, a 
panel of experts was consulted concerning the "International City" 
status of Lyon. These experts were queried on the importance of local 
politics in enabling a city to attain "International Status". These 
experts stressed a number of interesting points that need to be 
recognized by the political leaders of Lyon. The first point was that 
the city, not the region, had the responsibility to act and create a 
positive image. Lyon can not expect to use the successful image of the 
Rhone-Alpes Region as a replacement for its own lack of a positive 
image. Lyon, the city, is responsible for crafting its own image and 
plan of action.
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This inability of the Rhone-Alpes Region’s image to be 
transferred to Lyon, according to these experts, provides a mixed 
blessing for Lyon. An advantage to this theory is that the city must 
pursue a vigorous agenda to establish its own credentials instead of 
relying upon the region’s. The disadvantage is that the Rhone-Alpes 
Region has a substantially superior image and sense of 
intemationality than does Lyon, especially around the agglomerations 
of Geneva and Grenoble (Kukawka, 1989). Lyon will doubtless 
continue in its effort to unite the region under the influence of Lyon 
but these experts are in agreement that Lyon, not the region, must 
present the vision and image of intemationality needed to achieve its 
stated objective; to become an international "Eurocity". However, it is 
clear that the optimal scenario remains a cohesive and integrated 
linkage between Lyon and the entire region to promote the 
international ambitions of both Lyon and the Rhone-Alpes.
4.5 ELECTIONS OF 1992
During the course of 1992 there were two major national 
political events. The first, the regional elections held on March 22, 
1992, was to elect members to the 22 regional councils in France. The 
second, the national referendum on the Treaty of Maastricht, asked 
the French voters to state "Oui" if they supported the Treaty 
concerning closer European integration or "Non" if they opposed the 
Treaty. These two sets of elections proved quite volatile, sparking 
national debates on important and emotional issues. The high voter 
participation rate was reflective of the popular interest in these 
issues.
4 .51  REGIONAL ELECTIONS
Within the context of Lyon as a European or "International City", 
the regional elections of March 22, 1992 proved disappointing in that 
this issue was conspicuously absent. The political leaders of Lyon 
along with the regional authorities consistently stress the importance 
of "Europe" to the further development of Lyon and the Rhone-Alpes 
Region, however, this topic was never raised as a campaign issue 
during the regional elections.
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This regional election, to establish the 156 members of the 
Rhone-Alpes Regional Assembly, might well have been expected to 
focus on issues of importance to the region's future; closer 
institutional links with the European Community and other major 
European regions, the importance of expanding intra-regional 
cooperation, the status of major infrastructural projects, redefining 
the region’s relationship with Paris and other French regions or 
examining and debating long range regional strategy such as the
S.E.P.A.L. LYON 2010 plan. However, these topics of profound interest 
to the political leaders of both Lyon and the Rhone-Alpes Region 
during normal operating conditions were invisible issues during the 
regional election campaign
The regional election campaign was dominated by national 
political issues. The dominant issues in this election were immigration 
and the increasing strength of the Front National (F.N., an extreme 
right political party headed by Jean-Marie Le Pen), unemployment, 
the rise of the environmental parties and the increasing unpopularity 
of the governing Parti Socialiste (P.S.). Underlying these issues was a 
strong anti-government attitude by the French populace as a whole. 
These national issues led to a much larger campaign than had been 
anticipated and much higher voter turnout than predicted. Voter 
participation was 68.71% in the 1992 regional elections as opposed to 
the regional elections of 1986 where barely 50% of the voters cast a 
ballot.
The regional elections of March 22, 1992 were essentially a 
national campaign fought over the few major issues stated. This 
election was a preview of the national legislative election of March 
1993. A closer examination of certain voting trends and exit polls will 
illustrate a complete lack of regional focus in this campaign. Regional 
issues that regional leaders discuss and prioritise during the rest of 
the year have absolutely no interest or consequence to local voters 
during an election.
The results of these regional elections were dramatic. There 
were major electoral shifts as compared with the regional elections of
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1986. The composition of the Rhone-Alpes Regional Assembly has 
been greatly altered (Figures 4.2 & 4.3). The largest party in the new 
Regional Assembly is La Union Pour la France (U.P.F). headed by the 
past president of the Regional Assembly, Charles Millon (U.D.F.-P.R.). 
The U.P.F. is a coalition of the three major centre-right parties in the 
Rhone-Alpes Region; La Union de Defense de la France (U.D.F.), La 
Rassemblement Pour la Republic (R.P.R.) and the Lyon based La 
Nouvelle Democracie (N.D.) headed by Michel Noir. These three 
parties were proportionally represented on the U.P.F. list and will 
collaborate (in theory) as the major party of the new Regional 
Assembly. However, this centre-right governing coalition lost 7 seats 
from its total in the previous Regional Assembly reflecting the overall 
decline of the mainstream political parties during this election. With 
65 seats in the new Regional Assembly the U.P.F. falls far short of the 
79 votes needed for an absolute majority. Various compromises and 
coalitions with other parties, notably the environmental parties, will 
be needed if any meaningful business is to be conducted.
Le Parti Socialiste (P.S.) lost substantial ground in the Rhone- 
Alpes Region, and in France as a whole. The Rhone-Alpes list, headed 
by Gilbert Chabroux, Mayor of Villeurbanne, lost 12 seats in the 
Regional Assembly dropping from 39 seats in the previous Regional 
Assembly to 27 in the current Regional Assembly. This was indicative 
of the collapse throughout France of popular support for the P.S. 
Nationally, the party of President Mitterrand attracted a mere 16.42% 
of the vote, its lowest total since its creation at Epinay in 1961. This 
was a forceful statement of the unpopularity of the government and 
of politicians in general. This turn around currently leaves the P.S. as 
the third largest party in the Rhone-Alpes Regional Assembly behind 
both the U.P.F. and the F.N. Also of note on the left was the continued 
decline of Le Parti Communiste Frangais (P.C.F.) which lost two seats 
(13 to 11) in the Regional Assembly.
The older more established mainstream political parties all 
registered losses in these regional elections, particularly evident in 
the huge decline of the P.S. This is reflective of the general anger and 
distrust of the populace of politicians and the political process. An 
exit poll of 4,000 voters compiled by Ifop-Europe 1-Le Figaro during
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the regional elections showed that 47% of the respondents did not 
have confidence in their politicians (Table 4.3). These percentages 
were even higher (56%-67%) among those who voted for non- 
traditional parties (N.B. Non-traditional parties include the F.N., Les 
Verts and La Generation Ecologie). This large number of dissatisfied 
voters were attracted in large numbers to these non-traditional 
parties as the final election counts indicated.
Table 4.3 
Voter lack of confidence
Question: Generally speaking, are you confident or not tha t French 
politicians can solve the problems of the country?
Total PCF PS/
DVG
GE VERT RPR/
UDF
FN
Yes, 1 have 
confidence
33% 31 56 29 20 36 15
No, 1 don't have 
confidence
47% 48 24 56 63 43 67
No comment 20% 21 20 15 17 21 18
Question: Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the functioning of 
democracy in France?
Total PCF PS/
DVG
GE VERT RPR/
UDF
FN
S atis fied 33% 30 57 49 37 28 11
D issa tisfied 49% 56 25 39 49 52 73
No comment 18% 14 18 12 14 20 16
Source: Ifop-Europe 1-Le Figaro, 23 Mars, 1992.
Not only are the French voters lacking confidence in their 
politicians but they are dissatisfied with the functions of democracy in 
France (Table 4.3). Of the voters questioned in this same Ifop-Europe 
1-Le Figaro exit poll, 49% stated that they were not satisfied with the
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functions of democracy in France while a mere 33% expressed 
satisfaction. The dissatisfaction of the French electorate transcends a 
lack of faith in politicians (no trivial matter) but calls into question 
the fundamental manner in which democracy functions in France.
This is indeed a serious issue which is particularly documented by the 
73% of F.N. supporters who registered dissatisfaction with the 
functions of democracy. This is a powerful vein of political 
malcontent that has been exposed and effectively exploited by the 
F.N.
The substantial gains of these three non-traditional parties 
needs to be explained in greater detail to understand why local and 
regional issues were viewed as wholly irrelevant during this 
campaign. Nationwide, as well as in the Rhone-Alpes Region, the F.N. 
and the two environmental parties made the largest gains.
Nationwide the F.N. polled 14% of the vote and the two environmental 
parties split 15% of the vote. This 29% of the national vote represents 
a significant number of voters who are prepared to abandon 
mainstream political parties to support essentially single issue parties: 
immigration and the environment respectively.
In the Rhone-Alpes, the F.N. polled better than the party did on 
the national level. Led by Bruno Gollinisch, the European Member of 
Parliament for the Rhone Departement, the F.N. Rhone-Alpes managed 
to become, arguably, the largest party in the Rhone Departement.
This includes most of the Lyon agglomeration. In the Rhone 
Departement the F.N. won 20.87% of the vote which placed it well 
ahead of the P.S. (12.93%) and behind only the centre-right U.P.F. 
coalition of three parties that polled a combined 33.05% of the vote. 
This strong showing included a number of outright victories in the 
blue collar suburbs of the south and south-east including Saint-Priest 
(F.N.-31.22%), Vaulx-en-Velin (F.N.-30.95%), Venissieux (F.N.-24.54%) 
and a virtual draw with the P.S. (23.79%) and U.P.F. (22.97%) in 
Villeurbanne (F.N.-22.35%). These working suburbs of Lyon, with a 
heavy immigrant population, high unemployment and low living 
standards were fertile ground for the F.N. to capitalize with its anti­
foreigner, anti-Europe message. Even in Lyon proper, the F.N. placed 
second behind the U.P.F. with 20.21% of the vote.
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The success of the F.N. in this regional election was the 
dominating topic both before and after the vote. The F.N. linked 
immigration with unemployment thereby mixing the two most 
volatile issues in France. Except for the two environmental parties, 
which will be discussed next, both the P.S. and the centre-right 
coalition defined their campaigns around their position vis-a-vis the 
F.N. The P.S. alleged that the centre-right would cooperate with the 
F.N. once in power and that the P.S. was the only party capable of 
defending France from the evils of the F.N. The centre-right 
campaigned on a platform of no cooperation with the F.N. linked with 
a threat that only the centre right could hope to hold the F.N. at bay 
(The centre-right also incorporated its own veiled anti-foreigner bias 
into the campaign to attract F.N. supporters).
Having the F.N. dictate the tone and agenda of the campaign not 
only gave the F.N. a huge amount of publicity but narrowed 
considerably the focus of the campaign. The F.N. is opposed to greater 
European integration which led the other parties to ignore the whole 
question of Europe for fear of further alienating an already 
disgruntled populace. The issue of European integration is also one 
that provokes a hostile response among rural and blue collar voters 
whose support the mainstream parties deemed crucial if they were 
going to avert an election day disaster. The whole issue of European 
integration, regional linkages and other grand multi-national plans 
were therefore completely absent from the political debate during the 
regional elections.
The other non-traditional political movement that made 
significant gains was the environmentalists. This movement is 
divided, almost equally, between Les Verts and La Generation Ecologie 
(G.E).. Between them, these two environmental parties won 14.37% of 
the national vote. This represents the third largest national political 
party if the voting totals of these similar single issue party’s are 
combined. This places the environmentalists a mere 2% (16,42% vs. 
14.37%) behind the P.S. The gains produced by the environmentalists 
were also substantially greater than those registered by the F.N. 
regardless of the medias focus on the F.N. The F.N. nationwide gained 
4% of the vote over the 1986 regional elections. The
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environmentalists increased their share of the electorate from 2.6% in 
the 1986 regional elections to 14.37% during the 1992 regional 
election. This provides another indication of the dissatisfaction among 
many French voters with the mainstream political parties.
In the Rhone-Alpes Regional Assembly the environmentalists 
transformed their electoral success into 21 seats. After the 1986 
regional elections they held a single seat on the Regional Assembly. 
This represents enough seats to provide a voting majority along with 
the U.P.F. thus giving the environmentalists tremendous influence. 
This 19 seat gain is the largest in the Rhone-Alpes Regional Assembly 
though the 17 seat gain produced by the F.N. is similarly striking. 
These two non-traditional parties were able to transform their 
popularity into seats in the Regional Assembly because the regional 
elections were determined by Proportional Representation. However, 
the national Elections of March 1993 were not determined by 
Proportional Representation and neither the F.N. nor the 
environmental parties won a single seat in the National Assembly.
With the main focus of this regional election being the 
dissatisfaction of the French voters and the rise of non-traditional 
political parties, the issues and questions that actually concern the 
Rhone-Alpes Region and discussions of "Europe" were virtually 
ignored. In Lyon, Le Parti Liberal Europeen was all but ignored and 
gained only 1% of the vote. An Ifop-Europe 1-Le Figaro exit poll on 
the day of the regional elections asked the voter to choose the two 
problems on this list that most influenced their vote. The results 
(Table 4.4) show a preoccupation with internal national affairs though 
it must be noted that no regional issue questions were included in the 
exit poll (Is this symbolic of the dominance of national issues during 
the regional elections or just another Parisian oversight?)
Only 8% of the 4,000 voters polled listed the construction of 
Europe as one of their two major priorities during the election. The 
highest support for the construction of Europe, 11% each, was from 
the two major mainstream political parties, the P.S. and the centre- 
right coalition. The non-traditional political parties showed negligible 
interest in the concept of Europe. Among the problems of concern to
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the voters, only the position of France in the world (8%) and 
Insecurity (7%, but 22% by F.N. voters) ranked as low on the voter 
priority scale as did the construction of Europe.
Table 4.4 
Voter’s concerns
Question: Of the following problems, which are the two that m ost 
influenced your vote during today's regional elections?
Total PCF PS/ GE VERT RPR/ FN 
DVG UDF
Protecting the 
environm ent
21% 8 18 69 68 10 6
Level of purchasing 
oow er
13% 25 12 6 8 15 7
Im m igration 15% ? 5 D 4 11 60
Education 15% 16 19 11 9 18 5
Social ineaualities 12% 31 19 7 12 / 8
Unem ploym ent 24% 35 29 15 14 25 22
The construction of 
"Eurooe"
8% 1 11 9 7 11 2
Insecuritv 7% 5 3 3 1 8 22
The rise of the 
extrem e right
14% 25 25 20 19 9
G overnm ent scandals 41% oo JO 34 36 46 41
The place of France in 
the w orld
8% n / 5 6 13 6
No comment
Source: Ifop-Europe 1-Le Figaro, 23 Mars, 1992.
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The most important issue to the voters (41%) was the political 
scandals and affairs that have rocked French politics recently; another 
clear indication of widespread voter dissatisfaction with politicians. 
This issue commanded tremendous attention from all political parties 
and cut across all party lines. Unemployment, a perennial concern to 
French voters, was the second most significant (24%) problem in the 
mind of the French voter.
The specialised issues, or those clearly represented by a single 
issue party, also ranked highly due to their overwhelming specialised 
support. The problem of protecting the environment was extremely 
significant to those voting for the environmental parties (69% and 68% 
respectively). Not surprisingly, 60% of the followers of the F.N. listed 
immigration as a major problem thus elevating its overall status in 
the survey.
Such issues as education, spending power, social equality and 
the rise of the extreme right concerned the average voter to a much 
greater extent than did the construction of Europe or any other 
regional issue. Within the Rhone-Alpes, the construction of Europe, 
regional linkages, infrastructural projects and other major stated 
ambitions that will consume the time of the Regional Assembly were 
entirely ignored. One could make an argument that this is yet another 
example of the domination of Paris over the regions; even regional 
elections are overshadowed by national issues from the capital.
The 1992 regional elections were dominated by the increasing 
popularity of the F.N., the environmental parties and national issues 
that were later rehashed during the national legislative elections of 
March 1993. It is unfortunate that the local and regional voters were 
unable to voice an opinion as to what course the agenda of their 
Regional Assembly will take over the next six years. Nor is it clear 
that the elections have produced a Regional Assembly with a priority 
commitment to regional affairs. Having been elected on the basis of 
national issues, the new regional councillors have stated no specific 
regional agenda. This could prove detrimental to the progress of the 
Rhone-Alpes over the next six years.
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4.52 NATIONAL REFERENDUM ON MAASTRICHT
The second major political event in France in 1992 was the 
national referendum on the Maastricht Treaty for greater European 
integration. The French voters were asked to vote "Oui" or "Non" on 
whether France should ratify the Maastricht Treaty. This turned out 
to be a much closer referendum than anticipated by the government 
and led to an aggressive campaign by both sides and a 70% voter 
turnout. In the context of Lyon and the Rhone-Alpes, this referendum 
provided an excellent opportunity to examine the region’s support for 
the concept of "Europe". Lyon's political leaders argued that the city’s 
future is dependent upon closer integration with Europe; this 
referendum provided a unique opportunity to determine whether the 
people of Lyon and the Rhone-Alpes Region agreed with the leaders of 
local government on this issue.
Other major political factors became significant during the 
referendum campaign: would people vote against the Treaty in the 
hope that President Mitterrand would resign as did President 
DeGaulle in 1969? Would the farmers and unemployed fear the 
effects of greater European integration? Would the call of the F.N. to 
reject the Treaty for nationalistic reasons sway many voters?
However, the vote essentially remained grounded in the issue of 
closer European integration. In Lyon, the local authorities actively 
campaigned for approval of the referendum on the grounds that Lyon 
was a "Eurocity" and that it was critical to the city’s future that the 
referendum be passed. A brief examination of the national results is 
needed before a more detailed examination can be conducted of the 
results at both the regional level and within the Lyon agglomeration.
Nationally, the Maastricht referendum passed by a narrow 
margin with 51.04% of the vote in favour of the referendum and 
48.95% of the vote opposed with a higher than expected 70% voter 
participation rate. This is not an overwhelming endorsement of the 
Maastricht Treaty by the French and reflected deep divisions within 
the population. Regions with above average unemployment voted 
overwhelmingly against the Treaty as did rural France. The Treaty
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won its broadest support from white collar workers and the residents 
of the major urban agglomerations.
Politically, there were distinct voting trends visible among the 
major national parties. The parties in the middle of the political 
spectrum provided strong support for the Treaty while those parties 
on both the far left and the far right voted overwhelmingly against 
the Treaty. An exit poll conducted by Le Point of 1531 voters gives a 
broad perspective of the voting habits of the larger parties (Table 
4.5). The P.S. (82% support) and U.D.F. (64% support) strongly 
supported the Treaty, reflecting the mainstream view that closer 
European integration was beneficial to France. On the extremes, both 
the P.C.F. (76% against) and the F.N. (87% against) were vehemently 
opposed to the Treaty for reasons of unemployment and nationalism 
respectively. As with the regional elections of March 1992, these two 
highly charged issues were quite visible during the referendum 
campaign and served as an effective rallying point against the Treaty.
Table 4.5
Voting trends of the major French political parties 
on the referendum of September 20, 1992.
OUI NON
24% P.C.F. 76%
82% P.S. 18%
68% GR 32%
50% VERTS 50%
64% UJDJF. 36%
42% R.P.R. 58%
13% F.N. 87%
Source: Le Point. 19 Septembre-1992, No. 1044.
On the regional level, Rhone-Alpes was one of only nine regions 
that voted in support of the Treaty while thirteen regions opposed. 
This is one indication of the support that the voters of Rhone-Alpes 
have towards the concept of a closer integration between themselves
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and Europe. Rhone-Alpes voted 54.42% in favour of the Treaty and 
45.57% opposed. This was one of the strongest regional results in 
favour of the Treaty in all of France. Upon closer examination of voter 
returns, of the eight departements in the region only Drome, a 
predominantly rural departement, voted against the Treaty (50.45% 
against).
Table 4 .6
Urban support for the referendum within the Rhone-Alpes
AGGLOMERATION OUI NON
LYON 60.20% 39.80%
GRENOBLE 63.44% 36.56%
ST. ETIENNE 54.06% 45.94%
CHAMBERY 58.73% 41.27%
ANNECY 64.46% 35.54%
VIENNE 56.12% 43.88%
Source: Lvon Liberation. 21 Septembre, 1992.
The Departement of Rhone voted strongly in support of the 
Treaty with 55.91% of the vote as "Oui". Within the city of Lyon the 
figures were even more in favour of European integration, as they 
were in all major cities in the region (Table 4.6) The blue collar 
suburbs typified by Venissieux and Vaulx-En-Velin were exceptions 
to this voting trend as is to be expected from areas that strongly 
support the P.C.F. and the F.N. On the whole, these numbers illustrate 
the level of popular support attached to the concept of Europe within 
Lyon and the other major agglomerations of the Rhone-Alpes Region, 
j The desire by Lyon’s leaders to build for Lyon a greater European role
| is to some degree shared by the general population. An
| overwhelming defeat of the referendum on closer European
| integration by the residents of Lyon would have severely damaged
I the credibility of local leaders and seriously inhibited the city's many 
future plans to increase its links with Europe.
This level of support among the populace is critical to Lyon if it 
wishes to become a "Eurocity". This popular support is another of the
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criteria in the Soldatos model of an "International City". Soldatos 
argues that it is vital that a city not only have political leaders with 
the vision and will-power to promote and develop an "International 
City" but the populace must also be aware and supportive of the 
overall concept and the specifics needed to achieve that goal.
4.6 SUMMARY
The political situation in Lyon in the context of the 
agglomeration's international ambitions is, not surprisingly, confused. 
The problems are rooted in two specific aspects of the French political 
system. The first problem is the large range of official and semi­
official administrative and planning units that control a certain spatial 
area or mandate that is related to Lyon's overall international plan. 
The overlapping responsibilities, political fiefdoms and habitual maze 
of regulators all with a specific agenda make it difficult to formulate a 
coherent and effective policy to promote Lyon's international 
ambitions.
The second historical political problem in France that affects the 
authority of Lyon to pursue its international agenda is the centrism of 
the French State. The concentration of political power and decision­
making power in Paris and the national government places Lyon in a 
dependent situation, unable to take effective decisions regarding its 
future without being effected by Paris. The resolution of these two 
fundamental problems would require a major overhaul of the French 
political system that would decentralize numerous responsibilities to 
the local level while establishing the agglomeration as a political unit 
with substantial administrative powers. In the short to medium- 
term, this appears unrealistic. Lyon must continue to pursue its 
international agenda within the limiting confines of the French 
political system.
Within the context of the Soldatos model of an "International 
City", Lyon has succeeded in fulfiling the basic requirements. Lyon, 
through COURLY, has established a greater degree of political 
cooperation within the agglomeration than most other French 
agglomerations. This is especially relevant because of the failure by
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Grenoble and St. Etienne to establish a similar political structure. 
COURLY, and its extension, the RUL, enable the Lyon agglomeration to 
plot a relatively cohesive urban strategy within the wider 
agglomeration which is mandatory for Lyon to effectively pursue its 
international ambitions.
Lyon has also effectively established semi-official agencies 
whose mandate is to promote Lyon's international agenda. The C.C.I.L. 
and its international promotional arm, ADERLY, have succeeded in 
effectively managing and promoting Lyon's economic growth and 
image both in the Lyon area and abroad. This fulfils the requirement 
in the Soldatos model that stipulates that a city must possess such 
organizational and promotional agencies to achieve true international 
status.
Additionally, Lyon can justifiably claim the support of the 
majority of the population in its attempts at internationalizing the 
agglomeration. The support of the local business leaders towards 
Lyon's international ambitions is critical for financial and promotional 
support. The strong local support for the Maastricht Treaty is another 
indication that the populace as a whole broadly supports the agenda 
to promote Lyon as an "Eurocity".
Politically, Lyon is successfully pursuing its international 
ambitions within the constricting parameters of the French political 
system. Lyon has met the political objectives stated in the Soldatos 
model to a significant degree and is successfully pursuing an 
international agenda.
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The potential of Lyon to interact in a trans-frontier manner is a 
function of spontaneous and structured factors. Spontaneous factors 
might include, for example, research collaboration and student 
exchanges with European Universities. This may emanate from 
European Community programs, but the initiative rests with 
individuals and their institutions to respond in a spontaneous manner. 
At the other extreme, the opening of new air links is based on hard 
commercial decisions within the structured context of prevailing route 
licensing arrangements. Whether spontaneous or structured, it may 
be argued that for Lyon to achieve a greater European role, certain 
"facilitators" must exist, whether they be human, financial, corporate, 
or physical (in the sense of fixed infrastructure). This section seeks to 
explore the "facilitators" that may promote a greater European role for 
Lyon, their strengths and weaknesses.
The strategic plan, LYON 2010, can only be regarded as a 
political policy statement if its aspirations are underpinned by 
facilitating mechanisms. By far the most obvious manifestation of 
trans-national inter-action is the transport infrastructure (including 
telecommunication). This, in the broadest sense, includes the capacity 
to interchange people, goods and information across European 
frontiers. This chapter thus commences by analyzing the logistical 
capacity of the transportation infrastructure focusing on and radiating 
from Lyon. In particular the question must be answered as to 
whether Lyon is simply a well positioned crossroads or whether it has 
a function as a European node: a place of transit or a point of origin 
and destination. Historically Lyon has acted as a crossroads for road 
and rail routes, but the technology of these modes of transport has 
evolved rapidly; motorways and high speed trains have transformed 
surface travel arguably to a greater degree than has occurred in air 
travel.
I l l
CHAPTER FIVE 
THE TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE
Transportation is one of the critical functions of modem society. 
Every study conducted to rank cities in some hierarchical order 
stresses the spatial location and transportation infrastructure of the 
city in question. The ability of a city to handle large amounts of goods 
and people is one of the most important indicators in both the 
Soldatos and the DATAR/RECLUS models. The accessibility of a city by 
route, rail, air and water is a prime determinant of the attractiveness 
of a city and its ability to function as a major international centre.
At a European Community sponsored conference in October, 
1991, representatives from 30 European countries discussed the 
future of European transport. The conference estimated that route 
traffic could increase by 40% over the next 10 years. Some routes 
servicing the recently restructured Eastern Europe could see an 
increase of 1,000% over the same period. The conference called for a 
policy to integrate all forms of transportation (road, rail, river and air) 
within Europe and to study the environmental impact of such 
expansion (International Herald Tribune. 1-11-1991). Effectively 
handling the increased pressure on the transport infrastructure and 
intelligently planning for the future will be one criteria that separates 
the dynamic "Eurocities" from the passive cities. A close study of 
Lyon's current infrastructure and the projects either under 
construction or being planned over the next twenty years will offer a 
good indication of the future position of Lyon within a more 
integrated European transport network (Plassard, 1989).
5.1 THE AUTOROUTE SYSTEM
France currently operates 8,590 kilometres of autoroute and has 
committed to build a further 2,740 kilometres of autoroute by the end 
of the century (Bemadet. 1988). This, along with the Spanish national 
plan for the nineties, is the most ambitious autoroute building project 
in the European Community. Currently the Rhone-Alpes Region has 
903 kilometres of autoroutes which represents 10.5% of the national 
total (Figure 5.1). This leaves the region as one of the better served in
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France with 170 kilometres of autoroute per million inhabitants. The 
new national autoroute plan calls for an additional 504 kilometres of 
autoroutes to be constructed in the region. This represents 18.4% of 
all new autoroute construction in France and will give the region 270 
kilometres of autoroute per million inhabitants (Chassandel991).
This ratio is quite high by French standards and is a definite addition 
to the region's physical transportation infrastructure.
More than with any other form of transport, the favourable 
geographic position of Lyon assures the city a substantial amount of 
international route traffic. Examination of international freight traffic 
via road reveals that over 7.4 million tons of exports and 9.45 million 
tons of imports are trucked in the region annually (Reperes et 
Tendances Economiques. Janvier 1991). Table 5.1 shows the major 
distribution of trucked imports and exports concerning the Rhone- 
Alpes and the rest of the European Community. Italy and Germany 
are the major trading partners of the Rhone-Alpes Region and this is 
reflected in the truck traffic numbers.
TABLE 5.1
Flows of Truck Traffic in the Rhone-Alpes Region, 1989
Country Export Tons Import Tons
Italy 2,297,000 1,762,000
Germany 971,000 1,256,000
United Kingdom 380,000 556,000
Netherlands 207,000 419,000
Spain 302,000 386,000
Total 7,418,341 9,449,378
Domestic truck traffic tonnage entering the region - 18,096,793 
Domestic truck traffic tonnage leaving the region - 18,319,612 
Total tonnage of internal circulation in the region - 134,366,543
Source: D irecteur Regionale de TEquipement Rhone-Alpes, 1991.
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Through the two tunnels of Mont Blanc and Frejus that link the 
Rhone-Alpes with Italy, 40% of the traffic is heavy truck traffic and 
these numbers are increasing annually. In 1985, 714 trucks used the 
Frejus Tunnel on a daily basis, adding up to 260,000 trucks per year. 
In 1990, 1,480 trucks per day, or 540,084 truck per year used the 
Frejus Tunnel. This represents a 21% increase in annual truck traffic 
through the Frejus Tunnel. The Mont Blanc Tunnel recorded a more 
modest 12% annual increase over this same period but handles more 
total traffic. In 1990, 2,130 trucks per day, or 777,426 trucks per 
year passed through the Mont Blanc Tunnel. Total traffic through the 
Mont Blanc Tunnel in 1990 was 1,895,061 vehicles (Directeur 
Regionale de FEquipement Rhone-Alpes, 1991.). These two tunnels 
are reaching saturation point, causing long traffic delays and heavy 
pressure upon local resources and the environment.
National truck transport numbers are even larger. Over 18 
million tons of goods were trucked in or out of the region in 1989. A 
further 134 million tons were shipped by truck within the region. 
Domestically, Rhone-Alpes1 major regional trading partners are, in 
order, Provence-Alpes-Cote d'Azur, Ile-de-France, and Nord-Pas-de- 
Calais (Tableaux de l'Economie Rhone-Alpes. 1991). All three of these 
regions utilize the major north-south autoroute passages that are 
currently so crowded. On the A43, 25% of all traffic is heavy trucks. 
On the A6-A7 through central Lyon 9% of all traffic consists of heavy 
trucks and these numbers are increasing. Adding to Lyon's traffic 
congestion is the additional 82,000 heavy trucks that circulate within 
the city on a daily basis (Rhone-Alpes dans l'espace europeen. No 1, 
Octobre 1990). This amount of truck traffic in and around Lyon is 
potentially paralysing.
There are two forms of traffic that Lyon must handle. The first 
is local traffic. An estimated 1.5 million cars per day circulate in 
Lyon. The second is transit traffic; those vehicles that are just passing 
through the city. It is estimated that 300,000 cars per day pass 
through Lyon (Morelon, 1989). The main explanation for this high 
volume of traffic is that currently, the A6-A7 autoroute is the only 
north-south autoroute linkage through Eastern France. The majority 
of all autoroute traffic that travels from Northern Europe to Southern
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Europe passes through Lyon, literally through the middle of the city. 
Since the eastern by-pass was recently opened in April 1993, this will 
help reduce traffic congestion in central Lyon and the Fourviere 
Tunnel. The Fourviere tunnel is infamous for its lengthy traffic jams 
at all hours of the day and night. This is not surprising considering 
that 100,000 cars per day passed through the Fourviere Tunnel in 
1988, with another 72,000 cars per day using the Croix-Rouge Tunnel 
(Morelon, 1989).
The Rhone corridor autoroute has reached saturation levels and 
the French national autoroute plan is a direct reflection of this fact. 
Outside the Rhone-Alpes Region, the A9 autoroute (to follow the route 
of RN9) is planned to run north-south between Clermont-Ferrand and 
the A9 east of Beziers. This, in conjunction with the current A71 
autoroute between Clermont-Ferrand and Orleans, will complete a 
badly needed north-south autoroute connection between the Paris 
Basin and the Mediterranean coast (Bethemont. 1990). The planned 
expansion of the N20 from Vierzon to Toulouse through Limoges to a 
four lane autoroute will also help spread the north-south traffic in 
France and facilitate intra-urban connections. These additions will 
help reduce the traffic pressure on Lyon, especially during the peak 
travel seasons.
In the Lyon area itself a number of autoroute projects are 
planned or under construction. The A6 through the Saone Valley and 
the A7 down the Rhone Valley are being widened from two lanes to 
three in each direction. The eastern by-pass is a new autoroute 
comprised of three sections. The A46 North is a 25 kilometre stretch 
of autoroute that links the A6 with the A42 to the north of Lyon. The 
second section, the former CD300, is a 15 kilometre autoroute link 
between the A42 and the A43 to the east of Lyon. The final section, 
the A46 South, opened in April 1993, completes the eastern by-pass 
with a 22 kilometre autoroute link between the A43 and the A7 to 
the south of Lyon at the intersection of the A46 to St. Etienne 
(Bethemont. 1990). This 62 kilometre eastern by-pass is intended to 
ease both the local and transit traffic that currently passes through 
central Lyon.
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Lyon-Satolas International Airport now has direct autoroute 
access from the north with the A46 now connected with the A42.
This will greatly improve access to Lyon-Satolas for those people in 
the north of the region, particularly those living in Ain and the 
Savoyard Departements (Rhone-Alpes dans respace europeen. No 1, 
Octobre 1990). This will also provide these areas access to the TGV 
without having to access central Lyon when the TGV station at Lyon- 
Satolas opens in 1993. The A46 not only opens the transport hub at 
Lyon-Satolas to the northern half of the region but will also provide 
another north-south autoroute link through the area that by-passes 
Lyon. Lyon-Satolas is also directly connected with the A43 autoroute 
to the south of the airport. The completion of these autoroute 
connections to Lyon-Satolas ensures that the airport is easily 
accessible to the whole region.
The one project that is conspicuous by its absence is the long 
awaited western by-pass around Lyon. There is universal agreement 
that the western by-pass is badly needed but nobody wants this 
autoroute running through their community. The western by-pass 
does not yet have an agreed route and no construction has begun.
One could not even hazard a completion date at this moment. This is 
unfortunate in planning terms for the western by-pass is the logical 
route to handle the north-south transit traffic, being shorter and more 
direct than the eastern by-pass.
Looking at the rest of the Rhone-Alpes Region a number of other 
important autoroute projects are either recently finished or under 
construction. The completion of the A40 from Magon to the Mont 
Blanc Tunnel and the completion of the autoroute project to link the 
six major agglomerations in the region and Geneva has greatly 
improved intra-regional transport and reduced the time/distance 
relationship between these agglomerations.
The completion of these new autoroute projects will make the 
Rhone-Alpes one of the best served region's in France. The recently 
completed A49 project links Grenoble (on the A48) and Valence (on 
the A7). This will not only serve to link these two regional 
agglomeration's but will enable travellers from the south to by-pass
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completely the Lyon urban area on the way to the Alps (Chassande. 
1991). Additionally, the proposed extension of the A51 from 
Grenoble to Aix-en-Provence would connect and facilitate access to 
the major tourist areas of France; the Alps, Provence and the Cote 
d’Azur. This autoroute would also ease traffic considerably on the 
saturated A7 through the Rhone Valley. The A51 is complete from 
Aix-en-Provence to Manosque and is under construction between 
Manosque and Sisteron. Construction on the Grenoble to Sisteron 
section is expected to begin in 1994 (Bethemont 1990). This, another 
north-south autoroute that by-passes the Lyon area, promises to be 
well travelled because of the attractiveness of the route. Whether 
this will ease traffic around Lyon or merely succeed in overcrowding 
and spoiling a beautiful section of Provence, as the environmentalits 
argue, remains to be seen.
The extension of the A43 (Lyon-Chambery) to reach Albertville 
was a direct result of the 1992 Winter Olympic Games being hosted 
by Albertville and the surrounding communities. After the glow of 
the Olympic spotlight fades, Albertville and this section of the French 
Alps will have a direct autoroute link to Lyon and beyond. This is 
advantageous to all skiers who rightfully dread the traffic congestion 
associated with the French Alps. This A43 extension is also projected 
to form the basis of enlarging the N6 to an autoroute that would 
connect with the Frejus Tunnel and the Italian autostrada to Turin 
(Baleste, 1991). This would establish the autoroute link between 
Lyon and Turin which would facilitate increasing trade between these 
two cities, regions, and countries. This would add in solid terms to 
Lyon's position as a European crossroads.
The proposed autoroute from Babigny through Tarare to Anse, 
which will also connect via the four lane RN 82 to Roanne, will connect 
the A6 north of Lyon with the A72 creating a direct link with 
Clermont-Ferrand and eventually with Bordeaux. This will place Lyon 
directly on a major east-west autoroute system and provide another 
direct Paris-Lyon link via the A71 north from Clermont-Ferrand 
(Bethemont. 1990). This will enable Lyon to access West Central 
France and the Atlantic seaboard along with easing the Paris-Lyon 
traffic on the A6 autoroute.
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Also under discussion is an autoroute between Bourg-en-Bresse 
and Dole which would link in directly with both the A31 and the A36. 
These are two major trade access routes into Germany. This would 
connect Dole with Valence (via the A48-A49), the Frejus Tunnel, the 
Mont Blanc tunnel and eventually Southern France via the new A51. 
This would link Germany, Southern France, and Northern Italy 
through the Rhone-Alpes Region without using either the A6 or A7 
nor coming within 50 kilometres of Lyon (Baleste, 1991). It would 
also benefit Lyon by improving its autoroute access to Germany.
Two other autoroute projects are under consideration but have 
yet to receive funding or approval. A proposed autoroute link 
between the A42 and the A43 well to the east of Lyon would serve as 
a useful link between the northern and southern sections of the 
Rhone-Alpes Region. It would, for example, allow direct autoroute 
passage between Bourg-en-Bresse and Grenoble. The second 
projected autoroute would be through the Northern Haute-Savioe.
This would rim south of Annemasse, through Thonon and Evian and 
link up with the Swiss N9 (Rhone-Alpes dans l'Espace Europeen. No 1, 
Octobre 1990). This would complete an autoroute link around Lake 
Geneva and help accommodate the increasing traffic in the rapidly 
growing Northern Haute-Savoie.
Clearly these autoroute projects will greatly increase both 
Lyon's and the region's infrastructure. For Lyon the advantages are 
numerous. First, these new autoroutes will ease the acute traffic 
problems in and around the central city. Secondly, Lyon will be 
further established as an important east-west crossroads to 
complement it's already strong north-south position. Therefore, Lyon 
will improve it's position as a European crossroad while at the same 
time expanding it's intra-regional autoroute links and liberating 
central Lyon from the burdens of substantial amounts of through 
traffic. By committing to construct over 18% of all new national 
autoroutes in the Rhone-Alpes Region, France is clearly recognizing 
and encouraging the importance and needed development of Lyon 
and the Rhone-Alpes Region in a European context.
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5.2 RAILWAY SYSTEMS
5.21 TGV CONNECTIONS
Lyon is in a privileged position geographically in respect to the 
French TGV (Train a Grande Vitesse) rail network and the future 
European-wide high speed train system. In September 1981 France 
launched it's first TGV passenger train. In 1983 the Paris-Lyon route 
was completed, reducing the travel time between the two cities from 
over four hours to two hours (Walsh, 1991). In September 1991 the 
TGV began direct service between Lyon and both Rennes and Nantes 
in Brittany (International Herald Tribune. September 30, 1991). This 
route runs through the major new TGV station at Massy in the 
southern Parisian suburbs. Massy is served by the RER and is thereby 
connected with the entire capital. This essentially increases the 
number of Paris-Lyon TGV connections as well as opening up high­
speed rail access to the Brittany Region. This is the first section to be 
completed in the revised plan for the expansion of the French TGV 
network (Figure 5.2)
On May 14, 1991, a "Comite Interministeriel pour 
l'Amenagement du Territoire " (CIAT) chaired by then Prime Minister 
Michel Rocard passed final modifications on the Schema Directeur 
National des Liaisons Ferroviaires a Grands Vitesse. This latest plan 
for the future TGV network in France replaces and updates the plan 
which was proposed in June 1990 (LeProgres, 16 Mai, 1991). This 
ambitious expansion of the TGV network to include 16 new TGV lines 
will increase the TGV network by 4,700 kilometres. The price of this 
expansion is enormous, 210 billion francs in 1989 francs (Le Progres. 
15 Mai, 1991). The French are heavily investing in the TGV network 
to enable rapid transit between all areas of France, ensure that France 
will be an integral part of the future European high speed rail 
network and to promote the French TGV as the superior model of 
high-speed train and therefore to enjoy the cumulative economic and 
technological effects of being the leader in such a commercially high- 
tech field.
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One example of this positive cumulative effect is that the Texas 
high-speed-rail authority chose the French TGV system over the 
German Inter-City system for a 600 mile high-speed rail route 
connecting Houston, Dallas, and San Antonio. The overall value of this 
contract is $5.8 billion (in 1990 dollars) and is planned to be 
operational by 1998 (Rademaekers, 1991). This is a substantial 
project and is anticipated as a profitable beginning to other such 
cooperative and profitable international projects. The French have 
also won a bid from South Korea to construct a high-speed rail link 
from Seoul to Pusan. Though the initial investments are heavy, the 
various payoffs in these three areas are numerous and cannot be 
calculated in straight monetary terms.
Future high speed rail plans that directly affect Lyon and the 
Rhone-Alpes Region are numerous and highly significant. They 
include the Mediterranean TGV, which will be split into three separate 
projects: the TGV-Provence, a 219 kilometre section between Valence 
and Marseille, the TGV-Cote d'Azur, a 132 kilometre linkage between 
Frejus and Aix-en-Provence, and the TGV-Languedoc-Roussillon, a 
290 kilometre connection between Avignon and the Spanish border 
via Perpignan. The TGV-Rhin-Rhone, the TGV-Trans-Alpine and a 
Geneva-Chambery spur will complete the current round of TGV 
additions that directly effect Lyon (LeProgres, 16 Mai, 1991). These 
four projects represent a massive state financed improvement in the 
local infrastructure that will give a large boost to Lyon's international 
ambitions.
The TGV spur between Geneva and Chambery is a mixed 
blessing to Lyon. The positive factors are that this spur will slightly 
ease rail access between Lyon and Geneva. Direct access from Geneva 
to the main south-east TGV line is currently in abeyance. Among the 
various problems is the amount of Swiss financial contribution to this 
project. The Swiss are not willing to contribute financially to a large 
scale project unless it is manifestly in their best interests. The 
negative effect for Lyon is that this potential Geneva-Chambery line 
will further integrate the Savoyard departements of the Rhone-Alpes 
with Geneva. At this time, an exact route has not been established 
nor has the completion date been discussed. The politics of including
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Geneva with a French TGV project continue to cause delays and 
mutual apprehension.
The Trans-Alpes TGV is a projected linkage of Lyon and Turin, 
through Chambery and Suse, by high speed trains (French TGV’s and 
Italian ETR-450’s). This 261 kilometre route will reduce the overland 
travel time between these two cities to 1:25 hours. Running a high 
speed rail line through the Alps is an ambitious project (Daziano, 
1991). Among other ideas, a two track 50 kilometre tunnel/corridor 
between St Jean-de-Maurienne and Suse is being studied. Despite the 
obvious physical difficulties of the task, the rail authorities and 
governments from both countries are politically and financially 
committed to this linkage. This is also viewed as the major reason 
why Geneva wishes to pursue a TGV spur to Chambery. This TGV 
spur would link Geneva with the Trans-Alpine TGV and therefore 
with Turin and the rest of Italy.
The Trans-Alpes TGV is considered vital to Northern Italy. This 
would provide substantially easier and faster land access to France 
and subsequently to the rest of Northern Europe. Italy has 
historically been economically hampered by the difficulties of land 
transport over the Alps. The Trans-Alpes TGV will go a long way to 
solving this problem for Northern Italy. Lyon is also anxious to enjoy 
the advantages of being 1:25 hours from the industrial centres of 
Northern Italy. Not only will Lyon have direct access to Turin but it 
will also link Lyon in with the entire Italian national rail system with 
connections to such centres as Milan and the rest of the economically 
dynamic Po Valley. This high-speed rail link will enhance Lyon's 
position as the gateway between Northern and Southern Europe and 
as a true European crossroads.
The Mediterranean TGV calls for an extension of the TGV line to 
Valence (due for completion in late 1994) and then further south to 
Avignon where it will then divide. One route will go to Marseille and 
then on to Toulon. There is vigorous opposition to any proposed TGV 
route along this line by the inhabitants living between Marseille and 
Avignon, especially in the agricultural areas. Marseille city leaders 
are desperate for their city to be interlinked with the TGV network.
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The leaders of Marseille fear that without the image and advantages 
of the TGV that their position will further decline and that they will 
become further isolated both in France and in a greater Europe. The 
national government is also loath to leave its largest port and third 
largest agglomeration outside the TGV system. Currently there is no 
set route or construction date on this section of the Mediterranean 
TGV and major political battles loom in the future to establish the 
exact TGV route for Marseille (SNCF, La Lettre du Vovageur.
Novembre 1990). When the 219 kilometre stretch between Valence 
and Marseille is completed it will reduce the rail travel time between 
Lyon and Marseille from 2:45 to 1:25 hours and place Marseille a 
mere 3:00 hours from Paris.
The other eastern section of the Mediterranean TGV, entitled 
TGV-Cote d’Azur, will span the 132 kilometres between Frejus and 
Aix-en-Provence and will serve St. Raphael and Nice. This will place 
Nice 2:30 hours from Lyon and 4:00 hours from Paris via the TGV 
when all phases are completed (SNCF, La Lettre du Vovageur. 
Novembre 1990). Linking the major southern tourist resorts onto the 
national TGV grid will greatly facilitate vacationers throughout the 
year and in theory reduce the traffic on the A7 south of Lyon through 
the Rhone Valley. Plans to continue this line to the east into Italy are 
being resisted by the Italian government at this time.
The Italian government is unconvinced that the construction of 
a high-speed line over such difficult terrain is needed given the costs 
involved. Italy is concentrating more on opening it’s northern 
sections into Austria and Switzerland along with the Turin-Lyon 
connection than it is on the coastal route. Also, the Italian 
government, unlike the French government, does not want to add 
extra pressure to the coastal tourist area of the Italian Riviera. In 
France, many residents of the Cote d'Azur see the TGV line as a way in 
which to bring more tourists into the area and are therefore against 
this TGV expansion. With the Italians resisting this project it will 
become a dead end spur with no international function. This line will 
also have some major political battles to overcome before any 
construction is initiated.
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The western section of the Mediterranean TGV, the TGV 
Languedoc-Roussillon, will cover the 290 kilometre section between 
Avignon and the Spanish border. This line will pass through Nimes, 
Montpellier, Beziers, Narbonne and Perpignan continuing south into 
Spain (LeProgres, 16 Mai, 1991). A link up at the border with a 
Spanish high-speed train to connect with Barcelona is envisaged.
Spain is pushing forward with its own high speed rail network and on 
April 19, 1992 the first high-speed train ran between Madrid and 
Seville at speeds up to 300 kmh. This reduced the travel time 
between these two cities from 6:00 to 3:30 hours (International 
Herald Tribune. November 3, 1991). By linking the French and 
Spanish high-speed rail systems, the Iberian Peninsula will become 
directly linked to Northern Europe. Similarly to Italy, this will help 
alleviate the land based isolation from urban-industrial Northern 
Europe and the rest of the European Community that Spain and 
Portugal have historically endured. Again, the advantage is also 
Lyon’s. Being the major agglomeration between the two halves of 
Europe on the high speed rail line will be of tremendous benefit for 
Lyon in it’s bid for international status by improving it’s international 
crossroads position.
The third major European high-speed rail extension will help 
complete Lyon's access to the rest of Europe and finalize it’s role as a 
European crossroads. The TGV-Rhin-Rhone will, by 1994, place Lyon 
3:00 hours from Lille, under 4:00 hours from Brussels and, via the 
channel tunnel, in direct contact with London. This 425 kilometre link 
between Southern Alsace and the main south-east TGV line will tie in 
with the new German high speed Inter-City rail system, and in theory, 
on into parts of Eastern Europe in the future (Rhone-Alpes dans 
l'Esnace Europeen. No 1, Octobre 1990). This linkage with the core 
economic centres of Europe will serve Lyon well in the future.
A note concerning the linkage with London is needed. The 
British Rail situation is quite a different matter from the SNCF. In 
theory Paris-London will be a three hour train journey. The French 
side of the Channel Tunnel will be complete by 1994. However, in 
October 1991, the British Transport Minister changed the proposed 
route of the new rail service and stated that existing facilities could
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handle the rail traffic until 2005 (The Guardian, October 14, 1991). 
That the existing facilities are adequate to the task is debatable. What 
is incontestable, however, is that until at least 2005 there will be no 
high-speed rail link with Britain. This will keep travel times to 
London prohibitive by train for the continental business traveller.
The TGV and other high speed rail systems are competitive with 
airlines over a time span of 3:30 to 4:00 hours. Anything over a four 
hour journey is generally faster by air. The advantages of the TGV 
are that it connects city centre to city centre, rail service is seldom 
disturbed by weather and is overall less inconvenient than flying (lost 
luggage, advanced check in, security, etc). This 3:30 to 4:00 hour time 
span places Lyon in an advantageous position. Barcelona, Brussels, 
Turin-Milan, Paris and many cities in Western Germany will all be 
accessible from Lyon by TGV in under 4:00 hours. This illustrates the 
importance of the TGV for businessmen and travellers from Lyon. It 
also shows that Lyon is well positioned as a potential central hub and 
meeting place for Europe as a whole. When all of these TGV projects 
are completed, travel times between Lyon and the rest of Europe will 
be drastically reduced thereby greatly shrinking the size of Europe, 
encouraging closer contacts and increasing the attractiveness of Lyon 
as a “Eurocity” (Plassard 1987).
5.22 BASIC RAIL LINES
It is important to realize that, despite it's high profile and 
evident success, the TGV’s have supplemented rather than replaced 
Rapide and Regional rail services. An examination of the number of 
passengers that pass through Perrache and Part-Dieu rail stations in 
Lyon on a daily basis show the importance of the non-TGV rail 
networks (Table 5.2). At Lyon Perrache over half of all passengers 
are utilizing the regional services. Only 4,900 of the 31,950 daily 
passengers at Perrache are TGV passengers. Lyon Part-Dieu is, by 
nature, orientated towards the business traveller and the 12,900 daily 
TGV passengers is a reflection of this fact (Region Urbaine de Lvon. 
Janvier 1991). Out of 35,000 daily passengers at Lyon Part-Dieu, only 
6,900 were on regional passenger service. Also, the SNCF calculates 
that 20% of all TGV passengers either begin or end their journey on a
iL
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Regional train thus adding to the significance of the Regional rail 
system (SNCF, La Lettre du Vovageur. Novembre 1990).
TABLE 5.2
PASSENGER VOLUME BY CATEGORY, LYON 1989
TRANSPORT DAILY PASSENGERS AT DAILY PASSENGERS AT
TYPE LYON PART-DIEU-1989 LYON PERRACHE -1989
REGIONAL 6,900 17,750
RAPIDE + 15,500 9,300
EXPRESS TGV 12,900 4,900
GRAND TOTAL 35,300 31,950
PERCENTAGE
CHANGE 88 TO 89 +5.6% +7.4%
SOURCE: Region Urbaine de Lyon, 1991.
The regional rail networks are also important in that they form 
linkages between Lyon and its hinterland. Regional lines serve to re­
enforce the linkages between Lyon and the other major and minor 
urban centres in the Rhone-Alpes Region. Maintaining and expanding 
(a current project is to re-open old unused lines) the regional rail 
network is important in solidifying and increasing the linkages 
between the urban centres within the Rhone-Alpes Region.
5.23 RAIL FREIGHT TRAFFIC
The SNCF Lyon Region1 is a primary passageway for European 
rail freight. In 1989 a total of 9.23 million tons of freight was carried 
by rail in the SNCF Lyon Region. This figure is divided into 5.32
1 The SNCF Lyon Region consists of the departements of Rhone, Loire, Drome 
and Ardeche along with portions of Isere, Ain and Haute-Loire.
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m illion tons arriving in the region and 3.91 million tons being 
d ispatched from  the region (Daziano, 1991). The two m ajor rail 
fre igh t stations in this region are Venissieux, handling 1.4 million 
tons, and  Siblein, handling 0.9 million tons, both of which are in the 
Lyon agglom eration (Morelon, 1989). Examining the rail freight 
figures for both  Lyon and the COURLY during the la ter half of the 
eighties (Figure 5.3) reveals tha t the overall figures are static. Neither 
Lyon's nor the COURLY's rail freight num bers have significantly 
changed in recen t years. As expected, the Lyon agglom eration 
receives substantially  m ore rail freight than  it disperses.
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The SNCF has introduced a new freight transpo rt system  that 
consists of placing the complete truck (cabs included) on the train. 
This "Route Roulante" system facilitates quick loading and  unloading 
saving both tim e and  m oney (Le M onde. 10 Juin, 1991). The SNCF 
hopes th a t this new  system will lead to a rise in rail fre igh t traffic in 
the coming years. Also, the establishm ent of TGV freight lines has 
increased  the attraction  of rail freight transporta tion  in recen t years 
and  has strengthened  Lyon's position as a European entrepot. 
P lanners hope th a t these new systems will reduce the n u m b er of
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long-haul trucks on the European road network. These new rail 
freight transportation systems could have the double advantage for 
Lyon of increasing rail freight in the area while reducing the number 
of trucks driven through the agglomeration.
A large amount of international rail freight traffic passes 
through Lyon. The "INTERDELTA" is a direct high speed (120 kmh) 
freight service linking the Rhone and Rhine deltas that passes through 
Lyon daily. The "TRES" (Train Rapide et Sur), is another high speed 
freight link, this one between Northern Italy and the Lyon. These are 
but two examples of the special rail freight services that use Lyon 
because of it’s advantageous geographic position and it’s large rail 
freight capacity. Lyon also has daily point-to-point express freight 
lines to Paris, Lille, Rouen, Le Havre and Dunkirk along with a vast 
array of other slower services to the rest of France (Rhone-Alpes dans 
PEspace Europeen. No 1, Octobre 1990).
The combination of these three TGV projects in conjunction with 
the existing networks and freight capabilities leaves Lyon in the 
enviable geographic position of a true European "carrefour". Lyon is 
positioned between the rapidly growing Mediterranean countries and 
the more developed northern nations. Lyon must use the advantage 
of it’s prime location to capitalize on the flow of goods and resources 
that pass through the Lyon agglomeration. Lyon must begin to control 
the commercial flows through the city rather than be relegated to a 
role as a mere staging post.
5.3 INTRA-CITY TRANSPORT SYSTEMS
Transport inside the agglomeration of Lyon is managed by the 
Syndicat Mixte des Transports pour le Rhone et lf Agglomeration 
Lyonnaise (SYTRAL). SYTRAL's area of responsibility includes the 55 
communes of the COURLY and seven neighbouring communes.
SYTRAL controls over 1,100 kilometres of routes including metros, 
bus lines and the cable car services in the city (Les Dossiers 
Communaute Urbaine de Lvon. Juin 1990). In addition, SYTRAL is 
revitalizing urban and suburban rail fines and finking them with other
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modes of public transportation to increase the scope and service of 
Lyon's public transportation.
The metro is the pride of Lyon's urban transportation network; 
a thoroughly modem system that is large, clean, comfortable, fast and 
convenient. In 1991 a fourth metro line was opened. line 'D' services 
13 stations between Venissieux and Gorge de Loup in twenty minutes 
and connects with two metro lines “A” and “B”. This new 12 kilometre 
line brings the total network to 26.2 kilometres (Les Dossiers 
Communaute Urbaine de Lyon. Juin 1990). line 'D' also connects with 
two suburban rail stations. This is a large step in the plan to connect 
the metro directly to the suburbs by using existing rail lines. This will 
facilitate access to central Lyon and reduce vehicle traffic in the 
central city.
In the future, Lyon plans to increase the length and density of 
its metro system. Included in the scope of this ambitious project are 
the vitally needed metro connections to Lyon-Satolas International 
Airport, Eurexpo Exhibition Centre, Gerland Technopole and other 
outlying areas of importance. Without connecting these areas by 
metro they will remain isolated from the city centre and under­
utilized. Currently the only transport to either Lyon-Satolas or 
Eurexpo is a long shuttle bus ride from either train station at a cost of 
30-40 francs in each direction. Unfortunately these metro lines will 
not grow overnight. The metro will improve line by line over the next 
20 years but the current weakness of limited length and density of 
the system will hamper Lyon's inter-city transport in the immediate 
future.
5 .4  INLAND NAVIGATION
Pierre Savey, Directeur General of the Compagnie Nationale du 
Rhone (CNR), visualizes river and canal transport recovering the 
position as a major form of commercial transport that it has lost in the 
last twenty five years (Savv. 1991). River transport was ill-suited to 
change in the past not only because of fixed routes but also because of 
a visible lack of flexibility by the maritime managers and 
professionals. Recently this has been changing and a number of
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technological and infrastructural improvements have led to a modest 
revival in fluvial transport (Figure 5.4). This revival is not confined to 
the traditional customers of water transport: sand and gravel, coal and 
hydrocarbons. The transport of chemical and metal products, 
agricultural goods and dangerous wastes are also increasing.
However, the single most important addition to water transport has 
been the advent and use of container transport and roll on-roll off 
technology. These easy to load and transfer containers can transport 
any item that a heavy truck can with the advantage of being able to 
be loaded directly onto a truck in port.
In Lyon, three systems of port authorities exist. One type is 
owned outright by the local Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(C.C.I.L.), such as Port Rambaud in Lyon. Another type is owned by 
private companies such as the large petroleum ports of Feyzin and 
Givors. Finally there are those ports owned by the CNR which then 
grants concessions to the local C.C.I.L. such as at Port Edouard-Herriot 
in Lyon (Baleste, 1991). Both the C.C.I.L. and the private petroleum 
concerns (i.e. Elf) are actively promoting and expanding the fluvial 
ports of Lyon. This attitude by the owners and operators of Lyon's 
ports will help them gain greater prominence in the future.
Lyon, with its strategic position at the confluence of the Rhone 
and the Saone rivers, was the ninth busiest inland river port in France 
in 1990 handling 1.5 million metric tons of cargo (Figure 5.5). Port 
Edouard-Herriot is by far the largest and most important of Lyon's 
ports covering 109 ha, including 2.2 kilometres of quays (Morelon, 
1989). Port Edouard-Herriot has had it's position as a major port and 
transport hub reinforced by expanding and upgrading the 
infrastructure to include substantial container traffic capabilities and 
the handling of direct international cargos.
The Rhone River has been widened, deepened, and canalized 
throughout the 310 kilometres from Lyon to the Mediterranean Sea 
and is able to handle 4,500 ton river barges from Fos to Lyon and now 
through to Chalon-sur-Saone. (The by-pass in Magon to save a 
medieval bridge has been completed). By 1995 a canal for 900 ton 
river barges will be complete from the Greater Rhone to Sete and
131
FGJRE 5.4
EVCLLTTCN CF FRENCH RIVER TRAFFIC
30
MILLION
TONS
oO
4 0
1 9 4 0 1 9 5 0 1960 1 9 7 0 19 8 0 1 9 9 0 2000
SOURCE VCES NAV1GA81£S CE FRANC. 1990.
FIGURE 5.5
TOP TEN FRENCH RIVER PORTS 1 9 9 0
LYON
MCNCELANGc
2.3
MULHOUSE
ROUEN - j
t h i c n v i l :
W/yy/z/MmmiSTRASBOURG —
20 25 01 00 1 5
VCJUCN 
TONS 1990
SOURCE: VCES NAVXSABLES DE FRANCE. 1991.
132
north to St-Jean-de-Losne on the Saone which will link with other 
smaller canals (250 ton river barges) to the Paris Basin and the Rhine 
through Mulhouse (Region Urbaine de Lyon, Janvier 1992).
Lyon has direct maritime linkages with Tunis, Istanbul, Athens, 
Haifa and other Mediterranean ports. This direct international traffic, 
begun in 1979, has been expanding rapidly in recent years. Although 
international ocean/river barges are only 1,500 tons instead of the 
4,500 ton river barge convoys, a rapid increase in these direct 
international contacts is apparent. For example, Port Edouard-Herriot 
ships cables for suspension bridges made in Bourg-en-Bresse directly 
to Norway. Also, Port St-Romain-en-Gal unloads fresh fruits from 
Israel shipped in containers and transfers them directly to trucks for 
transport into Germany (Savy, 1991).
In 1988 direct international traffic accounted for 166,000 tons, 
in 1990 it was 320,000 tons (Transport de Marchandises en Region 
Rhone Alpes. 1991). Though the numbers are small they are 
increasing rapidly. The fact that both Marseille and Sete are better 
suited to handling ocean going vessels than they are river barges will 
add to Lyon’s share of direct international maritime traffic. Also,
Lyon is actively increasing it’s container capacity which will help 
encourage a steady rise in direct international fluvial and maritime 
trade (Lyon Matin. 14 Mai, 1991). Most ports in and around Lyon also 
have the advantage that they have land onto which they can expand. 
The fluvial port system of the Lyon is not concentrated within the city 
limits of Lyon.
The ports in the entire RUL handled significantly more freight 
than those ports located within the city limits of Lyon (Figure 5.6).
The RUL ports handled 3.5 million tons of cargo in 1989. This gives a 
truer representation of Lyon's overall port freight traffic. This figure 
has been increasing since 1986 to reach its highest level since the late 
seventies. The overall amount of fluvial freight traffic has been 
steadily increasing within the region as a whole.
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Regional ports handled  12.5 million tons of goods in 1990 and  
this figure has been expanding at a 2% annual rate. However, these 
ports are still under-used. The CNR submits tha t fluvial transport, 
especially in ternational, will increase substantially in the coming 
years because of two factors. First tha t the Rhone corridor is 
sa tu ra ted  with land transpo rt and tha t the existing yet under-u tilized  
ports of Lyon will be able to increase their share of the m arket. 
Secondly, the great increase in container traffic linked with the 
im proved and  m odernized container facilities a t Port Edouard-H erriot 
will a ttrac t g reater traffic, especially the sm aller sea /r iv e r vessels 
with in ternational cargo (Lvon M atin. 14 Mai, 1991). This is 
debatable considering the massive autoroute expansion, the doubling 
of Lyon-Satolas In ternational Airport, the increased rail services 
being offered and the general battle over cargo handling. However, 
w ith the overall increase in international trade and  cargo, the Lyon 
ports are  p rim ed to gather the rew ards for their in frastructu ra l 
im provem ents.
A nother m ajor sign of optim ism  for the fluvial ports of Lyon is 
th a t the French G overnm ent is again taking an active in te rest in
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fluvial traffic after almost twenty years of neglect. The Chassagne 
Report, first published in 1989, reaffirms after many years that the 
government is committed to realizing the long awaited Rhone-Rhine 
link via the Saone. This link would be 229 kilometres long and would 
require 24 locks (Baleste, 1991). The Chassagne Report envisages this 
grand fluvial link to be completed around 2005 and has already 
assigned 20 billion francs to this project. The rest of the cost is to be 
collected through local water taxes.
The existence of the Rhone-Rhine link would offer numerous 
advantages to Lyon. The Northern European ports are the busiest on 
the continent. Rotterdam, the largest port in the world, handled 300 
million metric tons of sea-borne cargo in 1989 and expects that figure 
to increase to almost 400 million metric tons by 2010. Antwerp, the 
second busiest port in Europe handled 95.4 million metric tons and 
Marseille handled 94.6 million metric tons in 1989 (International 
Herald Tribune. May 30, 1991). The advantage for Lyon, being on the 
major fluvial connection between the North Sea and the 
Mediterranean Sea, would be a prime geographic position and the 
ability to function as a major commercial crossroads between 
Northern and Southern Europe. This Rhone-Rhine link has been 
discussed for two centuries and even today would still provide a 
important European fluvial linkage that would prove beneficial to 
Lyon (Jeffries, 1982).
5.5 AIR TRAFFIC
The strength and size of a city's airport is another important 
factor in determining International status (Soldatos, 1988). As 
discussed in Chapter One, Lyon is viewed as having a weak airport, 
ranked in the fourth of six tiers in the DATAR/RECLUS study. This 
places Lyon in the same category as Naples and Aberdeen (Brunet,
1989). To compare Lyon's 3.7 million passengers in 1989 with the 60 
million passengers that went through London or the 40 million that 
travelled through Paris would be unreasonable. Unfortunately for 
Lyon, comparing itself with other non-capital European cities such as 
Frankfurt, Milan, Barcelona, or Geneva shows it to be substantially 
smaller and much less important (Figure 5.7).
135
BIRMINGHAM
LYON
MANCHESTER
MUNICH
MILAN
ZURICH
FRANKFURT
FGLRE 5.7
"EURCGTT' AIRPORT TRAFFIC - 1 9 8 9
7  A R B I ! 1 1 '
l i m n #
1 ; i 1 0  3 ! : ! ; ■j i j |
[ 1 1 A - ' 1 •
—1
4 1 2 - 3 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
1 1 . 9 -
12.7-
1%,   • ..
- 4 -
Cm. •  U
~~r~~
1 0  2 0  3 0
SCURCE: C C L L  -  1 9 9 0 .
~z
IN
MILLIONS
4 0
BELFAST
COLCNGc
BIRMINGHAM
LYON
STUTGART
HAMBOURG
MILAN
MANCHESTER
AMSTERDAM
FRANKFURT
FIGURE 5.8
PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN AIR PASSENGER 
TRAFFIC FOR "EURCCmES" 1 9 8 8 -1 9 8 9
q Q
1
- 7 . 3 —
^  . i
/  /  /  /  /  , /  / = /  
1 0  1 5  2 0  2 5
SOURCE; 
C .C J .L . - 1  9 9 0 .
r
136
Lyon-Satolas International Airport was ranked only 28th in 
terms of total passenger traffic among European airports in 1988 
(Brunet, 1988). This is an obvious weakness in Lyon's future plans to 
become a major European city. However, Lyon-Satolas has been one 
of the fastest growing airports among the "Eurocities" (Figure 5.8). A 
15.1% annual increase is impressive, yet in overall numbers this is far 
less than the single digit percentage gains of the major Eurocities 
airports (Aeroports Magasine. 1990). To redress this situation Lyon 
does have in progress an ambitious project designed to bring Lyon- 
Satolas into a competitive position with its European rivals.
Lyon-Satolas International Airport was initially opened in 1975 
and is located 20 kilometres from central Lyon on 3,000 ha of land 
(Figure 5.9). Lyon-Satolas, managed by the C.C.I.L. which has 
aggressively promoted the interests of the airport, has been 
expanding since it opened. This effort has been rewarded with a 
steady increase in passenger traffic. In the first half of the decade 
there was a slight reduction in the number of passengers using Lyon- 
Satolas, down from 2.8 million in 1981, to 2.76 million in 1985 (Figure 
5.10). This was largely attributed to the successful opening of the 
TGV line between Paris and Lyon thus effectively reducing the 
number of air travellers to Paris via Lyon-Satolas from 760,000 in 
1983 to 520,000 in 1984 (Region Urbaine de Lyon* Janvier 1991).
The second half of the decade has seen a steady rise in 
travellers using Lyon-Satolas International Airport. In overall 
numbers within France, Lyon-Satolas is the fourth largest domestic 
airport. In 1990, Lyon-Satolas handled 3.854 million passengers, 
trailing Marseille (4.983 million), Nice (5.726 million), and Paris 
(46.836 million) domestically (Figure 5.11). This illustrates the large 
disparity between Paris and the rest of France in air passenger traffic, 
as in all criteria. The small size of air traffic utilizing the second tier 
French cities is evident. Lyon, behind even the Southern French 
airports, is currently relatively unimportant on the continental scale.
In 1989, 3.75 million passengers used Lyon-Satolas, a million 
more than the 2.76 million in 1985. This strong growth is a positive
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factor in the development of Lyon's air traffic functions. The 15.1% 
rise in passenger traffic between 1988 and 1989 was one of the 
strongest registered both domestically and in Europe, as illustrated in 
Figure 5.8 and Figure 5.12. In 1990, however, the growth of 
passenger traffic dropped to 2.1% with a total of 3.84 million 
passengers. This, combined with the disastrous first four months of 
1991, due in large part to the War in the Persian Gulf, has greatly 
slowed the momentum of growth that Lyon-Satolas and the 
airline/airport industry as a whole had enjoyed at the end of the 
eighties (Interlignes Statistiques de Trafic. Avril 1991).
Through April 1991, total air passenger traffic at Lyon-Satolas 
for the first four months of 1991 was down 14.6%. This is completely 
accounted for by the 29.1% drop in international traffic since domestic 
numbers have remained constant. Another negative sign was the 37% 
decrease in international charter traffic during this period (Interlignes 
Statistiques de Trafic. Avril 1991). To show the extent of the impact 
of the Gulf War of 1991 on Lyon, airport passenger traffic from North 
America was down 91.4%, down 97% from the Middle East, down 58% 
from North Africa and down 29% from the rest of Europe (Interlignes 
Statistiques de Trafic. Avril 1991). During the first half of 1991, 
international passenger traffic was down 16% at JFK airport in New 
York City (International Herald Tribune. October 21, 1991). This 
trend was consistant for most major airports due to the drastic drop 
in international air travel during the Gulf War.
For the year 1991, the Paris airports (Roissy/Charles De Gaulle 
and Orly) registered a 3.3% decrease in passenger air traffic and a 
2.2% drop in air freight traffic. During the same year, both London 
and Frankfurt airports posted over 5% increases in passenger air 
traffic. However, the beginning of 1992 saw a return to pre-Gulf War 
levels of passenger air traffic around the world. The International Air 
Traffic Association reported that international air traffic world-wide 
was up 14% in January 1992 versus January of 1991. International 
freight was up 10% over the same time period. This helps bolster the 
argument that the drastic passenger air traffic drops during the Gulf
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War were only temporary. This is a positive sign not only for Lyon- 
Satolas but for the entire airline/airport industry.
To help determine the strength and international nature of an 
airport, a breakdown of the destinations of the travellers is important. 
In 1990, of the 3.84 million passengers using Lyon-Satolas 1.98 
million, or 51.5% were on domestic flights. There were 567,288 on 
Paris flights and the other 1.41 million were on other domestic flights. 
Of the 1.75 million international travellers the majority were on 
European flights (Figure 5.13). These figures illustrate that Lyon- 
Satolas is primarily a Euro-Mediterranean airport. Apart from a few 
flights to the DOM-TOM's and Black African capitals in the Franc Zone, 
Lyon-Satolas is not utilized for long range intercontinental flights. 
American Airlines cancelled its New York to Lyon service in 1990 and 
shows little enthusiasm for resuming such a service. Air Canada is 
examining a Montreal to Lyon service and Air France runs twice 
weekly New York to Lyon flights from March to October. This does 
not however, constitute an intercontinental service. Lyon has no 
direct flights to Asia, the Pacific Rim, or South America.
Another indication of the level of intemationality of an airport 
is the amount and importance of duty-free sales. LAX International 
Airport in Los Angeles earns more from its duty free shops then from 
all of the rest of its shops, restaurants, bars and boutiques combined. 
JFK International Airport in New York City alone accounted for $28 
million in duty-free sales as the United States led the world with 
$1,750 billion in duty-free sales in 1990. France totalled $580 million 
in sales from its duty-free airport shops, the vast majority being at 
Roissy/Charles de Gaulle airport in Paris. Nice and Cannes were the 
other major benefactors of airport duty-free sales profits in 1990 
(International Herald Tribune. October 21, 1991). Lyon-Satolas needs 
to upgrade the level of its existing duty free shops which are, to be 
generous, poor. The profits and prestige that are linked to airport 
duty-free sales are a small but visible representation of the city’s 
stature in the international urban community and cannot be 
overlooked.
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Sheer numbers, be they population figures or numbers of 
passengers using an airport, seldom tell the whole story. Not only is 
Lyon-Satolas a small airport in terms of total passenger traffic but it 
is also an unattractive and overall dependent airport in the European 
airport hierarchy. A study by Nadine Cattan, entitled "Une image du 
reseau des metropoles europeennes par le trafic aerien" was recently 
published in L'Espace Geographique (Cattan, 1990). Cattan contends 
that airport traffic patterns are a viable indicator in judging a city's 
position in the national and international urban system. This study 
undertook to determine the accessibility and attractiveness of the 
major European airports. This study also followed the air traffic 
patterns to determine which airports were dominant and which were 
dependent in the European airport network. The results show which 
European cities are in a superior position in the European urban 
hierarchy as a result of their respective airports. This study revealed 
the weakness, at the European and international level, of Lyon- 
Satolas.
Considering the actual physical accessibility of airports is a 
simple matter of determining distances between airports as the bird 
flies. The three major Swiss airports, being located in the middle of 
Europe, are in a superior physical position than Glasgow or Lisbon. In 
terms of physical position in Europe, Lyon-Satolas is highly ranked, 
being located close to the centre of Western Europe. The second 
measure of accessibility is "functional accessibility". This is a standard 
time-distance relationship equation put forward by L'Equipe de 
Strasbourg (Cattan, 1990). This "functional accessibility" takes into 
account such variables as distance and mode of transport from city 
centre to the airport, frequency of flights, delays and other such time- 
consuming facts of life for the frequent European air traveller (Cattan,
1990).
Lyon-Satolas is placed into the middle category of the 
"functional accessibility" criteria for two primary reasons: distance 
and ease from city centre to airport and limited flight availability 
within Europe. The first difficulty, the distance and difficulty in 
transferring from the city centre to the airport, is a problem that will 
be eventually solved by the proposed "Satorail" link. "Satorail" will be
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a specific rail link between central Lyon and the airport and is 
currently scheduled for completion in 1995, though this time-frame is 
looking doubtful (Satolas: Pole International de Communication. 
Fevrier, 1990). The second factor limiting Lyon’s "functional 
accessibility" is the limited number of flights from Lyon-Satolas to the 
rest of Europe. This problem cannot be easily solved at the local level 
as will be discussed later in this chapter.
The second section of this ranking is concerned with the concept 
of attractiveness. This section is split between passenger and freight 
traffic. In both sections Lyon-Satolas ranks in the last category of 
minimal to no attractiveness. It is interesting to note that in France, 
Paris is ranked on the top level of each category; however, every 
other airport in the country is ranked in the last category along with 
Lyon (Cattan, 1990). This is yet another indication of the huge 
disparity between Paris and the rest of the French agglomerations in 
important international functions.
With its lack of power and attractiveness, Lyon-Satolas fits the 
category of a dependent, not a dominant, airport. Interestingly 
though, Lyon-Satolas is not dependent upon the Parisian airports. In 
terms of passenger traffic, Lyon-Satolas is dominated by London. The 
major flux of Lyon-Satolas international passenger traffic travels 
through London. This dependence on London is the case for most 
airports in South-Western Europe. This exemplifies the power of the 
airlines and their system of using "Hubs" to gather and disperse traffic 
thereby determining the status and routes of any given airport 
(Humphries, 1991). Regardless of the fact that Lyon-Satolas wishes to 
become a major international airport, it is the airlines that ultimately 
make this decision. The fear at Lyon-Satolas concerning international 
passenger traffic is that the airlines will continue to use Geneva- 
Cointrin Airport with it’s 92 direct international destinations, versus 
21 for Lyon-Satolas, as the long-haul international airport for the area 
and relegate Lyon-Satolas to a regional airport with limited links to 
North African and European destinations (Bethemont, 1990).
In terms of air freight traffic Lyon-Satolas is dominated by 
Frankfurt along with the cities of Northern Italy, Austria, and
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Southern Scandinavia (Cattan, 1990). Frankfurt handles the most 
freight (1,115,000 tons in 1990) of any airport in Western Europe and 
its higher order services in this field are unmatched, especially among 
the smaller airports like Lyon-Satolas (17,065 tons in 1990). 
Domestically, Paris is the centre of the air freight industry ranking 
just behind Frankfurt and London in terms of volume. Paris handled 
872,392 tons in 1990 (Figure 5.14). Air France and Air Inter both use 
Paris as their hub city as do the major trucking companies in France. 
The trucking companies use the superior customs and loading 
facilities in Paris, thus virtually assuring that Paris will remain the 
major air freight destination in France (Bonnet, 1987). Lyon-Satolas 
has no direct voice in the matter, this being an economic decision 
taken by airlines and trucking companies.
Lyon-Satolas ranks sixth domestically in terms of air freight 
handled (in 1990). However, Lyon-Satolas is experiencing a rapid 
percentage growth. Lyon-Satolas expanded its air freight traffic by 
25.6% between 1988 and 1989 (Figure 5.15). Only Bale-Mulhouse 
experienced a higher percentage of growth, a 26.5% increase during 
the same period. Interestingly enough, three French airports 
experienced a decline in air freight traffic. Strasbourg (-0.4) and 
Nantes (-2.8) registered minor losses while Montpellier experienced a 
radical drop of -22% in air freight traffic in one year (Aeroport 
Magasine. 1990). Overall, these percentage gains are encouraging for 
Lyon-Satolas, but the overall volume of freight traffic needs to be 
dramatically increased in the future.
Lyon-Satolas is thus a dependent airport with minimal 
attractiveness. Lyon-Satolas also failed to handle enough passenger 
and freight traffic to be considered an airport of any real significance 
in this study (Cattan 1990). However, Lyon-Satolas is currently under 
siege by builders to expand, improve and upgrade it as a viable 
airport of the future. Lyon-Satolas is currently the second largest 
public works project in France behind the Channel Tunnel. This is an 
ambitious project that will transform Lyon-Satolas in size and 
potential (Aeroport International de Lyon-Satolas. Mai 1991).
145
A JA CCIO
STRASBOURG
MONTPELLIER
BORDEAUX
LYON
NICE
TOULOUSE
MULHOUSE/BALE
MARSEILLE
PARI S
RGLRE 5 .1 4  
FRENCH AIRPORT FREIGHT TRAFFIC 1 9 9 0
1 1 1 I 1 ! !.. . 3 7 .  | , ! j | 1 ' 1 !
A 1 9 ^  !'t .  I a  j
0 .  j  /  (
i  n  n 7 RI U *> U * O |
! 1 ! 1 ! 1
1 /  i UO  J  i i i
7 0 1 1 7<L 1 . /  0<C, ! !
*1 ^  Of? .c 4 . o o
1 c-rtc O .  I j J
1 1 »
| J  J .  I 3 0
______ ;______ ;____ i________ :______ j______!--------------------
U J r r  A  3 7 7 . 3 9 2 ------------
2 0 0  4 0 0  6 0 0  8 0 0  1 0 0 0
SCURCE: AEROPCRTS MAGASNE +  ACP, 1991.
1200
RGURE 5 .1 5  
E V C U m C N  CF FRENCH AIR FREIGHT 
TRAFFIC IN PERCENTAGE 1 9 8 8 - 1 9 8 9
M O N T P E L L I E R - 2  2 
NANTES 
3ALE-MULHOUSE 4 ^  
STRASBOURG 
3CRDEAUXyy
TOULOUSE - 
LYCN- 
MARSE1LLE -£ J
- 2 .3 -
2 6 .5 - a
PARIS /  /  /  /" ,/ /  7
1 0  2 0  3 0
THOUSAND
TONS
SOURCE; AEROPCRTS 
MAGXSTE +
ACP, 1990 .
146
One of the main features of the improved Lyon-Satolas 
International Airport will be the 16 platform TGV station located in 
the airport terminal (Chassande, 1991). This new TGV/train station 
will link Lyon-Satolas directly into the main north-south TGV line 
making the airport a mere two hours from central Paris and Roissy/De 
Gaulle airport. This will also allow additional train lines to directly 
access the airport thus allowing better access to regional customers.
At first this will be a limited service. For example, two trains per day 
round-trip from Chambery will marginally increase the accessibility 
of the airport to that agglomeration. Lyon-Satolas will not be running 
the 22 TGVs per day as will Roissy/De Gaulle upon completion of its 
TGV station. However, this will add an important dimension to Lyon- 
Satolas that will enhance both its immediate present and long-range 
future (Morelon, 1989).
In addition to constructing the TGV station and rail lines, a 
second runway is being added to the airport. Lyon-Satolas does have 
the advantage that it has room to expand yet again with a third 
runway sometime in the future if traffic necessitates. This second 
runway will almost double the capacity of the airport so that it will be 
capable of handling seven million passengers per year in 1993. This 
second runway will increase flight movements per hour from a 
current maximum of 37/38 during peak hours to over 50 flight 
movements per hour (Morelon, 1989). Since most flights are 
scheduled during peak hours, this vast increase in flight movement 
capacity will greatly increase the number of commercially viable 
flights using Lyon and the number of destinations can be increased 
accordingly. La SEDLYS, (Societe d’Etudes pour la Developpement de 
Lyon-Satolas) has also included four additional construction projects 
at the airport.
The first of these projects is a 90,000m2 "Pole d1 Affaires" office 
building. This will include an additional 2,000 parking places and 
employ approximately 3,000 people. This Pole d'Affaires is 
envisioned as being the anchor of an office/industrial park that will 
draw numerous enterprises and people to Lyon-Satolas making it an 
economic pole to complement the airport and surrounding area. The 
second project, the construction of an activity park on the southern
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fringe of the airport is intended to produce the same result. A 
number of high quality hotels and restaurants are also being added to 
the Lyon-Satolas complex along with an expanded parking facility. It 
is anticipated that these projects will provide the impetus to develop 
the critical mass needed to turn Lyon-Satolas into a regional economic 
pole.
The other two SEDLYS’ projects relate directly to the operational 
functions of the airport. A 22,000m2 office complex to house both the 
airport and airline officials will enable Lyon-Satolas to upgrade the 
level of its services offered so as to become more attractive to the 
airlines. The final project, a 50ha freight zone to be built southeast of 
the airport, is designed to help attract more freight traffic to Lyon- 
Satolas. This freight zone will be linked directly to both the autoroute 
and the rail lines for maximum utility (Presentation de l'Aeroport 
International de Lvon-Satolas. Mai 1991).
The success of the Lyon-Satolas project is vital not only for the 
airport but for Lyon and the Rhone-Alpes Region. The geographic 
location of the airport, 20 kilometres east of Lyon, enables it to look 
out on the alpine agglomerations of Grenoble, Annecy and Chambery 
to the east of the airport. Lyon-Satolas is capable of acting as a 
regional pole not only for transport but also for locating new 
enterprises. Turning this into an airport complex for the region and 
not simply Lyon enables the project to take on larger political and 
economic significance. A new neutral regional hub could help ease 
local political tensions and rivalries while increasing inter-urban 
cooperation. This ambitiously optimistic follow-on effect linked to the 
airport expansion will be a topic of interest well into the future and 
will be discussed in detail in Chapter Nine (Satolas: Pole International 
de Communications. Fevrier 1990).
Finally, Bron Airport needs examination. Bron Airport was the 
major airport serving Lyon until the opening of Lyon-Satolas 
International Airport in 1975. Bron Airport is located in eastern Lyon 
and is almost adjacent to the massive new Eurexpo conference facility. 
Bron is used primarily as an airport for small business planes, 
package delivery companies and some freight. With only a 1,800
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metre runway Bron will never handle the larger planes; however, 
having a small airport close to the centre-city and the Eurexpo 
complex to handle business planes and minor cargo is very useful to 
Lyon. This should not be neglected when assessing Lyon's transport 
infrastructure and facilities.
5.6 TRANSPORT SUMMARY
Every study undertaken to determine the international status of 
a city utilizes data from the city's airport to help determine a city's 
relative position: numbers of passengers, international flights and 
destinations, access to the CBD, freight tonnage, duty-free shops and 
higher services are some of the most visible indicators of a city's 
international status. The Cattan study, an empirical study that argues 
that an airport's attractiveness, power and status can directly 
influence a city's international ranking, placed Lyon-Satolas at the 
bottom level possible of European airports. From this study one can 
conclude that Lyon-Satolas is doing little to enhance the position of 
Lyon within the context of its international ambitions. Politically, this 
has been understood; thus the large scale construction projects at 
Lyon-Satolas to upgrade, expand and improve the airport. Lyon- 
Satolas must become a positive asset for Lyon in its push to realize 
true European and international status. Lyon-Satolas could also prove 
to be a regional stimulus for intra-urban cooperation within the 
Rhone-Alpes Region on both a political and economic level (Chapter 
Nine).
Transportation is the single most important and tangible form of 
urban infrastructure. Careful exploration of Lyon's position in the 
regional, national and continental transportation network concludes 
that Lyon's advantageous geographic location is being under-utilized, 
especially in the sphere of air transit. Lyon is also not capitalizing on 
its location as a transport node to control the various flows that pass 
through the agglomeration. Lyon is, rather, in a passive/acceptance 
mode being dominated by larger more powerful transport hubs. This 
is related to Lyon's poor higher service infrastructure, political 
influence and overall dynamism.
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There are other forms of infrastructure that are important to an 
agglomeration's urban ranking. Such facilitators as tourism, hotel and 
conference facilities, higher education, press and media, urban 
redevelopment and foreign population are important criteria in both 
the Soldatos model and the DATAR/RECLUS project. The next chapters 
in Part Two will therefore examine in turn each of these additional 
infrastructural criteria, the current state of Lyon's facilities and plans 
for the future.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE VISITOR ATTRACTION AND RECEPTION INFRASTRUCTURE
6.1 THE CULTURAL INFRASTRUCTURE
Culture is a broad and often misused term. Judging the amount 
and comparative rank or "worth" of a city's culture is problematic. 
However, all studies on evaluating what constitutes an "International 
City" stress the importance of a strong cultural presence. This often 
goes hand in glove with tourism, as in Florence whose large tourism 
industry is primarily driven by its substantial cultural attractions. The 
term "culture" will in future, for our purposes, encompass all that is 
possibly related to culture and can in theory be quantified.
Culture, or lack of major cultural institutions, is another one of 
the relative weaknesses of Lyon. On a European scale Lyon is ranked 
in the third of five tiers. This is one full tier below Geneva, Barcelona, 
and Turin, and two full tiers below Milan, Frankfurt, and Paris, which 
are all on the top tier. Nationally, only Paris is in the first tier of 
European cities and no French city ranks in the second tier (Brunet, 
1988). This substantial cultural gap between Paris and the provinces 
is no surprise. Lyon ranks behind Paris, Strasbourg, Toulouse, and 
Lille but ahead of Montpellier, Grenoble and Marseille.
Lyon's ranking is not impressive. Ranking marginally above 
that of its smaller regional neighbour Grenoble does not enhance 
Lyon's image nor its desire to establish itself as the undisputed 
regional capital. Lyon's dilemma is that it lacks the presence of an 
internationally renowned attraction. No famous museums, world class 
operas or theatres, major historic sites or monuments act as a magnet 
to draw the crowds and acclaim needed for international status. It 
would be unfair to state that Lyon is lacking culture but it is accurate 
to argue that Lyon has no cultural attractions at the international 
scale.
Lyon does possess some cultural infrastructure in the art arena 
including a new centre for the preforming arts. Also represented are 
a respected opera that entertained over 80,000 spectators in 1990
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and a symphony orchestra of 97 musicians conducted by E. Krivine. 
The well respected French National Popular Theatre (T.N.P.) is based 
in Villeurbanne and another 30 minor theatres operate in the area 
giving Lyon an active stage life (Agence d’Urbanisme de la 
Communaute Urbaine de Lyon, 1991). Lyon also plays host to a 
number of international festivals every year. The summer Jazz 
festival in Vienne (south of Lyon) and the International Berlioz 
Festival, which attracts 30,000 spectators, are the two most popular. 
These festivals are small in comparison to the numerous festivals 
staged throughout France and the rest of Europe during the summer 
months. This lack of international artistic attractions is a serious 
impediment in Lyon's quest to achieve international status.
The Natural History Museum is by far the most popular museum 
in Lyon, attracting over 300,000 people in 1990. This is twice as 
many visitors as the Museum of Fine Art or the Gallo-Roman Museum 
attracted during the same year. On another cultural front Lyon has 
the most important municipal library in France. The Municipal 
Library of Lyon in the Part-Dieu was opened in the early 1980's in 
conjunction with moving the National School of Librarianship from 
Paris to Lyon; a minor yet welcome devolution.
6.2 THE TOURIST SECTOR
Tourism is an important indicator in helping determine both a 
city's image and its position within the European urban hierarchy.
Both the Soldatos model and the DATAR/RECLUS project point to the 
importance of tourism to a city. Lyon is not known as a major tourist 
centre, a point illustrated by its poor ranking in this category in the 
DATAR/RECLUS study (Brunet, 1988). In the following section the 
merits of Lyon and what Lyon does present in the way of tourism will 
be examined, including the public and private agencies that are 
responsible for tourism in Lyon. Additionally, an examination of the 
future of tourism in Lyon in the context of the city's drive for 
international status will be presented.
In 1979, the newly revitalized Office of Tourism produced the 
first real study of tourism in Lyon; Regards sur le Tourisme Lyonnais.
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This report contained a basic blueprint for promoting Lyon on an 
international level and increasing the city’s tourism. This included, 
for example, accords with Air France to promote Lyon in its foreign 
offices through posters, and distribution of promotional literature. In 
1985. Le Livre Blanc sur le Tourisme Lyonnais was published by the 
Office of Tourism as the definitive report and future blueprint for 
tourism in Lyon. To be able to promote this ambitious "white paper" 
on tourism the Office of Tourism has seen its budget grow from 2.5 
million francs in 1980 to a budget of over 10 million francs in 1990 
(Renucci, 1988). This is a large increase in operating revenue but still 
constitutes a limiting budget with which to promote the second largest 
agglomeration in France.
In promoting tourism in Lyon, the Office of Tourism and the 
major local tour companies of Hexatour, Pegase, Rhonalp Tours, MTC 
Voyages, and Lyon Ballade, who contribute a large percent of the 
private funding for promoting Lyon, have promoted Lyon more as a 
staging post for the surrounding area rather than promoting the 
actual city of Lyon. The Vineyard tours of the surrounding area, 
especially the Beaujolais region, are quite popular. "L'Immersion 
Beaujolaise" (Pegase) and the November tours by Hexatour and MTC 
Voyages entitled "Rendez-vous avec le Beaujolais Nouveau" are but 
examples of these popular Beaujolais tours (Renucci, 1988). The Cotes 
du Rhone vineyards also promote a number of tours every year.
These vineyard tours begin and end in Lyon usually including a 
morning or afternoon reserved for a bus tour of the sights of Lyon.
Often, the vineyard tours are expanded to include the cuisine of 
Lyon. The Lyonnaise cuisine, made famous by such illustrious chefs 
as Paul Bocuse, Jean Vettard and Alain Chapel, is often considered to 
be the best in France. A combination of a vineyard tour with lunch 
chez Bocuse (quite popular with the Japanese as a day tour from 
Paris) makes for a unique gastronomic experience. However, it must 
be kept in mind that the tourists are in Lyon to enjoy the fine food 
and explore the surrounding region rather than actually to visit Lyon 
proper.
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Another popular tour theme promotes Lyon as the "Gateway to 
the Alps". Train and bus excursions leave Lyon for a grand tour of the 
Alps during both the summer and winter seasons (Atout Rhone. No 
27, Juin 1991). These tours, as with the vineyard tours, use Lyon for 
a logistical base of operations but focus little or no attention on the 
city itself. Once again this proves true for the popular river cruises on 
both the Rhone and the Saone rivers. Tours with such titles as "Lyon 
et le Pays des Dues de Bourgogne" or "Lyon, Avignon et la Provence" 
are also popular and inflate hotel statistics in Lyon but do little to 
actually promote Lyon in and of itself as a tourist attraction (Renucci, 
1988).
Lyon is blessed with a location in the middle of a territory filled 
with tourist attractions. However, Lyon receives little actual tourism 
as previously illustrated. A glance at the average length of stay in a 
Lyon hotel provides a good case in point. The average guest length of 
stay in a Lyon hotel is 1.6 days. In Paris the average stay is 2.6 days 
and is even higher in Milan (2.7 days), Berlin (2.7 days) and Budapest 
(2.8 days). Also, business travellers account for close to 75% of the 
hotel occupants in Lyon. Three in four hotel residents in Lyon are 
there for business reasons. In Paris the figure is almost reversed with 
70% of all hotel rooms being occupied by "classical tourists" and only 
30% by business travellers (Renucci, 1988).
Another sobering hotel statistic for Lyon's Office of Tourism is 
the hotel occupancy rate on weekends. During the business season of 
October, a Lyon hotel will average around 90% occupancy on a 
Thursday night. During a Saturday or Sunday this rate of occupancy 
will drop below 40%. Also, during the prime vacation month of 
August, Lyon's hotels show a moribund occupancy rate of 41% for the 
month. These numbers indicate that Lyon is neither a popular 
weekend retreat nor is it a prime vacation spot during the summer 
season. Figure 6.1 illustrates that all classes of hotels in Lyon 
increased their occupancy rates during the last half of the eighties.
The top of the line four star hotels continue to have the highest 
overall occupancy rate. This adds to the incentive for major luxury 
hotel chains to open in Lyon. Taken as a whole, these numbers 
illustrate that Lyon, despite good hotel occupancy rates attributable to
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business travellers, has a feeble tourist industry attracting very small 
numbers of tourists to see Lyon for its own sake at any point during 
the year.
The Office of Tourism views this lack of viable tourism in Lyon 
as a direct result of Lyon's lack of a specific image. Even those 
tourists who did visit Lyon and responded to a survey by the Office of 
Tourism cited the atmosphere and ambiance of Lyon as its greatest 
assets. This is excellent for the residents of Lyon who have known 
this for years, yet is a mixed blessing to the promoters of tourism in 
Lyon. On a beautiful day in June, a comparison of the Place Bellacour 
in Lyon and the lakefront in Geneva or the main square in Florence 
serves as a forceful reminder of how quiet, peaceful and totally 
French the city of Lyon remains. There are no crowds of international 
tourists waiting to get into museums or prime cafe spots. Nor are 
there many people speaking a foreign language. Even a comparison of 
International Herald Tribune readership, the major American 
newspaper in Europe, in various "Eurocities" illustrates the provincial 
nature of Lyon (Figure 6.2). Though millions of tourists crawl through 
Lyon on the A6 and A7 very few stop to see and enjoy this major 
French metropolis (Lyon. Ville Internationale. 1988).
6.3 HOTEL AND CONVENTION CAPABILITIES
In direct relationship with Lyon's poor cultural and tourist 
ranking is Lyon's very limited hotel and conference industry. The 
DATAR/RECLUS report Lyon ranked in the fifth out of six tiers, next to 
last. This is Lyon's lowest ranking in the project (Brunet, 1988). Once 
again Paris is the dominant city in France and is, in fact, the single 
leading city in the world in terms of hosting conferences. This fact 
alone accounts for the fact that France recently surpassed Britain as 
second only to the United States in the number of conferences hosted 
per year. After Paris, there is a significant decline in the nation's 
conference industry with Strasbourg (EC Parliament), and Nice (Cote 
d'Azur and Technopoles), constituting the provincial leaders in this 
field.
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In 1990, Lyon appeared for the first time in the UAI (Union 
Nationale des Associations International in Brussels) rankings. This is 
the international body that rates the size and calibre of an 
agglomeration's conference industry. Lyon edged past Toulouse 
(Aerospace) in 1990 to become the fourth-rated French city in the 
conference industry (L'Activite economique. Septembre 1990). This 
underlines the fact that Lyon is moving in the right direction to 
establish itself as at least competitive in this crucial criteria. There 
are a number of major infrastrucutral projects that will further 
enhance Lyon's hotel and conference industry.
Lyon realizes the importance of the conference industry both in 
terms of image and finances. The convention industry is booming in 
Europe with a 12% annual increase. Europe as a whole hosted 60% of 
the world's conferences in 1990. The average participant spent 1,000 
to 1,500 francs per day (L'Activite economique. Septembre 1990). A 
continual supply of major conferences can provide a major economic 
boost to the city. Conventions also offer a great opportunity to 
promote a city. Drawing conventioneers on a large scale from around 
the world would help boost Lyon's image both domestically and 
internationally.
Lyon is focusing on exploiting its well known medical facilities, 
especially in cancer research, to carve out a niche as a city of medical 
conferences. The medical field alone accounts for 19% of all 
international conferences. Specializing in such a profitable and 
respected area would help both in defining an image for Lyon's 
conference industry and in targeting promotional campaigns.
There are a number of important gaps in Lyon's infrastructure 
that need to be filled before Lyon can seriously expect to enter the 
convention business on a large scale. First and foremost is the lack of 
convention centres. Secondly, and closely inter-related, is the lack of 
high-quality hotels and hotel rooms (SEPAL, 1990). Comparing the 
hotel infrastructure of Lyon with other major "Eurocities" (Figure 6.3) 
illustrates that not only does Lyon lack overall hotel space, but that 
this need is especially acute in the all important four star/luxury 
classification. An examination at the total number of hotels in the
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area (Figure 6.4) reveals a total of only six four star luxury hotels in 
the entire RUL and only eighteen four star hotels (Lvon. Ville 
Internationale. 1988). This evident lack of four star hotels and known 
"name brand" hotels to the international business traveller such as 
Hyatt, Sheraton, Hilton or Marriott reduce the number of business 
travellers that chose to stay in Lyon as well as adversely affecting the 
convention industry.
In the hotel/conference centre categories, Paris has once again 
shown its dominance. More disturbing for Lyon is that Geneva has 
one of the strongest hotel/convention industries in Europe, ranked 
fifth overall. Figure 6.3 illustrates the percentage of luxury hotels in 
various Eurocities and the massive disparity that exists between Lyon 
and Geneva. This also illustrates that Lyon has the lowest percentage 
of luxury hotels of any city in this study. Lyon clearly has an uphill 
battle to achieve mere respectability in this important infrastructure 
and is disadvantaged by the prominence of its regional rival, Geneva.
Lyon does have ambitious plans to improve its much maligned 
hotel/convention industry. Plans call for a new four star hotel with 
150 rooms to open at Lyon-Satolas International Airport in 
conjunction with the expansion of the main terminal and the opening 
of the new TGV station (Satolas: Pole International de 
Communications. Fevrier 1990). This will join the existing but smaller 
four star Sofitel at the airport. Additionally, two other large scale 
projects are under construction which will greatly improve Lyon’s 
convention image and capacity.
6.4 THE GERLAND REDEVELOPMENT PROJECT
When examining the facilitators and infrastructural projects 
undertaken by Lyon to help establish itself as a competitive 
“Eurocity”, one must consider the Gerland redevelopment project.
The reconversion and development project in Gerland is designed to 
boost the overall status of Lyon while simultaneously addressing 
some of the major shortcomings in Lyon’s current infrastructure 
identified by the DATAR/RECLUS project and the SEPAL LYON 2010 
plan. The objective at Gerland is to create a city within a city that
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combines the high-technology employment base, quality of life and 
superior infrastructural support on a scale “appropriate to a “Eurocity” 
of the 21st century" (Brun, 1990). Gerland is an appropriate case 
study to examine a major urban renewal project designed to boost 
Lyon's “Eurocity” status.
Gerland, located at the confluence of the Rhone and Saone rivers 
in southern Lyon is well situated for renovation and development. 
Gerland is further spatially advantaged in that it has clearly-defined 
physical boundaries. To the north and east Gerland is borded by 
railroad tracks and freight yards which have isolated Gerland from 
the neighbouring districts of Lyon for over a century. To the south 
and west Gerland is bounded by the Rhone river. Being an easily 
defined spatial unit enables Gerland to be planned and renovated as a 
self-contained unit (Quartier de Gerland 1983-1989. 1989).
In the early 1980's, the COURLY and l'Agence d'Urbanisme 
through the Zone d'Amenagement Concerte (ZAC) des Berges du 
Rhone, (the agency responsible for the development zone of the banks 
of the Rhone), began exploring the possibility of improving and 
renovating the Gerland district. The Maison d’Amenagement de 
Gerland was established soon after and the actual restructuring of 
Gerland began in 1987 with the installation of l'Ecole Normale 
Superieur (ENS) in Gerland (Montes, 1992). To move the prestigious 
ENS from Paris, as was decided in 1985, to the new redevelopment 
project at Gerland not only solidified the basis of the whole project 
but indicated a strong degree of State support. This was a major 
success for Lyon's development and status. The ENS was installed in a 
modem purpose-made building near the former slaughterhouse in the 
middle of Gerland to serve as the foundation for this project. Since 
the successful installation of ENS, the planning authorities have 
concentrated on three elements of development to insure that 
Gerland's future development proceeds as planned in four distinct 
areas (Lyon Greland. 1991).
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6.41 ELEMENTS OF DEVELOPMENT
The first element adhered to by the Gerland planning 
authorities is that a true and complete urban landscape must be 
developed. Gerland must strive to construct it's own distinct urban 
identity and establish itself as a functional city within a city. By 
2010, 50,000 inhabitants and 40,000 jobs are predicted for Gerland. 
The majority of these jobs to be created will be in high-technology 
(bio-tech) and service industries. To support this population and 
ensure an urban identity Gerland plans to provide the shops, 
restaurants, living accommodation, recreational facilities and the 
entire infrastructure needed to develop Gerland into a functioning 
“quartier” and positive addition to modem Lyon (COURLY, 1989).
In conjunction with creating a true urban landscape the second 
element to ensure the planned development of Gerland is that the 
city's main activities must be incorporated into the Gerland district. 
Gerland must become an integral part of Lyon's economic and social 
life to develop properly. Gerland will not be considered a success if it 
fails to become one of the major focal points of Lyon. The strength of 
Gerland is within the context of adding to the existing elements of 
greater Lyon rather than becoming an isolated “quartier” of a few 
specialized functions. This would fail to enhance the overall functions 
of Lyon. Gerland must be well-integrated into the social and economic 
fabric of Lyon in order to contribute to the city's future “Eurocity” 
ambitions as planned.
The final element that the Gerland planning authorities 
concentrate upon is the successful development of Gerland's physical 
linkages and communications with Lyon. Currently, Gerland is 
relatively isolated from the rest of Lyon because of the physical 
barriers of the Rhone river and the freight yards. Gerland must 
become physically linked to Lyon if it is to develop in any meaningful 
fashion and to integrate its functions with those of Lyon. To solve this 
problem a number of major infrastructural projects are planned.
First, the extension of Lyon's modem metro (lines A and B) to Gerland 
is scheduled for completion by 1994/95. This will leave Gerland 
merely 10 minutes from both C.B.D.'s: La Part-Dieu and Le Presqu'ile.
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This will also connect Gerland to the rest of the public transportation 
system and thereby to the rest of the agglomeration (Montes, 1992).
Secondly, two new bridges across the Rhone river are planned. 
The first bridge is a planned continuation of the “Cours des Girondins”, 
a future east-west main axis road through Gerland. This bridge will 
link Gerland with the southern tip of the Presqu'ile. The second 
bridge, the future Pont de Pierre-Benite, will cross the Rhone river 
further south and link Gerland directly with the A7 autoroute, the 
ring-road and the major overland routes. This will provide easier 
commercial and private overland transport access to Gerland and 
encourage further development. The physical linking of Gerland to 
the Presqu'ile and the west bank of the Rhone is vital in opening and 
expanding the flow of people and goods through Gerland.
Finally, footbridges and minor roads will be constructed over 
and through the freight yards/train tracks on the north and east 
boundaries of Gerland. This will improve movement between Gerland 
and it’s immediate neighbours; la Guillotiere (with it's major 
universities) to the north and the 8th arrondissement to the east.
This will ensure greater public transport and pedestrian access to 
Gerland from the surrounding areas of Lyon. The improvement of 
Gerland's physical communication and transport infrastructure will 
help ensure that Gerland in 2010 will be well integrated into Lyon 
and possess the facilities needed to help play a role in Lyon's 
European plans (Maison d'Amenagement de Gerland, 1991).
6.42 MAJOR DEVELOPMENT AREAS
The three elements of Gerland's development are the broad 
structural requirements needed to create Gerland as a viable 
community. The actual development of Gerland is proceeding through 
four spatial stages. The first stage concerns the area around the ENS. 
This area's development is centred around l'Allee d'ltalie, one of two 
major east-west access roads in Gerland. This is the area of Gerland 
that was begun first and is nearing completion. The first stage of 
development in this area will include 1000 apartments, 55 
commercial services including a 1700 sq metre supermarket, 2 office
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complexes, 23,000 sq metres of public squares and parks and a 2 star 
hotel. This section will constitute the foundation of the new Gerland 
district. This area is also the host of the large (chemical- 
pharmaceutical) Rhone-Merieux complex. Along with ENS, this has 
provided the critical mass needed to launch the successful new Tony 
Gamier Science Park (Maison d'Amenagement de Gerland, 1991).
The Tony Gamier Science Park has been a successful technopole 
since it’s opening in 1987. Since it's establishment 110 enterprises 
have been located at this Science Park. These 110 new enterprises 
employ 6,500 people, mostly in the fields of high-technology and 
services. The Tony Gamier Science Park is succeeding in establishing 
the critical mass needed to further facilitate the growth of this area as 
a high-technology development pole. To date, this Science Park is 
fulfilling it's mandate of attracting high-technology jobs and critical 
mass around which to develop this new district of Lyon.
L'Allee d'ltalie development area also includes the Grande Halle 
Tony Gamier. This uniquely designed (transparent and without 
pillars) former industrial estate was completely restored by the city 
in 1988. Now, with a seating capacity of 20,000, the Grande Halle 
plays host to numerous musical, athletic and cultural events. This 
distinctive architectural building anchors one end of l'Allee d'ltalie 
helping to establish its focal position as a major development axis for 
Gerland. L'Allee d'ltalie area is the first cornerstone to the Gerland 
project and has, so far, met expectations and is a cause for cautious 
optimism regarding the district's future (Maison d'Amenagement de 
Gerland, 1991).
The second major development area revolves around the future 
marina and 22 hectares along the left bank of the Rhone river. This 
area will provide the second major focal point of the new Gerland 
district, and will include: 1000 apartments, 7 hectares of recreational 
land, a marina port designed to accommodate 200 small and medium 
sized (5 to 18 metre) boats, a four star hotel and convention centre 
complete with a 600 space parking lot and numerous shops and
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restaurants. Additionally, the new International School complex is 
located in this area.
The proposed four-star Sheraton (a major American hotel and 
convention centre corporation), to be constructed around the future 
marina would be a major boost for Lyon. The lack of four-star hotel 
and convention facilities was one of Lyon's shortcomings in the 
DATAR/RECLUS report and Lyon's own LYON 2010 plan. This four- 
star Sheraton will, according to preliminary plans, have 450 
bedrooms, a conference centre to accommodate 1,000 delegates. An 
assortment of upscale boutiques and restaurants and 600 parking 
places will complete this major addition to Lyon's infrastructure. This 
four-star complex will also serve as an impressive cornerstone for the 
whole marina development project (Maison d'Amenagement de 
Gerland, 1991).
The new International School complex in the marina 
development area also directly addresses one of Lyon's weak areas.
In both the DATAR/RECLUS report and in it's own LYON 2010 plan, 
the lack of an International School was viewed as impeding Lyon's 
international image and ambitions. This new International School on 
the left bank of the Rhone is a modem snake-like architectural 
statement. This futuristic complex provides 2000 French and foreign 
students the option of taking French exams, international options or 
foreign qualifications. This new International School complex is part 
of a greater higher education framework envisioned for Gerland. 
Currently, the vast majority of the students at the International 
School are local French children being sent to this school for reasons of 
prestige and language. However, this does not negate the fact that the 
International School does now exist and fills one of the holes in Lyon's 
international infrastructure.
The third spatial area for development is smaller in scale but is 
the largest in physical size. Le Parc du Confluent incorporates 80 
hectares of athletic facilities including 35 tennis courts, 20 playing 
fields (soccer and rugby), an olympic-sized swimming pool, a climbing 
wall and two major sporting venues; a 50,000 seat outdoor stadium 
and a 15,000 seat indoor arena. On the north end of the Parc, centred
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around the head offices of the Merieux Institut, will be a 320 room 
hotel complex, 100 apartments and a river port. Additionally there 
will be a footbridge constructed to link the park at the south point of 
the Presqu’ile with Gerland (Maison d'Amenagement de Gerland, 
1991).
The final area of development will be centred around the future 
east-west axis road; Cours des Girondins. The development area, in 
north Gerland, will constitute a second urban centre area in addition 
to l’Allee d’ltalie. An area of shops, restaurants and services 
surrounded by transitional and residential zones will complete this 
current phase of development. Cours des Girondins will help to 
physically spread the Gerland development into a multi-pole urban 
centre. The Cours des Girondins will be the area of Gerland closest to 
the rest of the city of Lyon with direct links into the university 
district to the north of Gerland. This will aid in the development of 
the planned educational infrastructure of the district.
6.43 THE IMPORTANCE OF GERLAND
The redevelopment of the Gerland district is of strategic 
importance to Lyon’s future international ambitions. First, this 
redevelopment of the old industrial Gerland district into a major 
urban pole will help redress the traditional economic east-west divide 
in Lyon. By redeveloping Gerland, in the south-east sector of Lyon, 
the municipal authorities are sending a strong signal that the 
integration of Lyon is vital to the city's future. Lyon cannot hope to 
achieve its international ambitions by becoming a divided city 
growing at two speeds.
Secondly, the Gerland project addresses a number of Lyon’s 
infrastructural weak points. The four-star Sheraton hotel and 
conference centre facility and the International School are both 
needed. The Grande Halle Tony Gamier, with it’s 20,000 seat capacity 
and ability to accommodate major events, is a needed attraction for an 
international city. These projects serve to fill holes in Lyon’s 
infrastructure that would, if left unresolved, have seriously retarded 
Lyon’s international ambitions.
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Thirdly, the successful development of the Tony Gamier Science 
Park is an early indication of the economic vitality of this new 
development. Through the development of a major new technopole 
centred around ENS and the Rhone-Merieux complex, the future 
economic strength, diversity and potential driving force for the whole 
district has been established. The Gerland redevelopment project, 
similar to the Part-Dieu project of the 1970's (Tuppen, 1977.), is 
intended not only to redevelop a section of the city in need of 
reconversion but to develop a “European” scale project.
6.5 CITE INTERNATIONALE
The second major project is at the Achille-Lignon wharf on the 
east bank of the Saone. In a beautiful park setting near the new 
Interpol world headquarters, a 200 room four star hotel and a 250 
room three star hotel are being constructed in tandem with the 
"Centre International des Congres". Many well known international 
hotel chains have expressed an interest in participating in this project. 
The large American hotel chains of Hilton, Hyatt, and Marriott are 
being considered as are Intercontinental and Trusthouse Forte et 
Loew (L'Activite economique, Septembre 1990). The addition of these 
world class hotels with their advanced appeal, international 
reservation system, and image will go a long way towards solving the 
current problem of having no real "marque" hotels. Also another 
major modem conference facility will enable Lyon to attract 
numerous conferences and congresses in the future.
Currently though, the Cite Internationale project is in the 
process of being scaled down to a smaller size. A lack of funds and 
interest by the major hotel/convention corporations, and the lack of 
suitable access such as the metro have dealt a potentially fatal blow to 
this development. This serves as a reminder that regardless of a 
political planning document, the economic realities are what will 
produce construction and growth. In this time of economic recession 
not all projects will become reality. Lyon must take this into account 
when planning future developments designed to enhance its 
international image and react accordingly.
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6.6 EUREXPO EXHIBITION CENTRE
Eurexpo, Lyon's major exhibition centre, was opened in 
September 1984 at a cost of 650,000,000 francs. Eurexpo is located in 
Chassien in the eastern sector of the Lyon Agglomeration next to Bron 
Airport. Eurexpo is the seventh largest exhibition centre in Europe in 
overall size with 85,000m2 of covered space and a further 130,000m2 
of open air facilities set on a 108 hectares site with 5,000 parking 
spaces. Eurexpo is considered one of the superior exhibition halls on 
the continent and is often compared with the facility in Milan. In 
1989, Eurexpo hosted 250 exhibitions catering to 1.2 million visitors 
and covering everything from Autoshows to Nuclear Research (SEPAL, 
1990). Despite the first-class facility, Eurexpo does need to attract 
larger and less localized exhibitions to be considered a top European 
venue. Seldom is the entire facility used and most of the exhibitions 
are hosted by local companies or agencies.
6.7 SUMMARY
The infrastructure needed to attract tourists and business 
travellers is currently one of Lyon's weaker attributes in its drive to 
achieve International status. The cultural infrastructure in Lyon is 
adequate for local purposes. However, it is not of a scale or quality to 
attract visitors to Lyon. This lack of a proven international attraction 
is detrimental to Lyon's international image. This is reflected in 
Lyon's small scale tourist industry. Lyon is well positioned as a 
staging post for tours of the Alpes or famous vineyards. Lyon itself 
though, is not a tourist attraction in its own right.
For the business traveller, Lyon lacks the necessary physical 
infrastruture of luxury/business class hotels and conference facilities. 
The advantages both financially and in terms of international image 
that are associated with this infrastruture is mandatory for Lyon in its 
drive for greater international position. The scaling back of the 
ambitious Cite Internationale is a blow to Lyon's plan to redress this 
infrastrutural problem. Currently, the Gerland redevelopment project 
is the only initiative in progress to address this problem and it is
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therefore very impotant that the Gerland project goes forward and 
succeeds in filling these infrastructual gaps.
The Gerland redevelopment project is increasingly important to 
Lyon's international ambitions. The new International School, the 
Sheraton hotel/conference centre on the new marina, the successful 
new Science Park and the other areas of development planned for 
Gerland will establish this section of Lyon as a pivotal section of the 
city. When these projects are finished, if they remain on schedule, 
they will succeed in addressing Lyon's major infrastructural needs in 
these categories.
One of the current drawbacks is that none of these locations, 
(Gerland, Achille-Lignon, Lyon-Satolas, Eurexpo), are currently served 
by the metro. The long range city plans call for the metro to be 
extended to these locations but it is not known whether they will all 
be achieved during the span of the LYON 2010 plan (SEPAL, 1990). 
The metro link to Cite Internationale/Achille-Lignon has already been 
indefinately postponed. This is a critical point because the Lyon 
metro system is the best form of intra-urban travel in Lyon 
connecting all central locations. To have the major hotel and 
convention centres isolated from the city as a whole will not only limit 
the number of conventions in Lyon but will also limit the financial 
advantages and image building effects for the rest of the city.
The general overview of Lyon's position in the context of these 
categories is that it lacks a major international attraction and needs 
the Gerland project to improve its physical infrastruture. In addition 
to transport and hospitality infrastructure the International status of 
a city is, according to the Soldatos model, also judged upon such 
criteria as its higher educational facilities, the independence and 
quality of its press and media, and the number of foreign residents 
living in the city. The DATAR-RECLUS report and the Soldatos model 
specify these three criteria as important to the potential of a city that 
has international ambitions. These three criteria will be examined in 
the next chapter.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE EDUCATIONAL, MEDIA AND DIPLOMATIC 
INFRASTRUCTURE
7.1 HIGHER EDUCATION
A city's higher education capacity is another one of the major 
indicators used in ranking and comparing cities. The Soldatos model 
emphasizes the importance of higher education services and the 
development of links between institutions of higher education and the 
high-technology industries. Paris was ranked by the DATAR/RECLUS 
team as the single largest university city in Europe. With over
350,000 university students, Paris accounts for over 30% of the 
French university population. Not only is Paris dominant in sheer 
numbers of students but also contains the vast majority of the 
prestigious Grandes Ecoles and 42% of all international students. Lyon 
is the second major university centre in France with 76,500 total 
university students in all institutes of higher learning during the 
1988-89 academic year. The three state universities of Lyon had a 
1990-1991 student enrollment of 57,450 which ranks Lyon fourth 
nationally in this category (Figure 7.1).
In Lyon there are three state universities. These three 
accounted for 57,450 students during the 1990-91 academic year, 
(Lyon I - 22,800, Lyon II - 19,250, Lyon III - 15,400). Of these 
students 88% are from France. 70% of the students are from the 
Rhone-Alpes Region, a further 19% are from other regions of France 
and the remaining 11% are from outside France (Figure 7.2). Looking 
first at the foreign students, this 11% is composed of 47% from the 
Middle East and North Africa, 23% from Black Africa, 12% from 
Europe, 8% from Asia, 3% from the Americas and 3% from other places 
(Figure 7.3). These numbers show a heavy tilt towards France's 
former North African and Black African colonies in contrast with very 
few Asians or Americans.
Examining the percentage of students at the three state 
universities from the departements in the region illustrates the areas 
which are within Lyon's academic zone of influence and those which
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are outside of this zone (Figure 7.4). The majority of these students, 
59%, come from the Rhone departement. Neighbouring Ain accounts 
for a further 10% of the student population. The other six 
departements in the region contribute very few students to the Lyon 
state universities. The Savoyard departements along with Ardeche 
and Drome are well outside Lyon's academic zone of influence.
Lyon is the largest university city in the region but is by no 
means the exclusive university centre of the region. Grenoble prides 
itself on having a strong academic reputation especially in the 
"prestigious" high technology areas of nuclear energy, computers, 
hydro energy and a range of other applied science fields. These 
specialties attract prominent students and scholars to Grenoble thus 
forming an academic critical mass in certain high-technology sciences 
at Grenoble. Lyon and Grenoble are ranked on the same tier in the 
European wide survey along with Bordeaux, Toulouse and Montpellier 
(Brunet, 1988). The Rhone-Alpes Region also has smaller universities 
in St Etienne and Chambery. Geneva also possess a strong university 
tradition and substantial academic population. Geneva shares with 
Grenoble a much greater percentage of students vis-a-vis the 
population as a whole thereby giving these agglomerations more of a 
university aura. Both Geneva and Grenoble also have central 
university locations which help spatially define an academic 
population. Geneva also shares with Grenoble the advantage of 
having certain prestigious programs, in Geneva's case these are 
related to the city's international institutions.
Lyon again finds itself in a familiar yet unwanted position.
Paris dominates university life in France and claims 42% of all 
international students. Lyon may be the second largest university 
city in France but within its own region it must compete with both 
Grenoble and Geneva. Lyon is not in a position to claim the academic 
leadership role in the Rhone-Alpes Region and indeed the superior 
academic image in certain high-profile fields of both Grenoble and 
Geneva places Lyon's academic image at a disadvantage.
Lyon realizes that it does not have an international reputation 
as a strong university city. The SEPAL LYON 2010 plan proposes
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future changes aimed at increasing the image of Lyon as a university 
city and academic pole. There is little constructive communication 
between the universities in Lyon and the rest of the region. The 
relationship between the universities within Lyon is competitive and 
there is a noticeably chilly relationship with the university in 
Grenoble. The optimum solution rests in the fact that the universities 
in question do not share similar strengths and could therefore be 
considered complimentary instead of competitive (Gras, 1990). Lyon 
II, for example, is not focusing on building a world class nuclear 
science programme to compete with Grenoble. Similar to the need for 
better and closer political integration in the region between the major 
urban centres, there is a need for such integration between the 
region's academic institutions.
Lyon has also decided to take an active hand in upgrading its 
academic institutions and image. The addition of l'Ecole Normale 
Superieure from Paris to Gerland to be integrated with the new 
technopole is a blessing for the city and helps solve two major 
problems. L'Ecole Normale Superieure is one of the best known in 
France. This will enhance Lyon's academic image and attract not just 
international students but some of the better French students as well. 
Secondly, this will link ENS with the high technology companies in the 
technopole at Gerland. This will help address one of the central 
problems of the local university system which is the lack of links 
between academic and private institutions. This combination of "grey 
matter" will help both the academics and private enterprises involved 
attract better companies and better students, and to improve the 
research and development elements of the technopole at Gerland.
Lyon has decided that it must spatially concentrate its academic 
institutions and personnel along with improving transport between its 
universities. Currently there is no true student quarter in Lyon which 
adds to its poor academic image. On July 30, 1990, COURLY purchased 
the abandoned Manufacture des Tabacs building with the purpose of 
installing a major new university site with a projected capacity of
14,000 students. This massive building is located on the 'D' line of the 
Metro on the Boulevard de l'Europe on the edge of central Lyon within 
walking distance of La Part-Dieu. This major university facility will, it
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is hoped, create a central university location around which an 
academic "quartier" will be formed (Lyon Agence d'Urbanisme de la 
Communaute Urbaine de Lyon, 1991).
To add to the university ambiance of the city, Lyon is planning 
to greatly increase the number of students at its three state 
universities. Lyon produced a 15 year plan for its universities that 
began in 1988. This plan predicts that over 40,000 more university 
students will be attending one of Lyon’s state universities by the year 
2003. This would boost the state university student body in Lyon to 
almost 100,000. This is a huge increase in numbers and the 
universities' acquisition of needed staff, space, facilities and money 
poses enormous financial and institutional problems.
Lyon plans to drastically increase its student body, improve 
upon the linkages between universities in Lyon and the rest of the 
region, increase international enrollment, bind the universities closer 
to the private sector, attract further Grandes Ecoles and create a 
university quarter. It is felt that this will give Lyon the needed 
academic critical mass to seriously boost its position in the academic 
world. This is indeed an ambitious task which would doubtless 
increase Lyon's academic standing if successful. Adding another
40,000 students to the state universities and creating a new 
university district by 2003 seems an ambitious task. However, if 
totally or even partially successful, this will provide Lyon with a 
vastly improved and enlarged higher education infrastructure. This 
will help in Lyon's bid for "International City" status.
7.2 PRESS AND MEDIA SERVICES
Another important infrastructural criterion is the size and 
strength of an agglomeration's press and media. A controlling 
agglomeration will support numerous national newspapers and 
magazines along with various radio and television stations of national 
and regional importance (Soldatos, 1988). Taking a closer look at the 
press and media of Lyon one finds a familiar situation: dominance 
from Paris and stiff regional competition.
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Lyon has two major daily newspapers, Le Progres and Lyon 
Matin. Le Progres, established in 1859, is by far the larger of the two 
with a 1990 daily circulation of 342,000. This placed Le Progres as 
the fourth largest regional (as opposed to national) daily newspaper in 
France. The fifth largest French regional is Le Dauphine Iibere of 
Grenoble with a daily circulation of 296,000 in 1990 (Science & Vie 
Economique. 1992). Le Progres and Le Dauphine Iibere have been 
competing for years to establish themselves as the dominant daily in 
the region and their history is bitter and inter-related.
Since the middle of the sixties there has been a national trend in 
France which has witnessed a dramatic decline in the readership of 
regional dailies despite the significant population increase during 
these same years. Le Progres had a peak circulation in 1964 of
500,000 papers per day. Since 1964, Le Progres has seen a steady 
decline in circulation and began to suffer severe financial losses in the 
early eighties. In 1986, Le Progres was bought by the Hersant Group. 
Ironically, the Hersant Group bought Le Dauphine Iibere in 1983 
because it too was suffering financial losses due to reduced 
circulation.
In 1984, Le Dauphine Libere had a daily circulation of 427,000. 
The circulation figure of 296,000 in 1990 is a substantial drop in only 
six years. During the same six years Le Progres has improved its 
circulation from 244,000 to 342,000. This is a handsome turn-around 
for Le Progres. True to form though, each paper is totally dominant 
within its city zone of influence. Neither can lay claim to the title of 
the paper of the Rhone-Alpes. Also, both are losing market shares to 
the Parisian national papers that have installed regional offices in 
Lyon. In 1986 both Le Monde and Liberation installed regional 
offices in Lyon (joining Le Figaro and L'Humanite). These nationals 
then began producing a regional paper; e.g. Le Monde Rhone-Alpes. 
Because of constant bickering between the two largest regional papers 
the Parisian national papers were able to penetrate the regional 
market and establish true Rhone-Alpes regional dailies at the expense 
of the local regional dailies. This has only increased the control by 
Paris of the local media on all levels.
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Currently Lyon hosts only one international press agency. In 
addition to the French Agence Presse, the Associated Press has an 
office in Lyon which services all of the other English speaking press 
agencies (UPI, Reuters etc.). However, on February 17, 1992, Lyon 
was chosen as the site for the headquarters of "Euronews". Lyon was 
chosen from among a field of 17 "Eurocities" (International Herald 
Tribune. February 18, 1992). Euronews is designed to become the 
European version of the highly acclaimed Atlanta based American 
Cable News Network (CNN). This is a major coup for Lyon. Not only 
will this add 50 international journalists to Lyon along with numerous 
editors and other news staff but will place Lyon in the middle of a 
major European-wide news project.
Euronews is scheduled to be on the air in 1993 broadcasting in 
five languages (English, French, German, Italian, and Spanish) to an 
audience of around 23 million. With an initial annual budget of $50 
million, Euronews will receive one quarter of its budget from the 
European Community, one quarter from advertising and sponsorship, 
and half from participating television stations in France (Antenne 2 
and FR3), Germany (ARD & ZDF), Italy (RAI), Spain (RTVE) and state 
owned television stations in Greece, Belgium, Monaco, Finland and 
Egypt. The 39 member stations of the European Broadcasting Union 
(EBU) is supporting the project and is providing technical assistance, 
images and library footage to help launch this initiative.
Euronews will greatly improve the international news and 
media profile of Lyon. This will attract numerous other international 
press agencies, journalists and various technical support facilities.
Lyon argued that it was vital for the city’s interests to attract 
Euronews to Lyon. Lyon, along with Valencia, Spain, were the only 
two cities to offer a financial incentive to Euronews to locate in their 
city. Lyon has given Euronews the former Hewlett-Packard 
headquarters in Ecully free of rent as its base of operations. Lyon 
paid Hewlett-Packard to move to a new headquarters in Bron both to 
keep Hewlett-Packard in the Lyon area and to open up this building 
for Euronews. Lyon has also granted Euronews an undisclosed sum of 
money to assist with the start-up costs of the venture (Le Progres. 19- 
2-1992).
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A nother point in favour of Lyon's selection as the operational 
base of Euronews is that the directors of the Euronews project are  
located in Geneva. The proximity of Lyon to Geneva is considered 
advantageous in this instance. The irony of having a sm aller regional 
com petitor directing the placem ent and operations of Euronews to 
Lyon has no t been lost on the officials in Lyon, bu t the im plantation of 
Euronews to Lyon is viewed overall as a positive boost for the 
in te rna tiona l status of Lyon.
7.3 THE FOREIGN POPULATION
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An agglom eration's foreign population is ano ther indicator used 
to determ ine international status. The Soldatos m odel includes this 
am ong its criteria (Soldatos, 1989). Lyon has a foreign population that 
consists of 13% of its total population (Figure 7.5). Two points m ust 
first be m ade regarding foreign populations. First, d ifferent countries 
have d ifferen t criteria as to who, by official definition, constitutes a 
foreigner. Different im m igration and assimilation laws make for 
profound distinctions in the term  "foreigner" among European nations.
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Secondly, the role played by the foreign population of a European city 
is complex and ambiguous, thus making it difficult to draw 
generalized conclusions on a city’s international status based upon the 
number of foreign residents. One of the problems in quantifying the 
impact of the foreign population on a European city is that the foreign 
residents themselves are widely different in ethnic and economic 
composition. However, the number of foreign residents in a city does 
add to the international composition, connections and flavour of a 
large city and can therefore be used cautiously as another indicator in 
helping determine the international status of a city.
On one end of the spectrum of foreign residents are the 
international business leaders. These highly paid executives of multi­
national companies are actively recruited by all major cities because 
these international business executives are the leaders of 
international corporations that provide the leadership for many 
international organizations. European cities are expanding certain 
infrastructures to appeal directly to these executives. Lyon, for 
example, constructed an International School in the Gerland district to 
educate the children of such executives in either French or another 
European language. Social clubs, welcoming committees and other 
family oriented groups are being established to increase Lyon’s level 
of attractiveness to these important foreign executives and their 
families.
Another group of foreign residents to consider are the 
immigrants (legal and not) from poorer nations. These economic 
immigrants move to the European cities in search of employment and 
a higher standard of living than available in their areas of origin. 
Directly after the Second World War such immigration was welcome. 
The booming industrial economies of the 1950’s and 1960's needed 
the extra work force and was able to absorb these immigrants with 
little trouble. Also, these early immigrants were mostly Southern 
Europeans (Italian, Spanish, Portuguese) who shared common 
religious and social beliefs along with similar physical features 
thereby easing their integration into French society.
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However, following the first oil crisis in the early 1970's, the 
industrial sector of the economy began shrinking. Simultaneously, the 
post colonial movement of immigrants to France from its former 
colonies in North and Black Africa added more immigrants to urban 
areas of France. As these new immigrants originated in different 
cultures they often did not share the same religious and social beliefs 
as the French. These immigrants were also physically distinctive from 
the French and often spoke poor or fractured French. This wave of 
immigrants were more obviously "non-French" than the previous 
immigrants. This combination of increased numbers of immigrants 
who exhibit a higher degree of visibility in a nation with increasing 
unemployment has led to a tangible degree of social unrest within the 
large cities.
Lyon has not been exempt from the problems of racism and 
unemployment. In October 1990, in Vaulx-en-Velin, the death of a 
youth at the hands of the police in this poor, predominantly 
immigrant housing project touched off a riot (Webster, 1990). This 
riot left many injured, burned down numerous retail outlets and 
generally outraged the whole nation. This darker side of a city's 
foreign population is being experienced throughout Western Europe 
and strengthening immigration policies is a prime concern of the 
European Community at this time.
The amalgamation of Foreign residents from business executives 
to economic immigrants; including students, teachers, small business 
owners and others, undoubtedly adds to the cosmopolitan nature of a 
large city. The proliferation of ethnic restaurants and shops in certain 
sections of Lyon and other large cities often produces a popular and 
colourful area both for locals and visitors. This cosmopolitan nature is 
one of the areas in which a significant foreign population can be used 
to improve a city's international status.
Among the major "Eurocities" that are comparable to Lyon, the 
Italian and Spanish cities of Milan, Turin, and Barcelona have the 
lowest percentage of foreign residents (Figure 7.5). The major 
Northern European cities of Frankfurt, Amsterdam and Liege have the 
largest influx of foreigners. The majority of the foreigners in these
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cities are Turkish and Balkan "guest workers". Lyon itself considers 
13% of its population as foreign with well over half of that number 
originating in Africa. There are large communities in Lyon of 
Maghrebins and Black Africans that continue to attract immigration 
from these areas. The second largest bloc of foreign residents in Lyon 
are the Southern Europeans who migrated to Lyon in the 1950's and 
1960's. The vast majority of Lyon's foreign population are economic 
immigrants who moved to Lyon to find employment. In 1990, there 
were 158,648 foreign residents in the Lyon agglomeration. Of these, 
only 400 were from North America and 2,843 from Northern Europe.
Lyon would like to increase the number of foreign residents 
from North America and Northern Europe. These foreign residents 
represent, to a greater degree, the international business executives 
and the international status that is linked to them and their 
employers. Unfortunately, the figures show that the number of 
European Community foreign nationals in Lyon decreased by 16% 
between 1982 and 1990 while the number of non-European 
Community nationals, primarily North and Black Africans, increased 
by 7% over the same period (INSEE, 1991). This is also representative 
of the number of foreign consulates and organizations that are located 
in a city. The number of consulates, and nations represented at the 
diplomatic level in a particular city is another criteria in ranking the 
International status of a city.
Lyon is the best served French city outside of Paris in terms of 
foreign consulates. Lyon has a total of 41 foreign consulates of one 
rank or another including a consulate from the United States. 
Strasbourg has 25 foreign consulates, being the seat of the European 
Parliament, and no other French city has more than twenty. Marseille 
has lost the consulate from the United States that had been located 
there along with numerous other foreign consulates. Lille has 20 
foreign consulates and Toulouse has 15. This strong number of 
foreign consulates in Lyon compared to its domestic rivals is a 
positive sign for Lyon.
On a European wide scale, Lyon's numbers look less impressive. 
Geneva with 67 consulates, Milan with 73, Barcelona with 62 and
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Frankfurt with 64 are far and away the best served "Eurocities" in 
this category. Turin, Amsterdam and Rotterdam rank in the same 
category as Lyon in numbers of foreign consulates. Lyon's position is 
strong but, again, substantially behind the major European Cities and 
its nearest geographical rival, Geneva.
Overall, in terms of foreign population and official governmental 
offices and consulates, Lyon places in the middle tier of "Eurocities". 
The weakness in Lyon's number of international business executives 
within its foreign population is a reflection of the weakness of certain 
white collar service sectors of Lyon's economy. Lyon's position vis-a- 
vis the other major "Eurocities" in terms of the Soldatos model's 
criteria of foreign population in the context of "International City" 
status is competitive though not first rate.
7.4 SUMMARY
Lyon, within the context of a provincial French city, has a solid 
foundation of higher education and media infrastructure as well as a 
significant foreign population. However, Lyon does not distinguish 
itself as a national or even regional leader. Grenoble is comparable to 
Lyon in these categories and both trail Paris by a substantial margin. 
On a European scale, and according to the Soldatos model, Lyon is 
lacking the appropriate strength to claim "International City" status in 
these categories.
Lyon is cogniscent of this fact and has establsihed long-range 
plans to address this problem. The plan to greatly expand the size of 
the higher-education community in Lyon is one example. In these 
categories, however, urban planners cannot effectively change such 
factors as press and media dependency on Paris, the high-technology 
educational facilities in Grenoble nor the type of foreign residents in 
Lyon. These are issues essentially out of Lyon's control and will 
continue to place obstacles in Lyon's drive towards International 
status.
The past chapters in Part Two have attempted to describe and 
analyse the physical facilitators of Lyon's effort to become an
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"International City". The Soldatos model has been used as the 
yardstick with which to measure Lyon’s position and potential. None 
of these criteria are absolutely quantifiable, rather, this has attempted 
to serve as an illustration of Lyon's current position and its actions 
and plans to upscale its image through the improvement of these 
facilitators. The final facilitator is the economy of Lyon. This is 
arguably the most important facilitator and will be examined in the 
next chapter.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF LYON'S ECONOMY
All models of an "International City" must consider a wide range 
of criteria to determine the actual ranking of a particular city. One of 
the most significant determining criteria concerns evaluating the 
economic strength of a city. Status, be it global or regional, rests first 
on the economic strength of a city. A dynamic, growing, high 
technology-driven economy accompanied by a first class financial 
centre with numerous specialized service professionals is a positive 
foundation and indicator of a city's status. The function of this 
chapter is to restate the economic criteria of the Soldatos model and to 
examine those elements of Lyon's economic and financial 
infrastructure. This will determine Lyon's economic strengths and 
weaknesses in the context of achieving "International City" status.
This study will in turn provide a basis for judging not only Lyon's 
position within the Soldatos model but also whether Lyon's ambitions 
are realistic and attainable. This will help determine Lyon's economic 
position vis-a-vis the other "Eurocities".
This chapter will divide the study of Lyon's economic foundation 
into six major categories. Each of these categories will in turn discuss 
the broader regional and international dimensions associated with 
each function and link these results back into the Soldatos model in 
order to evaluate the economic position of Lyon. The first three 
categories correspond to the three major sectors of the economy: the 
service sector, the industrial sector and the high technology sector. 
These three sectors of the economy provide the majority of revenue, 
employment and economic strength of a city and are thus significant 
in determining Lyon's position.
The next category to be examined concerns the international 
trade of Lyon and the Rhone-Alpes Region. Direct international 
commercial contact is needed to assert a significant international 
economy. International trade provides expanded contacts and image 
on an international scale and is therefore an important element in the 
internationalization process. Also, international trade patterns are 
valuable in examining certain economic flows and functions regarding
183
a city, thereby contributing to the evaluation of its relative economic 
importance. The fifth category to be studied concerns the location and 
number of corporate headquarters located in Lyon. According to the 
Soldatos model, an "International City" must possess numerous 
corporate headquarters of companies that have international 
functions. This helps determine whether a city has significant 
economic control of functions and flows or rather is merely an 
economic relay station. An "International City" will host the 
headquarters of a number of multi-national companies with global 
concerns.
The final category of this examination of the economic 
infrastructure of Lyon concerns the economic "image" of Lyon and the 
Rhone-Alpes Region. A number of national and international polls of 
top business executives are used to determine how the leaders of the 
business community, both within France and internationally, view 
Lyon in a number of vital economic categories. The economic image of 
a city is important in the Soldatos model in that it affects a city's 
ability to attract and maintain investment thus affecting the levels of 
critical mass needed to achieve "International City" status (Soldatos, 
1989).
This chapter will then examine Lyon's bid to host the future 
Central European Bank (EuroFed). This examination will be used to 
highlight certain economic assets and drawbacks of Lyon as well as 
the importance of Lyon's attempt to secure a significant and 
prestigious European financial institution. Analysis of the points in 
this chapter will position Lyon, in an economic context, within the 
European urban hierarchy and within the Soldatos model, thereby 
providing a foundation to determine the viability of the concept of 
Lyon: "International City".
8.1 THE ECONOMIC CRITERIA FOR "INTERNATIONALITY"
It is important to remember that the primary concern of this 
chapter is not to explore in detail the overall economy of Lyon and the 
Rhone-Alpes Region. The objective of this chapter is to illustrate the 
intemationality of Lyon's economy within the context of the Soldatos
184
model. The working hypothesis of this objective is that Lyon must 
fulfil, to some degree, the economic criteria established by the 
Soldatos model in order to achieve its ambition of "International City" 
status. This chapter will examine Lyon’s economic structure in the 
context of these specific economic criteria spelled-out in the Soldatos 
model.
The Soldatos model discussed the importance of an "International 
City" providing strategic support service of a superior level. The 
strength of a city’s higher support services reflect directly upon the 
city’s ability to control the financial flows within its region. Such 
higher support services include banking, insurance and financial 
services. Soldatos, in his model, also illustrated the importance of the 
presence of corporate headquarters and multi-national corporations in 
a city. Finally, Soldatos argued that an "International City" must 
establish the proper image and local/global links required to create 
the critical mass necessary to attain "International" status.
The DATAR/RECLUS ranking of the top 165 Western European 
cities incorporated a number of economic indicators within its model. 
The DATAR/RECLUS project included among its 16 criteria: Financial 
Functions, Multi-Nationals and "Infrastructure Technopolitaires". In 
the category of Financial Functions Lyon was placed in the third tier 
among major European cities. Lyon ranked well behind such 
"Eurocities" as Frankfurt, Milan, Amsterdam, Zurich and a number of 
capital cities. In the category of Multi-Nationals, Lyon again ranked in 
the third tier of European cities behind 12 major cities and on the 
same tier as 10 other cities of Western Europe. In both of these 
categories Lyon ranked in the third tier of European cities behind the 
major cities of Western Europe. However, Lyon’s position was far 
superior to that of any other French provincial city and on a par with 
such competitors as Turin, Barcelona, Dusseldorf and Manchester 
(Brunet, 1988).
In the context of "Infrastructure-Technopolitaires" Lyon ranked 
in the top tier (Along with Paris and Grenoble in France). In theory, 
this category indicates the level of high-level research and 
development functions, high-technology corporations, and the city’s
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level of high-technology infrastructure (digital fibre-optic 
communications for example). Lyon and other French cities did well 
in this category due to the current popularity of technopoles in France 
and the success of the State in constructing such technologically- 
advanced infrastructure as the TGV and digital telecommunications.
An examination of Lyon's economic infrastructure vis-a-vis the 
Soldatos model will help in determining the "International" status of 
Lyon. Examining the economic infrastructure of Lyon in the context of 
this model will help illustrate whether Lyon has the economic 
strength and linkages needed to carry the city to "International City" 
status. Without the economic motor to drive the other criteria and 
functions of intemationality Lyon will never achieve its 
"International" ambitions.
8.2 THE SERVICE SECTOR
The service sector has been the fastest growing sector of the 
economy in Lyon, and France in general, over the past twenty five 
years. Today the service sector employs more people in Lyon than 
does the industrial sector. The service sector employed 43% of the 
workforce in the Lyon Agglomeration in 1990 (l'Emploi dans Rhone 
-Alpes, 1992). In this section on the service sector of the economy 
the prime concern rests with Lyon's position and intemationality in 
four critical service sector enterprises: banking, insurance, financial 
services and information services. These four service sector 
industries form the core of the new age "International City's" ability to 
compete on the international stage.
8.21 BANKING
Banking is one of the basic foundations of any financial 
community. A true "International City" must possess numerous 
international banks, the headquarters of large local banks, and 
conduct business with a diverse and international clientele. This 
allows the city to retain the profits of such commerce and to ensure 
the local employment of high-calibre white collar employees. Also, 
this helps develop a relationship between local business and local
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banks whose cooperation can help establish some form of critical 
mass. Major bank headquarters and international bank branch offices 
also serve as a magnet to other banks, clients and higher level 
financial services thus attracting more higher services and their 
advantages to the city.
Lyon is the headquarters of three Banques des Depots, (Deposit 
Banks), Banque Morin Pons, S.L.B., and Credit Lyonnais which has 
returned the headquarters of its Depot operations to Lyon (though the 
corporate headquarters remain at La Defense in Paris). All of these 
Banques des Depots have a local function but their national functions 
remain limited except for Credit Lyonnais. None of the three has an 
international function as a Banque des Depots and none employs over 
one thousand people (Bonnet, 1989).
Lyon is also the headquarters for three smaller banks: Banque 
Populaire de Lyon, Credit Mutuel Sud-Est, and Credit Agricole du 
Rhone. The three banks have a national function limited primarily to 
the south-east section of France. None employs over 400 people, 
indeed Credit Agricole du Rhone employs less than 15 persons. A 
reflection of the limited banking facilities of Lyon is that neither 
Credit Lyonnais nor Banque de Rhone-Alpes, banks which originated 
in Lyon, currently have their headquarters in Lyon.
Lyon, being the second ranking French agglomeration, hosts 
branch offices of all the other major French banks. The main Lyon 
office of the powerful Banque National de Paris (B.N.P). also serves as 
the regional headquarters for the B.N.P. throughout the Rhone-Alpes 
and Auvergne regions. Lyon realistically acknowledges that the major 
French banks with headquarters in Paris are not going to move their 
corporate headquarters to Lyon. Lyon is instead attempting to 
establish itself as the regional financial centre of "Le Grand Sud-Est". 
The establishment of the regional headquarters of the B.N.P. and 
Societe-Generale in Lyon is one visible example of this strategy 
(Tuppen, 1988).
The first step is to convince important financial institutions 
similar to B.N.P. to establish regional headquarters in Lyon. These
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institutions must be responsible for not only the whole Rhone-Alpes 
Region but also for South-East France. The second necessity is to 
increase the authority of such regional offices. The French financial 
sector is as centralized as the French political system. Though there 
are many regional offices in Lyon most have a limited mandate. The 
Lyon director of La Societe Generate currently has the same powers as 
the local director in Carcassone for example (Bonnet, 1989).
Important decisions, and those involving significant sums of capital, 
are handled in Paris. Lyon’s ambitions to become a regional banking 
hub for South-East France would elevate Lyon’s financial functions 
and ability to control capital flows and investments.
The number of international banks that maintain offices in Lyon 
is another important indicator of Lyon’s position in the international 
financial world. In Lyon there were 18 international banks 
represented in 1992. Many of these banks are Spanish and Italian 
including: Banco Bilbao Vizcaya, Banco Popular Espagnol, Banco di 
Roma and Banco di Sicilia. These were originally established to serve 
the needs of the Spanish and Italian immigrants that moved into the 
Lyon area after the Second World War. The major function of these 
banks was to allow the migrant workers to send money home to their 
families. In the last decade these banks have admittedly expanded 
their services but remain in Lyon primarily to serve a specific 
national community and have little impact on the international 
interests of Lyon (C.C.I.L. Annuaire. No 33, 1990). Currently, the 
Banque d'Algerie and Banque de Maroc provide the same service to 
the immigrant populations of these countries that their southern 
European counterparts provided to their citizens after the Second 
World War. Again, these are international banks but with limited 
functions for a limited consumer base.
The remaining international bank branch offices in Lyon are 
primarily the major banks of European Community nations. Barclays, 
Midlands, Grindlays and Lloyds of the United Kingdom, along with 
Banque Worms, (Germany), and Caixabank (Italy) are a sampling of 
the European banks with minor branch offices in Lyon. Citibank, the 
largest bank in the United States, established a regional headquarters 
in Lyon to serve South-Eastern France that employs 20 persons
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(Mayere et Bonamy, 1988). This is not a branch bank open to the 
public but is rather in Lyon to serve the business community and the 
financial interests of Citibank. This minor office is the only 
representation in Lyon by a United States bank. No Asian or Middle 
Eastern Banks are represented in Lyon.
To contrast the 18 international bank branches in Lyon with the 
237 in Frankfurt or the 77 in Geneva is but one illustration of the 
weakness of Lyon’s international banking community. Not only are 
there many more international banks (and domestic bank 
headquarters) in these Eurocities, but these banks command far more 
resources, capital and prestige than do the ones in Lyon (Bonnet, 
1989). Frankfurt and Geneva each have the advantage of having 
established an image as an international banking centre. This 
international image, prominent in the Soldatos model, has helped in 
the acquisition of the critical mass needed in this field to solidify their 
international positions in the banking industry. Lyon has neither the 
history, image nor critical mass required to compete at the same level 
with these "Eurocities".
This lack of international and domestic influential banking 
operations has numerous negative implications for Lyon. Having to 
consult corporate headquarters in Paris to resolve matters of 
importance imposes a definite negative association on Lyon’s image as 
an international financial centre. For, if Lyon is just another 
provincial office to the Parisian banks, then it has no hope of 
establishing its own financial independence. Secondly, since the 
national financial power remains concentrated in Paris, future 
international expansion will be accomplished through offices in the 
capital and not in Lyon. Also, there is a core-periphery relationship 
that exists within France that drains many of the best and brightest 
executives away from Lyon and the provinces to work in Paris. Most 
corporate executives wish to end their provincial stint and return to 
the company's headquarters in Paris as soon as possible. This has a 
negative impact upon Lyon and retards the city’s progress towards 
any degree of financial prominence within France and the European 
Community.
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8.22 INSURANCE
Insurance is another critically important higher service that 
needs to be competitively available in any "International City" 
(Soldatos, 1989). The high level corporate insurance sector in Lyon is 
comparable in size and importance to Lyon's banking industry. Lyon's 
insurance offices offer general insurance services but most detailed 
transactions, such as complex industrial risk actions, are usually 
handled by the corporate headquarters in Paris. (Bonamy et. al.,
1989). A specialist, when needed on the spot, is dispatched to Lyon 
via the TGV. This specialist is then able to return to Paris at the end 
of the business day with the specialized job completed. The increase 
in technology has increased the financial zone of influence of Paris to 
include Lyon. The express TGV and instantaneous telecommunication 
equipment allows the talented trained specialists to operate out of 
Paris thus reducing the number of such high level service 
professionals in the secondary cities of France.
A telling example of the weakness of the corporate insurance 
sector in Lyon is that not a single mutual insurance company with any 
national function has its headquarters in Lyon, or even in the Rhone 
Departement. Le Union Prevoyance Entreprise SUD is the only mutual 
insurance company with headquarters in Lyon and has no function 
outside the city. Three of the mutual insurance offices in Lyon are 
regional headquarters of companies with headquarters in Paris, but 
none has the authority or expertise to be considered an actor in the 
international market. All of the domestic mutual insurance offices 
located in Lyon have their corporate headquarters in Paris. Another 
example of the stranglehold that Paris has on the French corporate 
insurance sector is that the large UAP insurance company has 1500 
agents in the field throughout France and an additional 3,000 at the 
company's headquarters in La Defense to control the field agents and 
all other aspects of the company (L'Entreprise. No 78, Mars 1992).
A ranking of corporate insurance offices on a variety of criteria 
showed the dominance of Paris and the weakness of Lyon. This 
ranking had a maximum possible score of +2 and a maximum negative 
score of -2. Paris led the nation with a total score of +1.05. The
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second ranked city was Marseille with a total score of +.50, (due in 
part to the important marine insurance companies in Marseille).
Lyon, in this ranking of corporate insurance offices, had a total score 
of -.72 (L'Entreprise. No 78, Mars 1992). This negative rating 
reinforces the argument that Lyon is badly lacking in this higher 
service sector of the economy and that it is dominated by Paris. This 
represents another area of the Soldatos model where Lyon is lacking 
the necessary attributes to attain "International City" status.
8.23 FINANCIAL SERVICES
Lyon is equally impoverished in the major financial services area 
of the higher services sector of the economy. Of the 106 such 
financial services corporate organizations in Lyon, only three with any 
form of national function had headquarters there in 1987. Of these 
three, Caisse d'Epargne de Lyon with almost 500 employees is 
significantly larger than the others and the only specialized financial 
services corporation with any international identity in Lyon. The 
other two, SOFIDEX and SAFIGEC each employ approximately 50 
people and limit their functions to Lyon. One-half of the remaining 
106 financial service corporations in Lyon have their headquarters 
outside of the Departement of Rhone. The other half of these financial 
services institutions are located in Lyon or are controlled by a local 
company (Bonnet, 1989). As noted, however, only Caisse d'Epargne de 
Lyon is of a significant size and national function to be considered a 
major financial services institution. It must also be noted, however, 
that many major French cities do not have even a single locally-based 
financial institution with the size and function of Caisse d'Epargne de 
Lyon.
Another indicator is the percentage of the active workforce 
employed in these fields. Only 2.9% of Lyon's active workforce was 
employed in these three service sectors (banking, insurance and 
financial services) in 1987 In contrast, 18.7% of the active workforce 
in Geneva was engaged in these activities during the same year 
(Bonnet, 1989). This is a substantial difference and reflects the status 
of these two neighbours in the international financial world. Geneva 
is a major international financial centre that provides the highest
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level of services in the financial sector and is home to numerous 
international financial institutions and important branch offices. In 
contrast, Lyon is not an international financial centre and is only a 
minor national one. Other major Eurocities employ between 4.7% 
(Barcelona) to 14.6% (Amsterdam) of their active workforce in the 
financial services sector. (Lvon. Ville Internationale. 1988). 
Significantly, all of the cities with which Lyon is competing for 
"Eurocity" status employ a greater number of their active workforce 
in these vital service sectors than does Lyon.
8 .24  INFORMATION SERVICES
The information services sector is the final higher services 
industry to be examined. The Rhone-Alpes Region was ranked sixth 
in France out of the 21 metropolitan regions in terms of information 
services infrastructure in 1991. This ranking was derived using 20 
criteria in the following four categories: labour, equipment, 
investment, and contractors (L1 Atlas Informatique. 1992).
Information and information technology are critical components 
of the modem global economy. The movement, organization and 
effective use of information is currently as important as any other 
service sector function. Information technology in France is often 
centred around the larger technopoles. Outside the major 
concentration of information-telecommunication research and 
development industries around Paris, the technopoles at Sophia- 
Antiopolis (Nice), ZIRST de Meylan (Grenoble) and the 
telecommunications centre at Lannion in Brittany constitute the major 
centres of research and development in this important field in France.
The dominance of Paris in the Information-Telecommunications 
field is well-documented. Two-thirds of the managers in information 
services were working in the Ile-de-France Region in 1991. This 
represents 64,205 information managers as compared with the 7,014 
information managers in the Rhone-Alpes Region in 1991, many of 
whom work in Grenoble. To further consolidate this sector of the 
service economy, over one-half of all new enterprises in information 
services created in France in 1991 were created in the Ile-de-France
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Region. In 1991 alone, a total of 2,379 new information services 
enterprises were formed in the Ile-de-France Region as compared 
with 460 in Rhone-Alpes Region, which was the second-ranking 
region in France (L'Atlas Informatique. 1992).
The positive factors for Lyon in the information services sector of 
the economy is that the Rhone-Alpes Region is the second-ranking 
region in France in the creation of information services enterprises 
and the employment of professional information managers. The 
negative factor for Lyon is that the Rhone-Alpes Region is a distant 
second behind the Ile-de-France Region. Also, many of the 
information services enterprises are located in Grenoble. Significantly 
for the long term, the Ile-de-France Region has developed the critical 
mass synergy needed in the field of information-telecommunication 
that will increasingly attract the top professionals and the majority of 
the research and development investment to the Paris Basin and 
away from Lyon and the rest of France. Over time this will only 
reduce Lyon’s already minor position in this important and expanding 
international sector of the economy.
8.25 STATUS OF THE SERVICE SECTOR
The overall picture of the service industry in Lyon is mixed. The 
positive points are that Lyon is attracting and creating new service 
companies. In 1987, 72 new service sector establishments were 
created in Lyon. Lyon is also the most attractive location in the 
Rhone-Alpes to establish a new service sector enterprise. 48.5% of all 
new service enterprises established in the Rhone-Alpes by companies 
outside the region were established in Lyon (Bonnet, 1989).
Examining the location of the headquarters of these new service 
enterprises in Lyon and the Rhone-Alpes illustrates similar results for 
Lyon. Of the 72 new service enterprises created in Lyon in 1987, 27 
have headquarters in Paris, 26 in the Rhone Departement, 10 in the 
rest of the Rhone-Alpes, and 9 in the rest of France (Chambre 
Regionale de Commerce et d'Industrie Rhone-Alpes, Janvier 1991).
The positive factor was that 26 were locally-controlled; the negative 
element was that 27 were controlled from Paris. Also, none of these
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new service enterprises was international, all had their headquarters 
in France. An "International City" needs international companies to 
locate new enterprises within its sphere of influence to be considered 
"International". Unfortunately for Lyon's international ambitions, 
multi-national service companies are not locating a large number of 
such new enterprises in Lyon.
Lyon has few headquarters of national importance in the 
banking, insurance or other higher service industries (Bonnet, 1987) 
This lack of economic decision-making is clearly visible when 
examining the location of the headquarters of the 500 largest French 
companies in 1987. Only 19 of the top 500 companies had their 
headquarters in Lyon, and of these 19,10 were subsidiaries of larger 
groups with headquarters in Paris (For example, R.V.I. is controlled by 
the State-run Renault Group).
Examining the creation of service industries shows more mixed 
blessings for Lyon. The location of the headquarters of the 171 new 
service enterprises created in the Rhone-Alpes Region in 1987 shows 
that 55 of these new service enterprises have headquarters in Paris 
while 54 have headquarters in Lyon. (C.C.I.L., 1989). This illustrated 
that Lyon is able to exert its position as regional capital to a limited 
degree. Lyon is seen as expanding its complementary role within the 
region vis-a-vis Paris, by increasingly becoming the location of 
regional headquarters of higher services corporations (Bonnet, 1989).
There are 72 major service sector enterprises in the Rhone-Alpes 
Region that employ over 50 people and that are owned by non-French 
companies. The United States is the major foreign influence in the 
region accounting for 28 (32%) of the foreign service sector 
enterprises in the region that employ over 50 people. The 28 
American-owned companies had an absolute value of almost 3 billion 
francs in 1990 (INSEE-Rhone-Alpes, 1991). The other leading foreign 
owners of service sector enterprises in the region are, in order, 
Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy. Of these 72 foreign- owned 
service sector enterprises in the region that employ over 50 persons, 
49 (69%) are located in the Departement of Rhone and 9 (13%) are 
located in the Departement of Isere. Lyon is clearly the prefered
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regional location for foreign-owned service sector enterprises in the 
region.
The importance of the banking, insurance, and financial services 
industries in Lyon is well below the standard of an "International 
City" as defined by Soldatos and by Brunet. This is indicated by 
Lyon's lack of national and international headquarters of corporations 
in these important service sectors as well as the small number of 
actual branch offices of international companies in Lyon. Lyon also 
lacks a serious regional presence in these higher services. Other 
regional urban centres are also dependent upon Paris for these 
services instead of being able to turn to Lyon, the regional capital, for 
these important services. The importance of money cannot be 
understated. To lack top level financial functions is a severe 
hindrance to Lyon. Being unable to control the flows of capital and 
resources that affects its activities leaves Lyon as a dependent city in 
financial terms. This situation needs to be addressed if Lyon is to 
achieve a greater degree of financial critical mass and "International" 
status.
8.3 THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Any city with “International” ambitions must have a successful 
industrial sector to effectively drive its economy. Without the 
economic driving force of a strong industrial sector the power and 
position of a city will quickly erode and decline. Therefore, a city 
must maintain a strong local industrial base upon which to develop 
the necessities of “International” status such as infrastructure, 
political strength and an effective service and high technology 
economy. A strong industrial sector of a city's economy provides the 
framework upon which a city's “International” status is constructed. 
This sector cannot be underestimated in favour of the currently more 
popular service and high-technology driven enterprises.
In addition to providing the framework for building 
“International” status, the industrial sector of a city's economy must 
be international in its own regard. When attempting to examine and 
determine the intemationality of a city's industrial sector a number of
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parameters must be established. First, one must acknowledge the 
advent of the local/global industrial economy. The distinction 
between which sectors are local and which are global is becoming 
increasingly blurred. The increase in mergers, buyouts and joint 
projects along with technology rapidly shrinking the relative size of 
the globe have all added to the difficulty in distinguishing between 
local and global economies (Soldatos, 1989). Second, no city can be 
absolutely judged on its own merits alone. One needs to include the 
wider economic region so as to avoid judging Lyon's industrial data in 
a vacuum. One cannot divorce the industrial sector of Lyon 
completely from the industrial sector of the surrounding area. With 
this understanding, certain broad criteria can be used to determine 
the strength and intemationality of the local industrial sector.
An examination of the industrial sector of Lyon's economy and 
that of the entire Rhone-Alpes Region will be divided into two 
sections. The first section will examine the actual size and strength of 
Lyon's industrial sector to determine its ability to support Lyon's 
international ambitions. This section will then continue by focussing 
on the intemationality of Lyon's industrial sector. This will include 
levels of foreign investment, foreign penetration and the number of 
local companies that function in an international context. The second 
section will determine the strength and intemationality of the 
industrial structure or framework of Lyon. The size and influence of 
local companies will be considered along with an examination of the 
industrial linkages and networks within the Rhone-Alpes Region. This 
will help determine if Lyon's industries are competitive with other 
European industries and if the regional linkages and networks defined 
by the Soldatos model are in place and functional within the Rhone- 
Alpes Region.
Lyon has traditionally been a centre for trade and industry. Lyon 
was a major trading post and the capital of Roman Gaul two thousand 
years ago. Since that time Lyon has continued to take advantage of its 
favourable location on the confluence of the Rhone and Saone rivers to 
become a prosperous commercial centre. Lyon has a diversified 
economy including a well-balanced industrial sector. Stretching south 
from Lyon along the Rhone river are major industries ranging from oil
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refineries and petro-chemicals to major vehicle assembly plants.
These heavy industries are the backbone of the manufacturing 
economy of Lyon. These industries must be of a size capable of 
driving the overall economy of Lyon to international status.
Within the greater Lyon agglomeration 164,000 persons are 
employed in the industrial sector of the economy. The industrial base 
of Lyon is 90% comprised of companies that employ less than 50 
persons (Enjeux intemationaux de l'industrie de Rhone-Alpes, 1990). 
This industrial sector is diverse and dependent upon this large 
number of small operations. However, it is the handful of large 
companies that have the greater international presence. These major 
companies are concentrated in five major industries: chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals, mechanical construction, electrical goods, metal 
works and textiles.
8 .31  CHEMICAL-BASED INDUSTRIES
The chemical (including petro-chemical) and pharmaceutical 
industry is one of Lyon's strongest and most international. This sector 
employs 14.5% of the industrial workforce in the Rhone-Alpes Region 
and is globally competitive (Bonneville et. al., 1991). World leaders in 
this industrial sector that are located in Lyon include Rhone-Poulenc, 
Merieux and lTnstitut Merieux. Rhone-Poulenc, which employs 5000 
persons, is the Lyon company with the greatest number of 
international functions. Rhone-Poulenc has 96 international offices 
throughout the globe including a strong presence in North America. 
Rhone-Poulenc has by far the greatest number of international offices 
of any Lyon-based company. Merieux and lTnstitut Merieux have 
less of an international function (Merieux has 11 international offices) 
except for the world-wide distribution of the vaccines and serums 
produced by lTnstitut Merieux (Bonneville et.al., 1991).
The heavy chemical or petro-chemical industry of Lyon is centred 
around the Elf-Aquitaine oil refinery at Feyzin. This refinery is the 
fifth largest in France and has the capacity to handle 9 million tons 
per year. It is important to both local industries and the economy as 
a whole that a major refinery is located in the Lyon agglomeration.
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This provides numerous jobs and the gas and oil needed to run other 
industries in the area. The refinery at Feyzin is also responsible for 
the development of a number of important research centres near 
Feyzin (Bonnet, 1987).
The Institut Frangais du Petrole (IFP) which employs 200 
persons, and the ELF-France centre de recherche, which employs 300 
persons, are two major research centres that are directly associated 
with the refinery at Feyzin. This is an example of the industrial sector 
of the economy providing the impetus for high-technology research 
centres. Without the refinery at Feyzin there would be no high- 
technology spin-off industries in this field near Lyon. Also, the ELF- 
CFP and IFP mini-refinery project at Solaise is a major research 
project that is developing the next-generation refinery technology. 
This mini-refinery processes only 20,000 tons per year but its 
primary function is improving refinery technology and methods 
(Bonnet, 1987). The critical mass associated with Feyzin in this field 
helped persuade AGIP, the Italian national oil company, to locate its 
French headquarters in Feyzin. This was a major coup for the area 
and illustrates the advantages inherent with the development of 
sufficient critical mass centred around a major industry. These are 
the projects that Lyon needs to enhance its reputation and image as a 
high-technology centre that can attract top researchers to prestigious 
projects.
The pharmaceutical concerns around Lyon are mostly controlled 
by non-French companies; Hoechst (Germany), Duphar (Netherlands) 
and Dow Coming (USA) are three major multi-national companies that 
manufacture pharmaceutical product in and around Lyon. Having 
Lyon as an attractive location for major international pharmaceutical 
companies to establish manufacturing concerns is a strong statement 
of Lyon's strength and intemationality within this industrial field.
The critical mass to support the pharmaceutical industry is already in 
place in Lyon and should continue to attract such major companies as 
well as smaller local concerns such as Boiron located in Sainte-Foy- 
les-Lyon (Bonnet, 1987).
8.32 METAL WORKS
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The second major industrial area of importance in the Lyon area 
is the metal works industry. In Lyon this is dominated by Renault 
Vehicules Industriels (RVI), a subsidiary of the State owned Renault 
Group. RVI has its headquarters in Lyon and is the single largest 
industrial employer (23,000 in 1990) in the Rhone-Alpes Region. 
Though RVI has its headquarters in Lyon it has plants throughout the 
region. Through RVI, the Rhone-Alpes Region constructs 53% of all 
heavy vehicles in France over 12 tonnes, 42% of all 6-12 tonnes 
trucks and over 90% of all buses (Rhone-Alpes dans PEspace 
Europeen. No 2, 1990). RVI is also directly responsible for the 
economic survival of a number of smaller companies. These 
subcontractors that depend upon the success of RVI produce 
components ranging from tyres to dashboards. The successful knock- 
on affects of a company the size of RVI has large implications to the 
local industrial sector. Such major companies are needed to ensure 
the strength and vitality of all levels of the local industrial sector.
A final note of interest concerning RVI is that even though its 
headquarters are in Lyon, the financial and international divisions of 
RVI were moved to Paris in 1977, where they have remained. That 
the major industrial company with its headquarters in Lyon maintains 
its financial and international divisions in Paris is illustrative of the 
financial weakness and lack of international image associated with 
Lyon. Until Lyon is in a position to retain these functions of RVI it is 
difficult to envisage Lyon attracting such high-level services from 
other companies.
The other major metal works companies in the Lyon area include 
Roux in Meyzieu (200 employed), Florence et Peillon in Vaulx-en- 
Velin (572 employed), Duranton-Sicfond in Venisseux (330 employed) 
and Leleu in Vaise (400 employed) (Tableaux de PEconomie Rhone- 
Alpes, 1991). These companies, along with RVI, help account for the 
fact that the Rhone-Alpes Region employs 16.5% of all persons 
employed in metal works in France. This local strength in this major 
industrial field helps provide Lyon with the strong industrial sector of 
employment and output that is required to succeed in the future.
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8.33 FOREIGN PENETRATION AND INVESTMENT
The importance of foreign penetration and foreign investment to 
the local economy is growing and provides another indicator of the 
increasing lack of distinction between a local and global economy. The 
local economy of any region is becoming increasingly dependent upon 
external influences, particularly investment. For a local economy to 
thrive it must in turn be successful on a global scale in terms of 
attracting foreign investment. Foreign market penetration and 
foreign investment are also crucial elements of the Soldatos model, 
being viewed as necessary to establishing not only international 
connections but also the global dimension required to enhance the 
local industrial sector of the economy.
The rate of foreign penetration into a regional economy is not a 
precise statistic. However, by using the same base indicators and 
applying them to all regions, a number of general conclusions are 
possible. The overall foreign penetration of Rhone-Alpes industries 
was 18.4% in 1989. This is significantly less than the national average 
of 21.6%. The French regions with the highest levels of foreign 
penetration in 1989 were Alsace (38.2%), Provence-Alpes-Cote d'Azur 
(22.6%) and Lorraine (22.0%) (Bonneveille et. al., 1991). All three of 
these regions share a frontier with a major trading partner to the east; 
Germany, Switzerland or Italy. Rhone-Alpes Region shares to a 
degree the advantages of a frontier location (Rhone-Alpes dans 
PEspace Europeen. No 2,1990).
The rate of foreign penetration in Rhone-Alpes is also slower than 
these other three regions as well as Ile-de-France. The Swiss and 
Germans are concentrating the bulk of their interest in France to the 
frontier areas of Alsace. The reason for such a high level of 
attractivity by Alsace is that it shares a frontier with both Germany 
and Switzerland and is well-positioned on the main northern 
European axis. The foreign penetration by the Swiss in the Rhone- 
Alpes Region is essentially limited to the area around Geneva and is 
therefore not focused on Lyon (Rhone-Alpes dans PEspace Europeen. 
No 2,1990).
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A final reason for the lack of foreign penetration in the Rhone- 
Alpes is that the many of the region's industries are viewed as 
vulnerable to European Community competition. This point will be 
discussed in the next section of this chapter in relation to the 
industrial linkages and cohesion of the region's economy. These 
reasons also help account for the low level of foreign investment in 
the Rhone-Alpes Region. Foreign investment represents 26% of total 
investment in France. Paris and the Ile-de-France Region are the 
most attractive investments to foreigners, Paris is in fact the fifth 
most attractive city in Europe to foreign investors, behind London, 
Brussels, Frankfurt and Zurich. The Rhone-Alpes Region attracts only 
18% of its overall investment from foreign sources (Rhone-Alpes dans 
FEspace Europeen. No 2,1990). This is 8% below the national average 
of foreign investment. This low level of foreign investment is another 
obstacle in Lyon's ambitions to construct an “International” economic 
image. If Rhone-Alpes cannot attract international investment one 
can argue that the region is either unattractive, uncompetitive or 
both. This argument is cause for concern among the leaders of the 
region and Lyon (Entreprise Rhone-Alpes Internationale:, 1989).
Overall, the relatively low level of foreign penetration and 
investment in the Rhone-Alpes Region is a considerable negative 
factor for the increasing internationalization of the region's economy. 
To attain a greater international status a city or region must be able to 
attract foreign investment. This is also mandatory for the health of 
the local industrial economy which is the foundation of the whole 
internationalization project. Without attracting foreign capital, Lyon 
will not be able to achieve either the industrial strength or 
intemationality of industry to establish the foundations of an 
“International City”.
8 .34  COMPETITIVENESS AND REGIONAL LINKAGES
The local and global competitiveness of the industrial sector of 
Lyon's and the region's economy is important in positioning Lyon 
within the economic framework of the Soldatos model. Without a 
competitive industrial sector, the international ambitions of Lyon will 
remain a mirage. In evaluating industrial competitiveness for this
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purpose a generalized overview rather than a detailed sector-by- 
sector approach is warranted. All sectors of Lyon's industrial base are 
not equally competitive on either a local or global scale but a broad 
comparative examination will serve to position Lyon within the 
appropriate context and parameters of the Soldatos model.
A DATAR study released in 1988 concluded that Lyon's and the 
region's competitive position in industry vis-a-vis the European 
Community was poor in most areas. Many sectors of local industry 
were judged not competitive with those sectors in other European 
Community countries. Specifically, such manufacturing companies as 
RVI were considered vulnerable to open competition with German 
vehicle manufacturers. Spatially, the heavy industry sector south of 
Lyon including St. Etienne were considered particularly vulnerable to 
the European Community single market competition after 1993. The 
areas close to Lyon, and the alpine agglomerations of Grenoble and 
Annecy were considered the most industrially-competitive in the 
region.
Another gauge of the region's industrial competitiveness concerns 
the actual size, structure and linkages of the industrial sector of the 
region. The first concern for the Rhone-Alpes Region is that in the 
current local/global economy, the success of local small and medium­
sized enterprises is critical. The backbone of this economy is 
comprised of the small and medium-sized enterprises that employ 
between 100 and 499 persons. In the Rhone-Alpes, only 4.1% of the 
industrial establishments fit into this category. In comparison, Baden- 
Wurttemburg, a member with Rhone-Alpes of the “Four Motors of 
Europe”, boasts that 23.9% of its industrial enterprises employ 
between 100 and 499 persons. This lack of competitively-sized small 
and medium enterprises in the Rhone-Alpes restricts the industrial 
flexibility and growth of the region as well as its overall 
attractiveness since this sized company is habitually the most 
attractive to investors (Rhone-Alpes dans l'Espace Europeen. No 2,
1990).
The small and medium-sized industries are also those more 
effectively aided by the political administration of the region. The
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Rhone-Alpes as a political authority can best help and influence the 
small and medium-sized companies to succeed and to adhere to the 
region's integrated economic goals. This can be achieved through tax 
incentives, constructing physical infrastructure such as office 
buildings and technopoles, along with encouraging cooperation with 
other enterprises or academic institutions. The region can impact the 
small and medium-sized enterprises to a greater degree than a 
company the size of RVI. Despite the region's administrative desire to 
assist small and medium-sized industries become competitive, there 
remain an insufficient number of such enterprises to impact 
substantially the local economy. This is one large structural problem 
in the industrial sector of the region's economy.
A second structural problem in the industrial structure of the 
Rhone-Alpes is the lack of effective linkages between the various 
enterprises either through the regional administrative structure or 
through private self-interest (Figure 8.1) In comparing the regional 
industrial linkages of the Rhone-Alpes with the other major regions of 
Europe, including the "Four Motors of Europe", one can distinguish the 
lack of cohesion in the Rhone-Alpes. A closer examination of Figure 
8.1 illustrates that the other major regions in Europe might not share 
the same structure (vertical, horizontal or some combination of the 
two) of linkages between various industrial sectors but they all share 
some form of organized structural linkages except for the Rhone- 
Alpes (La Region Rhone-Alpes dans l'espace europeen, 1990).
This lack of either vertical or horizontal industrial integration is a 
serious impediment to the industrial development and 
competitiveness of the Rhone-Alpes Region. This is especially harmful 
when considering the fact that the major competing regions of Europe 
all have a greater degree of industrial linkages to spur growth and 
development. Within the Rhone-Alpes a number of localized attempts 
at industrial linkages are being considered in such locations as 
Oyonnax and Annonay but on a regional scale such vital links are 
missing. This lack of linkages is detrimental in that a local economy 
operating on a global scale must have some form of cooperation and 
cohesion to enhance the overall performance and competitive nature 
of local level industries. The Rhone-Alpes, with an essentially "every
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man for himself1 industrial system, will remain at a competitive 
disadvantage vis-a-vis the other better-organized European regions.
There were 287 industrial enterprises of over 50 persons with 
foreign capitalization in 1990 in the Rhone-Alpes Region. Of these, 86 
were from the United States, 42 from Germany, 37 from the United 
Kingdom and 33 from Switzerland with the rest divided mostly among 
other European countries. The United States was the largest investor 
in industrial enterprises in the region accounting for 22% of all 
investment, 32% of wage-eamers and 39% of value added among 
foreign investors in the industrial sector.
Of these 287 foreign owned industrial enterprises, 31% are 
located in the Departement of Rhone. Isere with 21% of such 
enterprises ranks second in the region. However, none of these 
foreign-owned industrial enterprises has headquarters in the Rhone 
Departement. Caterpillar France, the French subsidiary of Caterpillar 
USA has its headquarters in Grenoble and employs 2207 people. This 
is the only American subsidiary with headquarters in the Rhone- 
Alpes Region (La Region Rhone-Alpes dans fespace europeen, 1990). 
This reflects the centralization of such foreign subsidiary's 
headquarters in Paris as opposed to Lyon or the other second tier 
French cities.
8.35 SUMMARY OF THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
The overall conclusion regarding the industrial sector of Lyon's 
economy in the context of the Soldatos model pivots on a number of 
generalizations. First, divorcing the local industrial economy of Lyon 
from that of the region as a whole is unrealistic. The industrial sector 
on a local scale does not operate in a vacuum, rather it is dependent 
upon regional and global forces. Therefore, the greatest problem that 
exists for the local industrial sector of the economy is the lack of 
regional linkages and cohesion. This must be addressed if Lyon is to 
function as a regional centre and “International City”. Secondly, the 
relative lack of industrial size, foreign penetration and foreign 
investment indicate that Lyon and the Rhone-Alpes Region is not 
competitive with such regions as Baden-Wurttemberg or Lombardy.
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The evident lack of small and medium-sized enterprises is another 
competitive disadvantage in the increasingly competitive local/global 
economic equation.
Attempting to judge the industrial sector of a local economy in 
the context of its “intemationality”, how it applies to the Soldatos 
model and its regional significance in a wider European competitive 
sphere, is problematic at best. No local economy is isolated, coherent 
or capable of independent action. However, within the basic 
parameters mentioned earlier in this section, the results of these 
studies on the local and regional industrial sector can to some degree 
place Lyon in a specific position vis-a-vis its European competitors 
and in a relative position vis-a-vis the Soldatos model. The overall 
picture one finds is that Lyon has a sufficient industrial base to 
warrant international aspirations and to construct the infrastructure 
needed to achieve some success. However, there remain problems of 
size, structure and international image that must be addressed for 
Lyon to improve its overall position in either a specific or relative 
fashion.
8.4 THE HIGH-TECHNOLOGY SECTOR
The third major sector of the economy consists of rapidly- 
expanding high-technology industries. These high-technology 
industries are often heavily committed to research and development, 
employ a limited number of well-educated staff and focus on a very 
narrow product range. Such industries are considered the industries 
of the future and are incorporated into the Soldatos model as an 
important necessity in the overall infrastructure of any “International 
City”.
As with the service sector and industrial sector of Lyon's 
economy, it is impossible to completely divorce the city's high- 
technology sector of the economy from that of the region. However, 
since the high-technology enterprises are usually smaller and more 
spatially dependent upon the local environment it is possible to 
separate the Lyon high-technology sector from that of the region to a
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greater extent than was possible with the service and industrial 
sectors.
The single largest industry in the Rhone-Alpes Region is the 
nuclear power industry. The distribution of electricity is the single 
largest facet of the region's economy. The nuclear power industries 
accounted for 10% of the region's total production income in 1990 
with a total production value of 16.5 billion francs (Bonneville et.al.,
1991). The nuclear industry is by definition one of high-technology 
that is dependent upon a high level of research and development and 
well-skilled scientists for its success. The numerous research and 
development enterprises dependent upon the nuclear industry both 
in the public and private domains are centred around Grenoble, not 
Lyon.
Grenoble has developed a strong tradition for nuclear research 
since the end of the Second World War. The first nuclear research 
centres in France were developed in Grenoble in the late 1940's. The 
major international research centres located in Grenoble include: la 
Laboratoire Europeene du Rayonnement Synchrotron (ESRF), l'lnstitut 
de Radioastronomie Millimetrique (IRAM), la Laboratoire de Champs 
Interises and lTnstitut Laue et Langevin (ILL). These four major 
international research centres form the core of the high-technology 
critical mass that is the strength of Grenoble's economy and 
reputation (Perrat, 1989).
Grenoble has neither the service sector strength nor industrial 
sector base of Lyon. However, the size and prestige of its high- 
technology industries and research centres allows Grenoble certain 
luxuries. Due to the nature of high-technology industries Grenoble 
has been able to secure a certain economic independence from Paris 
and establish a position that enables it to pursue European and 
international connections in the high-technology field. In Part Three, 
a detailed exploration of the region's urban relations will be 
undertaken; in this context the point remains that it is Grenoble and 
not Lyon that enjoys the superior high-technology industries and 
position (Bonnet, 1987).
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Lyon is not, however, without a high-technology sector. Lyon is a 
major hospital and biological technologies (bio-tech) centre. Lyon is 
host to the Centre Internationale de Recherche sur le Cancer (CIRC) 
which is one of the world's leading cancer research laboratories. Lyon 
has also used its traditionally strong medical reputation to persuade 
the Hospal Institut to move its headquarters from Paris to Lyon. The 
attraction of these publicly funded research centres is in conjunction 
with the numerous private medical/bio-tech research centres 
developed by subsidiaries of the chemical/pharmaceutical industries. 
Bio-Merieux is a research and development company associated with 
the large Merieux corporation. Bio-Merieux and such new bio-tech 
companies as Danto-Rogeat and Pyro-Controle in Vaulx-en-Velin are 
helping to establish the critical mass needed to develop Lyon as a 
foremost research and development centre in this lucrative and 
expanding section of the high-technology sector (Perrat, 1989).
Another manner in which Lyon is attempting to expand its high- 
technology sector is through the creation of “technopoles”. A 
technopole, in theory, is the grouping of a number of small and 
medium-sized research and development companies on a common 
site. A technopole should also attract the involvement of local 
academic institutions in an effort to combine the best resources in 
both the private and academic sectors to achieve maximum results. 
The concept behind a technopole is that of critical mass. By 
developing numerous research and development enterprises in one 
area, more such enterprises and individuals will be similarly attracted 
to that technopole.
Lyon has been actively establishing such centres during the past 
decade. Technopoles are dependent upon a local administrative unit 
to supply the infrastructure and incentives to establish the needed 
enterprises. Lyon's city administration (along with the COURLY) have 
emphasized the development of such technopoles with positive 
results. The C.C.I.L. is also an active participant in the development of 
local technopoles and describes them as such: “La nouvelle indentite 
des pepinieres d'enterprises innovatives de la technopole lyonnaise.” 
Three such nurseries of innovation have been established; “Novacite
L.
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Alpha” in Villeurbanne, “Novacite Delta” in Ecully, and “Novacite 
Omega” in the recently renovated Gerland district in Lyon.
Lyon and the Rhone-Alpes Region have a relatively strong high- 
technology sector of the economy, especially when Grenoble is 
considered. However, one must examine the dominance of Paris and 
the Ile-de-France Region in this important economic sector. Paris is 
the primary centre of high-technology companies and research and 
development in France. 75% of all high-technology companies in 
France have their headquarters in Paris including 400 of the top 500. 
This includes all of the largest 20 such companies. In addition, 75% of 
all research laboratories are located in the Paris agglomeration 
(Bonnet, 1989). This has clearly established Paris as the focal point of 
the French high-technology industry and has manifestly attained the 
critical mass needed for attracting the majority of new high- 
technology industries and merging with those smaller non-Parisian 
enterprises which would move more headquarters to Paris. This will 
continue to have a negative effect on Lyon’s high-technology 
industry's and its bid to establish an international high-technology 
function.
8.5 INTERNATIONAL TRADE
International trade is another valid indicator of the international 
dimensions of a local economy. International trade, divided into 
imports and exports, is useful in judging both the strength of a local 
economy and its international flows and linkages. These are 
important factors in determining whether a local economy assists in 
providing “International” status for the local spatial area. The 
Soldatos model uses international trade as one of the leading 
indicators in determining the “International” status of a city economy 
because it is an international process by definition (Soldatos, 1989).
International trade statistics are difficult to reduce effectively 
below the level of the region without losing the big picture of an 
integrated economic unit. In this examination of international trade, 
the Rhone-Alpes Region is the smallest spatial unit of significant size 
to be studied in any coherent fashion. Therefore, the region’s
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international trade numbers will be used to determine approximately 
the relative position of Lyon's international trade dimensions within 
certain parameters.
Additionally, international trade statistics must be treated with 
caution and utilized primarily for relative analysis. International 
trade statistics can be divided in a number of fashions, some of 
greater comparative value than others. One can use total tonnage, 
absolute value, or value per tonne when examining international 
trade statistics. All have a certain merit but must be taken within the 
overall context of determining the relative position of the local 
economy in an international context. In this study of the Rhone-Alpes 
Region's international trade, and how that trade affects Lyon's 
“International" status, all three types of trade statistics will be utilized 
to illustrate broad strengths and weaknesses.
Another difficulty in using international trade statistics is the 
inconsistent determination of which products appear on which 
region's ledgers. For example, all of the automobiles imported from 
Italy into France clear customs in either Amberieu or Corbas, both are 
in the Rhone-Alpes Region. Therefore, all Italian automobiles 
imported into France appear on the import statistics for the Rhone- 
Alpes Region even though these automobiles are dispersed throughout 
France for purchase. This falsely inflates the region's import 
numbers, specifically from Italy and specifically in this category thus 
skewing the true nature of the figures (Commerece exterieur de 
Rhone-Alpes en 1990. 1991).
Another problem concerning international trade statistics that 
should be noted is that products made in other regions of France that 
are exported through the Rhone-Alpes are often incorporated into the 
Rhone-Alpes export statistics. The opposite holds true in that 
products from the Rhone-Alpes that are exported through other 
regions or through company headquarters outside of the Rhone-Alpes 
are not always credited to the Rhone-Alpes' export totals.
These problems represent some of the difficulties in accurately 
assessing the level of local participation in international trade. With
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these problems in mind it would appear more useful to emphasize 
relative comparisons rather than absolute values. On assuming that 
all international trade statistics for local economies are imperfect, 
basic comparisons such as the overall percentage of French trade 
attributed to the Rhone-Alpes Region and comparisons between 
Rhone-Alpes and other French and European regions can still prove 
valuable on a relative scale.
In examining the international trade of the Rhone-Alpes Region, 
the focus will be on the percentage of national trade attributed to the 
Rhone-Alpes and on determining the major trading partners of the 
region to help establish a basic geographic flow. This will enable the 
Rhone-Alpes, including Lyon, to be relatively positioned within the 
context of the Soldatos model. An assessment will be possible as to 
whether Lyon, and the Rhone-Alpes, have the international trade and 
linkages needed to establish the required international functions and 
status that are demanded of an "International City".
8 .51  INTERNATIONAL TRADE TOTALS
The Rhone-Alpes Region accounted for only 5.66% of the total 
tonnage imported into France in 1988. However, this was equivalent 
to 8.31% of the total value of all imports into France in 1988 (an 
increase from 6.24% in 1974), ranking the Rhone-Alpes as the third 
largest importer in total value among French regions. Ile-de-France 
and Nord-Pas-de-Calais (British imports) were the largest total value 
importers in France in 1988. The value-per-tonne of imports into the 
Rhone-Alpes in 1988 was 5990 francs, higher than the national 
average of 4080 franc per tonne yet still behind seven other regions 
in France (lTnterregion des Douanes de Rhone-Alpes/Auvergne,
1990).
The Rhone-Alpes Region accounted for a mere 3.74% of the total 
tonnage exported from France in 1988. This was equal to 10.8% (115 
billion francs) of the total export value of France. This places Rhone- 
Alpes as the second ranking region in France in terms of total export 
value behind Ile-de-France. The value-per-tonne exported by Rhone- 
Alpes in 1988 was 11,985 francs, well above the national average of
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6369 francs per tonne yet less than half of the 25,824 franc per tonne 
vadue of exports from the Ile-de-France (Francexport Rhone-Alpes,
1991).
It is possible to reduce these international trade figures to the 
departement level in certain contexts. Within Rhone-Alpes, the 
Departement du Rhone was the leader in total import value 
accounting for 41.55% of the region’s import value, well ahead of the 
Departement of Isere which accounted for 18.08% of the regions total 
import value. The Departement of Rhone was also the region's leader 
in total export value, but by a significantly smaller amount; the 
Departement of Rhone accounted for 31.28% of the export value of the 
region while the Departement of Isere accounted for 23.69% of the 
region's total export value (Francexport Rhone-Alpes, 1991).
A number of limited conclusions can be drawn from this basic 
data on local international trade. The first conclusion is that in a 
broad sense, Rhone-Alpes is the second most important region in 
France in international trade based upon its overall performance in all 
categories and its second place performance in the important category 
of total export value. This indicates that Rhone-Alpes enjoys a strong 
level of high value-added export. This reflects a strong high- 
technology and finished goods export industry.
The second conclusion concerns the position of Lyon within the 
region. Rhone is the leading departement in the region in terms of 
international trade, especially in imports. However, it is significant 
that Isere (Grenoble) enjoys a high level of total export value 
reflecting the high-technology exports produced around Grenoble. 
Rhone is the leading but not dominant departement in the region in 
international trade. Lyon is the leading city in this successful region 
in the context of international trade which assists Lyon in its bid for 
“International” status; however, Grenoble is a strong regional 
competitor in international trade. This relationship must exist on a 
cooperative scale if Lyon is truly to maximize its position at the head 
of the region’s international trading linkages.
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Another criteria of "International” status is the number of local 
companies with a major international economic presence. The Rhone- 
Alpes Region has over 5000 corporations engaged in international 
trade at one level or another. The 21 largest exporters in the region 
were responsible for 40% of the region's total export value in 1988 
(Francexport Rhone-Alpes, 1991). This is a paradox for the region in 
that it illustrates that Rhone-Alpes has 21 corporations that can 
compete internationally and have developed the significant 
international presence and linkages needed. However, that a mere 21 
companies account for 40% of the region's export value reflects the 
limited number of major international companies in the region and 
the region's dependence on these companies.
8.52 INTERNATIONAL TRADE FLOWS & ORGANIZATIONS
Another significant factor of international trade concerns the 
geographic flow of goods and materials. Rhone-Alpes, like France, is 
heavily dependent on trade with its nearest European neighbours. 
Table 8.1 illustrates that, except for the United States, the top trading 
partners of the Rhone-Alpes are all close European neighbours and 
represent approximately 60% of the region's exports in total value. 
Germany (16.45%) and Italy (14.92%) together represent over 31% of 
the regions exports in total value. The increased international 
functions and linkages created through international trade are 
valuable and important in helping establish the international basis 
required to fulfil the criteria of the Soldatos model.
TABLE 8.1
RHONE-ALPES EXPORT PARTNERS IN TOTAL VALUE, 1988.
GERMANY 16.45%
ITALY 14.92%
U.SA. 8.48%
BEL-LUX 8.40%
UNITED KINGDOM 8.39%
SWITZERLAND 6.24%
SPAIN 4.31%
Source: EXPORTA, 1990.
213
In recent years, in an effort to improve its international trade 
and connections, the Rhone-Alpes Region has joined and created a 
number of organizations aimed at improving the region's international 
trade and linkages. One of these organizations is the Communaute de 
Travail des Alpes Occidentals (COTRAO). COTRAO consists of the 
Rhone-Alpes Region, the Italian regions of Piedmont, Val d'Aosta and 
Liguire along with the Swiss cantons of Vaud, Valais and Geneva. This 
trans-alpine trading organization is designed to help facilitate inter­
regional trade between members with a special emphasis on helping 
the non-European Community member Swiss cantons improve 
linkages with their European Community neighbours (Rhone-Alpes 
dans FEspace Europeen No 2,1990).
Another inter-regional organization developed to facilitate 
international trade within Europe is EXPORA. EXPORA is an 
association that establishes regional structures for international trade 
and dialogue between major European regions and the Rhone-Alpes. 
EXPORA is responsible for developing and coordinating international 
linkages involving Rhone-Alpes corporations (Rhone-Alpes dans 
FEspace Europeen No 2,1990). This organization assists in expanding 
the scope of the region’s linkages with public and private investors.
The Rhone-Alpes Region has also created the Enterprise Rhone- 
Alpes Internationale (ERAI). ERAI has established offices in 
Barcelona, Milan, Turin and Stuttgart in order to improve economic 
relations between Lyon and these "Eurocities". ERAI pursues an 
agenda designed to maximize all forms of economic contact between 
Lyon and these cities with particular attention to Lyon's value-added 
exports. Lyon has also established offices at the World Trade Centre 
in New York City and the European Commission in Brussels to improve 
its international linkages and lobbying ability. These international 
linkages, structured around international trade, help fulfil the criteria 
of international economic linkages spelled out in the Soldatos model. 
This also assists in promoting Lyon's international image and 
increases its visibility within the economic markets.
These organizations are recent additions to the region's efforts to 
expand its international markets, linkages and image. The strong
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commitment by both the political and economic sectors of Lyon to 
promote this international dimension is important. Without such 
commitment, Lyon would have little hope of achieving International 
status. Such efforts and coordination do not assure Lyon of achieving 
its ambitions but it does illustrate that Lyon is making a concerted 
effort to establish the international economic base needed to compete 
with other “Eurocities”. Even in 1977 the need to enhance inter­
regional cooperation was noted by Eduardo Martinengo, then 
Secretary General of the Committee for Cooperation between regions 
in the Alpine Arc, who stated that: "It is absurd to proceed "Chacun 
pour soi" at a time when there is a strenuous effort to build a United 
Europe: if Europe is to be united, the process must start at the bottom 
at the local level, between regions which have something in common.” 
(Le Monde. Novembre 7, 1977). Lyon has adhered to this strategy by 
actively promoting greater cooperation between neighbouring regions 
and other economically advanced regions in Europe.
8.6 PARENT HEADQUARTERS
The number of Parent Company Headquarters1 located in a city is 
another indicator of the “International” scale of a city in the Soldatos 
model. Examining the number of Parent Company Headquarters in 
Lyon is a straight-forward process and shows Lyon to be in an 
unimpressive situation. In 1988 only 19 Parent Companies had 
headquarters located in Lyon. This represented only 2% of the 
national total of Parent Company Headquarters. On a national scale 
this was comparable with Marseille which had 20 Parent Company 
Headquarters in 1988 (2.1% of the national total), and superior to Lille 
which only had 5 Parent Company Headquarters in 1988 (0.5% of the 
national total) (Dim and Bradstreet, 1990). This is a vivid 
representation of the economic weaknesses in decision-making power 
of the second tier French cities. That Lyon, the second ranking city in 
France, hosts only 2% of the national total of Parent Company 
Headquarters is a strong indicator that Lyon is lacking control over its 
economic flows and is not a major economic or financial centre on a 
national scale much less a European scale.
1 N.B. “Parent Company” is defined as a company which has subsidiaries 
and/or associates which are not controlled by any other company.
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Another telling point is that all three of these major French 
provincial cities have lost Parent Company Headquarters in the past 
decade. In 1979, Lille hosted 9 (0.8%), Marseille hosted 39 (3.3%) and 
Lyon hosted 31 (2.6%) of the nation's Parent Company Headquarters 
(Dun and Bradstreet, 1990). These numbers were relatively 
insignificant in 1979. However, that these cities have lost Parent 
Company Headquarters during the 1980's poses larger problems. The 
idea that France is undergoing a degree of devolution and 
decentralization is in this case contradicted. In fact, the opposite is 
happening. The Parent Company Headquarters of France, and thereby 
the real decision-making power, is becoming increasingly centralized 
in Paris. This trend is partially explained by the combination of 
corporate mergers and buy-outs, but the fact remains that Lyon is 
losing its few Parent Company Headquarters. This increasing lack of 
decision-makers in Lyon impedes Lyon's economic strength and 
status, and seriously hampers its potential international position.
Examining the number of Parent Company Headquarters in other 
major "Eurocities" shows a wide discrepancy between particular cities 
and countries. Milan had 73 Parent Company Headquarters in 1989 
representing 28.1% of the Italian total. Barcelona had 38 Parent 
Company Headquarters representing 22.8% of the Spanish total. 
However, Glasgow had 140 Parent Company Headquarters but this 
amounts to only 2.3% of the British total and the 170 Parent Company 
Headquarters in Hambourg represented only 5.2% of the German total, 
(before reunification) (Dun and Bradstreet, 1990). Therefore, not all 
countries have the same definition of what constitutes a Parent 
Company, but by using the percentage rather than the total amount 
one can make relative distinctions between the various “Eurocities''.
Milan (28.1%) and Barcelona (22.8%) are far above the rest of the 
"Eurocities" in this survey2 in regards to the number of Parent 
Company Headquarters hosted. Lyon would appear at the bottom of 
this survey along with Valencia, Bremen, Manchester and Glasgow, not 
the first tier of "Eurocities". This survey also showed that all of these
2 This Dun and Bradstreet survey consisted of Bremen (1.9%), Hamburg (5.2%), 
Barcelona (22.8%), Valencia (1.8%), Milan (28.1%), Turin (6.5%), Manchester 
(2.0%) and Glasgow (2.3%)
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"Eurocities" have witnessed a decline in the percentage of Parent 
Companies with headquarters in their city's over the past decade 
(except for Valencia which increased from 2 to 3 its number of Parent 
Company Headquarters). This is yet another indication of the 
consolidation of economic power in the Primate cities throughout 
Europe. This trend will make it increasingly difficult for second tier 
cities to expand their economic position and influence in the current 
local/global economy.
8.7 LYON’S ECONOMIC IMAGE
Perception or image is an important commodity when attempting 
to sell a product. Lyon, in trying to market itself as an “International 
City”, is working to polish and improve its image both domestically 
and abroad. The term “image” has a number of connotations, but for 
the purposes of this section, “image” will denote the various outside 
perceptions of Lyon as a city in regard to its economic and 
infrastructural capability along with its comparative positioning vis-a- 
vis other domestic and European cities.
Any attempt to analyse Lyon's image cannot be considered valid 
except as a broad and relative comparison for two reasons. First, 
image is by definition comparison; an image cannot be conceived in a 
vacuum but instead is a tool with which to view one item in the 
context of one or many other items; relative and contextual. Second, 
the methods in discerning a group's overall image of a city are limited 
at best through the restrictions inherent in any survey questionnaire; 
small numbers, precise questions and numerous variables. For the 
purpose of placing this necessarily vague and relative concept of a 
city's image into the broad framework of the Soldatos model's 
definitions of what a city's image must be to achieve “International 
City” status, this section will rely on a number of comparative survey 
studies and rankings of Lyon's image.
Since one cannot completely divorce Lyon's image from that of 
the Rhone-Alpes Region it is necessary to include a study of the 
French regions before turning to examine five different surveys 
ranking Lyon's image against domestic and European cities on
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different issues. These surveys will help provide a basis for analysing 
the relative position of Lyon's outside image vis-a-vis other 
competing cities in different contexts. This will assist in determining 
Lyon's position in this category of the Soldatos model.
8 .71  REGIONAL SURVEY
First, an examination of a comparative survey carried out to 
determine the relative image of the French regions on a variety of 
topics. This telephone survey conducted between January 13, 1992 
and February 7, 1992 asked 1688 top French business leaders to 
share how they viewed the image of their home region on a number 
of issues. The results of this survey showed Rhone-Alpes to be the 
French region with the highest overall image with a score of +44.8, (on 
a scale of -100 to +100). Rhone-Alpes placed ahead of Ile-de-France 
and Alsace in overall image in this poll.
In the following categories the questions were posed in the 
context of greater European integration; “To compete in the Europe of 
1993, do you think that your region is:”
1) well prepared
2) somewhat prepared
3) poorly prepared
4) not prepared
Rhone-Alpes ranked first in the categories of Education and Research, 
and Economic Dynamism. Rhone-Alpes ranked in the top three 
regions in all other categories, including: image, employment, quality 
of life, industrial base and political competence at the regional level.
Rhone-Alpes ranked first in this survey of French regions (with 
its overall score of +44.8) followed closely by the regions of Ile-de- 
France (+42.2) and Alsace (+39.6). These three regions were well 
above the rest of the French regions with Bourgogne (+23.0) being 
well back in the fourth position. That the Rhone-Alpes ranks so well 
in a comparative survey of French regions by business leaders is a 
positive reflection on Lyon. The future position of Lyon is closely 
linked to that of the region. That Lyon is the capital of this well-
218
regarded region will only enhance Lyon's image and international 
ambitions.
8 .7 2  CITY SURVEYS
Another annual poll ranking the cities of France is "Le Palmares 
des Villes" (L'Entreprise. No 78, Mars 1992). In this ranking, the cities 
of France are divided into groups based upon population. There are 
28 cities with a population over 200,000, 27 cities with a population 
between 100,000 and 200,000, 50 cities with a population between 
50,000 and 100,000 and 37 cities with a population under 50,000. 
Lyon fits into the category of cities with a population over 200,000 
and was ranked fourth in this category. The top six cities in this 
survey were Toulouse, Montpellier, Nantes, Lyon, Strasbourg, and 
Grenoble. Of these top cities only Toulouse, Lyon and Strasbourg rate 
as a “four star” city, representing the superior physical and human 
infrastructure offered by these cities.
Within this same category, cities with a population over 
200,000, St. Etienne ranks 25th, near the bottom with a mere two star 
ranking. St. Etienne also has witnessed a decrease of 13% of its active 
workforce between 1975 and 1990. This is a telling statistic 
especially when compared with the other leading French cities. Of the 
top six ranked French cities in this category Lyon had the lowest 
increase in active population between 1975 and 1990; a 1.3% increase. 
This signifies that Lyon has not been a rapidly expanding city over 
the past 15 years (as was noted in Chapter Three) but is none-the-less 
showing slight growth in this sector. The other two “millionaire” cities 
in France, Marseille-Aix (-1.3%) and Lille (-5.1%) experienced an 
overall decrease in their active populations during this fifteen year 
period.
The astronomical increases in Toulouse (26.2%) and Montpellier 
(21.2%) graphically illustrate the rapid increase in demographic and 
economic importance of these two cities and the southern area of 
France. The single largest increase is the 33.3% increase in the active 
population recorded in Grasse-Cannes-Antibes over the same 1975- 
1990 period. The explosion in the active workforce in these sunbelt
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cities adds to the growing image of these rapidly expanding cities. 
Attraction leads to further attraction leading to a situation of critical 
mass and the needed synergy and image to compete as a city on a 
greater scale.
Among the cities with a population of 100,000 to 200,000 the 
Rhone-Alpes cities of Annecy and Chambery ranked first and second 
in France. Annecy was the top-rated city in this population category 
and the only one to receive a “four stars” rating for superior 
infrastructure. Annecy has experienced a rapid 23.7% increase in the 
active population between 1975-1990 showing the growing economic 
and demographic strength of the capital of the Haute-Savoie. 
Chambery, the capital of Savoie, is ranked second in France in this 
category with a three star rating. Chambery has also shown a 
remarkably strong economic and demographic increase since 1975 
adding 17.6% to its active workforce (L’Entreprise. No 78, Mars 1992). 
The attractiveness of these medium-sized Savoyard cities illustrates 
not only the positive transformation of these cities into significant 
urban areas with an increasing image but also adds to the lustre of 
the region's image.
These rankings confirm that Lyon is the highest-ranked city in 
the Rhone-Alpes Region but is not the dominant city in the region.
The strong showing by Grenoble, Annecy and Chambery give the 
impression of a dynamic multi-pole region. The image of Lyon among 
the leaders of French enterprises is positive. These business leaders 
have confidence that Lyon and the region are economically dynamic 
and well-positioned to meet the challenges of closer European 
integration. What Lyon needs to accomplish to supplement this 
confidence is to translate it into ways to expand and improve its 
international image.
Another survey conducted by BVA-l’Entreprise of French 
business leaders centred around the perceived economic dynamism of 
the major French cities excluding Paris. The rankings of this survey 
placed Lyon well on top of the French urban hierarchy with a 79% 
approval rating. This was significantly better than the second rated 
Toulouse (63% approval) and far ahead of fifth rated Grenoble (37%).
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The reasons attributed to Lyon's favourable rating were its strong 
economic base, industrial diversity, its relatively well-developed 
higher service sector (compared to other provincial cities) and the 
large number of research and higher education facilities. The new 
“European aura” of Lyon was also mentioned as a positive factor 
affecting Lyon's favourable rating (LeProgres, Mars 4, 1992).
L'Expansion, a well-respected business magazine, conducted a 
survey designed to rank the “International Dimension” of the major 
French cities, again, excluding Paris. This survey was divided in to 
two sections which were than added together to indicate a final score. 
The first section, "International Economy and Trade", was comprised 
of seven categories: International Telecommunications, Exports, 
Foreign Corporation Hosted, Foreign Marketing, International 
Relations, Economic Strength and International Air Traffic. In this 
section Lyon ranked first with a score of 118 points out of a total of 
140 points. (20 points per category). The subsequent ranked cities 
were Toulouse (103 points), Bordeaux (101 points), Lille (97 points) 
and Grenoble (96 points). St Etienne ranked 24th nationally with 57 
points, well behind the leading cities (L'Expansion. 6/19 Decembre 
1990).
The second section, “Daily life and education”, was divided into 
five categories: Facilities for Foreigners, Sporting and Cultural Events, 
International Press and Presentations, International Cooperation in 
Research and Development and International Education at all levels. 
In this section Grenoble ranked first with 84 points (100 points 
possible) ahead of second-ranked Lyon with 79 points. Montpellier 
(77 points), Marseille (73 points) and Toulouse (70 points) were the 
other top cities in this second section. St Etienne finished tied for 
18th in this section with 40 points (L'Expansion. 6/19 Decembre 
1990).
The overall ranking (sections one and two) of the International 
Dimension of the major French cities was: (240 points possible).
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1) Lyon
2) Grenoble
3) Toulouse
4) Bordeaux
5) Marseille
197 pts) 
180 pts) 
173 pts) 
166 pts) 
166 pts)
(L'Expansion. 6/19 Decembre 1990).
In a survey to determine the International Dimension of the 
major French cities Lyon ranked first but was closely followed by its 
regional neighbour/rival Grenoble. This again reflects the overall 
strength and intemationality of the Rhone-Alpes Region. This also 
reflects that, again, Lyon is the leading yet not the dominant city of 
the region. Another indicator that Lyon may further enhance its own 
international and regional position if it were able to establish a 
common agenda based on cooperation with Grenoble. This concept 
will comprise a central theme of Part Three.
The Wall Street Joumal-Europe conducted a survey to rank the 
image of the major cities in France, (excluding Paris). The Wall Street 
Joumal-Europe polled 2000 of its readers (15% or 300 responded so 
this is a limited survey) in Western Europe (including those outside 
France) to solicit opinions on the image of leading French cities. The 
sampling is small yet interesting in that it presents a different 
ranking than those studies confined to French respondents. In this 
survey, Bordeaux ranked first with an 81% approval rating followed 
by Strasbourg (76%), Lyon (75%), Grenoble (72%), Montpellier (55%) 
and Dijon (51%) (Affaires economiques. No 18, Avril 1991). The 
inclusion of Bordeaux on top and Dijon as sixth should teach all a 
lesson about underestimating the importance of gastronomic good 
living in enhancing a city's image, (and quality of life!). Apart from 
this surprise, the familiar cities of Strasbourg, Lyon and Grenoble are 
clustered at the top of the ranking with a large gap between 
themselves and Montpellier and the other French cities.
A final survey concerns the image of the leading European cities 
and was undertaken by Harris Research in the United States and 
Europe on behalf of real estate consultants Healey and Baker in the
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United Kingdom and Cushman and Wakefield in the United States. 
This survey examined the opinions of senior managers in 506 
companies selected from Europe's 15,000 largest firms. This survey 
also solicited the opinions of leading American managers towards 
"business in Europe" (Northwest Airline's Magazine. March 1991). 
This survey examined leading European cities on such criteria as the 
cost of office space, the government-created business climate, 
manufacturing and financial services, linguistic facilities, short and 
long term growth potential and overall image. Table 8.2 illustrates 
the overall ranking of the image of the top twenty five cities in 
Europe based on this survey.
TABLE 8.2 
HARRIS RESEARCH SURVEY RANKINGS
# CITY # CITY
1 LONDON 14 HAMBURG
2 PARIS 15 BERLIN
3 FRANKFURT 16 LISBON
4 BRUSSELS 17 MADRID
5 AMSTERDAM 18 LYON
6 DUSSELDORF 19 STOCKHOLM
7 ZURICH 20 VIENNA
8 GENEVA 21 BUDAPEST
9 MILAN 22 ATHENS
10 GLASGOW 23 PRAGUE
11 BARCELONA 24 MOSCOW
12 MUNICH 25 WARSAW
13 MANCHESTER
Source: Northwest Airline's Magazine. March 1991.
This Harris Research survey shows the usual “Eurocities'' on top of 
the rankings led by London and Paris. Lyon's position in this survey 
at number 18 illustrates the habitual dichotomy of Lyon's situation. 
Lyon is the only French city outside Paris included in a survey of 
leading "Eurocities" but places towards the bottom of the survey.
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Lyon is perceived as deserving to be included in such surveys but 
needs to improve on its position to achieve the true International 
status it desires.
Another survey asked 1800 European business leaders in France, 
Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Switzerland and the Benelux countries 
to prioritize their most important criteria in determining where to 
locate a new plant site (Table 8.3). This survey listed nine criteria 
and asked the respondents to rate the importance of each on a scale of 
one to ten (Affaires economiques. No 18-Avril, 1991).
TABLE 8.3 
SITE LOCATION CRITERIA
CRITERIA SCORE
1 COMMUNICATION/TRANSPORT 9.3
2 CALIBRE OF THE WORKFORCE 8.5
3 PRESENCE OF DYNAMIC AND 
INTERNATIONAL ENTERPRISES
7.7
4 RESEARCH AND UNIVERSITY 
FUNCTIONS
7.2
5 CLIMATE AND PHYSICAL LOCATION 6.4
6 COOPERATION BETWEEN THE LOCAL 
URBAN NETWORK
6.0
7 CENTRE OF POLITICAL DECSIONS 6.0
8 IMAGE, CULTURE, LOCAL LEADERS 5.2
9 CULTURAL EVENTS 4.9
The importance of a superior communication and transport 
infrastructure is where Lyon can attract the most positive attention. 
Lyon's communication and transport infrastructure in conjunction 
with its central location is one of the city's best assets. The political 
dimension is rated as significantly less important. The important 
criteria to these business leaders is whether or not the location will 
prove profitable. Politicians have a limited direct impact on the 
profitability of any enterprise. This survey would indicate that local
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politicians would be best served by concentrating on constructing the 
higher level infrastructure that is most attractive to the business 
leaders. Lyon's leaders are, to their credit, emphasizing the 
improvement of the physical infrastructure of Lyon in their bid to 
increase the international awareness and image of Lyon.
After examining these surveys one realizes that there are a 
multitude of variables that directiy or indirectly impact the creation 
and evolution of a city's "image". Within a relative context, Lyon's 
image is the strongest in economic terms of all cities in France with 
the obvious exception of Paris. Lyon has the relative size, 
infrastructure, workforce and location in a strong region on a major 
European north-south axis. The results of these surveys corresponds 
to a significant degree with the results of the DATAR/RECLUS study 
examined in Chapter One. Lyon is the second city of France and a 
second tier "Eurocity". These surveys also illustrate the strong image 
projected by Grenoble. Lyon and Grenoble together anchor the urban 
system of the top-rated region in France. It is becoming increasingly 
clear that for either city to achieve true "International" or "European" 
status a cooperative relationship must replace the current competitive 
independent dialogue that exists between the two. This topic will be 
the focal theme of Part Three.
8.8 THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK
After the success in attracting Euronews (Chapter Six) to Lyon, 
where Lyon was the early favourite, the city is now ambitiously 
attempting to attract the future European Central Bank headquarters. 
Despite recent setbacks to the concept of a single currency and fixed 
exchange rates, plans for the new European Central Bank are 
currently still proceeding. The European Central Bank (dubbed 
EuroFed) will employ approximately 50 persons by 1994 and over 
300 persons by the year 2000 (Le Progres. Mars 16, 1992). The 
employment of 300 bank officials is only the beginning of the 
economic and public relation's rewards that would accompany 
EuroFed to Lyon.
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EuroFed will, in theory, represent the third pole in a global 
financial triangle that also includes Tokyo and Washington D.C. The 
city that successfully attracts EuroFed will be well positioned to 
expand into the global financial capital of Europe. This would create 
an enormous number of positive knock-on affects. EuroFed would, in 
one stroke, eliminate Lyon’s lack of higher level services, second tier 
economic status and image as a second level European city. The 
potential advantages of attracting EuroFed compelled Lyon's leaders 
to enter officially the competition to host this institution.
The eight cities that are officially competing for the privilege of 
hosting EuroFed are, in alphabetical order, Amsterdam, Barcelona, 
Frankfurt, London, Luxembourg, Lyon, Manchester, and Valencia. An 
examination of Lyon's self-promoted advantages and the actions that 
Lyon is undertaking in its effort to attract EuroFed may be made. 
Then a study of Lyon's competitors and a realistic appraisal of Lyon's 
chances will be discussed.
Raymond Barre, a former Prime Minister under President Giscard 
d'Estaing and a prominent local resident leads the team that is 
actively promoting Lyon's EuroFed bid. There are a number of 
important local and national business leaders on this team which also 
includes two distinguished members who are not French. Giovanni 
Agnelli, the Chairman of FIAT and Raymond Kendall, the head of 
Interpol (which is now headquartered in Lyon) provide an 
international dimension to this team designed to bring EuroFed to 
Lyon. ADERLY (the promotional branch of the C.C.I.L)., has also set up 
a task force (including Banque de France Lyon regional director 
Etienne Subra) to assist in presenting Lyon in the best possible 
manner in its hope of attracting EuroFed (LeProgres, Mars 16, 1992).
Lyon presents a number of arguments to support its bid to host 
EuroFed. First, Lyon stresses its central location within Western 
Europe and the modem transportation infrastructure which includes 
new autoroutes, TGV lines and an expanded international 
airport/multi-modal transportation platform at Lyon-Satolas (Chapter 
Five). Lyon also points out the superior communication and transport 
organization that operated so successfully during the 1992 Winter
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Olympiad in Albertville, a major international event. Secondly, Lyon 
argues that it has no other European Community institutions and 
would therefore help provide an equitable dispersion of European 
Community power. Third, Lyon argues that by locating EuroFed in 
Lyon it would help direct the focus of the European Community more 
towards Southern Europe, a region traditionally disadvantaged in 
financial power and representation within the European Community. 
Giovanni Agnelli is, in part, supporting Lyon’s bid to host EuroFed 
because of his conviction that Southern Europe is habitually ignored 
and over-shadowed by the economically stronger Northern European 
countries and that a greater southern focus is needed, especially in 
financial matters, to redress this disparity (LeProgres, Mars 16,
1992).
Conventional wisdom suggests that either London or Frankfurt 
are the leading candidates to be selected as the future site of EuroFed. 
These two cities are the largest financial centres in Europe and have 
already established the infrastructure (both physical and human) to 
accommodate such an important financial institution. However, each 
of these two leading cities has a serious flaw. London is hampered by 
the fact that the British people and government are commonly 
perceived as the least enthusiastic of any European nation concerning 
matters of closer European integration, especially financially. The 
unceremonious withdrawal of Sterling from the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM) and the subsequent public arguments concerning 
blame and future financial direction leave the capital of Britain in a 
relatively weak political position to pursue its bid to host EuroFed. 
Despite the current mood, British Prime Minister John Major has 
stated that his government would anticipate that EuroFed will be 
located in London regardless of current economic and political 
problems because of London’s global position in the financial 
community (Wall Street Toumal-Europe. March 23, 1992). It remains 
to be seen whether or not such serious political problems will be 
overcome and the rest of Europe chooses to trust Britain with its new 
Central Bank.
Frankfurt is in many ways a more logical choice since the German 
Central Bank has traditionally been the strongest and the most stable
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in Europe and sets the rate for ERM based on its own figures. Because 
of proximity to the already powerful German Central Bank, however, 
many Europeans wonder if the EuroFed would control the Bundesbank 
or the other way around. Also, Germany has current economic and 
social problems of its own as it merges former East Germany into a 
greater Germany. Germans are becoming increasingly concerned with 
the cost of closer European integration and are becoming ever more 
attached to the Deutchmark. Nonetheless, Frankfurt is to many the 
leading candidate because it is the leading financial centre on the 
continent (International Herald Tribune. March 18,1992).
Manchester and Valencia have the twin disadvantage of being 
smaller cities in economically weaker states with a limited 
infrastructure. Also, both cities are competing directly with larger 
cities within their own country. Additionally, Manchester suffers 
from the same political burdens as London in addition to lacking the 
British Government's official support, and a central location. 
Manchester and Valencia have to be considered long-shots at best to 
host EuroFed.
Barcelona, Amsterdam, and Luxembourg are viewed as viable 
second level choices if political and economic factors rule out both 
London and Frankfurt. Luxembourg, it is thought, has the advantage 
among the second level cities based on its central location to the 
financial centres of Northern Europe and almost equal proximity to 
Brussels (The European Community Offices) and Frankfurt (The 
Bundesbank). Luxembourg also has a history of fiscal responsibility 
and is a consistently strong supporter of closer European integration. 
Barcelona, the candidate of many southern Europeans, presents a 
strong case based upon its geographical location and southern regional 
links. Barcelona is a more credible candidate than Amsterdam but 
worries many northern Europeans. The northern Europeans have 
sufficient reservations concerning the money that they pay annually 
to support the southern community members without placing EuroFed 
in the south.
The future location of EuroFed will be decided by a vote of the 
twelve heads of state of the European Community countries, each
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leader getting one vote. Under such a format the selection process 
will be a highly political affair and doubtless part of a greater 
compromise. President Mitterrand has yet to publicly endorse Lyon's 
bid, (Le Progres. Mars 16, 1992), much to the anger of the Lyonais. 
President Mitterrand has been employing his political capital within 
the European Community in an attempt to retain the European 
Parliament in Strasbourg. This runs counter to the wishes of the rest 
of the European Community leaders that want to move the European 
Parliament to Brussels to effectively consolidate the political functions 
of the European Community.
This political manouvering will doubtless hurt Lyon's chances as 
will the fact that Lyon is economically less important than the three 
second tier candidates, Barcelona, Amsterdam, and Luxembourg.
Lyon manifestly does not have the human infrastructure in high level 
international finances to attract EuroFed on its merits alone. As 
Andreas von Schober, the Mayor of Frankfurt noted, installing 
EuroFed in Lyon would be the same as installing it in Wurzburg (a 
small Bavarian town). Lyon, according to von Schober, is not an 
important financial centre in Europe and is therefore obviously 
unqualified to host EuroFed.
The advantages to this whole episode is that, indeed, Lyon does 
have an outside chance of attracting EuroFed and becoming a major 
international financial centre. There are certain political combinations 
that could allow Lyon to emerge as a compromise candidate. More 
realistically, this is a first class marketing strategy to establish Lyon 
as a Eurocity, the French choice after Paris, and a city to consider in 
the future for European projects both large and small. This EuroFed 
campaign also enabled Lyon to illustrate to the rest of Europe its fine 
transportation and communication facilities, reinforce its image of 
central location, and keep Lyon in the public eye as being an up-and- 
coming Eurocity. Therefore, Lyon's campaign to attract EuroFed is a 
no-lose scenario showing astute local political skill and helping to 
place the name and image of Lyon on a greater European scale.
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8.9 ECONOMIC CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has attempted to examine the economic 
infrastructure of Lyon within the context of its international functions. 
Through utilizing the economic criteria of the Soldatos model and 
applying them to Lyon it is possible to analyze the broad strengths 
and weaknesses of Lyon in an international context. Lyon, as noted, 
needs to fulfil the economic criteria set forth in the Soldatos model to 
achieve "International City" status. This examination of the 
internationalization of Lyon’s economy does not establish any firm 
quantitative answers nor does it find that all sectors of Lyon’s 
economy operate equally. Rather, this examination is intended to 
provide a general basis for analyzing the overall internationalization 
of Lyon's economy in the context of the theoretical Soldatos model 
with which Lyon is being studied.
Lyon and the Rhone-Alpes Region have highlighted four areas of 
economic concern. These areas are directly related to the region’s 
concerns over the opening of the single European market in 1993.
The first concern is that the Rhone-Alpes maintain a competitive 
advantage in those industries of specialization that are currently 
strong in the region. RVI and other mechanical manufacturing 
industries are seen as particularly vulnerable to greater European 
competition. These industries cannot be eliminated from the region's 
industrial base if Rhone-Alpes is to continue to enjoy a successful 
economy. The strong chemical/petro-chemical and pharmaceutical 
industries must continue to perform at an international level and 
provide Lyon with a strong industrial base in this sector upon which 
Lyon can continue to construct high-technology spin-off industries 
and physical infrastructure (Peirat, 1989).
The second issue is that there be a mobilization of other 
concerned industries in the region to enhance these industries vis-a- 
vis their European competitors. The region hopes to encourage and 
promote better cooperation between industries within the region to 
ensure future competitiveness. This will be in conjunction with the 
third goal of the region which is to promote a greater global vision.
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The economy of the region needs to expand its horizons to remain 
competitive in the new era of local/global economies.
The final issue of concern to the region is the need to preserve, 
sectorally and spatially, the industrial equilibrium of the region. The 
Rhone-Alpes Region is economically imbalanced in that the peripheral 
sections to the south and west of the region are economically 
disadvantaged in comparison to the prosperous areas around Lyon 
and the alpine agglomerations, including Geneva. This regional 
inequality reduces the economic influence of Lyon within the region 
and the overall economic power of Rhone-Alpes.
The evident lack of an effective and cooperative economic urban 
network effectively reduces the economic power and services of the 
urban centre at the head of the urban network; in this case, Lyon. 
Improved economic integration within the Rhone-Alpes would 
decrease regional imbalances and permit superior distributional flows 
resulting in "auto-development”. Auto-development occurs 
economically in a structured and defined urban system where a tight 
network of urban areas easily diffuses the service capability of the 
major agglomeration which receives economic benefits and a regional 
leadership role in return. With an unstructured and ill-defined urban 
hierarchy such as found in the Rhone-Alpes, the financial capabilities 
of Lyon are diluted and unable to reach and impact other urban areas 
within the region. Consequently, the lesser urban areas continue to 
focus on other agglomerations such as Paris, Geneva and Grenoble for 
financial and economic services and support. This further reduces 
Lyon’s economic role and influence within the region.
This lack of regional economic cohesion has been further 
exaggerated by the effects of a prolonged recession. The recession has 
provoked an "every man for himself' attitude both among 
corporations and the urban centres in the region. Rising 
unemployment, especially in the economically disadvantaged areas of 
the region, has further eroded the desire to prioritize such concepts as 
cohesion and cooperation. A recession is a poor time to advance such 
concepts as inter-regional cooperation or global visions.
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Lyon's position is unique and complex, yet, within the context of 
the Soldatos model, can provide limited optimism for Lyon's 
international ambitions. The major economic weakness of Lyon is in 
the high-level financial services sector. The evident lack of control 
over banking, insurance and other financial services seriously retards 
Lyon's ability to act independently. This lack of decision-making 
ability is directly reflected by the monopoly of Parent Company 
Headquarters in Paris. This lack of control over financial flows is not 
going to change in the near future given the central position of Paris 
in all matters concerning France. If the Nation-State paradigm 
evolves into a Regional/European Community reality, Lyon might 
have some success in breaking the monopoly of Paris on economic 
matters. However, the short term reality is that Lyon will continue to 
lack any significant financial functions or control over economic flows.
Lyon must instead concentrate upon the strengths of its economic 
infrastructure. The strong diversified industrial and manufacturing 
sector of Lyon's economy is of a sufficient size and dynamism to 
enable Lyon to develop high-technology centres and promote 
infrastructural projects of a European scale. Lyon, along with the 
Rhone-Alpes Region, envisions three potential scenarios for the local 
economy in the future. The first scenario is that the recession 
continues to divide the region into competing economic zones. This 
will isolate Lyon from the rest of the region and retard the 
international ambitions of both.
The second scenario envisions Lyon and the region as an 
economic relay zone capitalizing on its advantageous crossroads 
position. This would leave Lyon with no actual control over the flows 
of goods, resources and capital that pass through the agglomeration. 
This will not help Lyon in achieving its international ambitions. The 
third and most optimistic scenario is that the regional agglomerations 
construct an economically complementary and cooperative region.
The short term reality will doubtless consist of a combination of 
the three proposed scenarios. The recession will hinder all efforts to 
promote a cooperative and coordinated regional economic policy. 
However, through greater regional awareness, aggressive political
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promotion of a regional identity and the economic reality that there 
are more profits to be made in cooperation than conflict in the post- 
1993 Europe, the regional economy will evolve into some form of 
closer cooperation. Lyon and the region will continue to serve as an 
economic relay zone based upon their advantageous location. The 
challenge is to utilize the increased infrastructure and local economic 
strength to assert more control over the flow of goods and capital 
through Lyon and the region.
In the context of the Soldatos model, Lyon lacks sufficient control 
over its economic functions to be considered a true "International 
City". The economic base of Lyon is suitably strong and diverse to 
enable Lyon to realistically strive for greater control of its economic 
functions and thus improve its international status. A cooperative 
economic system within the region would significantly improve Lyon's 
critical mass and potential to improve its economic and international 
functions and image and is therefore worth a concentrated effort.
Throughout Part Two, the examination of Lyon's infrastructure 
has illustrated a number of central themes. The first over-riding 
negative theme is the dominance of Paris in all spheres of French 
infrastructure from education to the economy, from transportation 
functions to research and development facilities. The prime inhibitor 
of Lyon's international ambitions is the centralism of the French State 
around Paris. Having stated this, Lyon does have reasonable cause for 
cautious optimism due to its status as the second city of France, its 
advantageous location linked to its high-level transportation 
infrastructure and a well diversified economy. However, much of the 
future success of Lyon will be linked to its future relationship with 
the other agglomerations in the Rhone-Alpes Region. Part Three will 
therefore examine the relationship of Lyon with its neighbouring 
agglomerations and with the Rhone-Alpes Region as a unit.
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FART THM E 
THE OMAN AND MCTONAL STSTHM
Part Two has illustrated that Lyon has not achieved the criteria 
necessary to be a European City. The Soldatos model indicates that in 
some circumstances where a city lacks the critical mass and synergy 
within the agglomeration, a functional association with other 
agglomerations within the same geographic orbit might provide a 
means to achieve international status. This poly-nuclear structure 
would require three elements to be credible: that a consensus and 
political will to share identity exists, that transport connections are 
sufficient to overcome friction of distance between the centres and 
that the central city in the system be universally regarded as the 
"capital". In the present case, the poly-nuclear structure centred on 
Lyon would include St. Etienne, Grenoble, the towns of the Alpine 
furrow and, to some degree, Geneva (Billet, 1988).
Secondly, in view of the inevitable difficulties when vested 
political, social and economic interests are involved in the case of 
neighbouring cities, a complementary or alternative approach may be 
to seek partnerships abroad, outside the immediate urban system. 
This can be accomplished through the Rhone-Alpes Region by forging 
links with other regions both inside the European Community and 
throughout the world. This can also be achieved through Lyon 
establishing independent relationships with other non-capital 
European cities and promoting its own agenda to various international 
bodies.
Accordingly, it is the purpose of Part Three to evaluate the 
attempt by Lyon to enhance its international status by forging links 
on two scales; that of the extended city region (encompassing the 
major urban agglomerations of the Rhone-Alpes Region and Geneva) 
and that of the international scale at the urban and regional level 
through extended linkages with other agglomerations and regions 
outside of France. Chapters nine and ten are devoted respectively to 
the examination of Lyon's pursuit of international status through both 
regional and international linkages.
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CHAPTER NINE 
LYON'S REGIONAL LINKAGES
Chapter Nine is divided into two major sections. The first 
section examines the recently published official Rhone-Alpes Regional 
plan, its publically-oriented summary and a number of 
academic/technical working papers that helped influence the final 
regional plan. These will provide a solid basis for determining 
whether or not the region officially shares and supports Lyon's 
international ambitions. This official support by the region is critical 
if Lyon is to achieve the poly-nuclear critical mass referred to in the 
Soldatos model that would help Lyon overcome various weaknesses 
and become a prominent "Eurocity".
The second section of this chapter considers the relationships 
between Lyon and the other major agglomerations in the region, 
including Geneva. This section examines four spatially-oriented urban 
linkages: La Voie Dauphine, L'Axe Alpin, ROVALTAIN and La Region 
Urbaine de Lyon (RUL). These four spatially-oriented urban linkages 
are attempts to further integrate the urban network of the region.
Finally, this chapter considers a variety of future scenarios 
concerning the urban network and regional integration of the Rhone- 
Alpes and their effects on Lyon. The growing economic disparity 
within the region, the continuing rural/urban split and the current 
condition of the region's urban linkages will also be discussed in the 
context of Lyon's position and future international ambitions.
9.1 LYON AS REGIONAL CAPITAL
The notion of a multi-nodal European city is only likely to be 
achieved if it forms part of a wider regional strategy. The resources 
and political impulses involved in such an inter-urban partnership are 
only likely to occur in the context of an agreed long-range agenda 
legitimized by the authority of the regional planning council.
The latest revision of the regional plan was recently published, 
(Schema de Developpement et d'Amenagement Regional. Conseil
235
Economique et Social Rhone-Alpes, May 25, 1992). The full report 
presented by the Conseil Economique et Social Rhone-Alpes (CES) to 
the Regional Council includes Regional Council discussion, voting, 
amendments and the views of various interest groups. This is the 
official basis of the Rhone-Alpes Region’s long-range policy and 
planning agenda. Additionally, a summary volume with illustrative 
maps indicates the main decisions of the regional plan and was 
published in order to educate and persuade the public to accept and 
support the objectives and values of the regional plan, (Rhone-Alpes 
demain. "Reinventons la proximite". Region Rhone-Alpes, 1992). 
Similarly, technical research reports which provided an intellectual 
input into the planning process are also of value. By analyzing these 
three sources, it is possible to infer what, if any, weight was given to 
Lyon’s international role and if any consideration was given to closer 
integration of the region's urban system with Lyon as the dominant 
pole.
9 .11  THE OFFICIAL REGIONAL PLAN
Schema de Developpement et d'Amenagement Regional, the 
official regional planning document, was put forward by the Conseil 
Economique et Social Rhone-Alpes. This plan was passed in its final 
form on May 25,1992 by a vote of 78 in favour of the plan and 18 
abstentions; there were no votes against the plan. This plan is 
envisaged by the Regional Council as an overall planning scheme to 
guide the development and administration of the region until the year 
2010. This plan, therefore, does not provide detailed documentation 
on specific works-projects but rather provides a framework for 
prioritizing the long-range agenda for the region.
The major themes echoed in the regional plan are those 
concerned with the economic and social problems facing the region 
both today and in the future. Unemployment is viewed as the single 
largest threat to the region. The social impact of wide-spread long­
term unemployment of 10% along with the continuing problems of 
regional economic disparity are the major issues of concern voiced in 
the regional plan.
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The increasing threat to the regionfs industrial and 
manufacturing base in the context of a borderless Europe will, it is 
feared, exaggerate both of these problems in addition to accentuating 
the growing urban/rural divide in the region. The challenge of Europe 
is also viewed as a potential opportunity for the regions of Europe to 
increase their role and prestige. This is especially true in France 
where decentralization still lags well behind the majority of the other 
European Community nations. The Rhone-Alpes Region views the 
challenge of post-1993 Europe as an opportunity to increase and 
legitimize its authority and establish a greater and more autonomous 
European role. However, the question concerning Lyon is what role 
the Rhone-Alpes Region projects for Lyon in its official long-range 
strategy.
The official regional plan is straightforward and to the point in 
its support for Lyon's international ambitions and the importance of 
Lyon to the long-range plans of the region. The regional plan states 
that "l'enjeu de Rhone-Alpes est l'enjeu de Lyon" (p. 14). The regional 
plan affirms the importance of Lyon achieving a comparable status to 
the other "metropoles europeennes". The regional authorities 
recognize that for the region to succeed, the regional capital, Lyon, 
must also succeed in improving its international status.
The regional authorities have officially committed to help Lyon 
achieve a greater international role: "Mais les acteurs de Rhone-Alpes 
doivent aider au renforcement des fonctions nationales et 
intemationales de Lyon." (p. 14). The region is especially committed 
to helping Lyon improve its position in the financial services sector of 
the economy. The region recognizes that the whole Rhone-Alpes will 
benefit if the regional capital, Lyon, is able to improve the status of its 
important financial services sector. The regional plan officially 
confirms that the region must "...hisser Lyon en particulier au niveau 
d'une place financiere intemationale." (p. 19).
This official recognition of Lyon's central role in the future of 
the Rhone-Alpes and the regional authorities commitment to help 
Lyon attain greater "Eurocity" status is very important to Lyon. This 
official support signifies that Lyon's international ambitions are more
237
than just political talk and planners fantasies. Rather, Lyon is viewed 
as the cornerstone of the region’s future in Europe and can expect the 
region’s full support in its desire to achieve international status.
9.12 THE SUMMARY VOLUME
The summary volume of the official regional plan; Rhone-Alpes 
demain. "Reinventons la proximite". also emphasizes the important 
role of Lyon in the region's future. This summary states that: "Le role 
que Lyon est appele a jouer au coeur de ce dispositif est tout a fait 
clair: la metropole doit constituer un element d’organisation et de 
dynamisme pour le reseau regional." (p. 81). Lyon must, with the 
help of the region, establish itself as a Eurocity and contribute in that 
capacity to the further development of the region.
This summary suggests, however, that for Lyon to achieve true 
Eurocity status it must be with the cooperation of the other major 
agglomerations of the region; Grenoble and St. Etienne. "Lyon ne peut 
jouer un grand role europeen que si elle integre ses fonctions urbaines 
et son niveau de services a un reseau rassemblant les autres grandes 
agglomerations de Rhone-Alpes." (p. 81). Lyon must promote further 
integration with the other regional agglomerations through economic, 
political and social cooperation. The establishment of a major regional 
pole centred around Satolas/l'Isle d'Abeau is a prime example cited in 
the summary of potential urban cooperation and recentring of the 
region that would benefit both the Rhone-Alpes Region and the 
agglomerations.
The support for the new development pole centred around 
Satolas/l’Isle d'Abeau is gaining strength and credibility. This can be 
attributed to three major advantages enjoyed by this new 
development pole; a prime location, advanced infrastructure and a 
favourable political climate.
The development pole of Satolas/l’Isle d'Abeau is strategically 
located on the A48 autoroute 25 kilometres east of Lyon. The first 
advantage of this development pole is that it is located on La Voie 
Dauphine, the major axis between Lyon and Grenoble along the A48
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autoroute (Figure 9.1). This new development pole is centrally 
located in that it faces the agglomerations of the alpine furrow yet is 
accessible via autoroute to the rest of the Rhone-Alpes. The 
Satolas/lTsle d'Abeau development pole seeks to utilize the same 
advantages of location as Lyon and the region on a regional scale; a 
central crossroads location with superior transportation infrastructure 
to attract economic and political growth.
The infrastructure of the Satolas/lTsle d'Abeau development 
pole is impressive. The cornerstone of this areas infrastructure is the 
multi-modal international transportation platform centred around 
Lyon-Satolas International Airport (Chapter Five). Lyon-Satolas 
International Airport is expanding its capacity and upgrading its 
facilities to better function as an international transportation 
platform. The addition of a TGV station at the airport is a second 
major infrastructural benefit to the Satolas/lTsle d'Abeau 
development pole. Finally, the autoroute network that connects 
Satolas/lTsle d'Abeau with the region, the major autoroute axis of 
France, Geneva and, in the near future, Turin. The highly developed 
nature of the Satolas/lTsle d'Abeau transportation infrastruture will 
help establish this development pole as a focal point of the Rhone- 
Alpes (Enquette sur l'lmpact Regional de Proiet de Satolas. 1989).
Additionally, the newtown of l'lsle d'Abeau offers numerous 
infrastructural advantages in addition to its prime location. In the 
early 1970's, l'lsle d'Abeau was one of the newtowns designated by 
DATAR for future development. Over the past twenty years, l'lsle 
d'Abeau has not achieved its initial promise or expectations.
However, that could change in the near future. Being a newtown, 
l'lsle d'Abeau was designed to accomodate the modem infrastruture 
and economic needs of today. This newtown was originally planned 
for structured expansion to include 50,000 people and numerous 
enterprises (Chatin, 1975). Today, this leaves l'lsle d'Abeau with 
properly zoned space onto which it can economically and 
demographically expand (INUDEL Rhone-Alpes, 1989).
Politically, the Rhone-Alpes Region and the region's secondary 
agglomerations view the Satolas/lTsle d'Abeau development pole as a
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neutral site on which to recentre the region. The current 
headquarters for the administrative offices of the Rhone-Alpes Region 
is in Charbonnieres-les-Bains, a western suburb of Lyon, that is in the 
COURLY. This location gives Lyon certain advantages and prestige 
that it is loathe to relinquish. However, the region and the other 
agglomerations would like to see a neutral site, specifically l'lsle 
d'Abeau, as the site of the new headquarters for the region.
This should not be viewed by Lyon as a slight by the region, 
especially in light of the fact that the region has officially committed 
to assist Lyon in furthering its international ambitions. The region 
views this as an opportunity to promote La Voie Dauphine, the logical 
axis in the region between Lyon and Grenoble. The development of 
this axis is a stated ambition of the region. Also' l'lsle d'Abeau is only 
25 kilometres from Lyon via the A48 autoroute and is located within 
the Region Urbaine de Lyon (Le Nir et al., 1989).
9 .13  TECHNICAL RESEARCH REPORTS
The CES solicited numerous technical and academic studies on 
specific planning topics to help in finalizing the official regional plan. 
Le Centre de Recherche sur la Politique, l'Administration et le 
Territoire (CERAT) located in the Institut d'Etudes Politiques de 
Grenoble which is attached to l'Universite Pierre Mendes France in 
Grenoble, contributed a number of academic policy documents that 
were pertinent to the regional plan.
One of the papers prepared by CERAT is entitled Les Inegalities 
Regionales en France: Le Cas de Rhone-Alpes (Kukawka, 1992). This 
paper touches upon themes similar to the official regional plan. 
Discussions on regional economic disparity, unemployment, the role of 
Rhone-Alpes in both France and Europe, La Voie Dauphine, L'Axe 
Alpin and the role of Geneva are all examined. The views in this 
document are similar in tone and context to the outlines of the official 
regional plan.
CERAT also published a paper entitled Les Relations entre la 
Region Rhone-Alpes et Geneve" (Kukawka, 1989). This paper dealt
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exclusively with Geneva and its relationship with Lyon and the 
Rhone-Alpes as a whole. Topics such as the competitive nature 
between the two airports, Geneva's driving role in the Annemasse 
area's economy and the lack of any true contact between Geneva and 
Lyon were discussed.
The majority of the technical papers consulted from CERAT and 
other academic/professional institutions agree that, for Lyon and the 
Rhone-Alpes to achieve their respective ambitions, certain historic 
compromises need to be forged between the region's agglomerations. 
"Or, si la region Rhone-Alpes veut exister veritablement, il faut que 
Lyon et Grenoble signent un compromis historique, a la fois 
economique, culturel et politique." (Kukawka, 1992).
These papers by CERAT are but examples of the numerous 
academic/professional papers dealing with the topic of the future of 
the Rhone-Alpes that were consulted by the CES in its formation of 
the official regional plan. The prevailing attitude that Lyon must fulfil 
the role of the regional capital and establish closer links with the 
other regional agglomerations is similar to Lyon's own ambitions. It is 
increasingly clear that Lyon, in a cooperative relationship with 
Grenoble and St. Etienne, must provide the region with strong 
leadership and infrastructure in the future (Denais, 1991).
9.2 URBAN LINKAGES WITHIN THE RHONE-ALPES
The urban areas within the Rhone-Alpes share a long tradition 
of individualism. These urban centres share no common history or 
geography. Each agglomeration has its own local cultural identity and 
historic rivalries with neighbouring urban areas. The rivalries 
between Savoie and Dauphine, Haute-Savoie and Savoie, and the 
alpine cities with those on the Rhone corridor date back centuries.
The past relative geographic isolation of the alpine cities reinforced 
the communal sense of local independence and parochialism. Today 
such individualistic traits are viewed as detrimental to the 
establishment and promotion of an operational urban network within 
the region. This section will examine four efforts at overcoming this 
local individualism through the establishment of spatially-oriented
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linkages between specific cities. These linkages are "La Voie 
Dauphine", "l'Axe Alpin", ROVALTAIN and La Region Urbaine de Lyon 
(RUL).
9 .21  LA VOIE DAUPHINE
La Voie Dauphine refers to the development between the two 
major agglomerations in the region: Lyon and Grenoble (Figure 9.1). 
These two agglomerations are connected by 110 kilometres of the 
A48 autoroute. These historical rivals, with no history of cooperation 
or common cause, need to establish a "historic compromise" (Rapport 
Carriere, 1988.) for their mutual benefit and that of the region as a 
whole. La Voie Dauphine is an axis of high-technology and light 
industrial development along the A48 autoroute between Lyon and 
Grenoble. This axis, it is postulated, will serve to link the important 
research and educational functions of these agglomerations and help 
develop the political and economic contacts needed to establish a 
working and cooperative relationship.
Currently La Voie Dauphine is comprised of two development 
sites along the A48 autoroute. South-east of Lyon is the Bourgoin- 
Satolas-l'Isle d'Abeau development zone. This pole includes the 
multi-modal transport platform of Satolas (TGV Station, autoroute hub 
and International Airport), and the newtown development of l'lsle 
d'Abeau. This constitutes an attractive development pole with a 
potential regional role as noted earlier in this chapter. North-west of 
Grenoble on the same A48 autoroute is the Voreppe-Moirans 
development zone of similar high-technology and light industry.
The area between these two development poles is one of the 
least populated in the region with a population density well under 
100 per sq km. However, because these enterprise zones fail to 
physically touch and are separated by a low population density area 
does not automatically infer that La Voie Dauphine is not a potential 
functioning axis of importance. The distance between the two 
enterprise zones can be traversed in 15 minutes along the A48 
autoroute. This does not impose a limitation on this development axis. 
Rather, having a green-belt between the two development poles with
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potential room for structured expansion could be constructed as a 
positive attribute.
La Voie Dauphine is a logical axis linking the two major regional 
agglomerations. However, this is an imposed axis rather than a 
spontaneous or integrated one. Politicians and planners rather than 
economic forces have decided that La Voie Dauphine is a mandatory 
major regional axis. A number of potential problems are uncovered 
when this axis is examined in detail. First, these development poles 
also share autoroute access with other regional agglomerations. The 
Bourgoin-Satolas-Hsle d'Abeau development is located on the direct 
Lyon-Chambery autoroute link (via the A43). Conversely, the 
Voreppe-Moirans pole west of Grenoble is centred on the intersection 
of the A43 and the newly opened A40 autoroute to Valence. This 
suggests that other orientations beside Lyon-Grenoble are possible. 
However, such secondary orientations are not necessarily at the 
expense of La Voie Dauphine nor is it clear that these expanded 
orientations will not be considered as a positive factor in the near 
future (Bonnafus et al., 1989).
Secondly, La Voie Dauphine suffers from not being on a physical 
corridor that opens onto Europe. The Lyon-Chambery-Turin axis and 
the Grenoble-Chambery-Geneva axis both have the advantage of 
direct European connections. La Voie Dauphine is restricted in that it 
remains a limited linkage between two French cities and can thus be 
considered less attractive as an investment corridor to certain 
enterprises with international functions. These first two problems are 
not necessarily major disadvantages and could be viewed as potential 
positive factors in certain spatial contexts.
The third problem facing La Voie Dauphine is that the axis is not 
yet well integrated economically or politically. La Voie Dauphine is 
politically split between two separate agglomerations (Lyon and 
Grenoble), two separate departements (Rhone and Isere) and a 
number of communes. This political situation leads to numerous 
problems when attempting to plan a coherent development strategy. 
The region, the only administrative authority for the whole axis, lacks 
the political power and financial resources to impose this axis. The
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region is left in a position to encourage its development but cannot 
directly effect its development.
La Voie Dauphine is currently more of a transport axis then a 
functionally integrated economic axis. However, La Voie Dauphine is a 
positive linkage for a number of current and future reasons. First, La 
Voie Dauphine links the two largest agglomerations in the region. For 
the Rhone-Alpes Region and the agglomerations of Lyon and Grenoble 
to optimize their potential in the future, Lyon and Grenoble must 
establish better cooperation and superior integration on all levels.
The progressing development of La Voie Dauphine along the linking 
A48 autoroute provides a solid first step in establishing a cooperative 
relationship between these agglomerations.
La Voie Dauphine cannot be dismissed as a mere political 
fantasy. The Lyon-Grenoble linkage is critical for the future 
development of the region. This linkage is also important for each 
agglomeration to help establish the critical mass and synergy together 
that they cannot currently generate as independent entities. La Voie 
Dauphine currently exists and has an important role to play in the 
future as the main economic and transport axis between the major 
agglomerations in the region.
9.22 LYON - ST ETIENNE
The relationship between Lyon and St. Etienne has evolved into 
one of uncomfortable dependency. St. Etienne has suffered the loss of
80,000 manufacturing jobs between 1962 and 1992. This has 
changed St. Etienne from a prosperous industrial town to one facing 
perpetual recession and difficult reconversion prospects. St. Etienne is 
also the only major agglomeration in the region not pursuing an 
aggressive political agenda to improve its regional or European 
position. Some of this can be attributed to the lack of drive displayed 
by the current mayor and his ruling cadre. Some can also be 
attributed to St. Etienne’s increasing dependence on Lyon.
The combination of difficult economic conditions, traditional 
style political leadership and the rise in political ambition and
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economic strength of Lyon have succeeded in pulling St. Etienne into 
Lyon's functional political/economic orbit. The stronger economy of 
Lyon employs a substantial number of St. Etienne residents and the 
increasing infrastructural dependency on transportation, health and 
cultural resources binds St. Etienne to Lyon in an ever increasing 
manner (Kukawka, 1992).
The capital of the Loire Departement none the less remains a 
major agglomeration; the third largest in the region with a population 
of 314,000 in 1990. St. Etienne is also slowing slight signs of economic 
and demographic recovery. The effective inclusion of St. Etienne into 
Lyon's functional orbit adds to Lyon's critical mass, overall size and 
strength and, therefore, its international status. This closer linkage, 
exemplified by the "Protocol de Concertation et de Cooperation" signed 
by the mayors of Lyon and St. Etienne on May 23, 1989, reinforces 
Lyon's position as regional capital and its influence over the relatively 
peripheral and poorly-integrated southern portion of the region. This 
closer integration helps enhance Lyon's functional size and credibility 
in its pursuit of international status.
9.23 L'AXE ALPIN
L'Axe Alpin is an envisioned north-south linkage of Grenoble- 
Chambery-Annecy-Geneva (Figure 9.2). The supporters of this Alpine 
Axis argue that these mountain agglomerations share a basic history 
and common cause for development. Each has experienced rapid 
economic and demographic growth during the past decades and are 
emphasizing developing relationships with neighbouring European 
regions in Switzerland and Italy. The promotional literature for this 
Alpine Axis also describes the Lyon area as a neighbouring region 
thus highlighting the perceived separation of these agglomerations 
from Lyon. This is based on the fear of Lyon dominating these 
agglomerations as regional capital. This fear of domination by Lyon is 
one of the reasons cited for establishing, at least on paper, this Alpine 
Axis.
One of the concrete results of the Apine Axis, according to its 
supporters, is the 2,000 hectares technology development site on the
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Savoie-Isere border at Montmelian-Pontcharra (Laurencin, 1991).
This site is designed to improve political and economic contact 
between these two departements and to help illustrate that the 
Alpine Axis is more than a policy document. However, these alpine 
areas have no history of cooperation in designing a coherent economic 
space. The Montmelian-Pontcharra project is a useful addition to the 
economy of this area but is not the beginning of a major coordinated 
alpine economic space. The Alpine Axis is a secondary one and is 
little more than individual urban enclaves linked by an autoroute. 
This does not constitute an axis nor a coordinated economic space. It 
is not possible to manipulate economic development and social 
identities like images regardless of the political ambition involved.
The Alpine Axis represents neither true economic nor cultural 
linkages. These are individual cities with individual mandates and 
identities, and these cities look towards Lyon, and Paris, for higher 
level economic and cultural functions (Kukawka, 1992).
Linkages between Lyon and each individual alpine 
agglomeration, Grenoble, Annecy and Chambery, are stronger than the 
linkages between the individual alpine agglomerations. For example, 
Chambery is substantially more dependent on Lyon politically, 
culturally and economically than it is on its alpine neighbours. These 
alpine cities control only the space that corresponds with their 
administrative functions; there is no greater spatial influence nor 
political control as opposed to Lyon which does in fact have a regional 
function outside of its immediate administrative area. Lyon has 
greater linkages with these cities than they have with each other, but 
these agglomerations also maintain strong ties with Paris.
Lyon, being the region's industrial, cultural and communication 
capital, has major linkages with all cities in the region. Lyon's 
influence is strongest in the Rhone corridor, but this influence also 
extends to the Alpine Axis and to the cities to the south and west. 
Within the greater context of Europe, the communication axis of the 
Rhone/Saone corridors are far more important than that of the Alpine 
Axis and thus provides more advantage to Lyon than the Alpine Axis 
provides to the alpine agglomerations.
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L'Axe Alpin is not a credible rival to Lyon or La Voie Dauphine 
as the major axis of the region. L'Axe Alpin has limited functional 
integration on both the economic and political levels. The fact that 
each member of l'Axe Alpine has closer ties with Lyon than with each 
other, the palpable lack of interest by Geneva and the priority given 
to La Voie Dauphine by Grenoble and the region leave l'Axe Alpine as 
more of a planners fantasy than a functional axis. Also, the premise 
that Lyon is a threat to these alpine agglomerations is a centrifugal 
force on the region and will therefore gain little support by any 
official government or regional authority.
9.24 GENEVA
The issue of Geneva must be examined when discussing the 
urban relationships of the Rhone-Alpes Region. Geneva is the driving 
economic force behind the above average demographic growth of the 
French-Geneva area centred around Annemasse. Geneva also shares 
150 kilometres of frontier with the Rhone-Alpes and only 6 
kilometres with the rest of Switzerland. This long frontier and 
economic relationship provides the basis for linkages and cooperation. 
However, these linkages and cooperation extend only to those areas of 
interest to Geneva, specifically the status of the 26,000 transfrontier 
workers (Kukawka, 1989).
However, Geneva still remains a polarized space which is 
relatively isolated from the Rhone-Alpes. The rejection by Swiss 
voters for proceeding towards eventual membership in the European 
Community has the potential to strain the traditional frontier 
relationship between the two regions. The split between European 
Community countries and those not in the European Community could 
pose problems in the transfrontier movement of goods, services and 
perhaps even workers. This would seriously retard economic growth 
on both sides of this frontier.
Geneva enjoys direct autoroute access with the towns of the 
Alpine Axis and the Lyon-Geneva autoroute has now been fully 
completed. Historically, it is of interest that the Lyon-Geneva 
autoroute was completed years after the Alpine autoroute linking
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Geneva with Grenoble via Annecy and Chambery. This is another 
example of the lack of contact and relations between Geneva and 
Lyon. Geneva is also relatively isolated from the major French rail 
lines. There is an incredible lack of even slow commuter trains 
between the Rhone-Alpes and Geneva as compared with the 
numerous links that exist between Geneva and the rest of Switzerland 
or between the cities of the Rhone-Alpes. For example, there is no 
train from Geneva to Annecy, Chambery or Grenoble after 5pm during 
weekdays. Nor are there more than four trains daily between Lyon 
and Geneva. The Lyon-Geneva train takes almost as long as the Lyon- 
Paris TGV. Geneva is interested in a TGV line to Paris but shows little 
enthusiasm for one into the Rhone-Alpes except as a linking spur with 
the future Lyon-Turin line; probably connecting at Chambery. The 
contact between Lyon and Geneva remains physically and 
economically limited even with the completion of the autoroute link.
Geneva, being already an "International City" and outside of 
France, looks more towards Paris than to any regional city, especially 
those smaller ones in the Alpine furrow. Geneva is positioned outside 
the surrounding French area by an international frontier as well as a 
different history and culture. There has been more rivalry between 
the Haute-Savoie/French and Geneva than there has been cooperation. 
Lyon has some limited economic common cause with Geneva but the 
contact is limited (Kukawka, 1992).
The relationship between Lyon and Geneva is further 
complicated by the proximity and competition that exists between 
Lyon-Satolas and Geneva-Cointrin International Airports. Geneva- 
Cointrin is, without doubt, more of an international airport than Lyon- 
Satolas, with numerous direct connections throughout Europe, Asia, 
Africa and the Americas. Geneva-Cointrin handles twice the number 
of passengers a year as Lyon-Satolas and four times the amount of 
cargo traffic.
Having competing international airports within 100 kilometres 
of one another leads to certain tensions. Certain French government 
planners (Rapport Carriere, 1988.) assert that Geneva-Cointrin and 
Lyon-Satolas should combine resources to produce a single
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international air platform. However, contrary to French opinion, 
Geneva-Cointrin has not yet reached saturation and, if it does in 
future, the Swiss authorities are showing a stronger preference to 
form a linkage with Bale-Mulhouse Airport which is directly on the 
Swiss/French frontier and well served by Swiss rail and autoroutes. 
The fact that Geneva-Cointrin airport overshadows Lyon-Satolas 
cannot be allowed to dictate the tone or focus of the relationship 
between Lyon and Geneva.
The relationship between Lyon and Geneva is relatively 
dormant. Lyon's varied industrial and manufacturing base along with 
Geneva's financial higher services should provide for a 
complementary relationship. Currently, the relationship between the 
two agglomerations is neither complementary nor competitive, rather 
it does not exist to any real extent. Geneva is focused on Paris and the 
international arena rather than on its immediate urban neighbour.
9.25 ROVALTAIN
Within the context of smaller towns and communes it is possible 
to achieve a limited degree of cooperation under favourable 
circumstances. This is possible provided these smaller towns and 
communes limit their scope of operation to specific and limited 
objectives on issues where they share similar and vested interests. 
One example of this initiative designed to promote local economic and 
political cooperation is ROVALTAIN (Figure 9.2).
In 1989, Romans, Valence, Tain l'Hermitage and 20 other minor 
communes joined together and formed ROVALTAIN. This association 
is charged with organizing and coordinating major projects such as 
University development, future TGV routes and industrial 
construction. There have been encouraging signs of successful 
cooperation such as agreement on the future route of the TGV line 
through Valence and the establishment of a University centre for the 
area in Valence. Much of the success of ROVALTAIN stems from the 
simple nature of the association in that its mandate covers only major 
projects of mutual interest (Kukakwa, 1989).
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ROVALTAIN, on a small scale, illustrates that it is possible to 
build non-political networks at first that are designed to increase the 
linkages and coordination between cities. University networks, 
technopoles, hospitals, industrial construction and cultural events all 
help in establishing the foundation for further cooperation and the 
possibility of constructing a political urban network. On a larger scale 
outside Rhone-Alpes, the cities of Montpellier and Nimes buried 
historical differences and have shown remarkable success in 
cooperating on social, cultural, economic and even some political 
affairs. Rhone-Alpes needs a similar functioning network of cities on 
a larger regional scale to avoid the serious handicap of overlapping 
functions, lack of cooperation and general mutual apathy if the region 
and Lyon are to attain their international ambitions.
9.26 LA REGION URBAINE DE LYON
La Region Urbaine de Lyon (RUL) is the true representation of 
the limits of the Lyon agglomeration according to the politicians and 
planners of Lyon (Chapter Four). RUL is an established semi-official 
agency that provides certain planning and administrative functions. 
The spatial dimensions of the RUL are large and thereby provide 
another example of an expanded urban linkage that would facilitate 
inter-urban cooperation. The RUL extends almost to St. Etienne in the 
south and includes the Saone valley north to the regional boundary. 
The RUL also includes the industrial Plaine de TAin and the newtown 
development pole of Satolas/lTsle d'Abeau. This area has a 
population of almost two million and includes the majority of the 
economically dynamic areas in the region (Laurencin, 1990).
One problem with the RUL is that in spans four departements 
(Rhone, Isere, Loire and Ain) and would place substantial control of 
portions of these departements in the hands of the planners in Lyon.
It would greatly benefit Lyon to be in a position to directly impact the 
RUL; however, the other political entities involved are reluctant to 
cede any sovereignty to Lyon. The RUL is a logical recognition of 
Lyon's official zone of influence and would greatly facilitate planning 
matters. In the short term the RUL will continue to play a minor 
organizational role but the potential for the RUL in the medium to
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long-term is substantial. The gathering of this large and important 
area under a single administrative umbrella is attractive and could in 
time become more of a reality.
9 .3  REGIONAL INTEGRATION
The question of internal integration of the Rhone-Alpes urban 
network is a critical one. The problems of cooperation and cohesion 
between the major agglomerations of the region have been examined. 
A brief discussion on two other problems effecting regional 
integration need to be considered to complete the examination. First, 
the problems of cooperation within an agglomeration threaten to 
divide and weaken the agglomeration and compromise its ambitions. 
Second, the economic disparity between areas within the region 
threaten to undermine the whole process of regional integration and 
future development. These problems need to be examined to 
effectively analyze the true potential for regional cooperation that will 
help Lyon in its ambitions and provide the region with a foundation to 
compete in the post-1993 Europe (Laurencin, 1990).
9 .3 1  INTRA-URBAN COOPERATION
The COURLY is a good example of municipal cooperation. The 
COURLY, the 55 communes of Lyon and its immediate hinterland, 
enables Lyon to form a relatively cohesive and coordinated strategy. 
The LYON 2010 plan would be an example of the level of cooperation 
that such a municipal organization can help establish. The COURLY is 
also active in attempting to reduce or reverse the habitual east-west 
economic split within the Lyon agglomeration. This form of greater 
municipal cooperation at an official level is mandatory for a city such 
as Lyon to establish international status.
Unfortunately, both Grenoble (with 32 communes) and St. 
Etienne (with 15 communes) were forced to abandon projects 
designed to forge closer municipal links, along the same lines as the 
COURLY, in 1990. One of the reasons for the collapse of these projects 
were the vast differences in tax rates. For example, in Grenoble, 
habitation tax varied from 3% to 16% and professional taxes varied
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from 8% to 21% depending on the commune. This difference in 
revenue-gathering was a major cause in the failure of these 
agglomerations to reach a municipal agreement. Other reasons 
included different political agendas, egos and the usual difficulties 
associated with coordinating numerous overlapping administrative 
authorities. Even without notable political cleavages, the different 
objectives between suburbs and city centres, and different communes 
within agglomerations, help construct serious barriers to future inter- 
urban cooperation within the region. This represents a serious 
danger, if communes within the same agglomeration cannot find 
common cause to cooperate, the greater concept of inter-regional 
urban cooperation would appear remote.
This is one of the unfortunate results of decentralization within 
the framework of overlapping administrative units. An increase in 
local conflicts, rivalries and lack of direction and cooperation are 
visible in many agglomerations. The mosaic of overlapping projects, 
administrative functions, egos and financial controls has led to serious 
intra-urban difficulties. This, in the context of the Rhone-Alpes 
Region, places large obstacles in the path of the urban cooperation at 
the regional level needed to effectively integrate the region and help 
promote both the region’s and Lyon's international ambitions.
9.32 REGIONAL ECONOMIC DISPARITY
The risk of the Rhone-Alpes Region becoming fractured along 
spatial/economic fault lines is serious. This would produce severe 
negative consequences for the region as a whole and retard Lyon's 
international ambitions. One example of this potential fracture is the 
division of the region's unemployment rate. The three departements 
of Loire, Drome and Ardeche are not only the departements facing the 
greatest demographic and spatial challenges, being located in the 
region's peripheral south-west area, but also suffer substantially 
higher unemployment rates than the other departements in the 
region (Figure 9.3).
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In 1992, the unemployment rate was 11.9% in Drome, 11.3% in 
Loire and 9.6% in Ardeche. These unemployment rates are 
substantially higher than those in the north-east of the region. The 
1992 unemployment rate was 7.2% in Ain, 8.2% in Haute-Savoie and 
8.9% in Savoie. These unemployment figures reflect the economic 
split in the region between the north-east and the south-west. It is 
some small consolation for the departements in the south-west that 
the unemployment rate is currently rising faster in the north-east but 
the sustained double digit unemployment figures in the south-west 
will cause long-term social and economic problems for the region as a 
whole if left unresolved.
This form of spatial economic division in the region is a threat to 
the future of the whole region. To compete effectively in the future 
the Rhone-Alpes cannot afford to be split between the prosperous 
north-east and the backwards south-west. This would place a serious 
social and economic strain on the region. This split will deflect 
attention and finances from the development of Lyon and the region, 
especially during the current difficult economic climate. This could 
stall or seriously retard needed infrastructural and economic 
investment.
9.4 FUTURE SCENARIOS
There are a limitless number of scenarios for the future of inter­
regional urban cooperation in the Rhone-Alpes. However, most 
arguments centre around either the centrifugal scenario or the 
centripetal scenario. The first, with the greatest negative potential for 
the region’s urban agglomerations, envisages the major 
agglomerations forming independent links with other agglomerations 
outside the region at the expense of internal relationships. Examples 
would be Grenoble with Turin or a further strengthening of the 
Annecy-Geneva relationship. Lyon would then, with St. Etienne, 
attempt to forge an international identity independent of the region 
and its rival agglomerations.
The second scenario, the centripetal one, optimistically 
envisages a greater degree of regional urban integration. In this
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scenario, the agglomerations of the region acknowledge that they have 
more to gain from cooperation than competition. Lyon would be 
accepted as the regional capital within a cooperative framework with 
the other agglomerations. This would promote the synergy and 
critical mass needed to create a beneficial and international 
environment as advanced in the Soldatos model.
A third scenario, potentially more realistic, combines elements 
from the first two. Lyon becomes the functional capital of the Rhone- 
Alpes but lacks the critical mass of high-level services and specialized 
infrastructure needed to promote Lyon's drive for regional and 
international status. Paris, at the same time, by increasing its 
monopoly on such higher services, reinforces its role as a competing 
functional capital of the region. This advantageously masks the 
excessive internal regional differences between agglomerations. 
However, the dominance of Paris links the regions agglomerations to 
Paris instead of permitting Lyon to develop as the functional capital of 
the region.
The most likely scenario in the short to medium-time frame is a 
combination of the previous three. Lyon, despite being deprived of 
various high-level service functions by Paris, will continue to 
consolidate its position as regional capital through its central location 
and economic, political and cultural weight. A closer degree of inter- 
urban cooperation will be established within the region but will not 
completely overcome the historical political and economic 
independence of the various regional agglomerations nor will it 
overcome the current economic problems faced by the country as a 
whole.
9.5 SUMMARY
The poly-nuclear urban structure requires three elements to be 
credible as a functional association: a consensus and political will to 
share identity, that transport connections are sufficient to overcome 
the friction of distance between the centres and that the central city 
in the system be universally regarded as the "capital". These three
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elements exist to a significant degree in the context of Lyon and the 
Rhone-Alpes Region (Tesse, 1989).
The official regional plan signifies a consensus and political will 
to increase the integration between Lyon and the other major 
agglomerations in the region, especially Grenoble. This coincides with 
Lyon's desire to use the other agglomerations in the region to increase 
its critical mass and international status. The transport connections 
between Lyon and the other agglomerations in the region are 
exceptional. Lyon is connected to the region's other agglomerations 
by autoroute which places these agglomerations within close 
functional proximity to Lyon. This proximity and transport 
infrastructure constitute sufficient transport connections to overcome 
any friction of distance.
Finally, it is becoming increasingly clear that Lyon is the 
accepted capital of Rhone-Alpes. The only true competitor for that 
position is Paris. The infrastructure of Lyon coupled with its 
economic, political and cultural weight combine to provide Lyon the 
necessary strength to establish itself as the central city in the region. 
The problems that remain are the national dominance of Paris and the 
remaining fear of the alpine cities of being dominated by Lyon. These 
two problems are hindering the implementation of closer urban 
linkages in Rhone-Alpes.
The regional plan advocates, as a cornerstone of its official 
policy, an enhancement of Lyon's position as regional capital and a 
closer integration of Lyon with the region's other major 
agglomerations. This provides two major advantages. As an explicit 
political objective expressed at the level of government immediately 
below the State, it may help overcome political rivalries that exist at 
the lower tiers of departement, commune and city government. 
Secondly, this objective may help unlock the large amount of public 
funding necessary to achieve greater regional integration.
Specifically, it could underpin the region's efforts in the negotiation of 
funding under the "Plan Contrat" arrangements with the State.
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This chapter has examined exclusively internal dynamics which 
might contribute towards raising Lyon’s international status. This 
internal dynamic and its affects can now be compared with external 
international initiatives which have been taken by Lyon and the 
Rhone-Alpes Region.
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CHAPTER TEN 
LYON'S INTERNATIONAL LINKAGES
Chapter Nine examined the role of Lyon within the urban 
network of the Rhone-Alpes, the attempts to promote various urban 
linkages and the ability of Lyon to utilize its position within the 
regional urban network to promote its international ambitions and 
increase its critical mass. Chapter Nine discussed the internal 
dynamic of Lyon's attempt to expand its status through exercising its 
role as regional capital and position at the top of the Rhone-Alpes 
urban hierarchy. Chapter Ten will therefore focus more upon the 
Rhone-Alpes Region and its links with other regions and organizations 
outside France. This chapter will discuss the status of regions within 
the framework of the European Community, their position concerning 
decentralization, federalism and their relationship vis-a-vis major 
urban centres. Additionally, Lyon's international agenda, in 
conjunction with the Rhone-Alpes, connected with other European 
regions through such organizations as the "4 Motors policy" and the 
"Mediane Alpine" super-region is examined. Finally, the results of a 
small scale questionnaire concerning the importance of "Europe" and 
Lyon's current and future status as a “Eurocity” will be detailed and 
discussed.
This chapter remains relatively brief reflecting the limited 
number of official and direct international linkages of Lyon and the 
Rhone-Alpes Region. Despite their international ambitions, neither 
have sufficient official and direct international linkages that reflect 
important international status. These links need to be expanded and 
improved if Lyon is to achieve "International City" status.
10.1 A EUROPE OF REGIONS
There is currently much discussion surrounding the concept of a 
"Europe of Regions" (Dunford, 1991; Ardagh, 1990; Beckouche, 1991). 
This is especially popular in the context of the European single 
market, established on January 1, 1993, because of the potential 
emphasis away from national governments towards more European 
and regional responsibilities. Regions are currently viewed as the
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optimum administrative size to effectively restructure local economic 
space to enable improved coordination and linkages on a larger 
European and international scale (Commission of the European 
Community ("Rapid Reports" (Regions), volume 2.1990). Regions can 
be considered the smallest economic unit that is viable in the 
global/local economic structure of the European Community due to the 
increase in trans-national economic functions (Chapter Eight).
The Rhone-Alpes is the second most populated, largest and 
economically-advantaged region in France, situated on an important 
north-south transportation corridor and sharing international borders 
with Switzerland and Italy. Rhone-Alpes has justifiable European 
ambitions that pivot around its central commercial location, increasing 
trade with other European regions and formal linkages with such 
regions. These, and other factors previously discussed, as developed, 
will help strengthen the economic position and European visibility of 
Lyon ("Regions et l'Europe (Les), l'obligation regionale." Interregions 
No 146, Janvier 1992).
Despite the current discussions surrounding the status of the 
region in Europe, the regions have no form of official representation at 
the European Community in Brussels; only the twelve member states 
have official representation. The major problem that the French 
regions have when attempting to deal directly with the European 
Community is the centralism of the French government. One example 
of this occurred on May 14, 1984, when the European Community 
passed a directive stating that the regions of the community needed 
to associate directly with the European Community offices. France 
established a mission headed by a Prefect under the national minister 
of Plan et de FAmenagement du Territoire to handle these direct 
relations between French regions and the European Community. The 
centralism of the French State successfully defeated the whole concept 
of direct regional contact with the European Community by placing 
such contact in the hands of a national government ministry.
The European Community formed the Conseil Consultatif des 
Collectivites Regionales on June 24, 1988. This body was established 
to provide the European Community with the views and opinions of
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the regions on pertinent matters. Realistically though, this is only a 
consultative body, one among many such consultative organizations 
and lobby groups in Brussels, and has no formal authority. If the 
future is truly to be a “Europe of Regions”, major transformations in 
the political landscape of the national governments and the European 
Community are needed. This would essentially involve a federal 
structure for the regions in a European Community with far greater 
administrative powers. Both of these objectives would be 
accomplished at the political expense of the nation-state. This is not a 
short or medium-range reality and therefore the international 
political mandate of the regions, especially in centralized France, will 
remain limited (Drevet, 1991).
One of the major obstacles that the Rhone-Alpes Region needs to 
overcome is the region’s lack of political decision-making power and 
economic independence. Internationalization and decentralization 
must proceed hand-in-hand to produce tangible results. The history 
of centralism in France focused on Paris is centuries old, being a 
logical development of the formulative nation-state/balance of power 
era prior to the recent phenomenon of European integration. Today, 
the advantage lies away from central economic and political control 
towards those countries whose political and economic strengths have 
been dispersed away from a single capital pole to a more regional and 
often federal structure as evidenced by Germany, and now Spain.
This along with the time-space modifications provided through 
advanced technology (TGV, digital telecommunications etc.) have 
served not only to shrink effectively the continent (and individual 
nations) but also provide for greater international regional scale 
linkages.
It has been argued that Europe is departing from the model of 
centralized national bureaucracy and that society, both economically 
and politically, will become increasingly grouped into smaller regional 
spheres with multiple international connections (Drevet, 1991; 
Labasse, 1991). Within this new practical framework, a region would 
need a capital/metropole as a unifying force and counter-balance vis- 
a-vis other regional capitals/metropoles. In Rhone-Alpes, this urban
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centre must be Lyon and it must be accomplished with the active 
cooperation of the region's other agglomerations (Chapters 4 and 9).
Comparing regions from different nations is a difficult task. 
Problems arise when comparing the different relationships between a 
French region, a German land, a Swiss canton and other regional 
structures throughout Western Europe with their national 
governments. The French regions have a much greater dependency 
on the French government than either the German lander or Swiss 
cantons have upon their respective governments. The federal 
structures of Germany and Switzerland provide for far greater 
regional legislative, administrative and judicial powers than are found 
in any French region. Additionally, comparing the financial strength 
of regions from different nations reveals that the French regions 
possess a far smaller budget than those of other European Community 
regions (Chapter 4).
The role of history and tradition is also important in determining 
the operation role of a region. In France, certain regions have a strong 
history of regional identity, including Brittany, Normandy, Alsace, 
Lorraine and Corsica. However, other regions such as the Rhone-Alpes 
have no common history, common tradition or background of 
cooperation. Swiss cantons, many Italian and Spanish regions, or 
British regions such as Scotland and Wales, enjoy a strong sense of 
identity and history that facilitates internal cooperation (Kukakwa, 
1992).
The problems facing regions in France such as Rhone-Alpes is an 
absence of historical identity and a severe lack of political and 
economic independence from Paris. The Rhone-Alpes requires 
increased autonomy in administrative and financial affairs to be able 
to function alongside other European regions. The French State could 
play a major role in restructuring the political landscape to the 
greater advantage of the regions. However, the grasp of Jacobinism is 
easing slowly if at all. With the return of a conservative government 
in April 1993, the role of the French State will remain pervasive in 
France.
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10.2 THE FOUR MOTORS
One of the cornerstones of the Rhone-Alpes Region's international 
agenda is the "4 Motors of Europe" organization. Rhone-Alpes signed 
an agreement of protocol and cooperation on September 9, 1988 with 
Baden-Wiirttemburg, Lombardy and Catalonia (Figure 10.1). These 
four economically prosperous and dynamic European regions agreed 
to increase linkages on a number of levels designed to improve their 
economies and international images (Kukakwa, 1990).
Regional links within the field of higher education have been 
successful because this is one of the few areas where the French 
regions have a political mandate and effective economic resources. 
Therefore, the Rhone-Alpes Region is actively pursuing higher 
education links with its 4 Motors partners. One such example of these 
educational links is the “Multi-regional International Business 
Programme” (MIBP) which includes graduate business programmes in 
the 4 Motors regions together with Wales and Ontario. The overall 
ambition of MIBP is to “...foster closer educational links, promote 
exchanges, academic and research networks, as well as technology 
transfers and industrial co-operation” (MIBP, 1993).
The MIBP consists of an introductory four week seminar held 
every September. The location of this seminar rotates among 
participating institutions and will be held in Lyon in 1993. The focus 
of this seminar is on the relationships between industry and regions, 
the growing role of the regions and the importance of regional policy. 
After this four week seminar the students undertake a one-year 
period of study in a partner institution abroad (MIBP, 1993). Such 
higher educational links are popular in that expenses are relatively 
limited, the regions do not require the government's approval and it 
produces positive exposure on an international scale. Such 
programmes also help establish links between higher education and 
the commercial sector. Commerce and economic development are the 
foundations of the 4 Motors organization and the promotion of such 
useful linkages is an important component of 4 Motors policy.
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A brief examination of certain basic comparative statistics of the 
4 Motors regions will help place Rhone-Alpes, and thus Lyon, in a 
clearer context relative to the other regions.
TABLE 10.1
COMPARISON OF THE 4 MOTORS REGIONS IN 1990
Rhone-Alpes Bad-Wiirt Catalonia Lombardy
Capital Lyon Stuttgart Barcelona Milan
Area-sq km 43,700 35,750 31,930 23,850
Population 5.20 9.25 6.00 8.90
Pop Density 117.0 260.0 188.5 372.6
PIB/Person 
(100 base)
118 122 92 120
Unemployed 8.2% 4.1% 21.6% 6.7%
%< 25 years 37.8% 33.8% 39.1% 34.2%
% Employed 
Agriculture
5.5% 5.0% 7.0% 3.9%
Urban
Structure
•k'k-k-k'k'jrk-k'k-k-k-k ■k-k-k'k-k-jck'k'kie'k'k •k-k’kJck-k-kJck-k-k'k-k ■k-Jck-k'k-k'k'fck'k'k
+1 million 1 0 1 1
100k-1 mil 4 7 3 2
5 Ok-100k 5 13 12 15
10k-50k 36 177 128 62
Source: Dunford, 1991.
Table 10.1 illustrates that although Rhone-Alpes is physically the 
largest region it has the smallest overall population and is at a 
particular disadvantage with regard to population density. Rhone- 
Alpes PIB per capita is on a par with Baden-Wiirttemburg and 
Lombardy and all three are well ahead of Catalonia. Currently, all 
four regions are suffering economically; unemployment is rising and 
companies large and small are being squeezed and face the prospects 
of the 1993 single market with some trepidation. Negative economic 
conditions such as 21.6% unemployment in Catalonia are of greater 
concern to the regional authorities and electorate than the 
development of regional links at the European level. Such difficult
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economic conditions deflate enthusiasm and deflect the concentration 
needed to increase significantly such regional links as represented by 
the 4 Motors organization (Kukakwa, 1988).
One of the major limitations of Rhone-Alpes compared with its 4 
Motors partners is the limited size of its urban structure and the 
previously discussed lack of political and financial decision-making 
powers that are enjoyed by the other regions. Overall however, 
Rhone-Alpes fits well with the other regions of the "4 Motors of 
Europe" and, despite certain disadvantages, belongs in such a 
grouping.
The "4 Motors of Europe" is not the only regional linkage 
organization in Europe. Another example of such a regional linkage 
within the European Community is entitled "Ouverture". Ouverture is 
funded by the European Community Commission for Regional Policy 
and is responsible for establishing linkages between regions in the 
European Community and Europe as a whole (The Strathclyder, March 
1993).
Ouverture was established in 1991 and is managed by four 
European Community regions: Asturias, Piedmont, Saarland and 
Strathclyde. Ouverture is one of two European Community-sponsored 
programmes on international development that has headquarters 
outside Brussels. The headquarters for Ouverture is in Glasgow, the 
capital of the Strathclyde region in Scotland (Ouverture. The 
Strathclyder, March 1993).
There are two important differences between Ouverture and the 
4 Motors organizations. First, Ouverture is financially supported by 
the European Community Commission for Regional Policy thus 
providing an official European framework for its operations.
Secondly, Ouverture has a physical headquarters in Glasgow as 
opposed to the 4 Motors which has no official independent 
headquarters. The 4 Motors organization is important in that it 
establishes broad linkages between four important regions within the 
European Community. However, the 4 Motors lacks the official
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European Community connection and the presence of a full-time office 
and headquarters devoted to its agenda.
The 4 Motors policy, although still in the early stages of 
development, has succeeded in developing three significant elements 
that will help Lyon's international ambitions. The first of these is the 
symbolism of the 4 Motors organization. If the French government 
fails to foster further regional international linkages then the Rhone- 
Alpes has illustrated both the will and ability to promote its own 
regional international linkages without the aid or participation of the 
French government.
The second element, closely linked to the first, is that the 4 
Motors is a spontaneous organization. The 4 Motors was not inspired 
or created by the national government but rather through 
spontaneous forces within the Rhone-Alpes and its partners. This 
illustrates the internal international aspirations of Lyon and the 
Rhone-Alpes as opposed to these aspirations being created outside the 
region by the national government. Significantly, this internal 
international aspiration is driven by the private commercial sector of 
the region through the C.C.I.L. and the regional Chamber of Commerce. 
The major function of such international linkages is greater economic 
opportunity therefore the active participation of such commercially 
orientated organizations is crucial.
Finally, the lack of official government bureaucracy at both the 
State and European Community level could have a positive influence. 
This could allow the 4 Motors organization to develop without certain 
bureaucratic constraints. The 4 Motors will posses its own dynamism 
provided by groups and organizations that operate in the real 
commercial world. This provides the 4 Motors with greater flexibility 
and opportunity while allowing it to remain unconstrained by political 
dogma and the ebbs and flows of changes in national governments as 
currently being witnessed in both France and, to a dramatic degree, in 
Italy. Significantly, the 4 Motors provides a direct opportunity for the 
private sector to participate in an international structure of 
cooperation.
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Currently, it is too early to comment on the success of the 4 
Motors organization. However, this is a new model of economic and 
political international linkages at the regional level that directly 
impacts both Lyon's and the region’s drive towards a greater 
European role and therefore cannot be dismissed as irrelevant.
An additional point of interest is that the Rhone-Alpes Region has 
established this relationship with other major European regions but 
has yet to establish any formal relationship with the Canton of 
Geneva. Spatially, it would be logical for the Rhone-Alpes and Geneva 
to establish a formal relationship, but this has not happened. This is 
yet another indication of the apparent indifference in the relationship 
between these two neighbours.
10.3 EUROPE MEDIANE ALPINE
Another European spatial concept is the “Europe Mediane Alpine” 
(Figure 10.2). This area stretches from Lyon to Vienna and includes 
Geneva, Bern, Zurich, Munich, Innsbruck and Salzburg to the north 
and Turin, Milan, Venice and Trieste to the south (Zagreb currently 
has more pressing problems). There is no formal protocol or 
organization to represent this spatial concept, rather, it is considered 
one of the five "Super-Regions" of Europe: the Europe of Capitals and 
Conurbations of the North-West, the Atlantic Arc, Mediterranean 
Europe, East and South East Europe and the centrally located Mediane 
Alpine (Kukakwa, 1992).
The zone Mediane Alpine is at present a theoretical construct. 
Unlike the 4 Motors, there is no organization basis to the zone 
Mediane Alpine and such organization would prove difficult given the 
size of the area and the number of countries involved both within and 
outside the European Community. Therefore, this is a very long range 
concept in political terms yet significant in economic terms. The 
Mediane Alpine identifies a zone which is growing in importance and 
Lyon is well positioned as a connector between the Mediane Alpine 
and the other "Super-Regions". Given its position at the edge of the 
Mediane Alpine it is doubtful that Lyon would play a directional role 
in this zone, however, as the only major French city integrated within
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FIGURE 10.2 
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this zone and given its connector position, Lyon has the potential to 
become a significant actor in the Mediane Alpine. Over time, this 
could reinforce Lyon's eastward connections and help compensate for 
Lyon's lack of hinterland to the west while complementing Lyon's 
traditionally strong north-south role.
Other external connections pursued by the Rhone-Alpes Region 
include the establishment of a delegation at the European Community 
Headquarters in Brussels on June 6, 1990. The mission of this 
delegation is to lobby and promote the interests of the region. 
Additionally, ADERLY with its mandate to promote Lyon as a 
European business centre and "International City", has established an 
office in Lyon and at the World Trade Centre in New York. Lyon is 
also linked with the city of St. Louis in the United States but this 
"twinning" provides little more than limited exchanges and good press 
for both cities.
The Rhone-Alpes Region currently has few official links with 
other regions and official organizations outside France. If the regions 
are indeed to play an increasing role of importance in Europe, the 
Rhone-Alpes must enhance its visibility and connections outside 
France. The "4 Motors of Europe" regional affiliation is a strong 
beginning for the Rhone-Alpes. Though the 4 Motors is in its early 
stages, the current exchanges and commercial potential for greater 
cooperation in all fields in the future is significant.
Lyon, as regional capital, has an important role to play in the 
future development of the region's external connections. This will in 
turn help bolster Lyon's own international ambitions through the 
vehicle of the region. At present, the Rhone-Alpes needs to expand its 
official and informal connections with other regions and organizations 
in Europe. This will not only help enhance its international image but 
will economically promote commerce and corporate cooperation in a 
trans-frontier manner. This will allow both the region and Lyon to 
participate on the European and international stage to a greater extent 
and help fulfil their international ambitions.
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10 .4  ATTITUDES TO LYON'S INTERNATIONAL STATUS - 
A STUDENT QUESTIONNAIRE
Chapters Nine and Ten have attempted to explore Lyon's formal 
regional and international connections. In both instances it was clear 
that these processes are at an early stage of development. For such 
linkages to develop it is obvious that there should exist public 
awareness of such efforts and general endorsement of Lyon's 
ambition to enhance its European status. Ideally, the strength of this 
awareness would have been tested by a wide-ranging survey of 
opinion. In practice, to attempt a significant opinion survey would be 
an undertaking well beyond the logistical possibilities of this project. 
Moreover, it is clear from earlier chapters that in certain key sectors; 
industry, transport, business and university research for example, the 
leaders of decision-making are acutely aware of the importance of 
Europe to Lyon's future. Additionally, reference to the results of the 
Maastricht Referendum indicated that a strong majority (60%) of the 
electorate of Lyon share this opinion. A critical element, given the 
long-range scale of European construction, is the view of young well- 
educated persons who will constitute the decision-makers and 
opinion-formers of the near-future. Accordingly, fieldwork in Lyon 
was completed by a small scale questionnaire of attitudes to Lyon's 
international status on the part of two distinct groups of students 
chosen from the Ecole Superieur de Commerce de Lyon (ESC) and from 
the Universite de Lyon III.
The former institution was selected as being representative of 
young persons being trained for employment as “cadres” in the fields 
of business, industry and administration. Moreover, through its 
predominantly private sector “Grand Ecole” status, the ESC attracts 
students from a national and international catchment, most of whom 
will eventually find employment away from Lyon. In the case of the 
Universite de Lyon III, the catchment is more specifically local and 
regional. Most of these students will aspire to gain employment in the 
local area in a wide range of occupations with the liberal professions 
predominating. A class of geography students was selected in the 
belief that a solid local knowledge and spatial awareness might exist. 
Both questionnaires were administered in classroom conditions with a
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contextual introduction but no other prompting. The questionnaire 
used (Appendix 1) varied only slightly, to suit the specific nature of 
the group. It is emphasised that the results represent simply a 
snapshot picture and not a rigorous survey. Nevertheless, the 
questionnaire proved illuminating and some of the more salient 
results merit further discussion.
In this section, responses to the 20 questions will be briefly 
examined to demonstrate some broad and general opinions derived 
from these different groups. The first two questions were asked to 
determine the permanent residence of the respondent and the reason 
that they chose to matriculate at that particular institution. This 
placed the respondents in a basic context of background and ambition.
Question 3 asked: All things being equal (salary, job interest etc.) 
would you consider working in Lyon? Why or why not? This 
question attempted to determine the overall level of attraction of 
Lyon. The overwhelming majority of the local students from the 
Universite de Lyon II stated that they would remain in Lyon. The 
non-local ESC students also displayed an attraction to Lyon with a 
clear majority stating that, given certain conditions, they could 
envision themselves working in Lyon. Most cited the proximity to the 
Alps and Paris, along with the quality of life as the most compelling 
reasons to remain in Lyon.
Question 18 asked the opposite question: Excluding personal 
reasons (family etc.) what would you see as the main reason for NOT 
working in Lyon? The responses from both groups included the usual 
complaints of big city living: pollution, traffic, peripheral housing 
estates and the daily stress of urban existence. Question 16; What 
aspects of Lyon's “image” do you see as being detrimental at a 
European scale? provoked a similar variety of answers on the 
problems of the urban environment. It is debatable if these negative 
responses can be fairly directed at only Lyon or whether they 
represent an inescapable part of urban living.
Question 4 asked: How important to you is European integration 
in: 1) career terms and 2) in principle. The responses were evenly
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divided between "Very" and "Somewhat" with a stronger approval of 
the principle of European integration. Only a handful viewed 
European integration as "Not at all" important. For a city that has 
strong European objectives, having a general level of personal support 
from the respondents concerning the concept of European integration 
is an encouraging indication.
Question 5 asked: Name the cities in France which you consider 
close to attaining "Eurocity" status, (excluding Paris). In both groups 
Lyon and Strasbourg were near unanimous selections. After these 
two cities, there was a substantial mix of opinions with no one city 
being clearly established as a potential "Eurocity" in the same class as 
Lyon and Strasbourg.
Questions 6,7,8 and 9 were designed to discern the respondents 
views on what Lyon's strengths and weaknesses are on a European 
scale. Not surprisingly the picture gathered from these questions is 
that Lyon possesses a first class location and transportation 
infrastructure but remains a provincial city dominated by Paris with 
few European scale institutions with the exception of Interpol. There 
was little difference in the responses between the two groups.
Question 10 asked: Do you consider Geneva to have a higher 
ranking as a "Eurocity" than Lyon? Why? The respondents at ESC 
were near unanimous in declaring Geneva a higher ranking "Eurocity" 
than Lyon. The financial service sector and international 
organizations were the most frequently cited reasons. However, the 
local students at Lyon III were more impressed with Lyon’s relative 
position. Approximately 30% cited Lyon as being more of a "Eurocity" 
stating that Lyon's size, industrial strength and E.C. membership 
counterbalanced Geneva's other advantages. Still, the majority judged 
Geneva to have a higher ranking as a "Eurocity" than Lyon.
Question 11 asked: Do you consider Grenoble as a rival to Lyon or 
complementary to Lyon? The responses to this question were almost 
evenly divided in both groups. Answers ranged from distinct rival to 
regional partner. In some small way this accurately represents the 
opinions of the relevant civic leaders: dichotomous.
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Question 12 asked: Are you aware of the "Quarte Moteurs" policy? 
Explain. At ESC, 4 students had some idea of the 4 Motors policy but 
none could effectively explain its function nor identify all four 
members. Considering that the 4 Motors is heavily promoted by the 
C.C.I.L., which operates ESC, this is an indication that the 4 Motors 
policy is not receiving widespread exposure among the students who 
could be most expected to encounter this programme. None of the 35 
respondents at Lyon III had the faintest idea of what the 4 Motors 
policy represented. This is a serious problem for this policy and 
illustrates that Lyon and the region are not effectively promoting the 
policy to even an educated audience that will be responsible for 
supporting and pursuing this policy in the future.
Question 13 asked: Do you consider that the TGV has improved 
Lyon's status as a uEurocity” or made Lyon more dependent on Paris? 
Regardless of how this question was answered the meaning was 
identical. Either the TGV has improved Lyon's status because it is 
closer to Paris or has increased Lyon's dependence on Paris for the 
exact same reasons. Regardless, the unanimous consensus is that the 
TGV has increased Lyon's dependence on Paris, which was perceived 
by some as positive.
Questions 14, 15 and 19 were designed to discern the awareness 
of the respondents on a number of local issues concerning Lyon's 
European status. Nobody in either group could name a local (Rhone) 
European Member of Parliament (Question 14) and very few 
respondents in either group, especially the local students, could 
accurately name two international/multi-national corporations located 
in Lyon (Question 19).
Question 17 asked: How important do you consider it is that Lyon 
should aspire to "Eurocity" status. The response options were, similar 
to question 5, "Very", "Somewhat" or "Not at all". The responses of 
both groups were almost even divided between "Very1 and 
"Somewhat" with only two respondents stating "Not at all". Overall, 
this response is positive for Lyon in that there is not a negative or 
lethargic attitude to the question of its European ambitions. This
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represents a degree of public support among these students for Lyon’s 
European agenda.
The last question to be examined, question 20 asked: Finally, do 
you consider Lyon to be:
1) an existing "Eurocity".
2) a potential "Eurocity".
3) a purely French city.
The clear majority placed Lyon in the second category, that of a 
potential "Eurocity”. An even number placed Lyon in either the first 
or the third category but overall, unsurprisingly, Lyon is considered 
by these respondents to be a potential "Eurocity".
The questionnaire, though small in survey size, did illustrate 
interesting perceptions. Lyon and Strasbourg were clearly the French 
cities judged closest to having attained "Eurocity" status. Geneva was 
viewed as more of a "Eurocity" but the local students also found 
reasons to rank Lyon over Geneva, most of whom also agreed that 
Lyon was a potential "Eurocity". The degree of personal and 
professional support for the concept of European integration is 
another short and long-term positive indicator for Lyon's European 
ambitions.
A survey sample of this size cannot draw any definite 
conclusions, nor should it make the effort. However, that these 
students in higher education broadly support Lyon's European 
ambitions and the overall concept of European integration bodes well 
for Lyon in the future. It would be of great concern if the young and 
educated of Lyon displayed a negative attitude towards Lyon's future 
European agenda and the concept of "Europe".
10.5 SUMMARY
The advantages to Lyon of greater direct international linkages, 
either on its own or through the region, are commercial and political. 
Greater direct international linkages will facilitate trade, research and 
development links, foster a degree of political autonomy and allow 
Lyon and the Rhone-Alpes to expand their functions at both the
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domestic and trans-national scale. The extension of Lyon and the 
region through these direct international linkages also serves to 
enhance the critical mass of Lyon which will further improve its 
European position and economic situation.
The ultimate objective of these direct international linkages is 
improved commercial activity between the participating 
cities/regions. The support of the C.C.I.L. and private industry in the 
4 Motors organization is indicative of the economic desirability of such 
links. Lyon and Rhone-Alpes need to expand their direct 
international links at both the formal and informal level to establish a 
true network of such conections. This will, if realized in the near 
future, greatly enhance Lyon's international position.
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CONCLUSION
"The primacy of Paris inhibits the regional sphere of activity of 
second-ranking French cities. Lyon is particularly disadvantaged in that 
to the west lies the low population density Massif Central, to the south is 
the city-port of Marseille with direct international maritime connections, 
to the east, Grenoble is a dynamic and, to some extent, rival pole while to 
the north-east Geneva has a well-established international role. To 
combat the primacy of Paris, and the competition of neighbouring cities, 
Lyon is justifiably attempting to develop an international and trans­
national role to enhance its economic, political and demographic base".
The objective of this thesis, as stated in the introduction, is to test 
the above hypothesis through reference to objective empirical data and 
subjective qualitative methods. Therefore, restating the summaries of 
the previous ten chapters would be of little relevance at this juncture. It 
is preferable to re-evaluate the effectiveness of the Soldatos model, the 
DATAR/RECLUS project and the LYON 2010 urban planning scheme in 
determining the nature of the current situation of Lyon. This will 
establish their utility as tools to influence and predict Lyon’s future and 
establish possible relevant applications to other agglomerations. This 
leads to general conclusions including some issues unresolved by this 
thesis but which merit further research.
C.l THE SOLDATOS MODEL
This thesis has utilized the Soldatos model as the theoretical 
framework upon which to discuss the concept of an "International City" 
and to ascertain where Lyon ranks vis-a-vis specific criteria. However, 
this theoretical model needs to be seriously examined. One of the biggest 
single factors in determining Lyon's status is that it is a French city. The 
historical, economic and social forces that have shaped France have 
substantially determined Lyon's current situation. The dominance of 
Paris, the centralisation of the French state and the system of local 
administration are all unique to France and therefore to Lyon. The 
significance of the current economic slowdown is also important in that it
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will impact the speed and effectiveness of Lyon’s efforts. The Soldatos 
model fails to reflect the implications of changing economic conditions, 
which perpetually exist, especially in the context of the current global 
economy. Similarly, the impact of current events, be they local politics 
or the restructuring of Eastern Europe, cannot be accurately represented 
in the Soldatos model nor in fact are they considered.
The Soldatos model is descriptive of a generic World City. World 
Cities such as London, Paris, New York and Tokyo share the criteria used 
by the Soldatos model to an advanced degree. However, the cities of 
Tokyo and Paris are vastly different. These differences cannot be 
accurately reflected in a model such as that espoused by Soldatos. The 
focus of this model, being on specific semi-qualitative criteria, ignores 
the important social and cultural realities of the situation.
Additionally, the criteria associated with a World City and those 
applicable to a regional or European-scale city are significantly different. 
It is impossible to apply the same criteria, regardless of minor 
differences in degree, to a city in the position of Lyon as compared with 
Paris. Every city, by definition, possesses certain more sophisticated 
services and provides specific services to its inhabitants both in the city 
and the immediate hinterland. The degree and scale of these services 
vary depending on a vast number of factors.
The concept of critical mass remains useful and of undeniable 
importance to the status and success of any city. The problem is to 
define at what points thresholds of critical mass are situated on the scale 
from regional to national to international city.
The Soldatos model, though flawed, provides the fundamental 
concepts of what a city requires and operates as a measuring stick 
against which Lyon and any other city can be broadly judged. The 
Soldatos analysis is perhaps better applied post hoc, i.e. descriptive of 
what a given city has achieved, rather than as a model pathway to the 
achievement of international status at some undefined point in the 
future. Nevertheless, the Soldatos model has had value to this study in a
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nominative sense. It is preferable to have ideas of "expectations" of the 
term "International City" than to operate in a conceptual vacuum and in 
this sense the Soldatos model has proven valuable.
C-2 THE DATAR/RECLUS PROJECT
The DATAR/RECLUS project shares similar dangers of arbitrary 
quantification and lack of flexibility concerning the forces of history, 
location and current events. However, as a working tool, this project has 
certain utility. Through choosing a limited number of criteria in a 
comparative manner between cities, it is able to provide a basic ranking 
in overall terms according to the specific criteria.
Lyon and Geneva are ranked 20th and 21st respectively in this 
project. Geneva is a city with more international functions than Lyon 
but, in terms of overall rankings, Lyon has strength in industry and 
demographics that Geneva cannot match.
The DATAR/RECLUS project remains a useful tool in that it is an 
applied study rather than theoretical conjecture. However imperfect, 
specific results and rankings are offered within a generalized empirical 
framework that can subsequently be used as a benchmark by other 
researchers to explore comparisons between specific European cities. In 
this sense the project was useful in defining the gaps in Lyon?s 
credentials and was intellectually valuable as a "half-way" position 
between the theoretical basis of Soldatos and the specific action 
prescribed in the LYON 2010 plan.
C.3 THE LYON 2010 PLAN
The LYON 2010 plan, the third cornerstone of the operational basis 
of this thesis, is the most effective. This official planning document best 
reflects the current situation of Lyon. The advantage is that this plan 
was conceived by local planners who have an appreciation for the 
individuality of Lyon's situation. These planners could accurately place 
Lyon in the context of its history in regards to Paris, local debates, and
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the strength of its location and industrial legacy. The LYON 2010 plan 
also reflects the city's orientation towards a future where the European 
Community and European linkages play an expanded and important role. 
Additionally, the place of the city in the regional and global economic 
and political planning schema is critical and can only be effectively 
discussed in a local and individualistic fashion.
The LYON 2010 plan demonstrates the operational priorities of the 
City of Lyon. These priorities range from the redevelopment of the 
Gerland district to the expansion of Lyon's regional role. The rationale 
behind the operational priorities is also discussed and is valuable in 
illustrating the logic behind the pursuit of specific objectives, including 
Lyon's future European ambitions.
The Lyon planners also make direct comparisons between other 
similarly positioned European cities and Lyon in an effort to determine 
Lyon's strengths and weaknesses. Additionally, these comparisons 
provide a current and updated status report on Lyon vis-a-vis other 
"Eurocities" on criteria of importance to the city of Lyon. The massive 
expansion project at Lyon-Satolas is one example of the utility of the 
LYON 2010 plan in accurately reflecting the operational priorities of 
Lyon.
The LYON 2010 plan is useful as a tool in that it can be tested and 
examined today and in the future. In the short-term one can assess the 
progress of this plan. Which priorities remain strong, which fade, what 
gets created and whether or not it is on schedule are all avenues of 
future study in the context of the LYON 2010 plan. In 2010, a critical 
review of Lyon will reveal the effectiveness of this plan and the persons 
charged with implementing various stages of the plan. Whether or not 
Lyon in the year 2010 resembles the LYON 2010 planned in 1990 will 
provide further indications. From the author's point of view, the LYON 
2010 plan provided a clear indication of the institutional framework of 
Lyon's ambitions and thus an opportunity to evaluate the extent to 
which administrative, legal and budgetary powers were in place to 
achieve Lyon's ambitions.
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None of the three approaches - the theoretical, empirical and 
applied - cited above was in itself a sufficient basis on which to arrive at 
conclusions. Rather each approach contributed intellectually at various 
stages of the research to structure a very broad and potentially 
unmanageable research topic. With the benefit of hindsight, the LYON 
2010 plan would have provided the most effective corpus around which 
to construct the thesis but with the consequence of severely constraining 
intellectual freedom to explore wider issues. This would have potentially 
produced a technocratic rather than academic thesis, more appropriate to 
a graduate in planning than a geographer.
Having acknowledged the contribution made to this thesis of each 
of the three approaches which structured the research, an assessment of 
Lyon's current status as a Eurocity can now be discussed.
C.4 LYON'S CURRENT STATUS
Lyon is attempting to establish and increase its trans-national 
functions to combat the primacy of Paris and to further position itself for 
the anticipated economic and political configuration of Europe. The 
national government, in the current European and global economy, can 
no longer protect and provide for the economic prosperity of Lyon. 
Rather, the Europe-wide economy forces every city and region to 
position itself in a competitive fashion.
Lyon can never hope to combat the primacy of Paris in the French 
urban hierarchy nor will Lyon succeed in prising away important 
political or economic decision-making functions from the capital. Rather, 
Lyon must establish itself as the undisputed second city of France, as a 
functional regional capital, and as an important European city with 
numerous trans-national functions. This is Lyon's current challenge as 
recognized by its political leaders and planners. From this conviction, the 
LYON 2010 plan was framed.
Lyon will never establish "International City" status in the context 
of the Soldatos model. The shadow of Paris looms too large over Lyon
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and the rest of the French urban hierarchy for any French city to 
establish itself as an "International City". However, the advantages that 
Lyon does possess are numerous and fundamental to its continued 
success. Lyon’s geographic position will ensure Lyon a large future role 
in the transportation plans of France and Europe. Lyon has correctly 
understood that its location and transportation infrastructure will be 
crucial to its future. The massive investment and improvement in Lyon’s 
physical transportation infrastructure will pay large dividends in both 
the short and long-term future of Lyon.
Another advantage that Lyon currently enjoys is an active and 
focused political will to establish Lyon as a major European city. This 
political will is illustrated by the LYON 2010 plan, the success of COURLY 
in uniting disparate political administrative units behind a common 
cause and the active role of the C.C.I.L. and other semi-official agencies 
operating with the blessing of the official administrative units. There is 
no guarantee that this political direction and focus will continue until 
2010 but having an official planning document, along with the French 
record for completing major projects regardless of political affiliation 
(TGV, nuclear plants etc.), argues well for Lyon following through on its 
European ambitions in the short to medium-term. Additionally, Lyon 
can convincingly claim that the majority of its population supports the 
concept of Europe and of Lyon pursuing a European agenda (Chapters 4, 
9, and 10).
The major problem currently facing Lyon in all areas is the oft- 
stated primacy of Paris. Lyon's lack of decision-making powers in the 
higher services, lack of parent company headquarters, research and 
development laboratories, and other criteria. Nor is Lyon going to 
develop a reputation as a world class tourist attraction in the near 
future. However, Lyon's outlook for the short and medium-term is 
optimistic. Lyon will continue to upgrade its transportation 
infrastructure, redevelop the Gerland district, increase its regional and 
European role and enjoy a healthy demographic and a competitive 
industrial base.
ii
iI
i
283
At the same time, it is obviously impossible to predict the effects of 
the current economic recession in France and the rest of Europe, the 
effects of the restructuring of Eastern Europe, and the expansion and 
potential deepening of the EC. These are but a short-list of major 
external influences on the dynamic of Lyon’s growth and ambition.
Lyon, Europe and the world will be vastly changed by 2010 in ways 
unanticipated by even the most visionary of contemporary observers.
Lyon does not exist in a vacuum and therefore cannot commit a 
high level of resources, either physical or financial, to its pursuit of 
international status. The daily operations of a major metropolis consume 
the vast majority of the time and resources of any city. The financial 
problems posed by the current recession, problems in the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM), trade agreements (GATT specifically) and the 
dramatic increase in the French national debt all cast a black shadow and 
have a dampening effect on such concepts as "International City" 
ambitions. The political uncertainty in Europe at this moment: Italy in 
chaos, France radically altering the National Assembly, the strains of 
German reunification, the horrors of former Yugoslavia, Russian 
instability and a host of other issues will inevitably affect Lyon's plans 
and prospects. Throughout the turbulence of Europe in 1993, the 
commercial and business leaders continue to advance towards a 
European economy, local political leaders pursue their agendas and the 
electorate remain concerned with unemployment, economic conditions, 
immigration and unpopular politicians. Within the complexity of these 
events, Lyon will continue to pursue its European agenda with whatever 
resources remain available; but to accurately predict the medium to 
long-term results is difficult in the extreme.
This project has, at this juncture, raised more questions and 
ambiguities than it has answered. There are no definitive answers to 
these questions since the fact that the European ambitions of Lyon and 
its potential "International City" status are topics that remain both fluid 
and complex. What this study does provide is a portrait of Lyon in 1993, 
its current situation and plans for the future. This can then be examined
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in the context of official projections, statements, future decisions and 
accomplishments.
C.5 APPROACH AND POTENTIAL FUTURE PROJECTS
The scale of this project was that of the city of Lyon. The scale 
could have been larger ("Eurocities") or smaller (Lyon’s economic 
infrastructure), however, the scale was determined by a desire to 
examine the complete picture of the city of Lyon. The synthesis of this 
"big picture" view of Lyon would have been lost if the project had 
concentrated solely on one aspect of Lyon’s situation. The desire was to 
avoid breaking the topic down to such a small level that the cohesiveness 
and interactions would be lost. (Wharf, 1990.)
The behaviouralist approach represents the philosophical 
persuasion of the author. Any attempt to quantify such a topic would 
have omitted elements of analytical interpretation which were deemed 
to represent the foundation of this thesis. Having trained as a political 
scientist, it was the author's concern to clarify the political objectives of 
the search for enhanced European status, to identify the actors involved 
in pursuing these objectives and the outcomes achieved thus far. The 
originality of the task from the author’s point of view was that by 
working in a geography department it was possible to view these 
questions in spatial terms rather than purely in non-spatial sectoral 
(economic) or institutional (legal) terms.
An essential aspect of research is to be sensitive to its 
deficiencies and also to be aware of future research agendas. It is in the 
nature of research that it is only on its completion that the gaps and 
deficiencies become evident. Given the author's background of an 
academic training in the United States some of the limitations of the 
thesis might be related to this non-European origin. This operates at two 
levels; the necessity to expunge pre-conceptions based on North 
American experience of the operation of cities and regions and secondly, 
to come to terms rapidly with unfamiliar and highly-complex 
institutional and legal structures operating in a foreign country. In this
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sense, much of the author's previously acquired experience was "non- 
transferable" except in general terms and the research was initiated 
from a position of tabla rasa. Similarity, apart from supervision 
meetings, the research was conducted almost entirety in a foreign 
language. This was not an insuperable problem but did impose penalties 
in the form of the time taken to master specialised and technical French 
and in the time taken to evaluate the utility of particular sources which 
could only be achieved by painstaking translation rather than the rapid 
scanning of one's native language. Rather than excuse limitations, it is 
more productive to identify them and to propose further research which 
resolves them.
First and foremost, it must be stressed that this research was 
conducted during a period of political and economic instability both 
within France and more widely in Europe. This was not, and could not be 
anticipated at the stage of research design. To take but one example, the 
arrival in France of a right wing Government dedicated to reducing 
public sector budget defecits and reducing unemployment is likely to 
influence the attitude to investment in such nebulous notions as Eurocity 
status, at least in the short term.
Secondly, for reasons of time and cost constraints, two vital aspects 
have not been examined in the depth that they merit. The question of 
the degree of solidarity in the Rhone-Alpes Region behind Lyon's 
ambitions has been examined largely in terms of officially-stated 
objectives in the most recent regional plan. It would have been 
instructive to have probed in more detail the degree of consensus at an 
operational level (local authorities, universities, individual firms) that a 
"European" Lyon is viewed as a critical element to the region's future and 
one to which it is worth devoting significant regional resources. 
Additionally, the relationship between Lyon and Geneva has only been 
touched on by inference. This is a thesis topic in itself but it is 
inescapable that the two cities are in a real sense rivals and fall within 
two separate political entities and thus are not amenable to the forms of 
brokerage that might apply within a single national state.
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The decision to limit discussion of Geneva to instances of direct 
impact (the erosion of Lyon’s influence in the frontier zone of 
Annemasse, the competition of Geneva Cointrin airport, for example), 
was deliberate. It would have required gaining an understanding of yet 
another foreign planning and administrative structure, complicated in 
this instance by a federal structure. To have included a substantial 
treatment of Geneva would have transformed the thesis into a 
comparative study, which was not one of the central objectives of the 
thesis. Moreover, from preliminary work it appeared clear that the 
notion of Lyon and Geneva promoting their European status in tandem 
was a fanciful one expressed only in vague, inconclusive terms rather 
than as a solid plank in the political agenda of either city. Nevertheless, 
the extent to which Lyon’s aspirations could be undermined by a smaller 
but very influencial neighbour is an obvious avenue for future research.
A third area which merits further research is the attitude of the 
populace at large. Lyon has the reputation of being a rather introverted 
society as far as its elite is concerned. Can a city, reputedly "provincial" 
within its own country, credibly espouse a European role? Evidence for 
this has been adduced in this thesis by surrogate methods, notably 
election results. This evidence suggests support for an enhanced role in 
Europe, however, public concern over employment, housing and social 
issues is greater and more tangible than support for abstract notions of 
European roles. This poses the question as to whether more immediately 
visible local issues will continue to have more electoral appeal than long­
term issues at a European scale.
A fourth aspect which will merit future research attention concerns 
the question of timing. The present pattern of economic retrenchment 
following a prolonged recession may have taken place too late to halt 
Lyon’s progress towards European status. This thesis has drawn 
attention to transport infrastructure developments which have already 
either been achieved (eastern motorway by-pass, development of Satolas 
airport) or will very shortly be achieved (Satolas TGV station, extension 
of the TGV line to Valence). Similarly, the political will for a greater 
European role has been enshrined in the regional and city plans. In this
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sense, infrastructure developments and political options have already 
been foreclosed and it may be assumed that the recession may defer but 
not reverse the impetus towards Lyon’s European role. It will be a major 
research theme to monitor the impact of the economic condition on the 
progress toward the objectives of LYON 2010.
Finally, the whole question of regional decentralization is again 
under scrutiny. With a new, and unchallengeable right wing government 
in power, and with macro-economic problems (budget defecit, 
unemployment) at the top of the political agenda, it is tempting to 
assume, at this point in time, that the attention of the government will 
focus on national economic issues rather than on rapid progress towards 
further regional devolution. The question is thus posed as to whether or 
not Lyon has gained sufficient strength and impetus to press ahead with 
its own aspirations regardless of national economic preoccupations. In 
this sense, the Soldatos notion of "critical mass" assumes significance; has 
Lyon passed the crucial threshold of self-sustaining importance or is the 
city still too weak vis-a-vis the central power of Paris to exert an 
independent role in pursuing its prefered agenda? The evidence 
adduced in this thesis suggests that in spite of much progress, Lyon has 
yet to achieve the critical mass necessary to develop independently of 
performance in the national economy or free from the tutelage of the 
national government. In this sense we come to the conclusion that 
Lyon's aspirations as an international city will depend on the speed of 
the recovery in the French economy as a whole, and in the wider sense 
the pace of economic recovery of Western Europe.
In reference to the original hypothesis, therefore, it is difficult to 
avoid the conclusion that Lyon's ambitions are logical and realistic in the 
long-term, but the present economic circumstances are unlikely to 
provide a conducive atmosphere for rapid progress. This thesis 
therefore closes on a note of ambiguity, but in a positive sense. It is 
unlikely that the progress made by Lyon will be lost. It is more likely 
that the city will forge ahead in areas where it has established strength, 
for example as a transport node, as a centre of medical research, and as a 
centre of technological innovation in industry, all at a European scale, but
288
where the achievement of a critical mass must await a general economic 
recovery in France and the European Community, an event Lyon is 
powerless to influence.
GLOSSARY
ADERLY: l'Agence de Developpement de la Region Lyonnaise
CES: Council Economique et Social Rhone-Alpes
C.C.I.L.: Chambre de Commerce et d’Industrie de Lyon
CDRE Centre de Documentation et de Recherche
Europeenne
CERAT: Centre de Recherche sur la Politique,
rAdministration et le Territoire 
CIRC: Centre International de Recherche sur le Cancer
COTRAO: Communaute de Travail des Alpes Occidentales
COURLY: Communaute Urbaine de Lyon
CUREI: Centre Universitaire de Recherche Europeenne et
Internationale
DATAR: Delegation a l'Amenagement du Territoire
ENS: l'Ecole Normale Superieure
ERAI: l'Entreprise Rhone-Alpes Internationale
ESC: l’Ecole Superieure de Commerce de Lyon
ESRF: le Laboratoire Europeen du Rayonnement
Synchrotron 
ILL: l'lnstitut Laue et Langevin
INSEE: l'lnstitut National de la Statistique et des Etudes
Economiques
INUDEL: Association Rhone-Alpes pour l'lnnovation Urbaine
et le Developpement Local 
IRAM: l'lnstitut de Radioastronomie Millimetrique
LET: le Laboratoire d'Economie des Transports
NICE: New International Cities Era
RUL: La Region Urbaine de Lyon
SDAL: Schema Directeur de l'Amenagement Lyonnais
SDAU: Schema Directeur de l'Amenagement Urbain
SEDLYS: Societe d'Etudes pour le Developpement de Lyon-
Satolas
SEPAL: Syndicat d'Etudes et de Programmation de
l'Agglomeration Lyonnaise 
SYTRAL: Syndicat Mixte des Transports pour le Rhone et
l'Agglomeration Lyonnaise 
ZAC: Zone d'Amenagement Concerte
290
BIBLIOGRAPHY
L'Activite economique. Lyon: Septembre, 1990.
Aeroports. 6-1990.
Affairs economiques. No. 18, Avril, 1991.
Agence dTUrbanisme de la COURLY. Lyon: 1991.
Ardagh, John. France Today. London: Penguin Books, 1990 edition. 
L'Atlas Informatique. Paris: 1992.
Atout Rhone. No, 27, Juin, 1991.
Audirac, Pierre-Alain et Jean-Paul Faur. "La Population des Regions." 
INSEE Premiere No. 82 (Juin 1990).
Baleste, Marcel. L'Economie Francaise - llem e edition. Paris: 
Masson, 1991.
Ballingrand, J.P. et D. Maquart. La Fin du Territoire Jacobin. Paris: 
Albin Michel, 1990.
Barbet, M. Les Regions et l'lntegration Europeenne: le Role des 
Organisations Interregionales. Memoire IEP, Grenoble, 
Septembre 1992.
Beaujeu-Gamier, Jacqueline. "Towards a New Equilibrium in France? 
Annals of the Association of American Geographers.
Vol. 64 No. 1 (March 1974); 113-125.
Beckouche, P. "French high-tech and space: a double cleavage", in 
Benko, G and M. Dunford (eds.) Industrial change and regional 
development. London: Belhaven, 1991.
291
Benko, G.B. "French Regional Policy in the early 1980's." International 
Social Science Journal 112 (1987): 233-254.
Benko, George et Alain Lipietz. Les regions aui gaenent. Paris: PUF, 
1992.
Bemadet, M., et al. Les Transports a l'Horizon 2000. Lyon: L.E.T.,1988.
Bethemont, Jacques. "Le Probleme des Infrastructures Autoroutieres 
dans Rhone-Alpes." Elan Rhone-Alpes No. 1 (1990).
________ . "Les Echanges Intemationaux de Rhone-Alpes". Elan
Rhone-Alpes No. 2 (1990).
________ "Rhone-Alpes et l'Echelle Europeenne." Elan Rhone-Alpes
No. 1 (1990).
Billet, Jean. "Developpement coherent des villes de Rhone-Alpes a 
travers leurs ambitions et le role des communications". Report 
presented to the Comite Economique et Sociale Rhone-Alpes, 
Novembre, 1988.
__________ Schema d'amenagement regional. Comite Economique et
Social Rhone-Alpes, document reneote, 7 Aout, 1990.
Bonamy, J., J. Bonnet et A. Mayere. Internationalisation des Services: 
Logiques. Processus et Structures en Reseaux. Lyon: CEDES - 
Economie et Humanisme, et Laboratoire d'Etudes Rhodaniennes 
260 - Lyon III, Novembre 1989.
Bonnafous, Alain. Le developpement economique et les besoins de
traversee. Union Internationale des Transports Routiers, Geneve, 
1990.
Bonnafous, A., P. Bossin, M.A. Buisson, L. Diaz Olivera, et D. Plat. A.
quoi reconnait-on une ville intemationale? Tentative de reponse 
par consultation d'experts. (Methode Delphi) Lyon: Rapport 
L.E.T., 1991.
292
Bonnafous, A., M. Le Nir, J.L. Routhier, et S. Thibaud. Le Transport 
Regional Inter-Cites en Rhone-Alpes. Lyon: L.E.T., 1989.
Bonnet, Jacques. "Limites Administratives et Developpement Local". 
Elan Rhone-Alpes No. 2 (1990): 2.
________ . Lvon Place Tertiaire: Contribution a une geographic des
affaires. Lille: EDISUD/Atelier national de reproduction de 
theses, Universite de Lille III, 1988.
Bonneville, M., M.A. Buisson, N. Commergon, et N. Rousier. Villes 
Europeennes et Internationalisation. Lyon: Equipe de 
Recherche, N.I.C.E., - Rhone-Alpes - M.R.A.S.H., 1991.
Boyer, Paul. Population Grenobloise: Perspectives 2000. Grenoble: 
Universite de Grenoble II, 1987.
Brim, S., et al. "Gerland: des abattoirs du passe aux laboratoires du 
future". Maitres des Sciences Economiques, Universite Lyon II,
1990.
Brunet, Roger. Les Villes "Europeennes". Paris: DATAR/RECLUS - La 
Documentation Frangaise, 1989.
Carriere, Jean. Rhone-Alpes. Une Prospective. Lyon: Publication du 
SGAR, 1988.
Cattan, Nadine. "Une image du reseau des metropoles europeennes 
par le trafic aerien" L'Espace Geographique. 1990.
C.C.I. de Lyon. Annuaire. No 18,1989.
C.C.I. de Lyon. Annuaire. No 33, 1990.
C.C.I. de Lyon et le Projet de SDAU (La): "Oui, Mais..." L'Activite 
Economique (Mars 1990).
293
Chassande, Pierre. "Les Infrastructures de Transport: De la
Concurrence a un Defi Commun". Projections No. 10 (Mars 
1991): 2-5.
Chatin, Catherine. 9 Villes Nouvelles: Une experience francaise 
d'urbanisme. Paris: Dunod, 1975.
Cheshire, P.C., and D.G. Hay. "The Urban Region of Lyon: A unique case in 
France." Urban Problems in Western Europe. INTA (1990): 7-21.
Commerce exterieur de Rhone-Alpes en 1990. Chambre regionale de 
commerce et d'industrie Rhone-Alpes, direction interregionale des 
douanes de Lyon, Juin 1991.
Commission of the European Communities. "Rapid Reports" (Regions), 
volume 2. Office of Publications of the European Communities, 
Luxembourg, 1990.
Contrat entre l'Etat et la Region Rhone-Alpes. 21-4-1989.
Dawkins, William. "Rhone-Alpes-Financial Times Survey", The Financial 
Times. February 19, 1993.
Daziano, Christian. "TGV Lyon-Turin: Mobilisation Generate au 
Piemont". Projections No. 10 (Mars 1991): 12-13.
Delebarre, Michel. En Europe, des villes en reseaux. Paris: DATAR - La 
Documentation Frangaise, 1991.
"Deplacements Urbains (Les)". Les Dossiers Communaute Urbaine de 
Lvon No. 1 (Juin 1990).
Denais, Jean et Bernard Perrut. Tout savoir sur la Region. Lyon:
Synopse, 1991.
D irecteur Regionale de PEquipment Rhone-Alpes. 1991.
294
Drevet, Jean-Frangois. 1992-2000, Les Regions Francaises Entre 
1TEurope et le Declin. Paris: Souffles, 1988.
______ La France et PEurope des Regions. Paris: Syros, 1991.
"Dun and Bradstreet. Parent Company Headquarters in Europe." 
Northwest Airlines Magazine. March, 1991.
Dunford, Mick. "The Rhone-Alpes Region." The Economist Intelligence 
Report London: 1991.
Economist. The. November 23,1991.
"l'Emploi dans Rhone Alpes." INSEE Rhone-Alpes. Notes et Documents 
No 99, avril, 1992.
"Enjeux intemationaux de l'industrie de Rhone-Alpes (Les)."
Prefecture de la Region Rhone-Alpes et Service d'Etudes du 
SGAR, Lyon: 1990.
"Enquete sur l'Impact Regional du Projet de Satolas". L'lNUDEL, Mars 
1989.
L'Entreprise. No 78, Mars 1992.
"Entreprise Rhone-Alpes Internationale: elaboration d'une strategie 
intemationale pour Rhone-Alpes." SEMA Group Management 
Consultants, Lyon: 1989.
L'Expansion. 6/19 Decembre, 1990.
EXPORTA. Paris: 1990.
Fabre, Jacques. Le Developpement des Villes Francaises de 
Dimension Europeenne et les Reseaux de Villes. Conseil 
Economique et Social, 12 et 13 fevrier, 1991.
Francexport Rhone-Alpes. Lyon: 1991.
295
Grands Proiets: Aeroport International de Lvon-Satolas. Aeroport 
International de Lyon-Satolas, 1990.
Gras, Pierre. LYON 2010: Une Ville Pour Vivre et Pour Rever. Paris: 
Syros-Alternatives, 1990.
Gravier, J.F. Paris et le Desert Francais. Paris: Flammarion, 1947. 
Guardian. The. October 14, 1991.
House, J.W. France: An Applied Geography. London: Methuen,
1978.
Humphries, Stan. "E.C. Goal: Fully Liberalized Air Industry". Europe 
(December 1991); 8-10.
Ifop - Europe 1 - Le Figaro. 23 Mars, 1992.
INSEE Premiere. No 111, Novembre, 1990.
INSEE Rhone-Alpes. Lyon: 1991.
Interlignes: Statistiques de Trafic. Aeroport International de Lyon. 
Numerous dates.
International Herald Tribune 
January 11, 1991.
May 30, 1991.
September 30, 1991.
October 21, 1991.
November 3, 1991.
February 18, 1992.
March 18, 1992
INUDEL Rhone-Alpes, La desserte interville en region Rhone-Alpes. 
Decembre,1989.
296
Jeffries, T. "The Rhone-Rhine Link in Perspective." Geography 67 
(1982): 56-59.
Jones, Philip. "The French Census 1990: The Southward Drift 
Continues." Geography (1991): 358-361.
Jouve, A., et Stragiotti, P. La France des Regions. Paris, Breal, 1992.
Keating, M., and P. Hainsworth. Decentralisation and Change in
Contemporary France. Hampshire: GOWER Publishing Company 
LTD, 1986.
Kesselman, M. "The End of Jacobinism? The Socialist Regieme and 
Decentralisation". Journal of Regional Policy 5 (1985): 179-193.
Kukawka, Pierre. "Formation et cooperation entre quatre regions non 
frontalieres". Sous la direction de Jean-Paul de Gaudeman. in 
Formation et developpement regional en Europe. Paris: DATAR- 
La Documentation Frangaise, 1990.
_______ Les inegalities regionales en France: le cas de Rhone-Alpes.
3 erne Seminaire Interdisciplinaire, acteurs intemationaux, 
institutions, enjeux, politiques." Universite Laval, Quebec,
Canada. 14-20 Juin, 1992
________ Les relations entre la region Rhone-Alpes et Geneve.
Clermont-Ferrand: La Suisse et l'echeance europeenne de 
1992, 16-17 Mars 1989.
________ . Le quadrige europeen. Rhone-Alpes et les grandes regions en
Europe. Grenoble: CERAT, 1989.
________ Le quadrige europeen. Rhone-Alpes et ses partenaires en
Europe. Grenoble: CERAT, 1988.
Labasse, Jean. "L'Evolution de l'idee de Region en France." In Regions 
Geographic! ues et Regions d'Amenagements. eds. John I. Clarke et 
Jean Pelletier, 45-50. Lyon: L'Hermes, 1978.
297
________ L’Europe des Regions. Paris: Flammarion, 1991.
Laurencin, J-P. La Region Rhone-Alpes face ou marche unique europeen. 
(Universite des sciences sociales de Grenoble, IREP-Developpement 
Grenoble), 1990.
Lebuy, Jean-Luc. MLe Pouvoir Departemental- Sept Ans apres la 
Mise en Oeuvre de la Decentralisation." Etudes (Julliet-Aout 
1989): 41-49.
Le Nir, M., J.L. Routhier et S. Thibaud. Le transport regional intercites 
en Rhone-Alpes. L.E.T., Conseil Regional Rhone-Alpes, 1989.
Lvon Liberation.. 21 Septembre, 1992.
Lvon Matin. 14 Mai, 1991.
Lvon Ville Internationale: Etude Comparative de Lvon avec 9 Eurocites 
(Villes Europeennes Non Capitales). ADERLY - AGURCO et P.L.I.,
1988.
"Lyon Gerland." Maison d'Amenagement de Gerland and COURLY,
Lyon: 1991.
"Lyon Gerland. La nouvelle rive gauche." COURLY, Lyon: Janvier,
1987.
Maison d'Amenagement de Gerland. COURLY, Lyon: 1991.
Martinengo, Eduardo. Le Monde, Novembre 7, 1977.
Mayere, Anne, et Joel Bonamy. Services Nouveaux et Creations 
d'Entrenrises de Service: Emergence d'une Offre Nouvelle?
Lyon: Programme Rhone-Alpes Recherches en Sciences 
Humaines, 1988.
McDonald, James R. "Labor Immigration in France, 1946-65." Annals 
Association of American Geographers 59 (1969): 116-134.
298
MIBP: Multi-Regional Business Program. ESC Lyon, Lyon: 1993.
Ministre de l'Education Nationale, Paris: 1991.
Monde. Le. 10 Juin, 1991.
Monde Rhone-Alpes. Le. 23 Mars, 1992.
Montes, Christian. Svsteme de transport et svsteme economique en 
milieu urbain: reflexions sur l'amenagement de l'agglomeration 
lyonnaise de 1960 a 1992. These pour le Doctorat de 
PUniversite Lumiere-Lyon II en Geographie, Amenagement et 
Urbanisme. L.E.T. et l'Universite Lumiere-Lyon II. Lyon: 13 
Novembre, 1992.
Morelon, Jean Pierre. "Lyon, Pole de Communication." In Les Couloirs 
Rhin-Rhone dans Pespace europeen. 319-346. Lyon: Laboratoire 
d'Economie des Transports, 1989.
"Ouverture comes to Glasgow." The Strathclvder. March 1993.
Pellerin, Christian. Rapport du Groupe de Mobilisation Europe 1993 sur 
les Regions. Paris; Syros, 1990.
Perrat, J. Poles d'excellence et technopoles en Rhone-Alpes:
Pinnovation pour-quoi faire? (Association pour le developpement 
des etudes economiques et sociales en Rhone-Alpes-ADEES, Lyon.) 
1989.
"Plan de reference du quartier de Gerland. Rapport d'options."
COURLY, Lyon: Mars, 1989.
Plassard, Frangois, et al. Reflexion sur les consequences en Matiere 
d’Amenagement des principaux proiets d'infrastructures de
transport
1987.
299
________ , (dir.) "Lyon, noeud de communications europeen". Lyon,
L.E.T., Mars 1989.
Point. Le No 1044, 19-9-1992.
Points d'Appui Pour l’Economie Rhone-Alpes: Special Recensement. No. 
61-62 Mars 1991, INSEE.
Presentation de L'Aeroport International de Lvon-Satolas. Aeroport 
International de Lyon-Satolas, Mai 1991.
Proeres. Le
28-4-1990.
5-3-1991.
15-5-1991.
16-5-1991.
19-2-1992.
4-3-1992.
16-3-1992.
Punter, J. "Decentralisation of the Planning System in France." The 
Planner 75 (1989): 12-15.
"Quartier de Gerland 1983-1989 (Le): une etape decisive." COURLY- 
Groupe Operationnel Lyon Gerland, Lyon: Fevrier, 1989.
Rademaekers, William. "Ambitions on a Grand Scale." Time (July 22, 
1991): 38-39.
Region Urbaine de Lvon: Reperes et Tendances Economiques. Lyon: 
Agence d'Urbanisme - Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie de 
Lyon, Janvier, 1991.
Region Urbaine de Lvon: Reperes et Tendances Economiques. Lyon: 
Agence d’Urbanisme - Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie de 
Lyon, Janvier, 1992.
300
"Regions et l'Europe, l'obligation regionale (Les)." Interregions No 
146, Janvier, 1992. 20-35
Renucci, J. "Tourisme et Produit Touristique a Lyon." Revue de 
Geographie de Lvon Vol 63-4 (1988): 191-205.
Reynauld, Christian. "Les reseaux a grande vitesse et les conditions de 
leur developpement." Transports 350, (Decembre 1991): 359- 
381.
Rhone-Alpes dans l’Espace Europeen. Rapports Particuliers Nos. 1-5. 
Grenoble, PPSH 17 - Louis Reboud et al. 1990.
"Rhone-Alpes demain: Reinventons la proximite." Schema
d'amenagement et de developpement de Rhone-Alpes, Region 
Rhone-Alpes, 1992.
"Rhone-Alpes d?un recensement a l'autre". INSEE Rhone-Alpes, 1991.
Satolas: Pole International de Communications. Elements Pour une 
Strategie Globale. L'Agence d’Urbanisme de la Communaute de 
Lyon, Fevrier 1990.
Savey, Pierre. "Les Ports de Rhone-Alpes: Une Chance a Saisir." 
Projections No. 10 (Mars 1991): 16-17.
Scargill, D.I. "The Ville Moyenne: A French Strategy for Town
Expansion." The Expanding City. London: Academic Press Inc,
1983.
Scargill, Ian. "Regional Inequality in France: Persistence and Change." 
Geography (1991).
________. Urban France. London: Croom Helm LTD, 1983.
"Schema de Developpement et d'Amenagement Regional" Proposition 
du Conseil Economique et Social du Region Rhone-Alpes, 1992.
301
Science & Vie. 6-1992.
Service Cantonal des Statistiques. Geneve, Janvier 1, 1990.
Service de la Navigation Rhone - Saone. 1990.
Soldatos, P. Lvon. Ville Internationale a Geometrie Variable: Pour une 
Planification Strategique de sa Croissance Internationale. 
Montreal: Institut d'Etude des Villes Internationales, 1989.
________ La Nouvelle Generation des Villes Internationales dans un
monde Transnationalise. Montreal: Institut d’Etude des Villes 
Internationales, 1989.
S.N.C.F. La Lettre du Vovageur. Paris: S.N.C.F., Novembre 1990.
Syndicat d’Etudes et de Programmation de 1’Agglomeration Lyonnaise 
(S.E.P.A.L.). "LYON 2010: Un Projet d'Agglomeration pour une 
metropole Europeenne". Lyon, 1991.
Tableaux de l'Economie Rhone-Alpes. edition 1991. Lyon:
INSEE - OERA, 1991.
Tesse, P.Y. "Lyon: les conditions du decollage." in Dommergues, Pierre 
et Nanon Gerdin (eds.) Les strategies intemationale des 
Metropoles Regionales." Groupe Ten. Paris: Syros, 1989.
_________Lyon Ville Intemationale: Premiers Elements d’Evaluation.
Lyon: Institute d'Etudes des Villes Internationales, 1990.
________ Lyon Ville Intemationale: Reflexions et Premieres
Propositions. Lyon: ADERLY, 1983.
"Transport Aerien: Les Vertus de la Concurrence". Science & Vie 
Economie Hor Serie (1991/1992): 119-120.
T ransport de m archandises en Region Rhone-Alpes. D irecteur regional
de l'equ ipm ent Rhone-Alpes, 1991.
302
Tuppen, John N. The Economic Geography of France. London: Croom 
Helm Ltd, 1983.
_________ "Redevelopment of the City Centre: The Case of Lyon -
La Part Dieu." Scottish Geographical Magazine 93-3 (December 
1977): 151-158.
Urbanismes & Architecture. 11-1990.
Voies navigables de France. 1990-1991.
Wall Street Journal - Europe. March 23, 1992.
Walsh, James. "The New France." Time (July 22, 1991): 30-38.
Warf, Barney. "Can the Region Survive Post-Modernism." Urban 
Geography 11 (November-December 1990): 586.
Webster, P. "Intifada Comes To Lyon." The Guardian. 19 October 
1990:21.
L
303
FURTHER SOURCES THAT WERE CONSULTED
Adonis, Andrew, and William Dawkins. "Vision - and a tale of two 
cities." Financial Times. 12 February 1992.
Aldrich, Robert, and John Connell, eds. France in World Politics. 
London: Routledge, 1989.
Anderson, Malcolm, ed. Frontier Regions in Western Europe.
London: Frank Cass and Co. LTD, 1983.
Ashford, Douglas. "The Socialist Reorganization of French Local
Government, Another Jacobin Reform." Government and Policy 
Vol.l (1983): 29-44.
Atlas Industrial Rhone-Alpes 1991. INSEE Rhone-Alpes et Prefecture 
de la Region Rhone-Alpes, 1992.
Aydalot, P. "The Location of New Firm Creation: The French Case." D. 
Keeble and E. Wever eds. New Firms and Regional 
Development in Europe. London: Croom Helm, 1986: 105-123.
Baleste, M. et al. La France: 22 regions de programme. Paris: Masson 
1993: 163-181.
Bamford, C.G., and H. Robinson. Geography of the EEC. Harlow: 
Longman Scientific & Technical, 1983.
Barbier, B. and D.G. Pearce. "The Geography of Tourism in 
France." GeoToumal 9 (1984).
Bastie, J., et B. Dezert. L'Espace Urbain. Paris: Masson, 1980.
________ "Rhone-Alpes et PEchelle Europeenne." Elan Rhone-Alpes
No. 1 (1990).
Billet, Jean. Schema d'amenagement regional. Comite Economique et 
Social Rhone-Alpes, document reneote, 7 Aout, 1990.
304
Bobbio, Valentino. The Liguria-Lvons Project: A Positive
Experience of Cooperation Between Regions of the European 
Economic Community. Berlin: CEDEFOP (European Centre for the 
Development of Vocational Training); Luxembourg: Office for 
Official Publications of the European Community, 1989.
Bonnafous, Alain. "Rhone-Alpes, capitale Paris. Les effects 
previsibles du TGV." Revue de Geographie de Lvon 3 
(1980): 233-240.
_______ Le developpement economique et les besoins de traversee.
Union Intemationale des Transports Routiers, Geneve, 1990.
Bonnet, Jacques. "Charles Millon." Figaro Rhone-Alpes 7 Mars 
1992: 5-7.
________ "limites Administratives et Developpement Local". Elan
Rhone-Alpes No. 2 (1990): 2.
Bonnet, Jacques, ed. Lvon. Ville Intemationale? Etude de ses 
relations avec les Etas-Unis. Lyon: Universite Jean Moulin 
Maitrise d'Amenagement, 1990.
Bonneville, Marc. "Revue de Rhdne-Alpes, Une Prospective". Revue 
de Geographie de Lvon Vol. 64 No 1 (1989): 40-42.
Boudeville, J.R. Les Espaces Economiques. Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1961.
________ Problems of Regional Economic Planning. Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1966.
Braudel, F. The Identity of France. Volume 1. History and
Environment. Translated by S. Reynolds. New York: Harper 
and Row, 1988.
Brocard, Madeleine. La Science et les Regions. Paris:
DATAR/RECLUS - La Documentation Frangaise, 1991.
305
Brunet, Roger. La France dans l'espace europeen. Montpellier: 
RECLUS, 1989.
Brunet, Roger, et Jacques Sallois. France: Les Dvnamiques du 
Territoire. Montpellier: DATAR/RECLUS, 1986.
Carrez, J-F. Le developpement des fonctions tertiaires superieures 
intemationales a Paris et dans les metropoles regionales. La 
Documentation Frangaise, Paris: 1991.
Cemy, P. and M. Schain eds. Socialism, the State, and Public Policy in 
France. London: Frances Pinter, 1985.
Cheshire, P.C. "Explaining the recent preformance of the European 
Community's major urban regions." Urban Studies 27-3 
(1990): 311-333.
Cheshire, P.C., G. Carbonaro, and D.G. Hay. "Problems of urban
decline and growth in EEC countries: Or measuring degrees 
of elephantness." Urban Studies 23 (1990): 131-149.
Chesnais, Michel. Transports et Esnace Francais. Paris: Masson,
1981.
Chiffres-Cles de l'lndustrie dans les Regions (Les). Ministere de 
l'Industrie et de l'Amenagement du Territoire, Paris: SESSI,
1989.
Clarke, John I., et Pelletier, Jean. Regions Geographiques et 
Regions d'Amenagements. Lyon: L'Hermes, 1978.
Claudius, Deriol. Lvon: Ville Mondiale. Paris: Stock, 1971.
Clout, Hugh D. "French Geography in the 1980's." Progress in Human 
Geography 9 (1985): 473-490.
 The Geography of Post War France: A social and
economic approach. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1972.
306
Costa, Jean-Paul, et Yves Jegouzo. ^administration francaise face anx 
defis de la decentralisation. Paris: Les Editions S.T.H., 1988.
Cottrell, Robert. "Baron plots battle for the throne." The 
Independent on Sunday. 12 December 1990, p. 14.
Courtois, G. Les regions entrainees par PEurope. Le Monde, 7 
Decembre, 1989.
Damier, C., D. Sabine, et A. Schwichterberg. Reflexions sur une forme 
de repartition des etudiants a Lvon: Un Ouartier Universitaire. 
Lyon: Faculte de sciences economiques et du gestion, Universite 
Lyon II, 1991.
Daniels, P.W. Service Industries: A geographical appraisal.
London: Methuen, 1985.
Delebarre, Michel. En Europe, des villes en reseaux. Paris: DATAR - 
La Documentation Francaise, 1991.
Demotz, P. ’devaluation des deplacements professionnels a partir des 
trafics ferroviaires "Grandes Lignes" au depart de Lyon." Revue 
de Geographie de Lvon. Vol 62, No 1,1987.
Elie, B. "Lyon: Plantification liberale et enjeux europeens." Le Monde. 
21 November 1989, p. 22.
"Entreprises industrielles de plus de 50 salaries a capitaux etranger." 
Chambre Regionale de Commerce et d'Industrie Rhone-Alpes,
1991.
Estrin, Saul and Peter Holmes. French Planning in Theory and 
Practice. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983.
"Etude de la Desserte Routiere". SERALP, Mars 1989.
Findlay, Allen, and Paul White. West European Population Change. 
London: Croom Helm LTD, 1986.
307
Fontain, Frangois. "Les Metropoles Regionales a la recherche de leurs 
points Forts." Economie et Statistique No. 230 (Mai 1990): 17- 
30, 81, 83.
France et ses Regions (La), edition 1986. Paris: INSEE, 1986.
France et ses Regions (La), edition 1990. Paris: INSEE, 1990.
France et ses Regions (La), edition 1993. Paris: INSEE, 1992.
Froment, A., et S. Lerat. La France au Milieu des Annees 80. 5eme 
edition, Tome 2. Montreuil: Breal Editions, 1989.
Froment, E., et M. Karlin. Fonctions Financiaires. Comparaisons 
Regionales. Lyon: 1988.
Gages, R. "Lyon Metropole, Le Confluent Espace International". 
Piquou sur Rue No. 60 (1985): 11-15.
Gassot, L., C. Voglimacci et J-P Jeandon. "Schema regional de la
communication Rhone-Alpes." Etude pour la Prefecture de la 
Region Rhone-Alpes, IDATE, Montpellier: 1989.
Gault, Michel. Villes Intermediaires pour l'Europe. Paris: Syros,1989.
Gilly, J-P. "Technopoles et Developpement: Mythes et Realites." 
Revue Geographique des Pyrenees et du Sud-Ouest 6 (1989): 
115-124.
Grandjeat, Pierre, et Yves Detraigne. Les Chambres regionales des 
comptes: Analyse dfune practique. Paris: La Documentation 
Frangaise Notes et Etudes No 4826 1987- 1987.
Gravier, J.F. Paris et le Desert Francais en 1972. Paris: Flammarion, 
1972.
308
Grillo, R.D. Ideologies and Institutions in Urban France: The 
Representation of Immigrants. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985.
Guerin-Pace, F. et D. Pumain. "150 ans de Croissance Urbaine". 
Economie et Statistiaue No. 230 (Mai 1990): 5-16.
Guichard, O. Amenager La France. Paris: Robert Laffont, 1965.
Hall, Peter, and Dennis Hay. Growth Centres in the European Urban 
System. London: Heinemann Educational Books LTD, 1980.
Hautreux, J., et M. Rochefort. La Fonction Regionale dans l'Armature 
Urbaine Francaise. Paris: Minist. de la Constr., 1964.
Hayward, Jack. The State of the Market Economy: Industrial 
Patriotism and Economic Intervention in France. Brighton: 
Wheatshelf Books LTD, 1986.
Hough, J.R. The French Economy. New York: Holmes and Meier,
1982.
Ilbery, Brian W. Western Europe: A Systematic Human Geography. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.
Jafflin-Vergnaud, C. L'integration de Rhone-Alpes dans 1'Europe: 
quelles infrastructures de transport? Lyon: L.E.T., 1990.
Jayet, H. L'Esoace Economique Francaise. Paris: INSEE, 1988.
Joly, Jacques. Grenoble et son Agglomeration. Paris; La
Documentation Frangaise Notes et Etudes No. 4769, 1985.
Jones, P.C. The Segregration and Integration of Provincial and
International Migrants in Lvon. France. 1962-75. Unpublished 
Ph.D. Thesis, University of Sheffield, 1982.
309
Klein, Jacques-Sylvain. L'explosion des impots locaux. Paris: La 
Documentation Frangaise Notes et Etudes No. 4802, 1986.
Kliot, Nurit, and Stanley Waterman, eds. Pluralism and Political
Geography: People. Territory, and State. London: CroomHelm 
LTD, 1983.
Knox, P.L. The Geography of Western Europe: A Socio-Economic 
Survey. Kent: Croom Helm LTD, 1984.
Knox, P. and A. Scarth. "The Q u a l i t y  Gf iife in France." Geography 62
(1977): 9-16.
Kofman, F. "Regional Autonomy and the one and Indivisible French 
Republic." Government and Policy 3 (1985).
Krause, Axel. "A Europe of Regions Becoming Reality." Europe. April 
1994: 22-23.
Labasse, Jean. "Lyon Metropole?" Revue de la Geographie de Lyon 
No. 57 (1982): 145-153.
________ "La Tension Paris - Province." Etudes Offertes a
Madeleine Grawitz. Paris: Dalloz, 1982.
________ . "Reseau Urbain et Flux Telephoniques: L'Example de
Rhone-Alpes." Revue de Geographie de Lyon. Vol 64-1 (1989): 
49-53.
________ "Sieges Sociaux et Villes Dominantes." Traveaux de
Pinstitut de Geographie de Reims. 43-44 (1988): 3-14.
________ . "L'Urbanisation de la France." Geogranhia Polonica 39
(1978): 65-74.
Labasse, Jean, et M. Laferrere. La Region Lvonnaise. Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de France, 1966.
310
Lacoste, Yves, (ed.) Geopolitiaues des regions francaises: Tome III. 
Paris: Fayard, 1986.
Lafferere, M. "Lyon et son Role Regional." In La France des Villes: 
Centre-Est. 29-69. Paris: La Documentation Frangaise, 1980.
Law, Christopher M., and others. The Uncertain Future of the Urban 
Core. London: Rouledge, 1988.
Lebeau, R. Adas et Geographie de la Region Lvonnaise. Paris: 
Flammarion, 1976.
Le Nir, Michel et Jean-Louis Routhier. "Les echanges intercites de 
personnes". Elan-Rhone-Alpes. No 8, 1992.
Lever, Robert. "Train Travel". Europe (December 1991): 15-16.
"Lufthansa Croit en Lyon." Le Progres (6 Mai, 1991): p.7.
Lvon. Noeud de Communications Europeen. Lyon: L.E.T., Mars 1989.
"Lyon-Ville Europeenne." Le Monde (28 Fevrier, 1975).
Masser, I., and P. Foley. "Delphi Revisited: Expert opinion in Urban 
Analysis." Urban Studies 24 (1987): 217-255.
Mazataud, Pierre. "Brain Drain: D'ou Viennent les Ingenieurs et 
Cadres Superieurs Travaillant en Rhone-Alpes." Elan Rhone- 
Alpes No. 1 (1990): 2.
McCarthy, Patrick, ed. The French Socialists in Power. 1981-1986. 
New York: Greenwood Press, 1987
McDonald, J.R. The European Scene: A Geographic Perspective. 
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1992.
311
Meny, Yves. "Decentralisation in Socialist France: The Policy of 
Pragmatism." West European Politics Vol. VII,I (January 
1984): 65-79.
Michelmann, Hans J., and Panayotis Soldatos. Federalism and
International Relations: The Role of Subnational Units. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1990.
Michelot, Jean-Louis. "Les conflits pour l'amenagement de
l’espace au confluent Ain-Rhone." Annales de Geographie 555 
(Septembre et Octobre 1990): 513-530.
Mingret, Paul. "Chances et difficultes pour les grandes metropoles du 
sud europeen: Geographie comparee de Milan, Barcelone, et 
Lyon." Bulletin de la Societe Geographique de Liege 26 (1990): 
25-32.
Monnier, Alain. La Population de la France: Mutations et 
Perspectives. Paris: Messidor/Editions Sociales, 1990.
Noin, Daniel. L'Espace Francais. Paris: Iibrairie Armand Colin, 1976.
Norcliffe, G. From Fordism to Flexible Production in the Technopole 
of Gerland. Lvon. Paper presented at the IBG conference, 
January 1992.
Ogden, P.E. "Counterurbanization in France: The 1982 Population 
Census." Geography 70 (1985): 24-35.
Ogden, P.E., and P. White, eds. Migrants in Modem France.
London: Unwin-Hyman, 1989.
Paterson, K. "Lyon's New City Centre." Town and Country 
Planning 46 (1978): 357-360.
Picasso, Alain. Lyon, place financiere de proximite. Analyse recent de 
sa bourse aux valeurs. Lyon: Memoire de Maitrise de 
Geographie, Lyon III, 1988.
312
Pinchemel, P. France: A Geographical. Social and Economic
Survey. Translated by D. Elkins. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986.
Pinder, David. Regional Economic Development Policy: Theory and 
Practice in the European Community. London: George Allen 
and Unwin, 1983.
Plassard, Francois. Elements de Svnthese sur le Sud-Est. Lyon:
L.E.T., 1991.
________ "Le Train a Grand Vitesse: Trafic, Activites et Centralite."
Cahiers Economiques de Bretagne. No. 3 (1989).
Pumain, Denise et Therese Saint-Julien. Atlas des Villes de 
France. Paris-Montpellier: RECLUS - La Documentation 
Frangaise, 1989.
 ________"Evolving Structure of the French Urban System." Urban
Geography 5 (1984): 326-336.
Region Urbaine de Lyon: Reperes et Tendances Economiques. Lyon: 
Agence d'Urbanisme - Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie de 
Lyon, Fevrier, 1991.
Rhone-Alpes en 1991. Points d’appui pour l'economie Rhone-Alpes. 
No 66, INSEE Rhone-Alpes, Juin, 1992.
Richardot, Jean-Pierre. Rhone-Alpes: Clef pour l'Europe. Paris: 
Robert Laffont, 1971.
Rodger, Ian. "Co-operation is the Key", Financial Times Survey of the 
Leman Region. The Financial Times. October 22, 1992.
Romus, P. L'Europe Regionale. Collection Europe, editions Labor, 
Bruxelles, 1991.
313
Ross, George, Stanley Hoffmann and Sylvia Malzacher, eds. The 
Mitterrand Experiment. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987.
Saint-Julien, Therese. Croissance Industrielle et Svsteme 
Urbain. Paris: Economica, 1982.
Scargill, Ian. "Local Government - the French three-tier experience.” 
Town and Country Planning. February, 1994: 61-63.
Schmitt, Dominique, ed. La Region a Pheure de la Decentralisation. 
Paris: La Documentation Frangaise Notes et Etudes No. 4772,
1984.
Schuler, M., et M. Bassand. La Suisse. Une Metropole Mondiale? 
Lausanne: EPFL-IREC, 1985.
Soldatos, P. La Nouvelle Generation des Villes Internationales dans 
un Contexte Euratlantique: Cadre d'Analyse. Montreal: 
Document Roneote, 1987.
_______ "Treize criteres pour une ville Internationale." in
Dommergues, Pierre et Nanon Gerdin (eds.) Les strategies 
intemationale des Metropoles Regionales." Groupe Ten. Paris: 
Syros, 1989.
Soja, Edward W. Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space 
in Critical Social Theory. London: Verso, 1989.
Tableaux de l'Economie Francaise. edition 1990. Paris: INSEE,
1990.
Tableaux de rEconomie Francaise. edition 1992-93. Paris: INSEE,
1992.
Tableaux de rEconomie Rhone-Alpes. edition 1989. Lyon: 
INSEE - OERA, 1989.
314
Taylor, PJ. "A Theory and Practice of Regions: The Case of 
Europe." Environment and Planning 9 (1991): 183-195.
Tenzer, Nicolas. La Region en Quete d'Avenir: Competences et
Movens. Paris: La Documentation Frangaise Notes et Etudes 
No 4816, 1986.
Tesse, P.Y. Lyon Ville Internationale: Reflexions et Premieres 
Propositions. Lyon: ADERLY, 1983.
Thompson, Ian B. "A new kind of location decision - where to build 
high-speed railway stations: the French case." Scottish 
Geographical Magazine. September, 1993.
Thompson, Ian B. Modem France. London: Butterworths, 1970.
Todd, Emmanuel. La Nouvelle France. Paris: Seuil, 1988.
Tuppen, John N. Chirac's France. 1986-88: Contemporary Issues 
in French Society. New York: St Martin's Press, 1991.
________ "Contempory Urban Issues in France: The Problem
Suburbs." Contemporary French Civilization Vol. 15 No.2 
(Summer 1991): 287.
________ "Core Periphery in Metropolitan Development and
Planning: Socio-Economic Change in Lyon since 1960." 
Geoforum 17 (1986): 1-37.
________ France: An Industrial Geography. Folkstone: Dawson &
Sons Ltd., 1980.
________ "France's Train a Grande Vitesse: Its Development and
Implications." Geography 343-344.
________ France Under Recession 1981-86. Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1988.
315
_________ Lvon: Patterns and Problems of Socio-Economic
Develpoment in the Post War Period. Salford: University of 
Salford, Department of Geography Comparative Study of 
Conurbations Project Working Paper No. 4, May 1984.
________ . Studies in Industrial Geography: France. Folkstone,
Dawson, 1980.
"Villes et Regions au Rendez-Vous de l'Europe." Population & 
Societes No. 257. Paris: L'Institut National d'Etudes 
Demographiques, Mai 1991.
White, Paul. The West European City. London: Longman, 1984.
La zone frontaliere rhonalpine d'un recensement a l'autre. INSEE 
Rhone-Alpes #EB/OD 91078, 1992.
QUESTIONNAIRE - LYON EUROCITE
1. Residez vous en perm anence: 
a Lyon -
en Rhone-Alpes - 
au tre  (precisez)
2. Pourquoi avez-vous choisi l'Universite de Lyon II?
3. Toutes choses etant egales (salarie, satisfaction dans votre 
travail etc.) envisageriez-vous de travailler a  Lyon?
4. Quelle im portance attachez-vous a l'in tegration  europeenne?
a. en terms de carriere:
beaucoup un peu aucune
b. en principe:
beaucoup un peu aucune
5. Citez les villes de France qui, selon vous, se son t pas loin 
d 'a tte ind re  le status d ’Eurocite (sauf Paris).
1.
j .
6. Citez des villes de l'Europe de l'Ouest que vous estimez etre des 
Eurocites ( sauf ies capitales nationales).
1.
2 .
3.
7. Quelles infrastructures (transport, financieres, culturelles) 
pensez-vous que Lyon possede a une echelle europeenne?
8. Quelle est, selon vous, la principale faiblesse de Lyon lorsau 'elle 
aspire au sta tu t d'Eurocite?
9. Lyon possede-t-elle des institu tions a lTechelle europeenne? 
Precisez.
10. Pensez-vous que Geneve se place avant Lyon en ta n t qu'Eurocite? 
Pourquoi?
}
I
I
I
11. Considerez-vous Grenoble comme une ville rivale ou 
com plem entaire de Lyon?
12. Etes-vous au couran t de la politique des "Quatre Moteurs"? 
Expliquez.
13. Considerez-vous que le TGV a am eiiore le s ta tu t de Lyon en tan t 
qu'Eurocite ou renforce la dependance de Lyon vis-a-vis de 
Paris?
14. Pouvez-vous nom m er un M embre du Parlem ent Europeen p o u r 
Lyon?
15. Quels aspects de “‘im age” de Lyon vous semble a ttrayan te  a une 
echelle europeenne?
16. Quels aspects de ‘T im age” de Lyon considerez-vous comme 
negatifs a une echelle europeenne?
17. Selon vous, est il im portan t que Lyon aspire au s ta tu t d ’Eurocite?
tres un peu pas du  tou t
18. Toutes raisons personnelles mises a part (famille, etc.) quelle 
serait p o u r vous la principale raison de ne pas travailler a  Lyon?
19. Citez 2 societes in tem ationales/m uld -nadonales im plantees a 
Lyon.
1.
20. Pensez-vous que Lyon soit:
1. une Eurocite deja en existence.
2. une Eurocite en puissance.
3. une ville pu rem en t francaise.
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